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Abstract  
 
This thesis presents an alternative conceptual framework with which to examine the 
emergence and evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. The proliferation of Islamist 
movements in the Middle East has stimulated scholarly inquiry that seeks to identify 
and explain episodes of collective action in Muslim societies. Addressing the 
phenomenon of mobilisation from the respective perspectives of Islamic studies, 
Area studies or social movement theory (SMT), pre-existing literature remains 
predominantly characterised by intra-disciplinary dualisms and limited inter-
disciplinary engagement. In this context, not only is there a deficiency of consistency 
concerning the relative influence of agency/structure and culture/ideology in 
collective action, but Hizbullah, arguably the most effective manifestation of 
movement mobilisation in the Middle East, is also conceptually under-explored. This 
research aims to transform these prevailing dichotomies into permanent dialectics by 
adopting the epistemological and methodological insights developed in Pierre 
Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’ as conceptual interlocutors to problematise 
conventional assumptions in traditional Islamic studies and SMT, to propose a 
revised Bourdieu-SMT approach for illustrating collective action and to prioritise the 
application of this holistic lens for assessing the multi-faceted dimensions of 
Hizbullah’s advancement in Lebanon. Equipped with these analytical tools, this 
thesis intends to initiate and contribute to an inter-disciplinary discussion on 
collective action by arguing that a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation can assist in 
explaining the mutually constituted process by which Hizbullah strategically 
inculcates dispositions and perceptions amongst agents within the parameters of 
specific fields in Lebanon while concurrently propagating cohesive discourses and 
practices with the objective of managing the harmonisation of its relational positions 
across fields that are inherently constituted by differentiated logics. Embedded within 
a system that internally mitigates against the exclusive exercise of symbolic power, 
Hizbullah is entrenched in a tautological struggle for opportunities that enable it to 
balance and enhance the legitimate status of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover page contains a graphic commemorating the 2013 anniversary of Hizbullah’s ‘Three Leading Martyrs’. The 
image shows Imad Mugniyeh (d. 2008), Shaykh Abbas Moussawi (d. 1992) and Shaykh Ragheb Harb (d. 1984) with 
the phrase ‘On the Road to Palestine’ symbolically sprawled in blood at the bottom (picture obtained from Hizbullah’s 
Al-Moqawama website).  
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Note on Transliteration  
 
While acknowledging other transliterations, such as Hezbollah, Hizballah, Hizb ‘Allah, 
Hizbollah and Hizbu’llah, this thesis has applied the spelling Hizbullah as outlined in 
the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies’ Word List.  Accordingly, existing 
and accepted English translations are adopted for Arabic individuals, locations and 
terms. In specific instances, transliterations included in the text reflect their original 
usage in work attributed to the cited or referenced author.        
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Glossary of Selected Bourdieusian Terms   
 
 
Allodoxia  The misjudgement, misinterpretation or misperception of an 
agent(s) practice by falsely construing its (their) position within 
the structured parameters of legitimate action.    
 
Collusio A group of agents converging towards collective dispositions 
and perceptions based on position and practice.  
 
Cultural Capital A field resource for accumulation and deployment derived from 
intellectual and educational qualifications as well as 
encompassing recognised knowledge, experience and 
charisma. 
 
Doxa The inherent law(s) historically enshrined and institutionalised 
within the construction, constitution and logic of a field.   
 
Economic Capital A field resource for accumulation and deployment derived from 
quantifiable, material and tangible commodities of exchange.    
 
Field  The dynamic, semi-autonomous network or configuration of 
objective relations between positions that provides the 
structured rules, principles and characteristics for legitimate 
practice.  
 
Field Homology The relational correlation of characteristics, compositions and 
commonalities that enable the ‘horizontal’ conversion and 
transference of capital from one field to another.   
 
Habitus An inscribed system of durable dispositions and perceptions 
that functions as a symbolic template in generating or 
regulating the practical activities of social agents within a field.  
 
Heterodoxy The predilection and purpose of an agent(s) to enhance their 
position from the dominated sectors of the field, revise the 
underlying principles of doxa and promote alternative 
interpretations of legitimate practice. 
 
Hysteresis A disruptive event that causes a structural lag or rupture 
whereby the perceptions and dispositions of agents become 
separated from the underlying structured rules and dynamics 
of the field.     
 
Illusio A prerequisite investment by each agent that encompasses a 
fundamental and inherent belief in the interest, value and 
stakes of participating in a field.    
 
Orthodoxy The predilection and purpose of an agent(s) to preserve or 
enhance their position within the dominant sector of the field by 
propagating legitimate practice within the parameters of the 
prevailing doxa.  
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Social Capital A field resource for accumulation and deployment representing 
an agent’s or group’s access to formal or informal social 
relationships, networks, institutions, organisations, 
associations or partnerships. 
 
Symbolic Capital A field resource for accumulation and deployment whereby an 
agent’s or group’s pre-existing currencies of economic, cultural 
and social capital are intangibly recognised as legitimate in 
exercising influence and authority over practice.    
 
Symbolic Power  A status in which an agent’s or a group’s values of capital are 
elevated to the extent of exerting and commanding exclusive, 
unilateral and unequivocal control over legitimate discourses 
and practices within a field.    
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‘…And we, Hizbullah…grew up in the Resistance project. We were small boys 
and youth. On this path we matured and grew up and we were nurtured and 
developed on the confrontation with the Israeli enemy and the defence of this 
ummah, the defence of Palestine, Jerusalem and its sanctities, and the 
defence of Lebanon and its people, its dignity and sovereignty. It is an issue 
which became mixed with our flesh, blood and veins, and we inherited it from 
our fathers and grandfathers, and we passed it down to our children and our 
grandchildren, and on this path we offered thousands of martyrs, and the 
finest of martyrs, from Sayyid Abbas [Moussawi], to Shaykh Ragheb [Harb], to 
Hajj Imad [Mugniyeh]. We offered our dear ones as martyrs, and for this 
reason, I conclude on Quds Day by telling the whole world: We, Hizbullah, will 
also hold our responsibilities to the extent that we have responsibilities, and 
we, Hizbullah, the Islamic, Shi’i, Imamate, Twelver Party, we will never 
abandon Palestine, we will never abandon Jerusalem, we will never abandon 
the Palestinian people, we will never abandon the sanctities of this ummah. 
May God have mercy on our Imam Khomeini, may God grant you all victory, 
and peace be upon you and His mercy and blessings…   
 
- Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, on Al-Quds Day in Beirut, 2 
August 2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
 Introduction 
Hizbullah in Lebanon 
 
‘If I were Iran – a crazed fanatic, I’d say let’s get a little fissile material to Hezbollah, have them carry it to 
Chicago, and then if anything goes wrong, or America starts acting up, we’ll just say, “Guess what? 
Unless you stand down, why, we’re going to let off a dirty bomb”’. 
- Mitt Romney, former Republican Presidential nominee, September 2012.  
 
In Evelyn Waugh’s Decline and Fall (1973: 208-209), Otto Silenus presumes to have 
solved the meaning of life. Explaining his epiphany by juxtaposing himself to Paul 
Pennyfeather, the novel’s protagonist, Silenus compares life to a rapidly rotating 
wheel. Akin to the heart of a tornado, tranquillity from the chaos of the storm awaits 
those who reach its core. Once aspiring actors have propelled themselves onto the 
wheel, the objective is to conjure and expend the energy required to reach the 
centre. However, not everyone has the capability to embark upon this exercise. 
Depending on one’s inscribed dispositions, ‘some just enjoy scrambling on and off; 
others cling on by dear life’ while a fraction decide not to participate at all. 
Revealingly, ‘people get hold of ideas about life, and that makes them think they’ve 
got to join in the game, even if they don’t enjoy it’. In sum, Silenus concludes that the 
real distinction in life is the stratification between people who are static and those 
who are dynamic.  
 
This thesis aims to conceptualise the complexity of this evolutionary transition 
through the lens of social movements. By examining the relational practices behind 
the inception and mobilisation of prospective change, the objective is to assess how 
organised eruptions of collective action manage the consistency of their narrative 
and position while concurrently adapting to mitigate against endogenous and 
exogenous threats. In this context, where the dynamic fervour of innovative 
heterodoxy is subsumed by the static allure of generative orthodoxy, the ultimate 
question becomes whether progress has been achieved. As George Orwell 
remarked: ‘to exchange one orthodoxy for another is not necessarily an advance. 
The enemy is the gramophone mind, whether or not one agrees with the record that 
is being played at the moment’ (Davison, 2001: 313).  
 
In order to investigate these theoretical questions, this thesis will examine the 
sustained ascension of arguably the most influential exemplar of collective action in 
the Middle East. Hizbullah, or the ‘Party of God’, initially emerged in 1982 on the 
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peripheries of the Lebanese civil war as the progeny of the Iranian Revolution, 
conceived to conduct the ‘Islamic Resistance’ against Israeli occupation. By its own 
admission, Hizbullah’s meteoric rise has become reminiscent of ‘the volcano that 
exploded’ (Jorisch, 2004: 75, 83). From a U.S. perspective, this ‘volcano’ was 
responsible for the targeting of Western citizens and military targets during the 
Lebanese civil war. Therefore, Hizbullah is categorised as a ‘terrorist organisation’, a 
proxy of Iran intent on the destruction of Israel and committed to undermining U.S. 
interests. As exemplified by Mitt Romney’s statement, and citing Hizbullah’s military 
involvement in the Syrian uprising, its ostensible links to drug trafficking in South 
America, its purported illegal fundraising schemes in North America and the alleged 
role of its Islamic Resistance in the assassination of Jewish citizens and Israeli 
officials from Bulgaria to Thailand, this linear, and largely decontextualised 
correlation of causation continues to portray Hizbullah in international public 
discourse as an Iranian strategic asset rather than a legitimate Lebanese actor. 
 
Consequently, employing an Aristotelian logic of analysis, the origin, form, matter 
and purpose of Hizbullah becomes reduced to the simplicity of immutability. 
Meanwhile, although the majority of states within the European Union justify their 
indirect diplomatic engagement with Hizbullah by differentiating between its political 
representatives within Lebanese state institutions and the Islamic Resistance, this 
separation misconstrues the relational homology of Hizbullah’s mutually constituted 
parts. As frequently reiterated by Hizbullah’s al-majlis al-shura (‘advisory council’), 
there is no distinction between the elements of its Resistance. Previously, while 
claiming responsibility for suicide bombings, kidnappings and military operations 
against Israeli soldiers in the vicinity of Lebanon, Hizbullah has adamantly denied 
participating in international ‘terrorist’ activities. Either the leadership is disingenuous 
by clandestinely managing an international organ within the Islamic Resistance that 
risks destabilising its interests in Lebanon or the leadership is authentic in its 
declarations, a position that challenges the myth of Hizbullah’s monolithic dominance 
by insinuating the existence of another intricate dimension to the already multi-
layered relationship between the Shi’i in Iran and Lebanon. While this thesis will not 
delve into speculation by attempting to reconcile Hizbullah’s domestic and 
international practices, this preliminary discussion, which serves to emphasise 
idiosyncrasies in the predominant perception of Hizbullah in the West, provides an 
insight into the complexity of the Party that reverts the epistemological priority of 
explaining the Resistance back to its roots in Lebanon.   
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Hizbullah did not emerge or evolve in a vacuum but it has been cultivated and 
consolidated within the dynamics of Lebanon. As an organisation, Hizbullah is 
involved in a diverse multitude of simultaneous activities. Hizbullah not only presides 
over a sophisticated network of social services specialising in construction, education 
and healthcare, but it also offers welfare programmes investing in career 
development initiatives that empower the Shi’i community. Next to the state, 
Hizbullah is the biggest employer in Lebanon, supporting an estimated 35,000 
families with salaries, a statistic that has earned it the reputation of attempting to 
establish a ‘state within a state’ (Sharara, 2006). Furthermore, Hizbullah has a 
growing portfolio in private ventures, such as urban planning, real estate, local 
commerce as well as the leisure and entertainment sectors.  
 
Concurrently, through the Jihad Council of the majlis al-shura, Hizbullah commands 
the Islamic Resistance, a military unit that has become a source of pride within and 
beyond the Shi’i community in Lebanon. Due to its successful military campaigns 
against Israel, a reputation that has only been enhanced through its support of 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, even Israeli Brigadier General Guy Zur recognised that 
Hizbullah is ‘the greatest guerrilla group in the world’ (Hirst, 2010: 350). As a result of 
this social and military Resistance, Hizbullah’s Loyalty to Resistance Bloc figures as 
one of the largest political forces in the 128-member, democratically elected 
Lebanese parliament while the Party of God is also the figurehead of the 
Shi’i/Christian 8 March Alliance. These representatives, donning suits as opposed to 
traditional Shi’i attire, are mostly educated and conversant in Western languages and 
philosophy.   
 
Principally, in Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah boasts a charismatic leader 
venerated by his supporters and respected by his adversaries. For the people who 
listen abidingly to his speeches and pledge unwavering allegiance to ‘Al-Sayyid’, 
Nasrallah is the embodiment of inspiration whose integrity and fortitude evoke the 
virtues of the Twelve infallible Shi’i Imams. Rather than relying on the limitations of a 
unified frame, Hizbullah deploys a myriad of positions, the cohesion of which is 
delicately welded together through a holistic combination of Shi’i activism, Lebanese 
particularism, Arab Nationalism, Islamic universalism, anti-Zionism and anti-
Imperialism. Al-Manar (‘the Lighthouse’), Hizbullah’s primary media organ for 
disseminating its Resistance narrative, is not only one of the most watched news 
channels in the Arab World, but the broadcaster also sponsors Al-‘Ahd, a Beirut-
based football team. 
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These encompassing practices have exceeded conventional mobilisation 
classifications. As a result of its existence in a variety of operational spheres and the 
diversification of its discursive frames, Hizbullah symbolises a community-based 
activist association, an Islamist group, a social movement, a non-governmental 
organisation, a humanitarian provider, a non-state actor, a political party, a Shi’i 
militia, a national Resistance Army and a regional ‘axis’ alliance member. The 
combination of Hizbullah’s multi-dimensional approach, as well as its highly 
disciplined disposition, has contributed to contradictory conclusions regarding its 
domestic and regional strategies. This seemingly ambiguous posturing, which is 
intentionally propagated by Hizbullah, allows the organisation to occupy a flexible 
space from which it can pre-emptively position itself to conceal, contain or confront 
perceived threats. While Hizbullah may harbour aspirations for symbolic power, a 
status in which its practices and discourses are unilaterally and unequivocally 
recognised as legitimate, the historical composition of Lebanon’s convoluted and 
competitive structures prohibits the pursuit of this agenda. Therefore, Hizbullah must 
interpret power through the lens of preserving its authoritative placement and 
presence within the Shi’i community.  
 
The exponential proliferation of literature in English on Hizbullah has accelerated in 
direct correlation to the movement’s enhanced public profile in Lebanon. Initially, 
considering the relatively secretive inception and mobilisation of Hizbullah on the 
peripheries of a protracted civil war, as well as the scant resources available for 
accessing information on the subject, attempts to describe or explain the Hizbullah 
phenomenon amongst the Shi’i community in the 1980s were limited to scholarly 
articles that sought to place Hizbullah within the context of Lebanon. As epitomised 
by Shapira (1988), Deeb (1988), Piscatori (1989) and As’ad (1991), these preliminary 
explorations into Hizbullah briefly examined the root causes of the movement’s 
manifestation in Lebanon, the ideological precepts guiding the underlying tenets of 
the Islamic Resistance, the internal composition, structure and dynamics of the 
movement, the influence of regional interests on its conception and nascent 
examples of the endeavours by Hizbullah to reconcile the principles of the Islamic 
Resistance with its practice in Lebanon.      
 
Following the end of a 15-year civil war, Lebanon experienced a period of diminished 
attention as the tumultuous epoch of prolonged conflict transformed into a phase of 
consensus politics and state rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the politicisation of 
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Hizbullah in 1992 created three separate yet inter-related trends in the development 
of the canon on the Islamic Resistance. Firstly, academics such as Hamzeh (1993), 
Norton (1998; 1999) and Ranstorp (1998) steered their analysis away from 
Hizbullah’s alleged activities during the civil war to concentrate on contemporary 
issues in producing journal articles assessing the motivations and challenges 
confronted by the movement in managing the ‘Lebanonisation’ process, namely the 
balanced transition between ideological dispositions and political pragmatism. 
Secondly, as demonstrated by the work of Harik (1994; 1996), researchers also 
strived to discover the scale, scope and substance of Hizbullah’s popular support 
within the Shi’i community through the lens of its extensive and expansive provision 
of social services. Thirdly, scholars including Picard (1993), Kramer (1993), Wege 
(1994) and Hamzeh (1997) utilised the opportunity presented by Hizbullah’s post-civil 
war sustainability and survival in Lebanon to revisit and expose the ideological 
origins, organisational structure and violent practices of the Shi’i movement 
throughout the 1980s.  
 
In the context of the latter, the first comprehensive books dealing specifically with 
Hizbullah were released that embodied the divergent interpretations of the Islamic 
Resistance, particularly in relation to the asymmetric use of violence and the hostage 
crisis. Whereas Ranstorp (1997: 108) depicted Hizbullah as ‘undisputably 
responsible’ for attacks on Western targets in Lebanon on account of its purportedly 
centralised and sophisticated command structure, its converging ideological and 
political interests with Iran as well as its overlapping networks with the Islamic Jihad 
Organisation, Jaber (1997) argued that Hizbullah, while susceptible to the overtures 
of its regional patrons, represented an embryonic coterie of groups devoid of the 
cogent cohesion or professionalism required to systematically orchestrate the 
meticulously planned and coordinated operations perpetrated by an Islamic Jihad 
Organisation functioning independently and diffusely in the space between Iran and 
Hizbullah.      
 
The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, widely attributed to the successful 
military operations of the Islamic Resistance, and the predominant global discourse 
on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., ushered in a new phase of detailed 
literature aiming to augment understandings regarding the internal dynamics and 
external objectives of Hizbullah. Approaching Hizbullah from a position of 
retrospective hindsight, while benefiting from increased access to sources and 
information on the movement after almost a decade of politicised activity, a sequence 
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of studies constructed alternative perspectives and holistic frameworks for explaining 
the relative juxtaposition, balance and influence of Hizbullah’s ideological principles 
in relation to its political practice. Deprived of Israeli occupation as the justification for 
the Islamic Resistance, the purpose of this work was to ascertain whether the 
movement was stringently adhering to and prioritising its foundational mantra or 
undergoing a process of negotiated transition and substantive transformation.  
 
Deviating from conventional narratives that addressed Hizbullah’s evolution either by 
propagating its fixed ideological rigidity or attesting to its instrumentalised ideological 
compromises amidst political developments, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) provided a 
dialectical model. Delving into the roots causes of the movement’s emergence in 
Lebanon, Saad-Ghorayeb replaced a chronological analysis of Hizbullah’s evolution 
with a thematic examination seeking to investigate the application of the movement’s 
core ideological principles in practice, especially the obedience to an Islamic State, 
the concept of wilayat al-faqih and Resistance against Israel, to conclude that 
Hizbullah’s actions were determined by simultaneously maintaining a balance of 
interests whereby the movement confined ‘its adaptation, and at times, embrace of 
reality to the political realm, whilst limiting its strategic goals to the intellectual realm’ 
(Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 187). Although positing that Hizbullah’s ideology remained 
consistent, by reducing its expression as the calculated result emanating between 
the intellectual and political spheres, Saad-Ghorayeb not only interpreted these fields 
as distinctly exclusive, but also endowed the organisation with the ability to 
independently direct its ideological discourse and practice. 
 
Grappling with the same causal links between ideology and politics, Hamzeh (2004: 
2) concurred with the consistent application of Hizbullah’s principles by postulating 
that the choice of behaviour depended on contextual circumstances which did not 
contradict the Party’s ideology. Designing a complex framework in which seizing 
power and establishing an Islamic order were the ultimate end goals, the means, 
contingent upon favourable or unfavourable operational opportunities subjectively 
derived and defined from crisis conditions, elicited commensurate responses from 
Hizbullah towards either militancy or pragmatism (Hamzeh, 2004: 80). In this 
convoluted schematic, not only were militancy and pragmatism interpreted as the 
only modes of action available to Hizbullah, but by assuming that the Party’s rigid 
command structure was both bureaucratically organised and beholden to Iranian 
interests, Hamzeh similarly portrayed the movement as a coherent decision-maker 
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with the strategic foresight to independently and cohesively identify opportunities and 
mitigate risks within its situational environment.  
 
Offering an insider’s account to Hizbullah, Shaykh Naim Qassem (2005), the Party’s 
Deputy Secretary General, authored a book for the purpose of broadcasting the 
movement’s ideological principles, internal organisation, community outreach and 
political priorities to the broader public. Acknowledging Hizbullah’s unwavering 
adherence to an Islamic State, jihad against Israel and wilayat al-faqih, Shaykh 
Qassem asserted that despite vigorous internal debate during the evolutionary 
process, Hizbullah’s stance had not altered as its ideological and political interests 
represented mutually compatible and convergent pillars as opposed to contradictory 
ones. Emphasising the complementarity of Hizbullah’s Resistance in terms of 
military, political and social activities that operated independently from Iran, Shaykh 
Qassam (2005: 262) outlined the sustainability of Hizbullah’s approach by stating 
that ‘if continuity is a function of a well-designed theoretical framework and 
programme, while the practical course is linked to popular outreach, then the 
existence of both of these assets to the Party should provide it with foundations for 
steadfast continuance’.  
 
While the development of literature on Hizbullah focused on assessing the prospect 
of transition through the negotiated balancing of the Party’s ideological and political 
interests rather than the movement’s transformation, Alagha (2006) chronologically 
examined the historical phases of Hizbullah’s integration into the Lebanese system to 
argue that the Party had gradually shifted the direction of its ideology. Dividing 
Hizbullah’s evolution from the primacy of its religious ideology (1978-1984/5) to the 
priority of its political ideology (1985-1990) before privileging its political programme 
(1991-2005), Alagha presented a linear narrative in contradistinction to his 
contemporaries. Perceiving Hizbullah’s Resistance identity as a strategic choice as 
opposed to a strategic obligation, Alagha (2006: 214-217) analysed that the 
politicisation of Hizbullah through the ‘Lebanonisation’ process had created 
instrumental ideological changes in the movement that diverged from its original 
principles. 
 
As these scholars concentrated on reviewing Hizbullah’s practices through the prism 
of reconciling its ideological and political interests, a sequence of post-2000 literature 
also contributed to this debate by exploring how the Party utilised its social and 
public services as a conduit for disseminating and inculcating its ideological as well 
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as its political interests. For Danawi (2002), Hizbullah capitalised on the 
marginalisation and socio-economic deprivation of the Shi’i community to inaugurate 
welfare institutions, especially the Shahid Foundation and Jihad al-Bina, which 
instrumentally acted as a means of structuring, organising and mobilising political 
support for the movement as it embarked upon a process of transition. Moreover, in 
the context of 9/11 and the global discourse on terrorism, Jorisch (2004) postulated 
that Al-Manar, Hizbullah’s official television mouthpiece, was strategically devised 
and deployed to justify, legitimise and reproduce the discourses and practices of the 
Islamic Resistance.  
 
Continuing on these themes, Harik (2005) elaborated on her previous work dealing 
with Hizbullah’s social services and the origins of the movement’s popular support 
within the Shi’i community in order to broaden the discussion beyond the rigid 
interplay between the Party’s religious doctrine and its political development. 
Framing Hizbullah’s dilemma as a conflated struggle between its Islamic Resistance 
against Israel and the U.S. fight against terrorism, Harik (2005) posited that Hizbullah 
cultivated and consolidated a comprehensive strategy that would complement and 
supplement its military position by investing in grassroots social initiatives aimed at 
sustaining popular support and transforming the Party away from negative 
designations pertaining to its radical ideology. Conversely, for Sharara (2006), the 
provision of Hizbullah’s social and public institutions were not to facilitate the 
movement’s transition or initiate change but to ensure the Party entrenched ‘a state 
within a state’, a parallel model for governance and organisation that would 
concurrently and consistently compromise the functionality of state structures in 
Lebanon. 
 
If the canon on the Islamic Resistance before 2006 was characterised by a small 
cadre of academics documenting and specialising on the intricacies of the 
movement’s ideological, political and social evolution in Lebanon, the eruption of the 
2006 July War and Hizbullah’s takeover of Beirut in May 2008 propelled the Islamic 
Resistance further onto the arena of global media, leading to the introduction and 
induction of new commentators, in addition to pre-existing experts, attempting to 
provide alternative perspectives and insights on the Hizbullah phenomenon in 
Lebanon. Using 2006 and 2008 as empirically observable episodes in which 
Hizbullah’s employment of military force intended to exact political concessions, 
these contributors each endeavoured to explain Hizbullah’s discourses and practices 
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from a variety of dimensions. Consequently, the field for studying Hizbullah 
broadened and diversified to encompass four discernible categories. 
 
Firstly, academics continued to address Hizbullah’s political/ideological nexus in a 
post-2006 environment. Testament to the growing status of the Islamic Resistance in 
global politics, Norton (2007a; 2007b) elaborated on the line of analysis developed in 
his previous work to publish a book briefly introducing and outlining the history of 
Hizbullah. Reiterating his assumption that Hizbullah’s activities were driven and 
determined primarily by practical interests, Norton (2007a: 35) stated that ‘political 
constraints and opportunities are the desiderata of political behaviour and ideology 
takes a back seat’ with the movement exemplifying ‘a sophisticated understanding of 
Lebanese politics’. Similarly, in order to appeal to a wider scholarly audience in the 
context of Hizbullah’s enhanced profile, Alagha (2011) released another book 
predicated on assessing the movement’s identity construction through the lens of a 
conceptual approach combining Resource Mobilisation Theory and Bourdieu’s notion 
of capital as interpreted by Manuel Castells. By chronologically evaluating Hizbullah’s 
efforts at identity formation, convergence and projection, Alagha (2011: 17, 178, 185) 
reasserted that the movement changed as circumstances changed while 
manipulating and transforming its religious ideology and resistance identity as its 
political position developed. Ultimately, Norton and Alagha viewed contemporary 
events as vindicating their former arguments regarding the Islamic Resistance.   
 
Meanwhile, a number of scholars also joined the discussion on analysing the role of 
Hizbullah in Lebanon. For Gunning (2007b: 183), the ideologically mutable 
constitution of Hizbullah demonstrated by the logic of political participation enabled 
the state to integrate and thereby potentially transform the organisation through 
institutional processes. Additionally, symptomatic of the academic requirement to 
conceptualise Hizbullah, Karagiannis (2009) applied a framing approach derived 
from Social Movement Theory (SMT) to explain how the movement strategically 
constructed, cultivated and consolidated a multitude of flexible and simultaneous 
narratives to resonate with its diverse target audiences. Delving deeper into the 
relational dynamics of framing on a micro-level, Malthaner (2011) developed a model 
to accentuate the importance of utilitarian social exchange, personal networks, 
communal solidarity and political mobilisation in shaping Hizbullah’s strategic 
discourses and practices. Conversely, although citing SMT models to illustrate 
collective action in Muslim societies, Azani (2011: 257) deviated from its conceptual 
precepts to devise and privilege a chronological, five-stage model of evolution in 
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which Hizbullah deliberately and disingenuously projected a politically pragmatic 
façade while harbouring aspirations informed by fixed ideological dispositions. Lastly, 
while not offering any innovative conceptual or contextual analysis, the chronological, 
three-phased assessment of Hizbullah conducted by Avon and Khatchadourian 
(2012) to elucidate the movement’s perpetual struggle between ideological principles 
and political interests epitomised the increasing academic intrigue surrounding the 
Islamic Resistance phenomenon in Lebanon. 
 
Secondly, alongside assessments focusing disproportionately on Hizbullah’s broader 
political and military strategies, a collection of scholars shifted the locus of enquiry 
exclusively towards the community-based activities of the Party within Shi’i 
constituencies. Augmenting research conducted on the importance of Hizbullah’s 
customised networks of aid and assistance in addressing deprivation and galvanising 
support, Harik (2006), Le Thomas (2010) and Bortolazzi (2011) continued to 
empirically examine the extensive scale and expansive scope of Hizbullah’s 
professional welfare institutions or ‘socialisation agencies’ in performing an Islamic 
obligation, empowering the Shi’i community, instilling harmonised identities and 
constructing compliance mechanisms of systemic support. Moreover, particularly 
following the destruction caused by the 2006 War between Hizbullah and Israel, a 
group of academics developed the analysis beyond Hizbullah’s organisation of social 
services to adopt a nuanced methodological approach that investigated the Party’s 
role in directly controlling religiosity and spatiality for the purpose of producing and 
reproducing beliefs and practices that enshrined a homogenous Resistance society 
within a delicately designed and delineated Islamic milieu amongst the Shi’i in 
Lebanon.  
 
Initially, and in response to prevalent Western assumptions, Deeb (2006a) wrote that 
Shi’i communities in Lebanon were undergoing ‘an enchanted modern’. This period 
of material and spiritual progress, in which pious Muslims were constantly engaged 
in an authenticating process of ‘defining, reinforcing, and prioritising certain religious 
discourses and practices’, sought to inscribe dispositions and perceptions towards 
collective and normative understandings of action (2006a: 128, 228). Consequently, 
applying this approach explicitly to Hizbullah’s efforts in privately and publicly 
instilling, inculcating and institutionalising its holistic Resistance narrative within Shi’i 
communities, Deeb (2006b; 2008) not only deconstructed the dynamics of dahiyeh, 
Hizbullah’s stronghold in southern Beirut, but also demonstrated how the movement 
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used cultural production, including the media, commemorative sites and ritual events, 
to reconstitute Lebanese history and implant a Resistance identity in memory. 
 
Elaborating on these observations, Deeb and Harb (2007; 2011; 2012) collaborated 
to assess how Hizbullah adapted to the growing expectations of an increasingly 
conscious youth demographic by investing in religiously-sanctioned leisure and 
entertainment sectors, how Hizbullah created physical and symbolic spaces, such as 
Khiam and Mleeta, to maintain and sustain the cultural legitimacy of the Resistance 
society amongst the Islamic milieu and how Hizbullah struggled to manage and 
mitigate against fissures emerging within its Resistance communities on account of 
political developments. A sub-theme of this literature also specifically examined 
Hizbullah’s influence in reconstructing, reshaping and rebranding areas under its 
jurisdiction, especially capitalising on the opportunities presented by the damage 
inflicted during the 2006 Israeli offensive on south Beirut. Exemplified by Hizbullah’s 
post-2006 remodelling of dahiyeh and Bint Jubayl, Al-Harithy (2010), Alamuddin 
(2010), Harb and Fawaz (2010) and Harb (2011) asserted that the movement’s 
architectural logic of organising territory aimed to embed religious symbolisations and 
territorial markings into the fabric of space thereby enabling the transformation of 
material assets into symbolic meanings and ensuring the dialectic reproduction of a 
collective Shi’i consciousness, identity and practice.  
 
Thirdly, as Hizbullah became progressively more established at navigating around 
the obstacles of Lebanese politics, more sophisticated in executing military 
campaigns against Israel, more consolidated within the Shi’i community and more 
integrated as a pivotal actor in the regional Resistance Axis, prominent U.S. think-
tanks and risk consultants specialising on global terrorism and national security 
entered the Hizbullah oeuvre of literature by providing policy research, analysis and 
recommendations for government decision-makers in addressing the threat of the 
Islamic Resistance. Composing their work to inform and influence foreign policy in 
the realm of political interests, these commentators formulated their assessments by 
disproportionately invoking Hizbullah’s regional and global activities.  
 
As demonstrated by the book edited by Carusso (2011), the overall objective of the 
contributors was to brief the U.S. Congress on Hizbullah’s military capacities and 
capabilities, its sources of revenue and financial assets, the nature of its relationship 
with Iran, Syria and Hamas as well as examples of alleged operations conducted by 
the Islamic Resistance abroad. Similarly, the comparative study of Hamas and 
 24
Hizbullah published by Gleis and Berti (2012) purported to present a nuanced 
analysis beyond ‘terrorist’ reductionism for the purpose of enhancing military and 
policy responses to these groups. However, this book, riddled with contextual errors, 
portrayed a Hizbullah, predominantly governed by its security apparatus, that 
seemingly de-prioritised its role in Lebanon to pursue a global, Iranian-led and anti-
imperialist Resistance agenda involving illegal fundraising and violent operations. 
More recently, Levitt (2013; 2014) has become the main mouthpiece of a trend within 
U.S. think-tanks in which Hizbullah and the Islamic Resistance are decontextualised 
in Lebanon but globally conflated as part of a clandestine, coherent and cohesive 
transnational network tasked with targeting Israeli, Jewish and U.S. interests abroad. 
 
In response to the dominant perspective of U.S. and Israeli think-tanks, a number of 
commentators rebutted this approach by countering the disproportionate discourse 
on national security and global terrorism with a revised analysis that explored the 
philosophy and ideology behind Hizbullah’s internal decision-making processes in 
Lebanon. In an attempt to explain the causes and consequences of Hizbullah’s 
involvement in the 2006 War with Israel, Saad-Ghorayeb (2006a; 2006b; 2007) not 
only questioned assumptions either insisting on Hizbullah’s execution of a rationally 
calculated opportunity, Hizbullah’s subservience to Iranian and/or Syrian directives in 
conflict or Western-centric definitions of power and victory, but she also illustrated 
the logic determining the movement’s interpretation of UN Resolution 1701 as well as 
its role in withdrawing from the political process and the mobilisation of organised 
protests against prevailing government practices in Lebanon following the 2006 War. 
Similarly, Crooke and Perry (2006) produced a three-part piece intricately examining 
how Hizbullah’s holistic strategic framework, operationalised by its complementary 
functions, defeated Israel in terms of its intelligence apparatus, its military tactics and 
its political nous. Moreover, Crooke (2009: 177-191) posited that by observing and 
obscuring Hizbullah solely through Western political thought as the antithesis of 
Israel and the U.S., policymakers failed to comprehend how the movement 
entrenched an encompassing and empowered ‘culture of resistance’.                 
 
Fourthly, considering the elevated global status of an introverted and insulated 
movement such as the Islamic Resistance, investigative journalists also sought to 
uncover information on Hizbullah. Prior to 2006, Hizbullah featured frequently as the 
lead subject in lengthy articles of Western press outlets, in particular the pieces by 
Goldberg (2002) and Shatz (2004). However, not only did these accounts 
superficially address the movement’s strategies and activities, but they also 
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reductively interpreted Hizbullah primarily through the prism of a post-9/11 discourse 
on global terrorism. Following Hizbullah’s 2006 War with Israel and the movement’s 
subsequent political rise in Lebanon, journalists endeavoured to provide the public 
with an explanation into the motivations, structure and interests of the Islamic 
Resistance. While some seasoned journalists, such as Blanford (2006), Hirst (2010) 
and Young (2010), preferred to afford Hizbullah a supporting role of secondary 
attention in their books on Lebanon, others claimed to concentrate solely on the 
Party of God. Nevertheless, these studies vary significantly in the definition of their 
focus, the structure of their work, the quality of their research and the vigour of their 
analysis. 
 
Testament to the strength of the Hizbullah brand in global media, MacFarquhar 
(2009) as well as Dekker and Medearis (2010) ironically used the movement’s name 
in the title of their respective books. Despite this labelling, the former only included a 
brief commentary on Hizbullah in the context of a chapter on Lebanon while the latter 
conducted a few largely apolitical interviews with prominent Shi’i figures in Lebanon. 
Additionally, established U.S. reporters, including Cambanis (2010) and Totten 
(2011), also contributed publications dealing specifically with Hizbullah. Based on 
informant interviews and anecdotal evidence, Cambanis (2010: 15-16) provided a 
commendable analysis detailing the internal contradictions and drivers behind the 
public endorsement of a movement that is ‘not quite a state, but much more than a 
political party; not quite an army, but much more than a terrorist network; not yet a 
full-fledged transnational movement, but much more than a Lebanese faction’. 
Alternatively, Totten (2011), who intended to assess the rise of Hizbullah, produced a 
subjective, loosely structured account of the movement possessing preconceived 
generalisations devoid of robust examination. The two most informative journalistic 
works on Hizbullah were released by three writers with considerable experience 
covering the Islamic Resistance. While Harel and Issacharoff (2008), two veteran 
Israeli journalists, compiled a comprehensive book on the causes, contexts and 
consequences of the 2006 Hizbullah-Israel War, Blanford (2011) amalgamated two 
decades of expertise on Hizbullah to author an insightful investigation into the 
political, social and military activities as well as aims of the Islamic Resistance in 
Lebanon spanning over thirty years.    
 
Primarily, rather than employ theoretical models without problematising their 
application, this research seeks to review and question whether mainstream SMT is 
able to effectively assess the complex, multi-dimensional and sustained mobilisation 
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of Hizbullah in Lebanon. By extension, the conceptual contribution of this thesis to 
the field of social movement studies is the proposition of an alternative framework 
with which to examine and explain collective action. More specifically, in order to test 
the assumptions of this revised lens, the empirical contribution of this research is to 
utilise these analytical tools to provide an amended insight and interpretation into 
how Hizbullah concurrently struggles to create, manage and reproduce the 
mobilisation of its Resistance in Lebanon. Consequently, there are three inter-related 
objectives to assist in achieving these complementary aims.       
 
Firstly, this thesis intends to offer a conceptual framework for explaining Hizbullah’s 
inception and evolution. In the field of sociology, SMT has developed to become one 
of the most theoretically structured and analytically rigorous methods for assessing 
collective action. While a number of scholars have applied SMT to Islamist 
movements, only a small cadre of academics has attempted to incorporate SMT into 
their studies of Hizbullah1. Saad-Ghorayeb (2003) references social movement 
studies but not only does she fail to utilise it to inform her research, she also fails to 
explore the mainstream manifestation of the sub-discipline, namely the Political 
Process Theory (PPT). Similarly, whereas Karagiannis (2009) cites Collective Action 
Frames (CAF) in examining Hizbullah’s discursive practices, he omits the other two 
essential components of the model, Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilising 
Structures. Lastly, Alagha (2011) and Azani (2011) both present interesting 
introductions to SMT for understanding Hizbullah. For the former, the importance lies 
in cross-fertilising Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and a rebranded version of 
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of capital while the latter provides an extensive literature 
review of SMT. However, neither implements these conceptual frameworks into their 
empirical investigations. Subsequently, Hizbullah, arguably the most successful 
example of Islamist mobilisation in the Middle East, remains under-explored by SMT.  
 
Secondly, subscribing to a Popperian interpretation of social science, the purpose of 
theory is not to verify but to falsify. By this logic, there is limited utility in simply 
transposing the parameters of SMT onto Hizbullah without any critical 
problematising. The prevalent model of SMT privileges structural forces and rational 
behaviour, epistemological preferences that have divided the field into almost 
                                                 
1
 Those who have integrated SMT models into their work include: Kurzman (1996); Munson (2001); Wickham (2002); Hafez (2003); 
Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule (2003); Clark (2004); Singerman (2004); Wiktorowicz (2004); Bayat (2005); Meijer (2005); Gunning 
(2007a); Tugal (2009); Olesen (2009) and Eligur (2010). Aside from Islamist movements, the Political Process Model has also been 
applied to other episodes of collective action in the Middle East: the Kurdish Nationalist Movement (Romano, 2006), the First 
Palestinian Intifada (Alimi, 2007) and the Second Palestinian Intifada (Araj & Brym, 2010). Lastly, attempts to read Islamic movements 
as versions of ‘new social movements’ include Simsek (2004) as well as Sutton and Vertigans (2006).  
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incompatible dualisms. Consequently, theories of social movement, propagating 
opposite sides of the spectrum, are mired in tautological debates concerning agency 
and structure, rationality and ideology, reason and emotion as well as culture and 
religion. As one of the most influential sociologists of the 20th Century with a 
background in Middle East research, detections of Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of 
Practice’ are evident in recent endeavours to revitalise conceptual thinking in both 
Islamic studies and SMT. However, the premise underlying Bourdieu’s oeuvre is the 
construction of a holistic set of analytical tools that transform mutually exclusive 
dichotomies into mutually inclusive dialectics. Rather than deductively select aspects 
of Bourdieu instrumentally, the revised objective should be to inductively inject SMT 
with the innovative dynamism of habitus (dispositions), capital (resources) and field 
(context), three relationally constituted concepts that inform and are informed by 
practice. This interdependence between theoretical and practical logics also 
resonates with the principles of Shi’i political thought. According to interviews with 
representatives of Hizbullah and other Shi’i figures, ‘ijtihad is the enduring practice 
that strives to maintain a compatible reconciliation between the theoretical logic of 
religion (sharia) and the practical logic of interests (masaleh). For this reason, a 
Bourdieusian reconceptualisation of SMT, which is equipped to address relational 
complexity, can enable a more accurate account of the motivations and challenges 
guiding Hizbullah’s evolution.  
 
Thirdly, by embracing the Bourdieusian principle of relationality, the empirical 
contribution of this thesis is to locate and trace Hizbullah’s engagement with the 
structures of Lebanon’s conditional context. Pre-existing literature on Hizbullah 
remains disproportionately focused on Hizbullah’s internal perceptions and practices, 
an introverted insularity that has the tendency to simplify how Hizbullah inducts, 
inculcates and institutionalises its Resistance within and between multiple fields of 
practice, each constituted by differentiated logics and structures that pre-date the 
Islamic Resistance. Historically, the entrenched confessionalism and subsequent 
suspicion that characterises the orthodoxy of modern Lebanon has emanated from a 
reciprocally reinforcing combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Lebanon, 
which currently has a population of just over four million people, contains 18 
confessional groups within an area famously proclaimed by former President Bashir 
Gemayel to be 10,452 square kilometres, an estimate that places the country 
between Qatar and Cyprus in terms of size2. This geographically vulnerable and 
                                                 
2
 This population statistic does not include the influx of refugees following the Syrian uprising. Since demographics are sensitive in 
Lebanon, in that confessional population figures correspond to political representation, accurate statistics are difficult to ascertain. The 
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socially eclectic mosaic of confessional cleavages was exploited by Imperial powers 
to imbue a neutralising and debilitating system of rival political elites that privileged 
equality in accordance to sect over citizenship. Whether this identity is perceived as 
a reconstructed class struggle (Mahdi ‘Amil), a defensive ‘armour and emblem’ for 
practical purposes (Samir Khalaf, 2003) or a symbolic reflection of religious piety, 
confessional mobilisation and elite sectarian politics remain the predominant 
discourses and practices in Lebanon3. In 1982, Hizbullah did not enter into an 
unrestricted environment; it launched itself into a game it neither designed nor was 
familiar with. Therefore, in analysing Hizbullah’s development, it is necessary to 
assess how Hizbullah has devised strategies that comply with pre-existing 
hierarchies within and across operational fields to enhance its legitimacy while 
paradoxically challenging the formulation of that process.   
 
For the purpose of effectively pursuing these three objectives, this thesis subscribes 
to a Bourdieusian perspective that conceives theory and practice as synergised in 
mutually constituted relationality. The etymological root of the word ‘theory’ is derived 
from the Classical Greek for theoria, a philosophical term pertaining to the act of 
‘contemplation’ or ‘spectating’ (Nightingale, 2004). In Fourth Century BC Athens, 
although Aristotle maintained that this process of theoria was devoid of any 
discernible utilitarian exchange with praxis (‘practice’) since reflection embodied an 
end in itself, Plato sought to reconcile the traditional principles of theoria with the 
praxis of its political and social context (Nightingale, 2004). By this reasoning, a 
theoros (pl. theoroi) represented an official ‘witness’ that attended public or private 
events as an emissary beyond the familiarity of their environment, such as the Pan-
Hellenic Games in Olympia or the Oracle in Delphi, in order to observe rituals, 
interpret their meaning and produce knowledge regarding these practices. Therefore, 
theoria is perceived as simultaneously informed by and informing of social 
phenomena across time and space. 
 
Expanding on this classical theme, the dialectic between theory and practice is a 
labour of Sisyphean proportions. The purpose of theoretical exploration is to devise a 
practical route with which to push the boulder of scientific inquiry to the summit of 
explanation within the parameters of pre-existing comprehension and extant context. 
However, through academic examination and falsification, the boulder is perennially 
                                                                                                                                           
last census was conducted in 1932. Bashir Gemayel (d. 1982), the founder of the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia during the civil 
war, declared that he sought to exert his authority over all of Lebanon, an area he claimed to be 10,452 square kilometres.  
3
 Mahdi ‘Amil (1936-1987), a Lebanese Marxist assassinated in 1987, wrote that the existence of confession as an ethnic grouping is 
an illusion: ‘it is not an entity. It is not essence. It is nothing. It is a political relationship determined by a certain historical form of the 
class struggle which is controlled by the bourgeoisie in the political absence of its class alternative’ (Firro, 2003: 65).    
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destined to return to the bottom of the mountain. Under these circumstances, the aim 
is to continually alter the structured dispositions of the mind and acclimatise the 
conditioning of the body in adjusting practices that align with the prevailing 
environment. Consequently, not only is the preparation and implementation of the 
task performed more effectively, but the planned target entails a reconstitution of 
assumptions that redirect the end, symbolised by the elusive apex of the mountain, 
to the methods through which theory and practice become synchronised in mutual 
relationality to produce knowledge of and on observable processes. Located 
between Islamic studies and sociology, this thesis presents a reconceptualisation of 
SMT via the analytical tools provided by Pierre Bourdieu with the intention of 
contributing to and initiating an inter-disciplinary discussion on the emergence and 
evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. In order to sketch and explain a schematic that 
plots a trajectory for examining the compatibility of theory and practice in collective 
action, this thesis is divided into two commensurate parts. 
 
In the first section, the opening three chapters outline the conceptual framework 
adopted to approach the conception and consolidation of Hizbullah in Lebanon. In 
Chapter One, the thesis begins by presenting a literature review of the existing canon 
on the study of collective action in Islamic studies and SMT. By referencing the 
prevalent intra-disciplinary debates and discourses within these academic fields, the 
intention is to place the theoretical assumptions and precepts of this research in 
direct relation to its target audience. After surveying the contours of these 
discussions, this chapter emphasises that the ‘pluralist’ branch of Islamic studies and 
the ‘critical’ school of SMT converge on the requirement to examine movement 
mobilisation through the relative balance between structure and agency while 
interpreting cultural and ideational factors within their relational context.  
 
Based on the conceptual compatibility between these perspectives, Chapter Two 
proposes an inter-disciplinary syncretism for collective action via the integration of 
analytical tools developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Following the identification and 
categorisation of four consistent areas of contestation within the study of collective 
action, namely the agency/structure nexus, the conceptualisation of culture and 
ideology, the prospect of concurrent and multi-faceted mobilisation as well as the 
problematic of mobilisation in producing change or reproducing orthodoxy, this 
chapter provides a brief synopsis of Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’ before 
sequentially addressing these issues by offering an alternative lens through the 
application of habitus, field and capital. 
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Invoking Bourdieu’s (1982: 50) assertion that ‘the specific object of research counts 
less indeed, than the method which was applied to it and which could be applied to 
an infinity of different objects’, Chapter Three deals with the methodological 
implementation of a combined Bourdieu-SMT lens for research on and in Lebanon. 
Following a discussion on the methodological concepts of relationality and self-
reflexivity inherent within Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’, in which the tools of 
analysis are reflected back onto the researcher, this chapter then proposes a 
reconceptualised Bourdieu-SMT framework for assessing Hizbullah’s mobilisation in 
Lebanon that is predicated on the epistemological designation of five inter-related 
fields of practice, including the Social Mobilisational Field (SMF), the Political Field 
(PF), the Military-Security Field (MSF), the Organisational Field (OF) and the Field of 
International Politics (FIP). Equipped with these conceptual instruments, the chapter 
concludes by demonstrating the rationale the researcher employed in accumulating 
relevant primary and secondary sources over the course of fieldwork to illustrate and 
supplement a Bourdieu-SMT approach.  
 
In the second section, this holistic conceptualisation is utilised to explain the 
inception and induction of Hizbullah in Lebanon through four empirical chapters. 
Since Hizbullah did not materialise in a vacuum, the objective of Chapter Four is to 
locate a Shi’i habitus within the historically constructed fields of Lebanon by 
investigating episodes of collective Shi’i mobilisation under the administrative system 
of the Ottoman Empire (1516-1919), under the French Mandate and the embryonic 
stages of Independence (1920-1958) as well as during the period of a proliferating 
Shi’i political consciousness under Musa Al-Sadr (1959-1978). By evaluating these 
three phases of evolution, Shi’i movement can be relationally recorded within the 
structured and structuring structures of Lebanon’s institutionalised political and social 
systems. As recounted by Georges Naqqash (1887-1978), ‘this Lebanon, which they 
have made for us, is a country consisting of two fifth columns…A state is not the sum 
of two non-powers – and two negations will never make a nation’ (Ziadeh, 2006: 
122). In this context, Albert Hourani opined that Muslims and Christians are 
perpetually locked in a mutually reinforcing practice of sectarianism where ‘to leave 
one’s sect was to leave one’s world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a 
community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of loyalty’ (Ziadeh, 2006: 
171).      
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In Chapter Five, a Bourdieu-SMT approach is employed to address the factors 
precipitating the inception of Hizbullah in Lebanon (1982-1991). By analysing the 
salience of five key events, including the revolutionary Shi’i activism espoused by  
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Israel’s Operation Litani in South Lebanon in 
1978, the return of hundreds of Shi’i clerics from Iraq, the disappearance of Musa al-
Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, this framework 
explains the process by which the amalgamation of disparate radical Shi’i habiti in 
the Social Mobilisational Field (SMF) transformed into manifestations of collective 
dispositions and perceptions (collusio) within the Shi’i community in Lebanon. 
Additionally, in the context of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, this chapter 
examines how Hizbullah translated these expressions of Shi’i collusio into a 
constructed and structured Organisational Field (OF) of harmonised discourse and 
practice before applying a Bourdieu-SMT perspective to explain the differentiated 
purposes and positions between Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance in the 
Military-Security Field (MSF) during the Lebanese civil war.  
 
In Chapter Six, a Bourdieu-SMT lens seeks to problematise and contextualise 
predominant assumptions regarding Hizbullah’s process of ‘Lebanonisation’ (1992-
2000). Adopting the explanatory tools of field analysis, this chapter demonstrates the 
multi-dimensional complexity confronted by Hizbullah’s OF in internally adapting to 
the perceived opportunities of political participation. Primarily, since the tacit 
induction of Hizbullah into the unfamiliar and entrenched dynamics of Lebanese 
politics seemingly contradicted the guiding principles of the Islamic Resistance, 
Hizbullah’s OF expended significant resources in constructing and implementing 
diversified tactics that ensured the realignment of harmonised Resistance practice, 
thereby retaining its balance and coherence within and across its corresponding 
fields. Furthermore, by detailing the sophisticated development of the Islamic 
Resistance, especially during its campaigns against Israel in 1993 and 1996, a 
Bourdieu-SMT perspective conceptually illustrates how Hizbullah strictly adhered to 
the pre-existing rules of the Military-Security Field (MSF) in order to acquire 
deployable forms of symbolic capital. However, this approach also reveals that 
despite Hizbullah’s OF accumulating valuable currencies of symbolic capital within 
the Shi’i community, the institutionalised logic of Lebanon’s Political Field (PF) 
continued to debilitate and restrict the viability and sustainability of Hizbullah’s 
Islamic Resistance.  
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Chapter Seven assesses the position of Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance in relation to 
the respective withdrawals of Israel (2000), its perpetually distinct adversary, and 
Syria (2005), its political patron in Lebanon. By documenting the encroaching 
permeation of the Field of International Politics (FIP) into Lebanese affairs after 2001, 
a Bourdieu-SMT approach explains why and how Hizbullah altered its practice to 
maintain the cohesion of its placement in Lebanon before the assassination of Rafiq 
Hariri in 2005. Devoid of protection from Syria and possessing limited capital in the 
Political Field (PF), this chapter also examines the events of 2006 and 2008 to 
exemplify efforts by Hizbullah in transferring and transposing its symbolic capital in 
the MSF to the logic of the PF for the purpose of preserving its status in Lebanon. In 
this context, this chapter additionally explores how Hizbullah has reacted to the 
independent diversification of dispositions and perceptions within the Shi’i community 
in the SMF by adapting, customising and modernising its mobilisation repertoires to 
reflect and legitimise its revised standing following the withdrawals of Israel and Syria 
from Lebanon. Lastly, this chapter is followed by a conclusion in which eight 
observations are proposed that not only highlight the contribution of a robust 
Bourdieu-SMT framework in enhancing the conceptual strength of collective action, 
but also augment the understanding of Hizbullah’s mobilisation in its reproductive 
struggle for symbolic power in Lebanon.    
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Chapter One 
Islamist Movements in the Academic Field(s)  
 
‘So far as fear of God is concerned, the control of the appetites, prudence and sobriety in conduct of life, 
decency and moderation in all circumstances…I declare that if the West has added one single iota to 
the accumulated wisdom of the East, my powers of perception have been strangely in abeyance’.  
 - Simon Ockley (1678-1720), Chair of Arabic at Cambridge (Irwin, 2006: 119)  
 
‘There is no Homo Islamicus. The history of the Muslim world is specific, it has its own style and colour, 
it is an incomparable part of human diversity. But it is not exceptional. Men everywhere have faced 
similar problems, to be resolved by analogous means’.  
 - Maxime Rodinson (1979: 161) 
 
‘We find ourselves in an Orientalist predicament. On the one hand, considering the postmodern 
reappraisal of the colonial past, generally it is politically incorrect to make derogatory remarks about the 
scholarly works of Arab historians…On the other hand, in the age of ongoing globalization the Western 
scientific approach carries the day. If science stands for a special kind of communication…by scholars 
who dominate this discourse…everyone who wants to be part of the game has to follow its rules’.  
 - Stephan Conermann (2000: 259) 
 
Edmund Burke III (1988: 18) postulated whether knowledge should be informed by 
viewing the objects of enquiry as ‘Islamic political movements’ or as ‘social 
movements in Islamic societies’. The former position appears to follow the 
essentialist precepts of the Orientalist tradition by subscribing to the primacy of Islam 
while the latter approach, propagated by historians influenced by the social sciences, 
places religion in context, thereby promoting a conceptualisation that allows for a 
comparative study of movements across time and space. As reinforced by Zubaida 
(2011: 65), are Islamic movements variants on a single model of Muslim society or 
do they represent a variety of religio-political movements with similar range and 
diversity to those in any other part of the world? This question occupies a parallel 
discourse on the periphery of a wider discussion, the core of which lies in the 
traditional differences of approach between social science and area studies.  
 
The consolidation of the U.S. as a global superpower after the Second World War 
signified a corresponding shift in academia. Reflecting the initial bias in the U.S. 
towards scientific universalism, Teti (2007: 123) explained that an ‘institutionalized 
hierarchy’ was established in which ‘“Disciplines” as producers of universal 
knowledge” were considered superior to the ‘epistemologically subservient fact-
collecting “Areas”’. As Middle East studies became inaugurated as an educational 
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field, its epistemic remit was debated between social scientific and humanistic 
approaches and between ‘approaches which accepted the region’s socio-political 
unity and exceptionalism and those who questioned it’ (Teti, 2007: 131). Echoing 
Leonard Binder’s (1976) critical appraisal of area studies, Richard Martin (1985: 15) 
posed whether Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies should be considered a specialist 
field or informed by more general disciplines? Therefore, in order to effectively 
examine Burke’s insights into the study of Islamist movements, it is necessary to 
identify the deeper roots of dichotomisation both within and between the Western 
institutions of academic practice.   
 
The first part of this chapter will outline how the academic study of Islam has 
evolved, from its nascent beginnings in Orientalism and Islamic studies to the 
emergence of its critics and apologists in the 20th Century. While acknowledging 
Edward Said’s thesis that the scholarly practice of Western Orientalists contributed to 
the construction of an academic discipline that institutionalised an ‘essentialist’ 
orthodoxy, the field gradually developed and became exposed to the influences of 
the European Enlightenment. As traditional Orientalists and their ‘modernist’ 
contemporaries competed for the predominant narrative in the context of U.S. 
hegemony following the Second World War, the emergence of Islamism in the late 
1970s divided the field into four parts. While ‘neo-Orientalists’ continue to designate 
Islam as the innate antithesis to the West, ‘new-Orientalists’ propagate this 
dichotomy by focusing on the existence of an intrinsically Islamic path to modernity. 
Furthermore, whereas ‘modernists’ interpret manifestations of Islam as inherently 
inseparable from the political, social and economic developments of Western 
modernity, ‘pluralists’ endeavour to propose methodological frameworks that 
problematise and reconcile these dichotomies.  
 
The second part of this chapter will examine the development of the sociological sub-
field of social movement theory (SMT) for the purpose of exploring whether literature 
on collective action can provide any insights into the conceptualisation of Islamist 
mobilisation. By documenting and detailing the evolution of the specialist sub-
discipline, including ‘structural strain’, Resource Mobilisation Theory, New Social 
Movements, Political Process Model, Collective Action Frames and Political Process 
Theory, the objective is to identify a ‘critical’ trend within SMT that prioritises 
concepts of agency, strategy and culture over the structural and rational 
preoccupations of its predecessors. By way of a conclusion, this chapter will 
introduce a revised approach for conceptualising Islamist movements that bridges 
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the prevalent dualisms within Islamic studies and SMT by adopting a theoretical 
framework devised to transform seemingly incommensurate dichotomies into 
mutually constitutive dialectics.       
 
1.1 Field Formation and Fragmentation 
 
St John of Damascus, the seventh century theologian, is considered the vanguard of 
the Orientalist tradition (Hourani, 1980a: 8; Sardar, 1999). Derived from philological 
methods developed for examining classical texts, this early interaction with Arabic 
was motivated less by a fascination with Islam and more by an interest to enhance 
the study of Christianity (Binder, 1976: 9; Adams, 1976: 41). However, the Council of 
Vienna (1311-1312) and the subsequent establishment of positions for Oriental 
languages represented the initial institutionalisation of the academic discipline of 
Orientalism in Europe (Toll, 1988: 14)4. Although early Orientalists recorded notable 
achievements in philology5, the field was mostly comprised of voyeuristic amateurs, 
aristocrats and clergymen who exclusively explored the Oriental East to vindicate 
European supremacy over Islam (Irwin, 2006: 147; Lockman, 2010: 37). 
Consequently, before Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838) constructed a cohesive 
programme for the study of Orientalism, this introverted cadre of scholars remained 
largely marginalised from mainstream academia.  
 
For Edward Said (1979: 130; 1980: 71), the work of Ernest Renan (1823-1892), 
which depicted Islam as ‘inherently and eternally antirational and antiscientific’, 
exemplified the ‘philologist as judge’, a predisposition of European scholars to 
propagate a ‘plague’ that expounded the ontological distinctiveness and intrinsic 
fanaticism of the Orient (Lockman, 2010: 79-80)6. While Renan’s approach was not 
innovative, his assessment coincided with the encroachment of post-Enlightenment 
rationalism and secularism on the formerly reclusive field of Orientalism. Influenced 
by events in Europe, such as the 1848 revolutions and the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-71), in addition to developments abroad, particularly the growing intervention 
of European powers within the Ottoman Empire, Orientalists became exposed to 
sociological debates concerning religion and modernity as well as colonial discourses 
of power.    
                                                 
4
  Chairs were created in Greek, Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic at Avignon, Paris, Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca.   
5
 Including Guillaume Postel (1510-1581), Edward Pococke (1604-1691), Thomas Erpenius (1584-1624) and Barthelemy d’Herbelot 
(1625-1695).  
6
 For Said (1980: 60, 72), while Renan is a ‘philologist as judge’, Louis Massignon (1883-1962) is a ‘philologist as guest’, overly 
sympathetic to the point of misrepresentation. Despite the contrast, neither is suitable for evaluating Islam due to their respective 
perceptions of difference.  
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The expanding hegemony of Europe, which was instrumental in structuring the 
parameters of the global public sphere, was equally important in demarcating the 
boundaries of an emerging field of Islamic studies. By combining the Habermasian 
concept of a ‘life world’, a societal space of communicative interaction, with the 
Bourdieusian notion of habitus, ‘a system of historically and socially constructed 
generative principles grating a frame in which individuality unfolds’, Dietrich Jung 
(2011: 90, 115, 156) argued that each scholar, constituted by their respective 
socialised discourses on religion and modernity, coalesced to produce an internalised 
‘generative grammar’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 33) that structured the conceptual 
underpinnings of Islamic studies.  
 
As demonstrated by the first congress of Orientalists in 1873, an integrated network 
of scholars led by Ignaz Goldziher and Christiaan Hurgronje instigated a trend that 
substituted a strict adherence to the immutable religious orthodoxy of Islam, 
enshrined in philological exegesis, with a critical methodology that encompassed a 
more dynamic scientific framework (Irwin, 2006: 191-196; Jung, 2011: 161-169)7. An 
integral component of this emerging field of Islamic studies was the inseparable 
fusion of Western and Muslim thinkers in constructing ‘modern knowledge on Islam 
within the coordinates of a wider global public sphere’ (Jung, 2011: 263). Of particular 
note was the integration of Jamal al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh, two pioneers of 
a modernist salafiyya movement, who sought to bridge the chasm between religious 
traditionalists and secular modernists for the purpose of establishing pan-Islamism 
and Muslim nationalism as prerequisites for political and cultural independence from 
colonial hegemony (Azmeh, 1993: 44; Esposito, 2011: 156)8. However, since the field 
of Islamic studies was constituted in accordance to a Eurocentric logic, agents who 
were structured by its discourses and disposed to reproduce its orthodoxy remained 
the drivers of the field’s practice. Consequently, Muslim thinkers were reduced to 
heterodox positions, compelled to adjust their habitus to legitimated conventional 
norms in accessing and contributing to the field. 
 
                                                 
7
 Goldziher, a Hungarian Jew, was one of the pioneers and masters of modern Islamic studies (Irwin, 2006: 191-196). Christiaan 
Hurgronje, a Dutch Muslim, was one of the first scholars to contest the assumption that Islam was anti-modern (Jung, 2011: 182, 
192). Other notable figures in this trend were Heinrich Fleischer, Theodor Noldeke and Julius Wellhausen.   
8
 Salafiyya literally means the return to the traditional practices of Islam. Although they differed in approach with Afghani promoting 
pan-Islamism and Abduh focusing on reform in Egypt, they were both versed in European social science, conducted discussions with 
European peers and published together. Other notable Muslim thinkers in this trend include Muhammad Iqbal, Ahmad Khan, Namik 
Kemal, Rifaat Tahtawi, Lufti al-Sayyid, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq and Taha Husayn. Rashid Rida, formerly a follower of Abduh, shifted to 
the vision of an Islamic state. He published his thoughts in the influential al-Manar (‘the lighthouse’) journal from 1898 until his death in 
1935. He was also an inspirational figure for Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 (Zubaida, 2011: 135-
144; Jung, 2011: 239-242).   
 37
By invoking Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and Foucault’s concept on the diffuse 
nature of power, Edward Said (1979) described Orientalism as a European discourse 
that exercises cultural dominance through its creation and reproduction of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, Said failed to clarify whether Orientalists within the field of Islamic 
studies were intentional or inadvertent agents in propagating this practice (Irwin, 
2006: 289-290). In adopting a Bourdieusian perspective, which seeks to reconcile the 
dialectic between the ‘colonial habitus’ and the field of Islamic studies, one can 
examine the construction of a predominant practice that essentialised Islam amidst 
the discourse of modernity (Jung, 2011: 212).    
 
As the essentialist orthodoxy of the field of Islamic studies became reinforced by its 
homology with European interests in the Ottoman Empire via the active participation   
of its agents9, a revisionist trend emerged that characterised Orientalism as ‘beset by 
subjective projections, displacements of affect, ideological distortion, romantic 
mystification, and religious bias’ (Binder, 1976: 16-18)10. However, the main fracture 
occurred after the Second World War as the international balance of power shifted 
from European powers to U.S. hegemony11. Following the proliferation of area 
studies departments in the U.S., the field of Islamic studies was threatened by an 
influx of historians, anthropologists and sociologists advocating the application of 
social science methods to the Middle East, including the Weberian-inspired 
modernisation theory (Lerner, 1958)12. 
 
In addition to external appraisals, criticism also continued to emanate from within the 
field of Islamic studies. Roger Owen (1973) urged scholars to replace the philological 
assumptions of Orientalists pertaining to the immutable nature of Islam with scientific 
models that explored the permutation of Islam within complex and diversified 
contexts (Lockman, 2010: 165). Similarly, Maxime Rodinson (1979) endeavoured to 
debunk preconceptions by presenting dynamic syntheses between Islam, socialism 
and capitalism. Marshall Hodgson (1974) extolled the fluidity of Islam by developing 
the concepts of Islamdom, Islamicate and Oikumene13. For Charles Adams (1976: 
                                                 
9
 Martin Hartmann and Carl Heinrich Becker overstated the Islamic concept of jihad to justify German involvement in the First World 
War (Jung, 2011: 194-195). Massignon (1883-1962) was part of the Anglo-French Committee that drafted the Sykes-Picot agreement 
in 1916 dividing up the Middle East between Britain and France (Irwin, 2006: 222).  
10
 Other scholars included Said (1979) and Adams (1976).  
11
 During the Second World War, Orientalists remained involved in the war effort: Charles Bekingham worked at Bletchley Park, 
Freddie Beeston at British military intelligence; Bernard Lewis for the Foreign Service in Istanbul; Hamilton Gibb at BBC Arabic (Irwin, 
2006: 237-238). 
12
 U.S. Orientalists had always operated on the peripheries of Islamic studies. In 1841, Edward Salisbury (1814-1901) became 
occupied the first Orientalist teaching position in the U.S. (Irwin, 2006: 213-214). Traditional Orientalists also departed for the U.S. 
(Hamilton Gibb – Harvard; Bernard Lewis – Princeton; Joseph Schacht – Columbia).  
13
 Islamdom refers to Muslim territory, Islamicate to the culture contained in that territory and Oikumene represents the settled world of 
high culture that spread over Europe, Asia and Africa (Irwin, 2006: 251) 
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41-49), philologists continued to reductively materialise Islam as an objective reality 
that superseded the explanatory weight of politics and economics.  
 
The debate for the predominant discourse and practice in acquiring knowledge on 
the Middle East was embodied by two conferences in 1979 and 198014. During the 
Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference, the participants acknowledged that the 
epistemological and methodological foundations of Orientalism were untenable, and 
while open to the influence of social science, they expressed reticence to privilege a 
revision that risked relegating the importance of Islam15. Ultimately, an accurate 
explanation of Islam in society required techniques that fused material and ideational 
factors symbiotically (Hourani, 1980b: 13-14; Lapidus, 1980: 90-92). Meanwhile, the 
International Symposium on Islam and the History of Religions encouraged 
interdisciplinary contributions in transcending the dichotomy between ‘fideistic 
subjectivism’ and ‘scientific objectivism’ (Martin, 1985: 1-2; 11). Devoid of mutual 
cooperation between Orientalist and social science methodologies, the former 
‘remain myopic, resulting in dangerous generalisations’ while the latter ‘become 
abstract, in fact, chimerical’ (Rahman, 1985: 202).  
 
While these conferences intended to reconcile the inter-disciplinary divide, in which 
Orientalists viewed social scientists as ‘under-educated dabblers overly inclined to 
grandiose theories’ while social scientists derided Orientalists as ‘ivory-tower 
scholars preoccupied with moldering texts’, each was matched by their intra-
disciplinary congruence. Whereas Orientalism pitted Islam against the West, social 
science polarised tradition with modernity (Lockman, 2010: 140). Furthermore, Sadik 
al-Azm (1981: 24) argued that Said’s ‘Orientalism’ implied the self-fulfilling existence 
of ‘Occidentalism’ whereby Islam was ‘a monolithic unique Oriental totality 
ineradicably distinct in its essential nature from Europe, the West and the rest of 
humanity’.        
 
Following the Second World War, the Islamic discourse in the Middle East remained 
eclipsed by the nahda (‘renaissance’) of socialist-inspired Arab nationalisms16. 
Nevertheless, the victory of Israel over the Arabs in 1967 was perceived as a defeat 
that accentuated the ‘Arab malaise’ (Kassir, 2006: 4) or takhalluf (‘backwardness’), a 
                                                 
14
 The Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference was held in California in 1979 with the papers published in Islamic Studies: A Tradition and 
its Problems (1980). In 1980, the International Symposium on Islam and the History of Religions took place in Arizona with the papers 
published in Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies (1985).  
15
 Hourani (1980b: 9); Said (1980: 60); Burke (1980: 77); Lapidus (1980: 90); Rahman (1980: 133).  
16
 Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt (1956); Abd al-Karim Qassam in Iraq (1958); the Arab Ba’ath in Syria (1963); Houari Boumediene in 
Algeria (1965); National Liberation Front in Yemen (1967) and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (1969).  
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reinforced cultural/socio-psychological disposition that confirmed the inability of the 
region to transition into modernity (Sing, 2012)17. Rather than revert to Eurocentric 
concepts of secular nationalism or revolutionary communism, national salvation 
rested in ‘popular political Islam’ (Azm, 1981: 22; Achcar, 2008: 21). Inspired by the 
thinking of Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna, Abul Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ali Shariati, the proposed antidote to Western 
modernity became referred to as Islamism, or islamiyya, ‘the ideology advocating the 
creation of a society and state based on Islamic principles’ (Gunning, 2000: 2)18. As 
demonstrated by the Iranian Revolution and the establishment of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s Islamic Republic in 1979, the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by 
salafi activists the same year or the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat by tanzim al-jihad in 1981, the influence of ‘Islamism’ began permeating from 
theory into praxis19. 
 
In response to this religious resurgence, the already polarised academic field 
became characterised further by dichotomy and divergence. For Achcar (2008: 26), 
Azm’s ‘Orientalism in reverse’ thesis, combined with contextual developments, had 
both consolidated traditional Orientalism to initiate ‘neo-Orientalism’ while 
simultaneously producing ‘new Orientalism’. Firstly, epitomised by the work of 
Bernard Lewis (1976, 1982, 1990, 2003, 2010), ‘neo-Orientalism’ resuscitated the 
essence of the ‘Muslim mind’ and emphasised Islam’s monolithic entity as an 
immutable set of core characteristics antithetical to modernity (Lockman, 2010: 111). 
Traces of this essentialist interpretation of Islam have been reflected in the writings of 
Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992), Samuel Huntington (2002) and Martin Kramer 
(1996, 2001)20. Furthermore, this position is also detected amongst the liberal 
intelligentsia in the highly politicised arena of U.S. academia21. According to Paul 
Berman (2003, 2010), liberals are naïve if they fail to see that Islamist movements, 
regardless of their position, are ‘stars in a single constellation’ (Ruthven, 2010)22.  
                                                 
17
 Authors who contributed to takhalluf literature include Sadik al-Azm, Yasin al-Hafiz, Nawal Saadawi and Mustafa al-Hijazi.   
18
 There are no etymological origins of this word in Arabic either in the Qur’an, hadith or sunnah. According to Martin and Barzegar 
(2010:10), this modern term ‘has been adapted to this usage by contemporary Muslim writers and intellectuals when writing about 
political Islam’. ‘Islamism’ isn’t universally applied due to its negative connotations (Abdul Rauf, 2010; Varisco, 2010). 
19
 Other ‘Islamist’ developments at this time include: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was formed in 1979 against Israeli occupation; 
Hizbullah, the Shi’i movement inspired by the Iranian Revolution, was founded in Lebanon by 1982; the Arab al-mujahideen (‘Muslim 
Warriors’) was formed in the 1980s to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (notable figures included Abdullah Azzam and 
Osama bin-Laden); Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine was established before the intifada of 1987.    
20
 Fukuyama argued that History, perceived as a perennial struggle over ideas, had finished with the victory of liberal democracy. 
Huntington, adopting Lewis’ ‘clash of civilizations’, posited that the victory of democracy was not yet guaranteed due to other cultures 
and civilisations that oppose liberal values. Kramer (1996: 16) stated that the Middle East seems ‘impervious to the worldwide triumph 
of liberal democracy…and it remains susceptible to ideological excess in an age of pragmatism’.   
21
 In 1995, Dick Cheyney’s wife, Lynne and Senator Joseph Lieberman established the National Alumni Forum to monitor radicals on 
university campuses. Daniel Pipes founded Campus Watch in 2002, which pressures academics that deviate from a neo-conservative 
agenda. Martin Kramer, Robert Satloff and Bernard Lewis support this initiative.    
22
 In particular, Berman targets Tariq Ramadan, a Professor of Islamic studies at the University of Oxford. While Ramadan’s books 
focus on ways to integrate and immerse European Muslims by using classical texts and teachings (Ruthven, 2007b). Berman accuses 
Ramadan of manipulating the West with his pragmatism as a ruse to disguise his anti-liberal, Islamofascist opinions. Prominent 
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Secondly, proponents of ‘new Orientalism’ not only posit that ‘Islam and modernity 
are compatible, but in fact Islam is the only and necessary path to modernity in the 
Muslim world’ (Achcar, 2008: 26). This trend is echoed in the work of Olivier Roy 
(1990, 2004, 2007, 2009) and Francis Burgat (1997, 2002), both of whom consider 
Islam as an integral component of modernisation as it provides ‘the essential 
language and culture of Muslim peoples’ (Achcar, 2008: 24)23. Moreover, the 
alternative modernity of ‘Muslim society’ (Gellner, 1981), the redesign of a ‘fifth circle’ 
towards an autonomous Islamic path to modernity (Salvatore, 1997) and the 
assembling of an exclusive Islamic narrative in contradistinction to the West (Crooke, 
2009) all contain aspects of this thesis24. However, by focusing on the 
epistemological priority of an explicitly Islamist response to modernity, ‘new 
Orientalism’ aligns with its ‘neo-Orientalism’ counterparts in ‘the essentialist view 
according to which religiosity is a permanent and essential phenomenon for Muslim 
peoples’ (Achcar, 2008: 26).        
 
Thirdly, ‘Modernists’ symbolise another category of scholarship emanating from a 
post-1979 discourse of Islamism. Exemplified by Fred Halliday (1993, 1996, 2002, 
2008) and Sami Zubaida (1993, 2011), ‘modernists’ replace the ‘pseudo-sociology’ 
and ‘essential homogeneity’ (Azmeh, 1993: 22) of Orientalists with a perspective that 
interprets Western modernity as the undisputed normative condition in which culture 
and ideology are shaped, negotiated and contested. Preferring to avoid ‘regional 
narcissism’, in which ‘primordialists’ perceive the Middle East as ‘some age-old, 
atavistic, historically continuous, influence of holy texts and unshifting identities’, 
‘modernists’ claim that ‘the past explains the present only if its continuation can also 
be explained’ (Halliday, 2002: 193-205; 2008: 18-19). Contrary to Orientalists, and in 
reference to Islamist revanchism, ‘the modernism of this proposed state is the 
fundamental feature of this supposedly pre-modern creature of postmodernism’ 
(Azmeh, 1993: 31; Affendi, 2003: 17). Rather than evaluate the revival of Islamist 
discourse and practice literally as a ‘fixed menu’ of pre-prescribed formulas, 
                                                                                                                                           
commentators Martin Amis, Melanie Philips and Christopher Hitchens represent a similar liberalism that is ‘more intolerant of religious 
identity politics than the xenophobic right’ (Affendi, 2012: 17-28).      
23
 For Roy (2007), however, Islam was an intrinsically flawed project that will lead to post-Islamism, a condition that substitutes 
modernisation for neo-fundamentalism in which the overpoliticisation and privitisation of Islam creates Islamo-nationalists.  
24
 Salvatore’s (1997) Seven Interpretative Circles: a) Conflation of late-classical Orientalism; b) the deconflationist Middle Eastern 
Studies inspired by modernisation theory; c) Reconflation of Islamic Revival and Islamism; d) deconflation through appealing to 
inevitable modernity of Islam’s politicisation; e) the ‘trajectory of political discourse of modernity in the Arab World which can be 
expressed in terms that are not imitative of the Western experience’ (xxv); f) Conflation of the Islamist din wa dawla (religion and 
state); g) deconflation of Islamist din wa dawla.    
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‘modernists’ highlight the ‘a la carte’ manipulation of the religious lexicon to construct 
and justify policies for the modern present (Halliday, 1993: 153-154, 2002: 199)25.  
 
Fourthly, whether espousing ‘new social history’ or incorporating analytical tools from 
other disciplines, the conceptual lens adopted by ‘pluralists’ attempts to problematise 
essentialist and modernist assumptions from both ends of the dichotomy (Gunning, 
2000: 15-25). In the first instance, Ira Lapidus (1980, 2002) and John Esposito (2010, 
2011) emphasised that the relationship between religion and politics in Islamic 
societies has always been ambiguous and diverse. Therefore, in a postmodernist 
construction of the secular nation state, identity is neither imposed nor contradictory 
to Islam but has continuously existed in tandem with religious symbols creating 
complex systems of meaning (Lapidus, 2002: 870). Similarly, Asef Bayat (2005, 
2007, 2010, 2011), believed post-Islamism represents a change from the universal 
monopolisation of religious truth towards ‘ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion and 
compromise in the movement’s principles and practice’, a development which 
represents a shift from the immanence of Islam to Muslim agents ‘who come to 
define and redefine their religion’ (Bayat, 2007: 13, 2010: 231).  
 
Complementing and supplementing this ‘new social history’ is research aiming to 
construct a framework that ‘includes the study of foundational texts but that insists 
upon connecting them to the questions and debates of contemporary scholarship 
across disciplines and regions’ (Ernst & Martin, 2010: 8). By applying methodological 
techniques developed by Michel Foucault, Talal Asad and Pierre Bourdieu, three 
figures relatively under-explored by the field, the discursive Enlightenment tradition 
that influenced Islamic scholarship by defining conceptualisations of both religion and 
secularism can be analytically contextualised and problematised to produce a 
reconstituted dialectic. For Lawrence (2010: 304-305), this ‘cosmopolitanism’ 
recaptures Islam’s diversity and dynamism26. 
 
In conclusion, the field of Islamic studies, formed and institutionalised from the 
beginning of the 20th Century, was not parochial in its initial assessment of Islam. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of the U.S. as a global superpower, as well as 
                                                 
25
 Expanding on this point, Zubaida (2011: 4) calls this exercise ‘spray on Islam’, in which the adjective is implanted onto modern 
concepts – ‘Islamic’ state, ‘Islamic’ finance, ‘Islamic’ art, ‘Islamic’ science etc. – in order to manufacture a false difference and ensure 
the relevance of Islam in a modern context.  
26
 This conclusion questions whether Salvatore’s (1997: xiii, 249) construction of a ‘fifth circle’ represents ‘new-Orientalism’ or 
pluralism. Salvatore comments that ‘de-essentializing Islam’ does not necessarily imply the ‘re-essentializing of modernity’. The ‘fifth 
circle’ offers an alternative to the constraints of a Western hermeneutic straightjacket by developing a hybrid methodology based on 
an Islamic canon of modernity that reconstructs turath (‘cultural heritage’) to interpret Islam as a ‘coherent, albeit plural, cultural 
system fostering an original tradition of knowledge’. However, due to the onus of the ‘fifth circle’ being reliant and dependent on 
reconstructing an autonomous Islamic trajectory, this thesis places Salvatore in the category of ‘new Orientalism’.   
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corresponding developments in the Islamic world, provided new opportunities for 
scholars equipped with new methods to challenge the dispositions and positions of 
traditional Orientalists. Ultimately, in this revised configuration of intra/inter-
disciplinary competition, Islam became ‘essentially contested’ (Gallie, 1956) between 
‘neo-Orientalists’, ‘new Orientalists’, ‘modernists’ and ‘pluralists’. While the 
predominant orthodoxy of the field may privilege conventional intra-field debates 
between Orientalists and modernists, the disposition of ‘pluralists’ to explore and 
construct inter-field conceptual frameworks represents an emerging trend.    
 
Rather than propagate decontextualised and dichotomous grand narratives, Islam 
can be neither separated from a historical tradition in which endogenously-
constituted ideas of religion were conceived nor detached from the exogenously-
determined political, social and economic conditions that precipitated its 
(re)emergence. Whereas structural approaches risk creating ‘homogenous and 
coherent social units which are to be identified by the discourse of their ideologies’ 
(Bayat, 2005: 891), prioritising an agential perspective that examines the 
diversification of relational interactions threatens to reduce structures of practice 
(Turam, 2011: 144-146). Consequently, the objective of a ‘pluralist’ approach is to 
problematise prevailing assumptions by constructing contextualised frameworks that 
reconcile the mutually constitutive dialectic between agency and structure (Hroub, 
2010: 9-19; Schwedler, 2011: 135-137).  
 
Recalling the nexus posed in the introduction between ‘Islamic political movements’ 
or ‘social movements in Islamic societies’, Burke (1988: 33) concluded that the more 
relevant discovery would be incorporating methodological advances that enhanced 
the enrichment of both perspectives. However, while a ‘pluralist’ perspective offers 
insights into bridging this chasm through a sociological lens that identifies Islamist 
movements as heterogeneous and situational, it lacks a cohesive framework with 
which to harmonise its epistemological and methodological assumptions for the 
purpose of accessing and enabling discussions within the academic field. In order to 
further explore the sociological aspect of Islamist movements, the next part of this 
chapter will examine the development of social movement theory, a subfield of 
sociology that provides conceptual frameworks for investigating collective action 
within and across a range of contexts.   
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1.2 Introducing Social Movement Theory 
 
Whether framed via the collective consciousness of the proletariat from the dominant 
control of the bourgeoisie (Marx), the solidarity of active participation caused by the 
anomie of societal breakdown (Durkheim) or the instrumental rationality of agents 
responding to the inequality of resources (Weber), this triumvirate of pioneers who 
contributed to defining the field of Sociology all conceptualised the phenomenon of 
collective action (Ruggiero & Montagna, 2008: 9). However, the inception of the 
‘classical period’ of social movements was marked by an interest in the seemingly 
irrational behaviour of individuals following the Second World War.  
 
Influenced by the Chicago School and the Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis, 
collective action theorists examined the effects of ‘structural strain’ on marginalised 
segments of society, a process precipitated by industrialisation, urbanisation, 
unemployment and War (Blumer, 1951; Park, 1967; Turner & Killian, 1957). 
According to Neil Smelser (1962), the maelstrom of grievances resulting from the 
relative deprivation and social alienation of ‘structural strain’ evoked an anxious 
response by affected individuals who embarked upon incoherent and anarchic 
collective action against the inability of institutions to manage the change or restore 
cohesion (Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 4). For these ‘breakdown theorists’, rather than 
concentrate on the ideology of mass society, beliefs were constituted by an 
individual’s innate attitude and psychological propensity (Garner, 1997: 11). 
Reinforcing this social-psychological dimension, Ted Gurr’s (1970: 319) ‘frustration-
aggression’ thesis stated that collective action ‘is a diffuse disposition towards 
aggressive action determinate on relative deprivation’ and the ‘perceived discrepancy 
between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities’.   
 
Deviating from observations that investigated the psychologically predisposed and 
primordial responses of individuals to structural strain, Resource Mobilisation Theory 
(RMT) viewed social movements as rational and organisational. For RMT, structural 
strain was not the cause of collective action but an objective and ubiquitous reality. 
Rather than an instant reaction to specific structural conditions, social movement was 
a dynamic interaction between organised contenders and the shifting politico-
economic context (McAdam, 1982: 7-17). RMT also contended that participants of 
collective action were not as estranged as ‘breakdown theorists’ had assumed 
(Oberschall, 1973). Furthermore, not only were social movements collective by 
definition, but by privileging psychological explanations, ‘breakdown theorists’ would 
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be unable to effectively account for the historical role of social movements in 
facilitating political change.       
 
Inspired by Mancur Olson (1965), RMT offered an alternative conceptualisation 
focusing on a meso-level, ‘neoutilitarian logic’ (Cohen, 1985: 674) in which social 
movement organisations (SMOs) operated as the ‘orienting, focal unit of analysis’ 
(Snow et al, 2004). Navigating within the social movement sector (SMS) and the 
social movement industry (SMI), SMOs managed collective action by instrumentally 
accumulating and distributing resources through cost-benefit analyses for the 
purpose of utilising and creating solidary networks as well as achieving external 
consensus in effectively pursuing strategically and politically calculated interests 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1979; Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 8)27. By instilling collective 
action with a Weberian-infused framework of instrumental rationality and institutional 
bureaucracy, RMT had reconceptualised social movement theory in two ways. 
Firstly, by emphasising the rationality and agency of organised actors in decision-
making, not only had RMT de-essentialised the reductionist trend of prioritising 
‘structural strain’, but it had also disproved the psychological motivations determining 
collective action and replaced them with the dynamic aspirations of emancipation 
(McAdam, 1982: 17; Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 15-16; Garner, 1997: 22; Cohen, 
1985: 688). Secondly, as organised ‘New Left’ movements emerged, RMT had 
recaptured the study of social movements from other strands of sociology by 
constructing a robust conceptual framework with which to address this new trend.  
 
1.3 New Social Movements 
 
While concurring with an RMT approach that involved rational, networked and 
organised participants, European ‘new social movement’ (NSM) theorists diverged 
from their U.S. counterparts in their omission of three determinant factors of 
collective action, namely social structures, culture and identity (Cohen, 1985: 673). 
Although hailing from traditional Marxism, these scholars shifted the locus of 
discontentment and conflict from the proletariat struggle over production and 
distribution to a new space where an eclectic class, crossing traditional boundaries, 
harboured post-material values that target the quality of life in civil society (Cohen, 
1985: 667; Offe, 1985: 293; Melucci, 1985: 789; Habermas, 1987: 392). In a ‘post-
industrial’ or ‘programmed’ society, the social system, symbolised by money and 
                                                 
27
 While the shared beliefs of a social movements advocating action are contained within the SMS, the SMO acts as the formal body 
that identifies with and represents the interests of the social movement within an SMI comprised of other social movements vying to 
facilitate social change (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1979).  
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power, threatened to create and reproduce truths by encroaching onto the ‘life world’ 
– the repository of shared meaning which enable human beings to communicate, 
negotiate, socialise and legitimate (Touraine, 1981; Habermas, 1987: 393-394; 
Beckford, 1986: 146). Responding to this infraction, social movements mobilised to 
create an alternative public space and, in a Gramscian sense, contest over ‘social 
control of the main cultural pattern’ (Touraine, 1985: 754).  
 
NSM theorists also countered an RMT approach that directed collective action 
towards political institutions. Contrary to the ‘old paradigm’ of an unchallenged 
welfare state establishing a civic culture of universalised interests, 
compartmentalised spheres and de-emphasised political participation, the ‘new 
paradigm’, in which the private/public distinction disappeared as the gap between 
state and civil society expanded, NSMs sought to challenge ‘the social construction 
of the very boundaries between public, private, and political domains of action 
(Cohen, 1985: 694; Offe, 1985: 824). Confronted by inept and incapable 
representatives, NSMs deviated from conventional political structures to an 
autonomous ‘sub-system’ of latent forms of subinstitutional and extraparliamentary 
protest (Melucci, 1985: 798; Wolff, 1998: 58-59).  
 
Consequently, the ‘new’ nature of social movements was the creation of this physical 
space between the state and civil society. NSMs were neither ‘post modern’, in 
espousing new values that were not universally shared amongst civil society, nor 
‘premodern’, in adhering to ‘a romanticized prerational past’ (Offe, 1985: 849). In a 
‘post-industrial’ epoch of globalised and interconnected information networks, NSMs 
strived to occupy this ‘new space’ with the collective identities of those suffering from 
‘withdrawal symptoms in a culturally impoverished and unilaterally rationalized praxis 
of everyday life’ (Habermas, 1981: 36). By challenging prevailing norms of practice, 
NSMs endeavoured to politicise institutions of civil society without the constraints of 
political institutions for the purpose of reconstituting a culture of collective action that 
was ‘no longer dependent upon ever more regulation, control, and intervention’ (Offe, 
1985: 820).  
 
For NSM theorists, a utilitarian approach was insufficient because collective action 
was not confined to political institutions and strategic calculations as ‘new’ conflicts 
affected the system’s cultural production (Cohen, 1985: 690; Melucci, 1985: 798). 
Therefore, it was not what movements do (RMT) but what they are (NSMs), 
mobilisations emerging in the cleavage between state and society that substitute 
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aspirations for political integration with the preservation of their collective identity. 
The objective was to facilitate change through modernising institutions, creating new 
elites, affecting political decision-making and renewing cultural meaning (Melucci, 
1985: 807-815). The formation of the movement represented the ends, not the 
means. Furthermore, while RMT could understand how collective action occurred, by 
epistemologically privileging the instrumental rationality of actors over the structural 
forces that constituted cultural norms and collective identities, RMT could not explain 
why or where collective action was directed due to its continuous tautological modus 
operandi that omitted evolution, contingency or change (Melucci, 1985: 797; Wolff, 
1998: 54-57; Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 9; Foweraker, 1995: 17). Conversely, in 
order to assess opportunities for collective action, NSM scholars focused on identity 
formation and cultural positioning within social contexts (Wolff, 1998: 54-57).     
  
1.4 Political Process Model 
     
In the context of the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S., McAdam (1982: 40) 
concluded that ‘breakdown’ theorists and RMT were equally ill-equipped to explain 
that social movements ‘develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction 
between movement groups and the larger socio-economic environment they seek to 
change’. While agreeing with NSM scholars on the existence of structural 
opportunities, McAdam invoked the importance of ‘political process’ (Tilly, 1978), a 
position that converged with RMT regarding instrumental rationality and SMO 
management in organising resources for political ends. By invoking Peter Eisinger’s 
(1973: 11) ‘structure of opportunities’, defined as ‘a set of constraints or opportunities 
presented by the political environment that enable collective action’, McAdam (1982: 
40-50) devised a tripartite model for political process that combined this concept with 
RMT and Marxist notions on ‘cognitive liberation’28. 
 
Firstly, collective action should be viewed as a political struggle between protesters 
and the state in which the opportunities for defiance afforded to the former are 
structured by the institutional modalities and access extended by the latter (Piven & 
Cloward, 1977: 23). Consequently, protesters are vulnerable to the symbolic and 
tangible concessions or incentives offered by a system of elites. Therefore, political 
impact is limited by a structure of opportunities whereby ‘protesters win, if they win at 
all, what historical circumstances has already made ready to be conceded’ (Piven & 
                                                 
28
 Eisinger (1973: 28) confirmed the existence and importance of a ‘structure of political opportunities’ by explaining that the very 
appearance of protest ‘signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the 
political system itself’.  
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Cloward, 1977: 36). Expanding on these insights, McAdam (1982: 41-43) suggested 
that although structural instability is the default position in capitalist societies, political 
opportunities vary over time. The possibilities emanating from these structural shifts 
enable challengers to reduce the power imbalance and improve their bargaining 
position, which encourages collective action by raising the costs of repression and 
diminishing the risks of participation. 
 
Secondly, as rational actors, social movements seek to transform opportunities to 
enhance the resources, organisation and durability of collective action. Addressing 
the deficiencies of RMT, McAdam attempted to qualify the definition of a ‘resource’, 
formerly referred to as ‘legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor’ (McCarthy & Zald, 
1977: 1220) while resolving the ‘free-rider’ problem in which rational individuals 
choose to benefit from movement mobilisation as opposed to contributing resources 
to its cause (Olson, 1965). Rather than vaguely describe resources as anything 
ranging from material to non-material assets (Oberschall, 1973: 28), McAdam (1982: 
41-44) prioritised resources pertaining to the recruitment of members, the 
establishment of solidary incentives, the improvement of communication networks 
and the centralisation of leadership. Moreover, citing the work of Aldon Morris (1981: 
766), McAdam (1982: 41-44) posited that utilising and transferring the motives of 
established pre-existing network structures and internal social organisations would 
provide a solution to the ‘free-rider’ obstacle.         
 
Thirdly, McAdam (1982: 48) observed that ‘mediating between opportunity and action 
are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations’. By treating 
grievances as peripheral, not only had RMT ignored the variation of collective 
perception to structural conditions over time, but it had also failed to explain how 
movements, presented with identical political opportunities, pursued different 
strategies and paths (McAdam, 1982: 35; Szymanski, 2003: 7). Consequently, 
prospective participants must recognise that the system has lost legitimacy, demand 
rights for change and realise the potential opportunities in affecting change. Invoking 
the Marxist term of ‘cognitive liberation’, a self-reflective process of defiance by which 
a change in consciousness regarding the environment precipitates a shift in 
behaviour (Piven & Cloward, 1977: 1-4), McAdam (1982: 48-49) provided a relational 
link between the structure of political opportunities and the subjective perceptions of 
social movements.        
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Inexorably linked with ‘cognitive liberation’ was the role of institutional elites in 
shaping social movements. Deviating from conventional understanding, in which 
institutionalised elites prevent movements from organising and accessing the 
establishment in order to preserve their position (Gamson, 1968: 20), McAdam 
(1982: 32) argued that this perspective underestimated the ability of social 
movements to independently influence elites. McAdam (1982: 57-58) concluded that 
the success of a movement relies on a choice between institutional (reformist) and 
noninstitutional (revolutionary) tactics. Paradoxically, while the former represents a 
more acceptable and attainable objective for collective action, this direction risks 
diminishing its impact by endowing movements with the same powerlessness that 
initially led them to adopt noninstitutional avenues (Eisinger, 1973: 26).     
 
1.5 Collective Action Frames 
 
During the nascent discourse on SMT, a recurring trend was the attempt to 
conceptualise the schism between the existence of objective structural conditions 
that present opportunities for collective action and the subjective perceptions of this 
environment by social movement agents. Referencing the tendency of traditional 
models to ‘abstract the participant/respondent from the context and networks in 
which the rationales are developed’, a group of sociologists posited that these 
approaches were unable to adequately comprehend dynamic interpretive processes 
due to the uniform application of grievances (Snow et al, 1986: 465). Invoking the 
concept of ‘framing’, which acted to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label’ events in 
relation to life spaces (Goffman, 1974: 21), Snow (et al, 1986: 464) coined the term 
‘frame alignment’, a process that linked individual and SMO interpretive orientations 
as congruent and complementary. While framing viewed movements as the ‘carriers 
of extant ideas and meanings’, agents ‘actively engaged in the production and 
maintenance of meaning’ (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 613). Therefore, the impetus for 
collective action required three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 615-617).     
 
The implementation of these objectives is achieved through three concurrent 
practices (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 623-626). Firstly, in the ‘discursive field’, a 
movement will focus on Frame Amplification, which involves articulating and 
accentuating a frame with emphasis on the ‘clarification and invigoration of an 
interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue’ (Snow et al, 1986: 469). 
Subsequently, Frame Alignment enables the SMO, and its interpretation, to be 
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perceived as synonymous with the issue. Secondly, the ‘strategic field’ encompasses 
the utilitarian characteristics of SMO aspirations. To optimise mobilisation, an SMO 
engages in Frame Bridging, which conjoins ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames to appeal to individuals with common grievances and 
orientations but lacking organisation or direction (Snow et al, 1986: 467). 
Additionally, SMOs utilise Frame Extension, which endeavours to portray their 
interests as inclusive of broader issues, as well as Frame Transformation, which 
seeks to readjust or reformulate pre-existing frames (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 625). 
Thirdly, in the ‘contested field’, since SMOs are unable to unilaterally impose 
interpretations of reality, they may confront counterframing, a situation whereby the 
construction of frames becomes debated and negotiated both internally and 
externally as to the most effective method for collective action (Snow & Benford, 
2000a: 625). 
 
Ultimately, the strategic aim of framing within these three fields is to align personal 
and collective identities between protagonists and constituents (Snow & McAdam, 
2000: 43-45). In doing so, SMOs are engaged in identity convergence and identity 
construction. While the latter attracts support from pre-existing solidary networks and 
identities, the former produces a new collective identity in which individuals regard 
movement activity as ‘consistent with their self-conception and interests’ (Snow & 
McAdam, 2000: 47-61). Nevertheless, framing does not operate in a vacuum but 
remains a relationally dynamic process in which participation and identity are subject 
to ‘reassessment and renegotiation’ within the contextual constraints of politics, 
culture and society (Snow et al, 1986: 467; Snow & Benford, 2000a: 628-630). As 
agents are both consumers and producers of meaning, frames are equally 
susceptible to changes in perceived political opportunities or cultural patterns 
(Tarrow, 1992: 189). Moreover, while a ‘master frame’ broadens appeal at the 
expense of detail, exclusive frames risk alienating prospective participants (Snow & 
Benford, 1992: 133-155). In order to mitigate against these threats, frames rely on 
credibility, in appearing empirically viable and consistent, as well as salience, in 
terms of centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity (Snow & 
Benford, 2000a: 619; Snow & Benford, 1988). Regardless, an SMO must frequently 
adapt and evolve depending on its situational context.    
 
The conceptual framework provided by Collective Action Frames offers five general 
contributions to social movement theory. Firstly, frames flourish in contexts of 
interpretative ambiguity and contested meaning. Secondly, deviating from McAdam, 
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frames are not cognitive structures located in individuals but properties of 
organisations. Thirdly, master frames that are the product of these interpretative 
processes are central to understanding the course and character a movement. 
Fourthly, frames can be studied both as dependent and independent variables. 
Lastly, ideology, collective action frames and opportunity structures are ‘different 
words not for the same thing but for different aspects and dimensions of the complex 
of symbolic, ideational and intersubjective factors associated with movement 
mobilization and dynamics’ that are intrinsically interconnected via discursive framing 
processes (Snow, 2004: 405).  
 
1.6 Towards a Synthesis  
 
Intending to assimilate and harmonise prevailing trends within the discipline, Doug 
McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1996) proposed a synthesised 
conceptualisation of SMT. This project was influenced by two interrelated 
developments in the 1990s. Firstly, while U.S. scholarship had focused on using 
political process to link institutional politics to social movements in a national context, 
European NSM scholars had begun applying political opportunity structures to a 
cross-national context. Secondly, the advent ‘cultural turn’ in a post-Cold War epoch 
encouraged scholars to rethink their structural and rational bias in exchange for 
considering the cultural and ideational factors determining mobilisation (Jasper, 
2007: 59; Platt & Williams, 2002: 328; McAdam, 1994: 36-37; Morris, 1992: 351).  
 
Firstly, for NSM scholars, McAdam’s Political Process Model (PPM) was constrained 
by two factors. Primarily, PPM failed to account for how movements perceive the 
availability of opportunities and why, given similar circumstances, movements 
adopted different strategies to pursue these opportunities. Additionally, PPM could 
not explain why a movement sometimes succeeds in seizing its opportunities while 
other movements might fail (Syzmanski, 2003: 12). In response, and building upon 
the work of Herbert Kitschelt (1986), Hanspeter Kriesi (et al, 1995: xii, 244) 
suggested a reconceptualisation that connected external political constraints with 
movements’ choices at the meso-level of enquiry.   
 
Rather than view institutional restraints as inferred, Kitschelt (1986: 58) initially aimed 
to emphasise movement variations in mobilisation and impact by listing institutional 
factors that influenced the choices and inhibited the activities of movement actors. 
Through a cross-national study of anti-nuclear movements in France, Sweden, the 
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U.S. and West Germany, Kitschelt (1986: 61-67) discovered that a movement’s 
impact was directly correlated to the relative open or closed nature of the prevailing 
political system within each country. Expanding on these findings, Kriesi (et al, 1995: 
xiii) argued that political opportunities were defined by national cleavage structures, 
institutional structures, prevailing strategies and alliance structures. Furthermore, as 
opposed to the general conceptualisation of movement interests in PPM, the 
instrumental, subcultural and countercultural characteristics of a movement, and its 
relational experiences with the political system, were pivotal in explaining 
mobilisation strategies and impact (Kriesi et al, 1995: 236-237).      
 
Secondly, since the social constructionist perspective of Collective Action Frames 
(CAF) had provided a conceptual link between the duality of structures and agency in 
collective action, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) adopted this approach as a 
means of integrating the ‘cultural turn’ into SMT. Adapting Max Weber’s analogy that 
man ‘is suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun’, Clifford Geertz 
(1973: 5) postulated that culture represented those very webs of significance. 
Therefore, interpreting culture is a semiotic exercise of meaning in an ‘interworked 
system of construable signs’ (Geertz, 1973: 14). However, culture was not just 
systemic but also performative (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995: 5-8). For Ann 
Swidler (1995: 27), if culture influenced collective action, it was not by supplying the 
ends but providing ‘the vocabulary of meanings, the expressive symbols, and the 
emotional repertoire with which they can seek anything at all’. By extension, culture 
offers a ‘tool-kit’ of components that are used to construct ‘strategies of action’ 
(Swidler, 1986: 273).   
 
In an unprecedented time for the confrontation of human cultures (Melucci, 1995: 
41), CAF could not only highlight the role of culture in recruitment resources and pre-
existing networks, but it could also present a resonant view of the world that 
legitimises and motivates protest activity by mediating between structurally-
determined opportunities and the ‘processes by which the meaning and attributed 
significance of shifting political conditions is assessed’ (McAdam, 1994: 37-43)29. 
However, while a conceptualisation of culture through the lens of CAF could enhance 
understandings of movement emergence and impact, cultural variables could not be 
assessed independently in isolation but in coordination with developments in RMT 
                                                 
29
 Invoking Melucci’s (1995: 50-55) assertion that collective identities are complex processes involving semantics of meaning, CAF 
were also proposed to assist in the ‘conceptually muddy’ topic of collective identity to ‘reconstitute the individual self around a new 
and valued identity’ between the social psychological (dispositional) or post-material changes in industrial society (structural). (Hunt et 
al, 1994: 192; Freidman & McAdam, 1992: 169; Snow & McAdam, 2000: 62; Klandermans, 1992; Gamson, 1992).  
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and PPM to explain how culture acts as an opportunity and constraint, how framing 
constructs meaning and how social movement produces culture (Johnston & 
Klandermans, 1994: 21; McAdam, 1994: 45).  
 
Reflecting these discussions, Political Process Theory (PPT) consisted of three 
conceptual components (McAdam et al, 1996: 3-10). Firstly, the authors redefined 
political opportunity as encompassed by the relative openness or closure of the 
political system, the stability of elite alignments underpinning a polity, the presence of 
elites and the state’s capacity and history of repression. Secondly, ‘cultural framing’ 
was included as the link mediating between opportunity and action involving the 
‘conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of 
the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (McAdam 
et al, 1996: 6). Thirdly, maintaining the contributions of RMT, ‘mobilising structures’ 
remained unchanged as ‘those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage’ (McAdam et al, 1996: 3). By combining 
the dominant strands of SMT, PPT intended to encourage theorists to broaden their 
research programme to include cross-national studies beyond the confines of 
democratic Western polities (McAdam et al, 1996: xii-xiii).     
 
1.7 Misinterpreting Culture 
 
The most vehement criticism of PPT came from Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper 
(2004). Referring to the model as an untested ‘hegemonic’ paradigm, the authors, 
proponents of ‘cultural constructivism’, emphasised PPT’s conceptual deficiencies in 
relegating notions of strategy, agency and culture within immutable structures 
thereby failing to ascertain how structured opportunities and constraints are 
perceived in the inter-subjective understandings of different social movements 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 88, 90-91). Firstly, political opportunity structure, the 
reconceptualised and underlying tenet of PPT, was not only overly ‘political’ in nature 
but it engendered ‘virtually anything that…helped a movement mobilise or attain its 
goals’ (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 11). Similarly, although PPT claimed to increase the 
utility of the RMT-inspired concept of ‘mobilising structures’ by clarifying its definition 
of ‘resources’, the model had simply created another ‘sponge’ to soak up a wealth of 
potential opportunities (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 275; Meyer, 2004).    
 
Secondly, by separating ‘cultural framing’ from opportunities (McAdam, 1994: 39), 
not only had PPT omitted the influence of culture in shaping political and mobilising 
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structures, but the model had also failed to understand that cultural factors define 
and create opportunities presented as structural (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 9, 24, 
28). Rather than attempt to construct SMT based upon the microfoundations of 
agency, strategy and culture, an approach that places ‘human agency at the centre 
of movement analysis, for it operates at the centre of collective action’ (Morris, 2004: 
246), PPT was accused of propagating invariant models of structure that privilege 
conceptual hyperinflation and discard individuals from the equation (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2004: 76, 90, 92).    
 
In effect, by offering a conceptualisation that fused CAF with culture and incorporated 
these elements into PPM, PPT was guilty of employing ‘cultural framing’ as a 
corrective to remedy the discrepancies of PPM and ensure its survival in the face of 
new academic realities (Jasper, 2010: 965). In compartmentalising culture to a 
component of CAF for the purpose of connecting structural opportunities and SMOs, 
the ability of the latter to rationally and selectively deploy CAF as a resource in PPT 
not only underestimates the ubiquitous influence of culture, but it also structuralises 
agency by denying CAF its original remit of illustrating the dynamic interaction 
between society, the movement and individuals in which meaning is continuously 
contested and constructed (Tarrow, 1992: 197; Klandermans, 1992: 100; Williams, 
2004: 100-101; Whittier, 2002: 291). As the ‘elusive and ill-defined pseudoentity’ 
(Geertz, 1973: 29), culture is not simply determined a priori, deployed instrumentally 
as an identifiable and enabling ‘tool-kit’ or the exclusive preserve of an SMO, but it 
also represents a potentially debilitating force that is contained within semiotic codes, 
social practices and institutionalised structures (Williams, 2002: 329, 2004: 99; 
Swidler, 1995: 28-30).  
 
Independent of its association with culture, CAF were useful in conceptualising the 
activities of movement activists but overemphasised their cognitive elements 
(Williams, 2004: 93, 2002: 250-251). Although CAF implied the emergence of a 
symbolic congruence of consciousness and identity between the organisation and its 
members, the approach failed to recognise that ‘activists are multivocal rather than 
mono-ideological, consensual and passive’ (Platt & Williams, 2002: 356; Gamson, 
1995: 105-106). Therefore, in order to explain identity, solidarity and consciousness 
in collective action, one must migrate from a theory of SMOs to explore the mutually 
constitutive link between the individual (agency) and socio-cultural (structural) levels 
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in facilitating and constraining mobilisation (Gamson, 1992: 74; Whittier, 2002: 292-
295; Platt & Williams, 2002: 353)30. 
 
Reacting to these responses, McAdam (2004: 224-225) admitted that the ‘existing 
theoretical consensus is inadequate to account for the origins of the very movement 
that animated the perspective in the first place’. Citing his work on ‘contentious 
politics’, a relational model that aims to utilise insights from rational, cultural and 
structural approaches to ‘produce a program of inquiry centred on the detection of 
robust mechanisms and processes in contentious episodes’ (McAdam et al, 2001: 
304), McAdam (2004: 230) concluded that unless these perspectives are combined, 
‘we cannot hope to develop anything close to a complete understanding of the 
origins of social movements’.  
 
For Jasper (2010: 966, 2004: 3), these mechanisms remain structuralist and static by 
dismissing movement dynamism and eliminating the process of choice at the micro-
level. Ultimately, Jasper (2004: 12) believes that sociologists need to develop a 
social model that compensates for the ‘weaknesses of game theory’s individualistic 
and economic models…and structural sociology’s blindness to agency and action’.  
By way of an alternative, Jasper (2010: 965, 2004) proposed a ‘theory of action’, an 
approach to collective action that shifts the focus of inquiry to agency, strategy and 
culture. In this perspective, choices, which are explained by metaphors of meaning, 
rhetoric, emotions, morality, leadership and psychology, can only be assessed by 
considering culture as all action, including the perception of opportunities, the 
definition of resources, network mobilisation and participant motivation, which is 
filtered through cultural understandings. Consequently, these cultural meanings are 
also used to persuade audiences that they share interests, solidarity, identity and 
direction (Jasper, 2010: 967; 2007: 60, 93; 2004: 4).           
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 A range of SMT literature has attempted to provide new insights on CAF. Steinberg (2002: 209, 224) suggests that CAF lacks the 
sufficient tools to conceptualise culture as dynamic and relational so a dialogic analysis of ongoing social action must view ‘culture as 
a set of practices that occurs between power holders and challengers, sympathizers, authorities and other groups. Della Porta and 
Diani (1999: 78, 80-82) criticise framing for not considering the multiplicity of cultural models and recommend a link between symbolic 
production and political context, the result of which would entail an analysis of anti-system frames, realignment frames, inclusion 
frames and revitalisation frames. Hank Johnston (1995: 218, 241-242) proposes a microframe approach that would assess the 
dialogue between frame structures and the textual material on which they are based so that cultural and social influences are viewed 
through the lens of the individual.    
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1.8 Ideology and Religion in SMT  
 
The rising prevalence of ‘cultural framing’ invariably caused attention to the role of 
ideology in collective action. Whereas Geertz (1973) viewed ideology as an aspect of 
the cultural system that created meaning, Williams and Platt (2002: 335) have 
provided a more substantial definition in which ideology is an assemblage of ideas, 
expressed in a discourse constructing and mobilising activities that are oriented 
through moral, cognitive and emotive processes responding to failures or absences 
of cultural doctrine and structural circumstances in order to achieve interests in 
establishing or re-establishing idealised conceptions of past, present and future 
social conditions.  
 
Although receiving a brief mention in early forms of SMT (Turner & Killian, 1957), 
ideology has been traditionally neglected in favour of structural and rational 
alternatives. Following SMT’s response to the ‘cultural turn’, ideology was subsumed 
within the remit and responsibility of CAF. According to Oliver and Johnston (2000a: 
1), this placement failed to sufficiently address the relationship between CAF and the 
political concept of ideology. Rather than interpreting ideology as a complex 
interpretative schema that does not operate in a vacuum, the SMT promoted by PPT  
treated CAF as ‘fully formed cognitive structures that constitute part of the cultural 
tool kit of everyday life’ (Oliver & Johnston, 2000a: 3-5). By dismissing the notion of 
deliberation, differentiation and development of agents within social movements, 
CAF became a descriptive process and subsequently unable to explain how 
ideologies adopt, adapt and create content (Oliver & Johnston, 2000a: 7-14). 
 
This complexity and confusion is also evident in attempts to incorporate religion 
within SMT. In the 19th Century canon of sociology, religion was either perceived 
instrumentally, as facilitating the integration of societies and mediating between the 
individual and the state (Beckford, 1990: 2), or in the Durkheimian sense of providing 
an invaluable blueprint for the construction of a moral community. Regardless, during 
the Enlightenment period, an age characterised political ideology, scientific discovery 
and technological enquiry, the ‘secularisation credo’ (Gunning, 2007a: 11) diagnosed 
religion as antithetical to modern progression. Inheriting the predominant orthodoxy 
of their disciplinary predecessors, ‘breakdown’ theorists researched collective action 
in the context of fascism and communism, two ideologies that reduced religion as 
‘epiphenomenal, a declining force in a fully secularised world’ (Hannigan, 1991: 314). 
Although new episodes of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s inspired a 
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renaissance in SMT through RMT, NSM and PPM, these discussions further 
exacerbated the ‘insulation and isolation of the sociology of religion’ (Beckford, 1985; 
1986: 162). Consequently, invoking religion to understand social activity was 
‘underexplored – arguably ignored – in the academic literature on social movements’ 
(Smith, 1996: 2).   
 
Attempting to initiate a discussion with NSM, Beckford (1990: 9) emphasised that in a 
post-industrial age of ‘spirituality’ and ‘global ethic’, religious symbolism was 
becoming ‘increasingly cooptable by social activists trying to combat social 
problems’. Subsequently, elements innate to religion, such as ideological legitimation 
and universalistic values are conducive to the agendas of NSM. For Smith (1996: 6, 
10), religion also provided assets for collective action through motivation, resources 
and identity. Moreover, John Hannigan (1991: 316) proposed a ‘theoretical synthesis’ 
with NSM by breaking the ‘community closure’ of the sociology of religion (Beckford, 
1986: 16). Influenced by the work of Rodney Stark (1987) and John Lofland (1965, 
1993, 1995), ‘new religious movements’ (NRM) argued that religion was not simply 
an ‘epiphenomenal cloak for essentially material or political interests’ (Smith, 1996: 
8-9), but an invaluable method for observing and explaining ‘how and why people 
think and act religiously’ (Swatos, 1989: 153). Therefore, in an effort to prevent 
religion from the conceptual monopoly of other sociologists (Zald, 1982: 322; 
Robertson, 1985: 358), Hannigan (1991: 325-327) offered a synergy between NSM 
and NRM in which both represented ‘collective attempts to articulate new grievances, 
construct new identities, and innovate new forms of association’.       
 
Following these discussions, not only has Williams (1996: 377; 2002: 251-253) 
highlighted the dearth of conceptual tools with which to explain the role of religion in 
constructing legitimate ‘cognitive rationales’ that justify and motivate social change, 
but McAdam (et al, 1996; et al, 2001; 2004) and Jasper (2004) have also articulated 
the requirement of SMT to expand its remit beyond Western liberal democracies. 
Regardless, religion and social movements remained on ‘parallel discourses rather 
than enriching dialogues’ (Kniss & Burns, 2004). Examining 105 essays published in 
major sociological journals since Mayer Zald’s 1982 call to fuse the sociology of 
religion with social movements, only eight had addressed religion explicitly (Kniss & 
Burns, 2004). Nevertheless, the adoption and application of aspects of PPT by 
scholars analysing collective action in the Middle East, initially pioneered by Charles 
Kurzman (1996), have contributed valuable insights into the role of religion, 
especially Islam, through the SMT lens of political opportunities, mobilising structures 
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and cultural framing31. According to Charles Kurzman (2004: 295-298), the study of 
Islamist movements can provide SMT with an empirically testable subject that 
explores the challenging methodological questions encountered by Western 
academic engagement with collective action.  
 
In Egypt, not only did academics critique cultural framing in its inability to 
comprehend the movement activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in translating ideas 
and ideology, derived from Islam, into organisational practices, but in the absence of 
political opportunity structures, the Muslim Brotherhood deployed religion as a way of 
perceiving opportunities, generating mobilisational resources and motivating 
behaviour despite the constraints imposed by a repressive and closed institutional 
state framework (Munson, 2001: 497-506; Wickham, 2002: 4-18). Similarly, in his 
work on Hamas in Gaza, Jeroen Gunning (2007a) appraised SMT assumptions by 
assessing how the organisation manages and balances the complex and multi-
faceted relationship between religion, democracy and violence in framing ideas and 
motivating behaviour. Furthermore, while evaluating the mobilisation of political Islam 
in Turkey, Banu Eligur (2010) reiterated that SMT’s omission of religion failed to 
examine how movements frame Islam to enhance their appeal and called for a more 
dynamic interaction between political opportunity structure and movement 
entrepreneurs. For Bayat (2005,  2007), SMT’s Western-centric elevation of the state 
over civil society produced a parochial perspective of homogenous and coherent 
social units, a position that failed to recognise the differentiated and diverse 
composition of movements that have the capacity to change their environments 
without access to political power.  
          
Conclusion   
 
Garner (1997: 1) summarised that ‘more than any other field of sociology, the study 
of social movements is volatile because the phenomena under consideration change 
so rapidly’. This brief synopsis demonstrates a fundamental chasm between 
conceptual frameworks within SMT. The complexity of constructing and 
implementing an effective conceptual framework for collective action has split the 
field along dichotomous epistemological perspectives and dualistic methodological 
approaches. As scholars debate the relative prevalence of structure versus agency 
or material versus ideational factors in explaining the causal mechanisms motivating 
                                                 
31
 Kurzman (1996); Munson (2001); Wickham (2002); Hafez (2003); Wiktorowicz (2004); Bayat (2005); Gunning (2007a); Eligur 
(2010). The Political Process Model has also been applied to the Kurdish Nationalist Movement (Romano, 2006), the First Palestinian 
Intifada (Alimi, 2007) and the Second Palestinian Intifada (Araj and Brym, 2010).   
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collective action, it is no longer accurate to speak of a definitive ‘social movement 
theory’ with clear parameters, but to refer to a sub-discipline of sociology invigorated, 
yet fragmented, by ‘theories of social movement’.     
 
The trends and themes of this tautological intra-disciplinary debate recall the earlier 
discussions within field of Islamic studies. In both instances, each field is beset with 
conceptual questions that have produced polarisation, encouraged the pursuit of 
divergent practices and reproduced the logic as well as the characteristics of a 
divided discourse. Subsequently, enhancing the conceptualisation of social 
movements, particularly in the Middle East, remains a highly contested, debated and 
fractured exercise. However, this literature review has identified convergent 
commonalities between the ‘pluralist’ position within Islamic studies and the ‘critical’ 
branch of SMT. Specifically, rather than conform to an orthodoxy that prioritises 
structural and rational explanations of collective action, these proponents of 
revisionism seek to replace reductionist theories with new methods that reposition 
the epistemological focus to a sociological interpretivism responsible for 
conceptualising mobilisation through the lens of agency, strategy, culture and 
religion.  
 
While scholars have endeavoured to contextualise and subsequently problematise 
collective action by applying mainstream SMT to Islamist movements in the Middle 
East, these embryonic experiments misinterpret the objectives of theoretical 
examination by exhibiting a tendency ‘largely to “borrow” from rather than critically 
and productively engage with an thus contribute to, social movement theories’ 
(Bayat, 2010: 4). Commenting on the increasing irrelevance of traditional grand 
theories, Jasper (2010: 965) affirmed that ‘the passing of these giants from the 
intellectual stage has left a silence’. Therefore, in order to construct a viable and 
effective path to explain movement mobilisation in the Middle East, a more 
representational and rigorous conceptual framework of analytical tools must be 
devised that synthesises the respective contributions of the ‘pluralist’ and ‘critical’ 
schools of thought.  
 
The next chapter will attempt to address this challenge by exploring the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu as a potential intermediary and interlocutor between ‘pluralist’ 
Islamic studies and ‘critical’ SMT. Interestingly, both Jasper (2004, 2010) and 
McAdam (2011, 2012), scholars positioned on polarised ends of the SMT spectrum, 
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have invoked Bourdieu for enhancing their conceptualisations of collective action32. 
However, not only do they neglect to adequately credit Bourdieu with providing the 
methods behind their observations, but they also reference Bourdieu’s work 
selectively rather than acknowledge that his theoretical concepts are relationally 
inclusive and interdependent. Conversely, by transforming mutually exclusive 
dichotomies into mutually constituting dialectics, the adoption and application of 
Bourdieu’s sophisticated analytical tools can facilitate a conceptual process that 
bridges the chasm between Islamic studies and SMT to produce a more accurate 
understanding of Islamist movements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Jasper’s ‘Theory of Action’ (2004: 5, 2010), which is reminiscent of Bourdieu (1998), places actors in ‘strategic fields’, arenas 
governed by resources and rules in which actors judge ‘what new arenas their opponents can force them into, and what resources 
and skills they and other players control fro maneuvering in those arenas’. Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) suggest a theory of 
‘Strategic Action Fields’, a ‘meso level of social order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common 
understandings about the purposes of a field, the relationships and the rules’.   
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Chapter Two 
Introducing Metanoia into Social Movement Theory 
 
‘Social research is something much too serious and too difficult for us to allow ourselves to mistake 
scientific rigidity, which is the nemesis of intelligence and invention, for scientific rigor, and thus to 
deprive ourselves of this or that resource available in the full panoply of intellectual traditions of our 
discipline and of the sister disciplines of anthropology, economics, history, etc’. 
 - Pierre Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 227)  
 
‘A theoretical problem that is converted into a machine for research is set in motion, it becomes in a 
sense self-propelling, it is driven as much by difficulties it brings up as by the solutions it provides’.  
 - Pierre Bourdieu (1993a: 29)  
 
‘There is no denying that there exist dispositions to resist; and one of the tasks of sociology is precisely 
to examine under what conditions these dispositions are socially constituted, effectively triggered, and 
rendered politically efficient’.  
 - Pierre Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 81)  
 
In the previous chapter, a synopsis of collective action was provided in which 
seemingly incompatible dichotomies were identified within and between the fields of 
Islamic studies and SMT. In the case of the former, traditional disputes tend to 
oscillate around the importance of the ‘Islam’ adjective in accounting for the 
manifestation, motivation and movement of collective action in Muslim societies, 
leading to a perennial ontological and epistemological chasm between Orientalists, 
modernists and pluralists. Similarly, incommensurate sociological dualisms in SMT 
have ensured that scholars fundamentally disagree on the integral causes and 
components of collective action33. The lack of a cohesive explanatory model has 
added complexity and confusion in applying these approaches to empirical cases. 
Consequently, the conclusion indicated that the ‘pluralist’ branch of Islamic studies 
and the ‘critical’ school of SMT were manoeuvring away from the primacy of 
reductive conceptualisations that privilege the universal rationality of actors operating 
in their objectively structured environment to converge on the importance of agency, 
ideology and culture. While ‘pluralists’ are experimenting with the contextualisation of 
Islam within variable social conditions by adopting methodological techniques from 
other disciplines, ‘critical’ SMT seeks to revitalise the discipline by alluding to the 
differentiated, dynamic and diverse characteristics of movement mobilisation.   
 
                                                 
33
 These include reconciling the relative importance of agency/structure, subjectivism/objectivism, universalism/particularism, 
individual/social, materialist/ideationist and qualitative/quantitative perspectives.   
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As SMT provides an analytical framework that focuses on collective action across 
time and space without essentialising specifically geographical or religious factors, it 
is preferable to work within the remit of its pre-existing theoretical assumptions and 
incorporate the perspectives of ‘pluralist’ Islamic studies rather than attempt to 
construct and elaborate upon the latter emerging school of thought, which represents 
more of an ad hoc corrective than an alternative revision within the discipline. 
Nevertheless, traditional SMT is not without its challenges. In particular, there are 
four areas of academic incongruity that should be addressed in order to prevent SMT 
practitioners from engaging in tautological debates regarding the theoretical primacy 
of their respective epistemological priorities.           
 
Firstly, SMT remains restricted by its inability to effectively assess the weighted 
importance of the agency/structure dialectic. In the prevalent model proposed by 
Political Process Theory, mobilised actors are depicted as subservient to exogenous 
structures. In this respect, not only are agents rendered reactive to opportunities for 
collective action presented by the predominance of events beyond their control, but 
since the social movement organisation is responsible for translating these objective 
developments into the subjective perceptions of its supporters, agents are also 
characterised as passive receptacles bereft of the capacities to interpret 
opportunities independently. Furthermore, the mobilisation strategies devised by a 
social movement organisation are governed and determined by a structured 
definition of instrumental rationality that omits a nuanced approach that privileges the 
dynamism of situational contexts. Although the agency/structure dualism is perhaps 
the most enduring and contentious question across academic disciplines, effectively 
explaining the strategic motivations of movement mobilisation requires a conceptual 
framework that reconciles this complex distinction.   
 
Secondly, there is an inclination for mainstream SMT to promote a linear and uniform 
application of culture and ideology that simplifies the emergence and manifestation of 
collective action. While Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilising Structures and 
Collective Action Frames each draw upon the relevance of cultural and ideational 
factors in pre-existing repertoires of movement mobilisation, the identification, 
comprehension and appropriation of these structuralised forces are interpreted as 
attainable and deployable resources rather than contested as well as constantly 
structuring concepts. By extension, since social movement organisations are 
presumed to comprise of rational actors with instrumental interests, the struggle for 
ideas is not perceived as an enabling and disabling feature of collective action but as 
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a product to be acquired and utilised. In both instances, the multi-faceted complexity 
of culture and ideas in movement mobilisation is underexplored. Consequently, in 
order to induce SMT with a more nuanced conceptualisation of collective action, a 
relational approach is required in which culture and ideas are construed as 
entrenched elements within the immanent structures of the social world that generate 
and regulate practice while simultaneously providing actors with a set of parameters 
of possibilities for framing interests, accruing resources and motivating action.   
 
Thirdly, the prevailing Political Process Theory disproportionately channels the 
direction and purpose of mobilisation towards the end of political recognition and 
representation. Contrarily, episodes of collective action in the Middle East are not 
necessarily conceived or predicated on political aspirations. For example, Islamist 
Resistance movements propagate a holistic approach that positions them within 
concurrent spheres of activity. While engaging with the political institutions of the 
state may be a desired goal, Islamist Resistance movements expend a significant 
amount of effort in implementing other related objectives, such as sustaining their 
presence in military arenas as well as cultivating networks of social services in their 
communities. By constitution and composition, the structures that determine the 
logics and rules of these spheres are different. As a result, rather than construct an 
encompassing strategy, social movement actors must design customised 
mobilisation tactics that are applicable to and compatible with the legitimate practice 
of the sphere in question. Therefore, the most pertinent level of analysis is not only 
the exclusive pursuit of the political process but also the ability of a social movement 
to develop varying mobilisational strategies while relationally sustaining its positions 
within and between multiple spheres of activity.  
 
Lastly, traditional SMT has not sufficiently invested in conceptually explaining the 
relative change instigated by social movements within a prevailing political system. 
While SMT scholars may refer to ‘episodes’ or ‘lifecycles’ of collective action in 
determining the reasons behind the eruption and durability of social movements, PPT 
is unable to conceptually account for the trajectory or transition of movement 
mobilisation. Moreover, by focusing on the political dimension, the PPT subscribes to 
a Western-centric definition of change. Conforming to the precepts of New Social 
Movement Theory, some movements may consider the creation and preservation of 
a space within the social system as preferable to politicisation; for others, limited 
access to the political system may be construed as the optimal method for 
harmonising its positions across operational arenas without disproportionately 
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succumbing to the structured logic of a unipolar approach. Ultimately, in order to 
gauge effective indicators or indices of change, a redefinition of SMT is required to 
emphasise that movement practice evolves in mutual constitution to the structures of 
its situational context, a relationship that results in a range of strategies and 
directions for development.  
 
These four limitations, which this chapter will deal with in sequence, have contributed 
to SMT being perceived as a disjointed field of irreconcilable theories of social 
movement as opposed to a coherent dialogue of SMT frameworks. This intra-
disciplinary dissonance has been transposed beyond the field’s borders. 
Consequently, non-SMT scholars seeking to apply its framework(s) to empirical 
studies do so selectively with only a modicum of conceptual engagement. For 
example, academics from outside the discipline insist on implementing PPT as a 
general set of parameters for examining collective action, whereas within SMT, the 
traditional model that was devised in 1982 and revised in 1996 has become 
contested. Even its chief architect, Doug McAdam (2001, 2011, 2012), has defected 
from its initial assumptions. Nevertheless, the disparate voices within SMT compel 
others to extrapolate its most elementary and digestible forms to illustrate their 
arguments.    
 
In order to traverse inter/intra-disciplinary dichotomies, not only should a cross-
disciplinary syncretism be constructed, which combines elements of ‘pluralist’ Islamic 
studies and ‘critical’ SMT, but their respective perspectives should be placed within a 
refined analytical framework to propose a viable conceptual alternative to the 
inherent deficiencies of mainstream SMT. Consequently, this thesis posits that the 
analytical tools enshrined in Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’ can offer a useful 
intermediary between divergent positions by providing the methods with which to 
transform dichotomies into dialectics and enhance the conceptual strength of SMT in 
informing a framework that elevates and prioritises the notion of mutually constituted 
relationality for explaining the dynamic interaction between structure and agency, the 
multi-faceted role of culture and ideas, the multi-dimensional characteristics of 
differentiated social fields and the importance of a shifting situational context in 
determining perceived prospects for continuous mobilisation and movement 
evolution.  
 
For researchers interested in appraising the underlying tenets of their respective 
fields, Bourdieu represents the epitome of kritikos, the Ancient Greek term for 
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judgement that endeavours to critically challenge conventional wisdom (Grenfell, 
2010: 87-88). Moreover, the ISI Web of Science lists Bourdieu as the most cited 
sociologist in the world since 1990 (Santoro, 2011: 3-5). Despite this recognition, 
while Bourdieu’s epistemological and methodological insights are nominally referred 
to in ‘pluralist’ Islamic studies and ‘critical’ SMT, there has been no concerted effort 
to construct a cohesive framework of collective action by utilising his approach34. One 
reason for invocation over implementation could be the complex content and style of 
his writing in which ‘Bourdieu’s work in globo is still widely misunderstood, and its 
overall economy and internal logic remain elusive’ (Garnham & Williams, 1980: 209). 
Therefore, the application of selected parts of Bourdieu to explain different problems 
leads to a misreading of his overall theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 4). 
However, since the underlying tenet of Bourdieu’s framework is the mutually 
constituting and reinforcing relationality between concepts, picking aspects of his 
approach independent of their encompassing counterparts creates a methodological 
fallacy that distorts and devalues the potential of his analytical tools.  
 
Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’, developed over 30 books and 400 articles, deplores 
‘theoretical theory’ or ‘theoreticist theories’, the recurring Lakatosian tradition of 
theoretical explorations inclined towards analytical research that is abstract, 
parsimonious and formulates connections between comparable objects of enquiry, 
thereby constructing synthetic systems of independently conceptualised phenomena 
devoid of empirical investigation (Swartz, 1997: 5; Calhoun, 1993: 9). For Bourdieu 
(and Wacquant, 1992: 31-36, 161), research is simultaneously empirical, in 
confronting the world of observable phenomena, and theoretical, by engaging 
hypotheses regarding the underlying structure of relations through which 
observations are designed to capture with scientific theory emerging as ‘a 
programme of perception and of action – a scientific habitus – which is disclosed in 
the empirical work that actualises it’. Consequently, Bourdieu sought to instil 
metanoia, a ‘new gaze’ that encouraged an epistemological rupture precipitating ‘a 
mental revolution, a transformation of one’s whole vision of the social world’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 251).  
 
Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical employment of ‘tool kits’, Bourdieu 
created his own ‘analytical tools’, such as habitus, field, capital, doxa, orthodoxy, 
                                                 
34
 In Islamic studies, aspects of Bourdieu have been applied in Martin & Barzegar (2010) and Jung (2011). In SMT, although not 
adequately cited, Bourdieu is undoubtedly the inspiration behind Jasper’s (2004, 2010) ‘Theory of Action’ as well as Fligstein and 
McAdam’s ‘Strategic Action Fields’ (2011, 2012).  
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heterodoxy, illusio, hysteresis and collusio, to transcend perpetual dualisms, 
including theory and research, structure and agency, micro and macro, objectivism 
and subjectivism as well as the individual and society (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 
178). Since sociological language is politically and academically loaded with partisan 
preconceptions, Bourdieu’s artificial language acts as a precautionary measure to 
protect it from ‘naïve projections of common sense’ and to ensure that it is ‘inserted, 
locked into a network of relationships that impose their logical constraints’ (Bourdieu, 
1993a: 21). Therefore, these concepts mitigate against the futility of a corrupt 
sociological lexicon of systemic definitions while guaranteeing that their integrity is 
preserved with definitions applicable ‘only within the theoretical system they 
constitute, not in isolation’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 96).   
 
2.1 A Manual in Basic Bourdieuese35 
 
[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu, 2010: 101).  
 
Bourdieu (1987: 147) classified himself as a proponent of constructivist structuralism 
or structuralist constructivism. Subscribing to the main precept of structuralism, 
Bourdieu posited that objective structures are capable of orienting practices 
independently of agent consciousness. Concurrently, supporting a constructivist 
viewpoint, he maintained that ‘there is a social genesis to both schemes of 
perception, thought and action on one hand, and social structures on the other’ 
(Jackson, 2008: 164). Placing himself between the two traditionally divided pillars in 
social science, namely the objective physics of structural materialism and the 
subjective tenet of social phenomenology, Bourdieu believed that practice was 
directed by the mutually inclusive and dialectical constitution of these two poles. 
Inspired by notable phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Bourdieu (1988b: 773-787) challenged the ‘academic 
temple’ of structural-functionalism by arguing that agents were actively engaged in a 
struggle against their conditions and the context in which meaning and experience 
was transmitted (Fowler, 1997: 93, 99).        
 
In order to understand social life, one must conceive it as the ‘mutually constituting 
interaction of structures, dispositions and actions’ (Calhoun, 1993: 4). An individual’s 
activity is not only informed and orientated by its engagement with the social 
                                                 
35
  Term used by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: ix).   
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structure, but it also re-establishes and reproduces this social structure through 
practice. Therefore, Bourdieu’s objective was to design a ‘theory of structure as both 
structured (opus operatum, and thus open to objectification) and structuring (modus 
operandi, and thus generative of thought and action)’ (Grenfell, 2008: 45; 2010: 88). 
Reworking the previously insurmountable equation between the subjective and 
objective, Bourdieu’s field becomes a designated arena of objective, historical 
relations between positions that are allocated, related and consolidated by capital or 
the ‘distribution of material resources and means of appropriation of socially scarce 
goods and values’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 15-16). Completing the conceptual 
tripartite is the habitus, which represents a set of historical relations in the form of 
‘mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action’ that ‘function 
as symbolic templates for the practical activities of social agents’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 15-16). 
 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is arguably his most innovative and incisive legacy. 
More generative in composition than simply a repetitive ‘habit’, the habitus has been 
acquired through a historical process and durably incorporated into the transposable 
perceptions and dispositions of an agent (Bourdieu, 1993a: 86-87). While the notion 
of habitus, which seeks to account for agency and practice within structural 
conditions, has a philosophical precedent in pre-Bourdieusian parlance, Bourdieu’s 
sophisticated cultivation of this analytical tool, whether in explaining the responses of 
the Kabyle in Algeria to the advent of imposed economic structures (1979), the 
differing dispositions of academics within the French academic system (1988a) or 
illustrating the permutations of the distinction of taste (2010), has become a unique 
and definitive component within the explanatory framework of the ‘Theory of 
Practice’36. 
 
Initially, Bourdieu (1979: vii) described the habitus as a ‘system of durable, 
transposable dispositions which function as the generative basis of structured, 
objectively unified practices’. In other words, agents are partly structured by objective 
conditions but they are not viscerally predisposed to passively react to external 
constraints because agents also participate actively in structuring and reproducing 
these conditions. Whereas rational choice theory assumes a homo oeconomicus of 
utilitarian individualism and positivist materialism in which agents act freely, 
                                                 
36
 Whereas habitus resembles Aristotle’s hexis and Hegel’s ethos, Bourdieu seems to have been influenced by the work of Marcel 
Mauss (1872-1950) who used the term habitus to argue that ‘the human body is not regarded simply as a passive recipient of 
imposed, cultural imprints but as a self-developable means by which subjects achieve a range of human objects’ (Asad, 2003: 251-
252). Additionally, while Edmund Husserl wrote about the concept of habituality in phenomenology, the idea of memes and mimetics 
in Richard Dawkins’ (1976) theory of human social evolution also mimics Bourdieu’s habitus (Coker, 2008: 904-905).      
 67
consciously and instrumentally to maximise interests within the parameters of 
cost/benefit analyses, the habitus of agents does not fully determine autonomous 
action but responds with ‘regulated improvisation’ that is contingent upon the pre-
existing, mutually constituted relationship between structuring dispositions and 
structured dynamics (Bourdieu, 1977: 65; 2000: 138-139). By introducing the habitus, 
Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 19) is proposing another definition of agency in 
which rationality is ‘immanent in a historical system of social relations’. 
Consequently, practice is dictated by a combination of a system of durable 
dispositions of perception, identification and recognition that have been internalised, 
unconsciously through the existing social environment and consciously through 
formal learning (Jackson, 2008: 164). Therefore, agents are creative and inventive in 
being able to ‘generate appropriate and endlessly renewed strategies, but within the 
limits of structural constraints of which they are the product and which define them’ 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 138).          
 
This interpretation is not to suggest that the habitus is fixed, static and destined to 
move in a predictable or pre-meditated manner. Rather, Bourdieu explains that the 
habitus resembles a self-correcting programme that constantly evolves in a state of 
permanent motion and revision thereby enabling it to adapt, assimilate and adjust to 
changing conditions, even to the point of transformation (Bourdieu, 2000: 139; 
1993a: 87). In this respect, the habitus is a ‘generative principle of regulated 
improvisations’ with practice characterised as ‘a repertoire but not a melody’ (Bigo, 
2011: 242). Therefore, it is ‘informed by a kind of objective finality without being 
consciously organised in relations to an explicitly constituted end; intelligible and 
coherent without springing from an intention of coherence and a deliberate decision; 
adjusted to the future without being a product of a project or plan’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 
50-51).  
 
Moreover, since the habitus of agents provides the ‘grammar’ for practices but never 
constitutes the text of those practices, agents are also afforded opportunities for 
improvisation beyond the structuring of the habitus as they are concurrently engaged 
in mutually dialectic relationship with a contextual environment that supplies the text 
for practice. Seen through this prism, social movement scholars working largely 
outside the confines of SMT have adopted Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to recapture 
the dynamism of agency within collective action (Husu, 2013; Crossley 2003, 2008; 
Haluza-Delay, 2008). However, while the concept of habitus acknowledges agency, 
improvisation and transformation, Bourdieu (1993a: 87) contends that the extent of 
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this process is inexorably linked to the structure of objective conditions in which 
agents are produced, positioned, perceive and practice.  
 
Therefore, in order to apply a Bourdieusian analysis, one cannot solely examine the 
composition or characteristics of the habitus independent of its constituent parts. 
Consequently, the habitus only exists and operates in accordance with, and in 
response to, objective structures that generate and regulate action. In this context, 
action obeys a ‘practical logic’ as the habitus selects responses that are reasonable 
in considering what is deemed appropriate and acceptable (Schatzki, 1997: 287-
288). To neglect the rules governing perception and practice risks committing a 
methodological fallacy by disregarding that the conceptual cohabitation between 
habitus and field involves an interconnected interaction of ‘ontological complicity’ 
representing ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Grenfell, 2010: 89). Rather than choose 
between the field, which ascribes meaning and value, and the habitus, which 
activates these properties, it is only ‘by reference to the space in the game which 
defines them and which they seek to maintain or redefine, can one understand the 
strategies, individual or collective, spontaneous or organized, which are aimed at 
conserving, transforming or transforming so as to conserve’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 153).   
 
The field is the ‘epistemological priority’ as ‘dispositions constituting the cultivated 
habitus are only formed, only function and are only valid in a field’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 
87). The field is a dynamic, semi-autonomous ‘network, or configuration, of objective 
relations between positions’, a structure of rules and principles that provides and 
limits the scope of practice (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 97). Since the allocation 
and distribution of capital is unequal, the field represents a theatre of competition and 
struggle in which strategic agents shape and reshape the field through constant 
negotiation and contestation. For these reasons, the relational dynamics and 
components within a field are often illustrated by referring to the characteristics of a 
game. To be inducted into its zonal sphere of influence, players must subscribe to a 
shared belief, an instinctive ‘feel’ for the game, a recognition of its operational 
parameters and inherent meaning, thereby becoming participant stakeholders that 
are invested in performing its purpose.         
 
For Bourdieu (2000: 96), the fundamental law (nomos) of the game, ‘irreducible and 
incommensurable with any other law or related to any other field’, is represented as 
doxa. Similar to norms in international relations, doxa encompasses everything 
‘which goes without saying’, the set of fundamental beliefs, latently pre-reflexive and 
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semi-conscious but shaped by intuitive dispositions and practical experience, which 
supply the game with its inter-subjective, tacit and unwitting allegiance (Bourdieu, 
2000: 16; 1993a: 73-74; Jackson, 2008: 167-168; Deer, 2008: 120). Those who 
actively seek to reinforce the prevalent doxa within the field propagate positions of 
orthodoxy whereas those seeking to revise the underlying principles of doxa promote 
heterodoxy. Nevertheless, since agents are not masters of knowledge, capable of 
commanding or controlling the contextual conditions of their practice, ‘misrecognition’ 
or allodoxia  results from  misconstrued or misguided action in which agents falsely 
perceive themselves as interpreting or representing legitimate forms of practice 
(Bourdieu, 2000: 185).  
 
Possessing and nurturing a belief in the legitimacy of the game while recognising its 
boundaries and contributing to the reproduction of its logic compels each player to 
become an investor in the value of stakes on offer. By extension, interest is an 
integral part of the game by the default of participation. Although Bourdieu avoided 
the universalistic terminology of Weber’s instrumental rationality or Adam Smith’s 
homo capitalisticus, both of which defined interest as a calculable, visible and 
tangible value, he was captivated by the multi-dimensional facets of interest in which 
the particular logic of a field exudes and sanctions its own motivations ‘for each field 
fills the empty bottle of interest with a different wine’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 
25-26). Therefore, illusio, the field-centric ‘fundamental belief in the interest of the 
game and the value of stakes inherent to membership’, replaces conventional 
conceptualisations of interest (Bourdieu, 2000: 11). Relationally constructed as 
opposed to instrumentally pre-determined, illusio is a prerequisite investment by all 
participants of the field, whether proponents of orthodoxy or heterodoxy. 
Furthermore, illusio infers a deeper involvement that is not limited to economic or 
material interest (Bourdieu, 2010: 79). Principally, it is an ‘affective investment’, 
which is generated in the link between the field (a game offering the stakes) and the 
habitus (a system of dispositions synchronised to the game), a belief that produces 
‘the feel of the game and the stakes, which implies both the inclination and the 
capacity to play the game, to take an interest in the game, to be taken up, taken in by 
the game’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 18). 
 
The last element of Bourdieu’s conceptual formula is capital, the resource that 
classifies stratification and explains how agents devise strategies to enable their 
manoeuvrability in a designated field. Ultimately, capital acts as a ‘medium of 
communication’ between habitus and field (Grenfell, 2010: 89). Rather than reduced 
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to material resources, various types of capital can be detected depending on the 
specific currencies available within a given field. Nevertheless, Bourdieu indicates 
that there are four types of identifiable capital – cultural, economic, social and 
symbolic - ubiquitous in all fields and which agents can possess, acquire and deploy 
for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing their positions. Moreover, since the 
allocation, distribution and accumulation of capital is weighted differently as assigned 
and ascribed meanings and values vary depending on the logic of the field in 
question, the same practice performed in two fields may elicit different responses. 
 
As culture is interpreted as an omnipresent feature of each field, inseparable from its 
inherent illusio, Bourdieu was concerned with assessing how cultural resources, 
processes and institutions hold individuals in competitive and self-perpetuating 
hierarchies of domination (Swartz, 1997: 6). Without culture, ‘there is no race, no 
competition’ but it is produced ‘by the very race and competition which it produces’ 
(Bourdieu, 2010: 247). Therefore, culture is not simply an exogenously structured 
factor that contributes to the constitution of a field, but it is also a dynamic form of 
capital, an attainable and appropriational resource for collection and consumption. 
Although empirical intra-field analysis is required to decipher the specific meaning, 
characteristics and value of cultural capital, on an abstract level, it consists of 
intellectual and educational qualifications (Fowler, 1997: 31). Cognisant of the 
diversification of this category, Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 119) emphasised that 
the skills and aptitude expressed by cultural capital exist in three forms: embodied, 
objectified or institutionalised. Exceeding the confines of the academic arena, cultural 
capital also implies specialised knowledge or experience in comprehending and 
conveying the origin, composition or purpose of practice that is subsequently 
perceived as recognised and legitimate by agents within the structures of a specific 
field.  
 
The second form of currency noticeable in each field is objectively quantifiable values 
of economic capital. Either inherited or acquired, and depending on its relative 
signification within a particular field, the deployment of these tangible material 
resources as mutually accepted commodities of exchange can alter or negotiate 
one’s position as well as persuade, co-opt or incentivise others to adopt dispositions 
or perceptions that subscribe to a specific practice. Conversely, the unequal 
distribution of economic capital can equally limit or prevent an agent’s capacity to 
advance their relational position. Thirdly, social capital refers to the sum of 
resources, either ‘actual or virtual’, that are endowed on an agent or group by ‘virtue 
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of possessing a durable network of institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). Akin to the 
concept of Mobilising Structures in mainstream SMT, these organic or strategic 
associations, affiliations and partnerships of formal or informal constitution, 
formulated either out of conviction or convenience, enable or disable agents from 
enhancing their positions in their respective fields of operation.  
 
Unlike its field counterparts, symbolic capital is more challenging to quantify. Similar 
to the philosophical pursuit of kleos (‘glory’) or arete (‘excellence’) in Ancient Athens, 
symbolic capital resembles the quest for honour and prestige. Inherently 
recognisable but intangible, symbolic capital signifies the charismatic metamorphosis 
of cultural, social and economic capital into reverence and authority. For Bourdieu 
(2000: 242), this resource is ‘what every kind of capital becomes when it is 
misrecognized as capital, that is, as force, a power or capacity for (actual or 
potential) exploitation, and therefore recognized as legitimate’. In other words, 
symbolic capital occurs when a habitus, suffering from a deficiency of self-esteem, 
devoid of meaning or cognitively paralysed, is predisposed to grant acceptance and 
justification on capital thereby converting and elevating it to symbolically normative 
proportions.    
 
Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 98-99; 1993a: 34-35) frequently invoked the analogy 
of a card game to illuminate the strategic interplay between capitals and their uses. 
Akin to the value of cards in a deck, the hierarchy of capital (economic, social, 
cultural and symbolic) varies depending on the game (field) and its immanent laws 
(doxa). For example, two players with the same overall capital can differ in position 
as well as strategy based on the relative impact of their attributes. Each player 
(habitus) shares a belief in the stakes of playing the game (illusio) and starts with 
their specific allocation of tokens divided by volume and category (capital). 
Subsequently, a player’s move is informed by three factors: firstly, by the cumulative 
and proportional weight of the tokens held; secondly, by the player’s perceptions and 
dispositions derived from previous experience of the game; and thirdly, by the 
player’s ability to assess the presumed position and predisposed tactics of their 
opponents. Equipped with these options, players either subscribe to the expected 
laws of the game by diligently protecting and enhancing their capital or strive to 
negotiate and revise the relative value of their capital by altering the exchange rate, a 
process that discredits conventional strategies as irrelevant and redundant.   
 
 72
2.2 Addressing Culture and Ideology  
 
Bourdieu’s formula of habitus, field and capital formula also provides an alternative to 
pre-existing discourses on culture and ideology. Traditionally, ‘“culture” stood for 
what humans can do; “nature” for what humans must obey’ (Bauman, 1999: x). 
Nevertheless, this seemingly distinct definition became problematic as reproductive 
human activity caused academics to consider whether culture should be perceived 
as a restraining structural force reminiscent of the rigidity of nature. The resulting 
ambiguity centred on the negotiated balance between culture as an objectively 
immanent force or a subjectively attainable commodity37. Most notably, the 
Weberian-inspired Geertz (1973: 89) attempted to traverse the dualist schism by 
referring to culture as man-made ‘webs of significance’: ‘an historically transmitted 
pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and 
develop their knowledge about and their attitude toward life’. 
 
Bourdieu presents interpretations of culture as a dichotomy between structuralists 
and functionalists. Following from Geertz, the former elevated culture to a structured 
structure in which a set of signs and symbols comprise systems of communication 
and knowledge that restrict human activity (Grenfell, 2010: 88; 2008: 45). 
Subsequently, culture is reduced to a ‘corpus of intergenerationally transmissible 
knowledge’, separated from ‘the ways in which it is put to use in practical contexts of 
perception and action’ (Ingold in Lizardo, 2011: 31). Elaborating on this point, Asad 
(1983: 252) argued that a thick description of culture accepts a ‘hiatus’ between 
‘(external) symbols and (internal) dispositions, which parallels the hiatus between 
“cultural system” and “social reality”’. Therefore, by neglecting the relational link 
between objective semiotics and subjective ‘life’, this perspective omitted relations of 
power that are an integral ingredient of culture (Asad, 1983: 238-239). 
 
Alternatively, functionalists, such as Marx and Durkheim, propagated a subjectivist 
line interpreting culture as a product of social infrastructure, a structuring structure 
that reified ideology as an imposition of the dominant class in the critical tradition 
while maintaining social control and moral authority in the positivist tradition (Grenfell, 
2010: 88: 2008: 45). Therefore, in order to question how culture works ‘in the 
production of knowledgeable actors and in the reproduction and transformation of 
                                                 
37
 Since the coining of the term ‘culture’ at the end of the 18th Century, most notable sociologists have grappled with its meaning, 
including Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Talcott Parsons, Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck.  
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systems of power and inequality’, Bourdieu intended to bridge the 
structuralist/functionalist divide by reconciling the two conflicting positions in a 
relational approach that examined structures as symbolic systems to uncover the 
logic of practice which gives them their structuring power (Lizardo, 2011: 30). In other 
words, Bourdieu studied structure dialectically and simultaneously as both structured 
and structuring (Grenfell, 2008: 45). 
 
Adopting a Bourdieusian lens, culture is afforded two inter-related roles. Firstly, since 
all fields are structured arenas beset by power struggles, they are irrevocably 
connected to culture. Subsequently, culture embodies the fundamental basis of the 
game, the stakes (illusio) that agents not only recognise but compete over. Within 
these struggles, Bourdieu (2010: 248) insisted that ‘the value of culture is generated, 
or…belief in the value of culture, interest in culture and the interest of culture – which 
are not self-evident…to induce belief in the innateness of the desire to play and the 
pleasure of playing’. Therefore, culture, which encompasses history, religion, 
language and mores, is the structured product of power relations that is inherited and 
imprinted as the interest generating/regulating an agent’s dispositions to practice. 
Since the habitus is also a structuring agent, the manifestation, meaning and 
mutability of culture within a given field is commensurably reliant upon the mutually 
constituted acceptance, adoption and application of the stakes by agents engaged in 
competitive fields of struggle.   
 
Secondly, Bourdieu ‘de-culturalised’ culture by conceptualising it as an acquistional 
form of capital at the disposal of strategically disposed agents. By extension, culture 
ceases to operate in the transcendental realms of immanence and becomes 
anthropomorphic, a qualifiable resource used by agents as a tool in power relations. 
By identifying culture relationally as one of four currencies of capital, Bourdieu 
bisected the assumptions of two ‘radically opposing’ intellectual traditions: Marxism, 
which holds that culture is a power resource standing in its own right; and humanism, 
which elevates culture as a structured value (Swartz, 1997: 288). Ultimately, from a 
Bourdieusian perspective, cultural capital, contextualised within a systemic structure 
of power, provides an opportunity for agents responsible for accumulating and 
disseminating culture to pursue pragmatic interests in enhancing their position within 
their respective fields of practice.  
 
In terms of ideology, Bourdieu (2010: 67) generally derided a hegemonically 
monopolised and colonised concept that represents merely an ‘illusion consistent 
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with interest’38. While ‘ideology’ may symbolise a ‘well-grounded illusion’, its 
conceptualisation would be a considerable methodological error as ‘“ideology”…does 
not appear as such, to us and to itself, and it is this misrecognition that gives it its 
symbolic efficacy’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 250). Although sharing an inter-
subjective appreciation for the ‘belief’ and ‘purpose’ of the game (illusio), each field 
represents a polarised struggle between dominant and dominated agents that is 
managed by a system of rules (doxa). Subsequently, agents acquire and deploy 
different types of capital depending on whether they promote orthodoxy or propagate 
heterodoxy. In this gerrymandering for position, predominantly dominant actors 
endeavour to achieve symbolic capital, which enables them to dictate legitimate 
meaning and knowledge, or what Bourdieu labels as the exertion of symbolic power 
and symbolic violence. Since Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 13) defined ‘symbolic 
systems’ in a similar fashion to Marxist ‘ideologies’ or Weberian ‘theodicies’ as 
instruments of knowledge and domination that delineate the boundaries of the social 
world in the context of interests, the term orthodoxy could be interpreted as aligning 
with the notion of a ‘dominant ideology’. While this is an erroneous correlation, 
invoking Louis Althusser’s insights on ‘ideology’ demonstrates that Bourdieu should 
not be relegated to the periphery of debates on the concept.           
 
Firstly, Althusser’s (2008: 39) thesis on ideology stated that ‘what is represented in 
ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence 
of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in 
which they live’39. This rendering resonates with Bourdieu’s dismissal of ideology as 
illusory and meaningless. Secondly, Althusser (2008: 40) maintained that ideology 
‘always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is 
material’. The recognition of these inscribed rituals that govern action may provide 
the subject consciousness and demonstrate how ideology ‘is realized and realizes 
itself’ until it becomes the ruling ideology but ‘in no sense does it give us the 
(scientific) knowledge of the mechanism of this recognition’ (Althusser, 2008: 59; 41-
47). Again, Bourdieu would concur with the analysis of Althusser’s argument. In 
particular, the constituting relationship between the ideological apparatus and the 
subject’s practices reflects the inextricable link between habitus and field with the 
ruling ideology of the dominant over the dominated comparable to the reinforcement 
of orthodoxy over heterodoxy in Bourdieuese. However, whether expressed through 
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 Bourdieu (1993a: 70) stated that ‘I have never once used here the expression “dominant ideology”…my whole effort is aimed at 
destroying verbal and mental automatisms like the linkage between dominant class/dominant ideology’. 
39
 Althusser (2008: 32-33) notes that ideology was a term invented by Pierre Cabanis (1757-1808) and Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) 
while positing that it has no history as it ‘is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness’.  
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dominant ‘ideology’ or conveyed through symbolic power, both are synthetic forces of 
power, which the dominated are disposed to misconstrue and misattribute as 
legitimate within their structured environment. For these reasons, Bourdieu illustrated 
his theory by creating unloaded language that avoided contributing to the 
perpetuation of ‘ideology’ as an epistemological priority.  
 
‘If I have little by little come to shun the use of the word 
“ideology”…It is above all because, by evoking the order of ideas, 
and of action by ideas and on ideas, it inclines one to forget the 
most powerful mechanisms of the maintenance of the symbolic 
order, the two-fold naturalization which results from the inscription 
of the social in things and in bodies…with the resulting effects of 
symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 181).       
 
Since Bourdieu was concerned with examining social phenomena from the enduring 
struggle for power over culture, religion becomes an inferred discussion within his 
broader conceptual framework with Bourdieu (1993a: 147) remarking that ‘the 
sociology of culture is the sociology of religion of our time’. However, it is important to 
briefly incorporate Bourdieu’s insights into religion as it is an undeniable source and 
driver for Islamist mobilisation. Firstly, while Islam is inseparable from culture, the 
power of culture evokes a diversity of dimensions. For neo/new Orientalists, Islamic 
culture is static and immutable; for modernists, Western culture is a unipolar force 
that precipitates reactionary responses in Islam; and for pluralists, culture is 
periodically contested, negotiated and revised as a dialectic between agents and 
their situational environment. In this context, religion, like culture, cannot be treated 
as a monolithically transcendental or ethereal force impervious to the effects of 
history. Critiquing Geertz’s structurally semiotic conceptualisation of religion, Asad 
(1993: 53; 1983: 251) argued that reaching a universal definition of religion is futile 
because:      
 
‘religious symbols…cannot be understood independently of their 
historical relations with nonreligious symbols or of their articulation in 
and of social life, in which work and power are always crucial…It is that 
different kinds of practice and discourse are intrinsic to the field which 
religious representations (like any representation) acquire their identity 
and truthfulness’.  
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Asad’s observation, in which religion is inspected through the prism of power and 
practice, complements Bourdieu’s conceptualisation. In cultural terms, Islam becomes 
part of the ‘purpose’ and ‘belief’ (illusio) that ties the habitus towards a particular field. 
Therefore, the task is not to discover the theoretical essence of religion but to 
contextualise the perception of Islam and its interaction within the existing social 
(power) structures of the field. The habitus is disposed to have an inscribed 
understanding of Islam in an institutionalised setting but how the meaning of Islam is 
(re)produced depends on the continual practice of agents in accordance and 
coordination with the rules of intra-field dynamics. 
 
Secondly, and by the logic that all fields are fields of culture, there are two reasons 
why Bourdieu would interpret Islam as an independent sub-field of analysis, such as 
in the pedagogic scholarship of academia or in localised Muslim communities of 
religious exchange, rather than essentialising its influence as a core field of 
overarching inquiry. Primarily, ‘the connexion between religious theory and practice is 
fundamentally a matter of power – of disciplines creating religion, interpreting true 
meanings, forbidding certain utterances and practice and authorising others’ (Asad, 
1983: 246). Subsequently, since Islam is reliant on the social reality of perception, 
practice and power within relational contexts, the permutation and manifestation of its 
epistemological relevance lies within intra-field dynamics as opposed to exclusively 
providing the intrinsic laws with which to investigate the generative and regulative 
practice within a core field of social interaction. Furthermore, since all fields are 
struggles over culture by definition, the reification of Islam to the epistemological 
primacy of its own independent core field not only dismisses other cultural forces that 
have contributed to shaping the religion, but it also undermines the ubiquitous role of 
Islam in determining dispositions and perceptions for motivating practice within a 
multiplicity of fields.   
 
Thirdly, Islam is not only a structured and structuring aspect in the illusio of a field, but 
it is also a strategically as well as instrumentally acquired and deployed resource in 
the pursuit of advancing one’s interests and position. In particular, and depending on 
the intrinsic value bestowed on its recognition and legitimacy within a specific field, 
Islam is a form of cultural capital, in which religious qualifications and experienced 
knowledge become commodities for accumulation and appropriation. However, over 
an extensive historical period of socialised practice, religions have exceeded their 
confinement to cultural capital to develop their utility in mobilising other forms of 
strategic field movement. For example, it is incumbent on every practising Muslim to 
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pay zakat, a compulsory tax levied on one’s annual income. If this revenue is 
collected by a religious leader or institution, the receiving agent is able to acquire 
legitimate currencies of economic capital with which to enhance their position. 
Moreover, routinised practice in Muslim societies, such as mosque attendance, 
commemorative rituals or organisational membership, create informal and formal 
networks that provide an agent with considerable values of social capital. The 
transferability and conversion of religion from cultural to economic and social capital 
does not preclude other avenues for accruing capital. However, contrary to the 
limiting assumptions of religious capital, the cross-capital applicability of religion 
renders it a diversified source for intra-field movement40. 
 
Fourthly, and by extension, in fields where Muslim practice is a contributing factor to 
field orthodoxy, for instance in Muslim-majority societies, agents will endeavour to 
perpetuate or propel their legitimate capital towards symbolic proportions thereby 
ensuring that heterodox positions, either occupied by other Muslims or non-Muslims, 
remain suppressed and neutralised. As Asad (1986: 16), explained, ‘wherever 
Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct practices, and 
to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of 
orthodoxy’. However, while the predominant orthodoxy may expend capital to 
discredit, devalue or diminish heterodox practices, agents subsumed by orthodoxy 
can still translate cultural, economic and social capital into symbolic capital as long as 
other agents are disposed to perceive its meaning as credible in relation to intra-field 
dynamics. Thus, it is the embedded position of religion within power structures, and 
not its conceptual substance, that determines practice.       
 
Therefore, the religious does not explain the social; the social conceptualises the 
religious. Adopting a Bourdieusian lens, Muslim societies can be explained by 
preparing and applying a two-pronged approach. Firstly, historical conditions and 
power structures should be explored to ascertain how Islam manifests in its 
situational context within a designated field of cultural struggle. Secondly, this 
structured environment requires examination to deduce how it enables the habitus to 
instigate opportunities for strategic movement and to facilitate ‘the production and 
maintenance of specific discursive traditions, or their transformation – and the efforts 
of practitioners to achieve coherence’ (Asad, 1986: 11, 17).      
 
                                                 
40
 Similar to the debate regarding religion as its own core field, religion cannot be reduced to religious capital. Firstly, due to its 
differentiated character, religion has no objective or ontological meaning without its contextualisation in existing social structures. 
Secondly, creating religious capital as a separate category would underplay religion’s role in acquiring other forms of capital.   
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2.3 Collective Action and Transferability  
 
By their construction and constitution, fields are systemic and hierarchical structures 
of recurring power relations between agents and structures. Each agent (habitus), 
subscribing to the purpose and interest of participating in the stakes on offer (illusio), 
is subject to, and deeply embedded in the laws (doxa) of the field, employing 
recognised values of capital to either maintain or enhance their position. As fields 
represent competitive arenas of divergent and differentiated dispositions divided by 
widening chasms caused by the unequal distribution of capital, a polarisation 
between orthodox and heterodox practice emerges. While agents may act as 
individualised subjects, equipped with their respective practices, this does not 
preclude the intra- and inter-field possibility of related habiti lodged in similar 
positions and coalescing organically or strategically through solidaristic interests41. 
 
Consequently, agents in similar positions within or between fields may experience 
disposition alignment or congruent actions resulting in the mobilisation and 
collaboration of habiti in practices of mutual perception and purpose. While Bourdieu 
did not explicitly address collective action in extensive detail, his analytical tools 
implicitly provide the means with which to examine social movement (Swartz, 1997: 
186). In particular, Bourdieu (2000: 145) referred to collusio, a situation in which 
there is an ‘implicit collusion among all the agents who are products of similar 
conditions and conditionings’. In this mutually reinforcing relationship, each agent 
discovers ‘in the conduct of all his peers the ratification and legitimation (‘the done 
thing’) of his own conduct, which, in return, ratifies and, if need be, rectifies the 
conduct of others’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 145). These socialised solidarities (collusio), 
rooted in the dialectic of shared perceptions and experiences (habitus) to the social 
environment (field) and their share of capital, produce collective dispositions of 
practice.  
 
Equipped with the concept of collusio, Bourdieu offers a solution to the commonly 
contested ‘free rider’ challenge in SMT. Since the homogeneity of conditions 
facilitates the objective homogenising of habiti and allows practices to be 
homogenised, the bond between habiti is not superficial or transient, inferring a 
consciously non-committal or fickle stance, but constitutes an intrinsic bond through 
‘conductorless orchestration’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 58; Swartz, 1997: 105). These joint 
                                                 
41
  Bourdieu uses the term habituses but this thesis will refer to the plural of habitus as habiti. 
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dispositions of interest and position also lead agents to display the same social 
conatus, a practice which ‘inclines agents to strive to reproduce at a constant or an 
increasing rate the properties constituting their social identity, without even needing 
to do this deliberately or consciously’ (Bourdieu, 1988: 176). This process of collusio 
is further accelerated by the inherently competitive logic of the field, which organises 
and categorises agents into distinct classes that become ‘the basis of the 
representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization’ 
(Bourdieu, 2010: 481). In effect, the construction of these stratifications exemplifies 
and exacerbates the exercise of symbolic power, the ‘simultaneous act of making 
conceptual and social discriminations’ (Swartz, 1997: 87). While SMT 
disproportionately relies on CAF for conceptualising the practice of solidarity instilled 
amongst agents by social movement organisations, the concept of collusio both 
within and between fields provides a robust explanation for the prospect of 
convergence in collective action.     
 
Firstly, by virtue of their structured dispositions of practice, the dominant continue to 
reinforce their distinctive positions through the deployment of their superior values of 
capital. The symbolic capital accrued from the validation and legitimation of this 
reproductive action justifies their role as the recognised defenders of the field’s doxa. 
This collective practice, whether the product of a subconscious adherence to an 
innate blueprint of behaviour or the strategic execution of a visceral sense of 
intuition, maintains orthodoxy, which, in turn, sustains the prevailing interpretation of 
doxa within the field and suppresses heterodoxy. By extension, the structured 
construction of illusio, the inter-subjective perception of ‘belief’ dictating the barriers 
for entry and the value of stock required to be inducted and progress, remains as 
agents continue to structure the conventional constitution of the field.  
 
Secondly, in a similar vein, collusio implies the formation of homogenous, solidarised 
groups comprising the subservient subjects of a field. Either coalescing around 
dispositions inclined to cooperate or strategically acting to collaborate, the heterodox 
practice of agents with equal levels and perceptions of capital form a collective front 
to advance their positions. This distinction is the predominant struggle in each field 
as orthodox practice seeks to acquire and deploy capital to preserve the status quo 
whereas heterodox practice attempts to seize on perceived opportunities to 
accumulate legitimacy for advocating revisionist approaches. Additionally, aside from 
this intra-field fragmentation between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, there is a third 
example of collusio that occurs within the two classifications. Not only are there 
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prospects in field dynamics for intra-orthodoxy and intra-heterodoxy collusio to 
emerge over legitimate modes of practice, but in some instances, sub-branches of 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy may converge to achieve mutual interests. In either case, 
the arrangement of collusio is ultimately dependent on the harmonisation of 
strategies directed by dispositional and positional considerations regarding the 
alignment of habitus, field and capital towards a particular practice and purpose. 
 
An essential component of identifying classifications in a designated field and 
contributing to the endurance of cleavages depends on the ability of the group ‘to get 
itself recognized, to get itself noticed and admitted, and so to win a place in the social 
order’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 483). Correlating to and augmenting the SMT concept of 
CAF, a group is ‘defined as much by its being-perceived as by its being’ and must 
therefore distinguish itself from others by appropriating practices, adopting stigmata 
that delineate boundaries and instilling social identity (Bourdieu, 2010: 484-485; 
Swartz, 1997: 186). By doing so, a mutual process of reinforced classification is 
conceived in which those who associate with them thereby stratifying themselves ‘in 
the eyes of other classifying subjects’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 484).       
 
In this way, language invariably becomes an indispensable component in executing 
classification strategies as groups devise a name and mobilise around the ‘unifying 
power of a word’ to legitimate and consolidate its existence (Bourdieu, 2010: 483). 
On this topic, Bourdieu (1991: 8) dedicates significant attention to the power of 
linguistics, an aspect he believes is absent in the discipline. For Bourdieu (1991: 7-
9), purveyors of language are afforded recognition and legitimacy not simply because 
of their ability to deploy pithy, attractive and resonant prose, but their entitlement 
derives from their ‘capacity to produce expressions which are appropriate for 
particular situations’. Applying Bourdieu’s formula, prospective speakers, similar to 
Weber’s charismatic leader, are governed by a linguistic habitus and therefore 
unable to improvise from a carte blanche of terms. Instead, language is concocted in 
a relational context as the rhetorician operates within the confines of what their 
dispositions deem appropriate considering the inter-subjective comprehension of 
language within a designated field. Moreover, complementing observations evident in 
aspects of SMT (Johnston, 2008), in order to achieve symbolic status, an aspiring 
orator must also cater their techniques to appeal to agents from varying positions 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 27-28).  
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In this context, field rules that govern individualised habiti while creating opportunities 
for manoeuvrability can also be applied to collective habiti (collusio). Although fields 
are ‘profoundly hierarchized, with dominant social agents and institutions having 
considerable power to determine what happens within it’, denying agents the ability 
to mobilise would undermine the principles of Bourdieu’s framework (Thomson, 
2008: 73). Bourdieu (1988: 177) revealed that the solidarity of homologous positions 
can feasibly augment ‘the probability of constituting a mobilized and socially active 
group’. Therefore, the game may be ‘rigged’ in favour of the dominant players but the 
‘dominated, in any social universe, can always exert a certain forces, inasmuch as 
belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 80). The habitus may be regulating, in that it operates 
within a range of possibilities informed by its structured dispositions, but it is not 
fixed. Conversely, the habitus is equipped with a strategically generative capacity 
that is directly determined by its relationship to the situational context of the field. 
Consequently, the habitus is constantly improving its standing by capitalising on 
perceived opportunities presented by the field to accumulate capital and instigate 
practice. In this way, while the habitus may devise and instruct the decision, capital 
acts as the ‘energy of social physics’, providing the vehicle with which to enhance an 
agent’s position through practice (Bertrand Russell in Swartz, 1997: 78).  
 
Bourdieu (2010: 126) referred to this type of strategic manoeuvring as ‘vertical 
movements’. However, these ‘vertical movements’ are not universally applied but rely 
on whether the agent’s motives are to conserve their position, vie for succession or 
subvert the system (Swartz, 1997: 124). In the first instance, players may share the 
purpose and stakes underpinning the field but may remove themselves from actively 
competing, preferring to adopt a risk-averse attitude that guarantees the 
maintenance of their position. To achieve this, the collusio of conservationists is 
formed around complementary dispositions and perceptions with orthodox or 
heterodox agents to ensure that capital is organised for stability to prevail. Secondly, 
successionists intend to establish a collusio with the objective of acquiring legitimate 
capital to ascend the hierarchy of the field by either challenging the interpretation of 
orthodoxy from an orthodox position or striving to achieve orthodoxy from a 
heterodox position. Thirdly, the collusio of subversionists refuses to submit to the 
dominance of orthodoxy, challenges the precepts of its control and promotes the 
reconstitution of the field’s doxa from a position of revisionist heterodoxy. While these 
attempts may cause the counter-mobilisation of capital by orthodox actors to expel 
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this threat, they may also lead to an alignment of interests between disgruntled 
orthodox actors and disenchanted heterodox practice.    
 
However, collusio, in any of its forms, is not restricted to intra-field dynamics. 
Bourdieu’s concept of field homology provides another dimension in assessing multi-
field collective action. Although Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 109) was hesitant to 
offer a definitive explanation for the role of external actors in precipitating 
corresponding effects in designated fields without recourse to evidence supplied by 
empirical examples, through ‘horizontal’ or ‘transverse’ movements, Bourdieu 
(1993a: 33; 2010: 126) admitted that capital can be conceptually (re)converted and 
transferred from one field to another. While the unequivocal characteristic of a field is 
its foundation in fundamental laws ‘irreducible and incommensurable with any other 
law or related to any other field’, conceptual connectors for inter-field dynamics are 
identifiable and observable since fields are semi-autonomous by design and 
constitution (Bourdieu, 2000: 96). Their borders, which surround the social space in 
which agents move, are neither fixed nor porous but characterised by a semi-
permeability comparable to the process of osmosis. In other words, fields represent 
an open and fluid space, a ‘game devoid of an inventor,’ and therefore lacking in 
strictly defined boundaries (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 103).  
 
By invoking the term field homology, Bourdieu explained that while each field 
possesses ‘its own determinate agents…its own accumulation of history, its own 
logic of action, and its own forms of capital’, ‘the patterned, regular and predictable 
practise within each field bear striking similarities, as do the kinds of social agents 
who are dominant in each social field’ (Calhoun et al, 1993: 5-6; Thomson, 2008: 70). 
Therefore, while not identical, field homology proposes that fields can share enough 
of the same characteristics and therefore be interdependently intertwined so that 
struggles present in one field can have homologous effects on another with the 
underlying premise being that collective habiti (collusio), originating both inside and 
outside their respective fields, could relate to each other through their positions and 
converge on dispositions for action (Swartz, 1997: 130). For example, ‘weak’ fields 
are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to ‘piracy’ from external forces due to 
similar values of capital and their potential transferability (Bigo, 2011: 240). 
 
For the dominant of each field, homology acts as an additional tool to enforce the 
reproduction of the hierarchical order across multiple fields. If internal struggles 
oscillate around the quest for symbolic capital, and by extension, the exertion of 
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symbolic power, the cognitive and discursive authority to impose legitimate 
knowledge, its meaning and its direction, field homology aims to transfer the image of 
this projection to other arenas (Bourdieu, 2000: 185). Consequently, in fields which 
share analogous dynamics and laws, therefore displaying similar values of capital in 
terms of currency exchange, the dominant of each field instigates an inter-field 
collusio with corresponding agents to instil and reproduce orthodoxy within their 
respective fields through the deployment of horizontal capital. Conversely, by the 
same logic, those subversive elements that challenge doxa across fields are 
disposed by practice and position to exercise the transference of horizontal capital in 
order to further their cause as proponents of heterodoxy.  
 
2.4 Reproduction and Change  
 
Invoking Bourdieu’s analytical tools, it would appear that power relations in a given 
field would be repeated in a tautological cycle of reproduction. Even if individual or 
collective agents manage to strategically acquire more relevant forms of capital with 
which to advance their position, the institutionalised structure of doxa and its 
orthodoxy acts to limit the extent of their innovation, movement and progression 
while reinforcing the legitimacy of its practice. Bourdieu (2000: 116) explained that 
the reason was that actions in a field are (re)produced by the very logic of the field in 
that ‘the structure of the space of positions which results from the whole history of the 
field...appears to them [agents] as a space of possibles capable of orienting their 
expectations and their projects by its demands and even of determining them…so 
favouring actions that tend to contribute to the development of a more complex 
structure’.   
 
This passage seems to imply that opportunities for accumulating sufficient capital to 
promote heterodoxy and depose the prevailing doxa are futile given the 
overwhelming structural dominance of orthodox parties. This realisation would 
ostensibly vindicate Bourdieu’s interest in constructing a theory of reproduction over 
change since his primary objective was not only to explain how cultural resources, 
practices and institutions function to maintain unequal social relations, but also to 
examine how these stratified social systems of hierarchy ‘persist and reproduce 
intergenerationally without powerful resistance and without the conscious recognition 
of their members’ and thereby render ‘explicit the forms of misrecognised symbolic 
power that underpin the implicit logic of practice, expectations and relations of those 
operating in these fields’ (Swartz, 1997: 285; Deer, 2008: 122). Nevertheless, it 
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would be inaccurate to assume that Bourdieu succumbed to the immutability of the 
system. On the contrary, the habitus of the agent is not innately obedient but an 
agent of permanent resistance, albeit within the remit of the possibilities provided by 
its dispositions and practice (Bigo, 2011: 243). Consequently, Bourdieu (and 
Wacquant, 1992: 14) wrote if one follows the logic that symbolic systems contribute 
to the making of the world, but are also constituted in social relations, ‘then one can, 
within limits, transform the world by transforming its representation’.  
 
Michel Foucault (1990: 95) penned that ‘where there is power, there is resistance, 
and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power’. While Bourdieu’s writings concur with this statement, the debate is 
the degree to which resistance can be effective within the structures of power 
relations. By extension, how can a resistance incited by the dominated escape the 
antinomy of domination when one’s assimilation into a designated field insinuates 
one’s co-option by its institutions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 82)? Conversely, this 
enduring dialectical struggle appears only capable of dissipating when the former 
achieves a total monopolisation of power. By transforming a field of activity into an 
apparatus, ‘the dominant, in all fields, see their domination as the end of history – the 
“end” in the sense of both conclusion and goal – which has no “beyond” and 
therefore becomes eternal’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 112-113). However, while Bourdieu 
(and Wacquant, 1992: 102) insists that an apparatus emerges when the dominant 
‘annul’ the other participants, a Fukuyama-inspired ‘end of history’ never fully occurs. 
 
In the absence of an apparatus in praxis, a Bourdieusian analysis suggests two inter-
related loci for resistance and change: field revision led by endogenous forces or 
field reconfiguration fuelled by exogenous factors. Firstly, change can be facilitated 
through the medium of ‘vertical movements’. For conservationist or successionist 
agents, individual or collectivised, dominant or dominated, searching for recognised 
and legitimate capital allows them either to maintain or enhance their positions in 
adherence to the extant conditions of doxa. This movement may initiate slight 
revisions to the order of positions but changes to the field’s immanent laws or the 
inter-subjective nature of the stakes the game offers will be of appearance as 
opposed to substance.  
 
Since subversionists, the collusio of collective habiti for aspiring change, reside in the 
heterodox shadow of the dominant, they encounter significant obstacles in 
stimulating change for three reasons. In the first instance, while it is the field that 
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renders value to different forms of capital, promoting heterodoxy may entail collecting 
or focusing on types of capital in areas that are deemed less ‘legitimate’ as its 
agenda contravenes the conventional practice of orthodoxy. Therefore, if heterodoxy 
has any chance of succeeding, it must adopt modes of action that are sanctioned by 
the rules of a system initially structured to preserve the interests of the dominant. 
Secondly, heterodox mobilisation may stiffen the resolve of the dominant orthodoxy 
and elicit a counter-mobilising response that attempts to use superior capital to 
negate, co-opt or coerce any challenge to the hierarchy. In the words of Bourdieu 
(1993a: 73), ‘if this heterodoxy (heresy) were to manifest, its emergence brings the 
dominant agents out of their silence and forces them to produce the defensive 
discourse of orthodoxy, the right-thinking, right-wing thought that is aimed at 
restoring the equivalent silent assent to doxa’. Thirdly, capital investment and 
deployment may assist in elevating one’s position in a field but this may not 
necessarily reap direct implications on the immanent laws (doxa) of the field as there 
is an inherent paradox involved in juxtaposing heterodoxy with its relational context 
since those advocating a heterodox agenda are invariably stakeholders in the 
purpose of the game which they are playing (illusio) and intending to change. 
Consequently, Bourdieu was sceptical that doxa could be overturned by commenting 
that ‘any common-sense reflection on established rules is necessarily mediated – 
and therefore restricted…by the lack of means to express and therefore question 
what is implicit and taken for granted’ (Deer, 2008: 123).  
 
Due to the extant exertion and exaction of symbolic systems of power, both individual 
(habitus) and collective (collusio) agents for change are discouraged and debilitated 
from pursuing heterodoxy.  As the dominant are the custodians of orthodoxy, a status 
that is stable so long as field laws enshrine their capital as legitimate, heterodox 
positions advocated by the dominated either persevere with actions that are not 
rewarded or submit to the prevalence of their marginalised role in the rule of 
orthodoxy. Collusio may act to solidify solidarity between the habiti of subservient 
subjects in a field, but either informed subconsciously by their structuring habitus or 
emanating consciously from their agential assessment of the structured conditions of 
the field, the inclination of the dominated to misrecognise and misattribute symbolic 
capital as legitimate ensures that agents remain pacified by accepting practice as 
generated/regulated in conformity to immanent laws (doxa).  
 
Despite being subject to the reproductive hierarchies of the dominant, this coercion is 
governed by practical consent and collaboration because the perceived legitimacy of 
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this constructed yet classified distinction is deeply inscribed in the habiti of the 
dominated (Bourdieu, 2000: 170)42. By reproducing this stratified system of division, 
the symbolic makes its own ‘contribution to the maintenance of that order only 
because it has the specifically symbolic power to make people see and believe which 
is given by the imposition of mental structures’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 482). Thus, such a 
habitual and unchallenged process of pre-meditated, self-perpetuating and self-
disciplined practice serves to (re)produce a repetitive function and ‘veil the conditions 
of their subordination’ (Calhoun et al, 1993: 6). In effect, even the ‘partial revolutions’ 
instigated by subversive elements within fields do not depose the beliefs on which 
the game is based but claim ‘to be returning to the sources, the origin, the spirit, the 
authentic essence of the game, in opposition to the banalization and degradation 
which it has suffered’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 74).     
 
Concerning intra-field dynamics, the analysis provided paints a pessimistic portrait of 
the conceptual and practical challenges involved in revising a structured system 
comprised of the mutually reinforcing relationship between habitus and field. A 
considerable proportion of the issues encountered stem from the heterodox agent 
being embedded within the very system targeted for proposed change. Social life 
becomes one of ‘structural permutations rather than of structural transformation; one 
of market competition, not collective organization; and one of reproduction not 
revolution’ (Swartz, 1997: 188). However, akin to Bourdieu’s concept of relationality, 
no structure or system operates in a vacuum but is contingent on relational forces of 
constitution. Therefore, similar to the dialectic between habitus and field, there is a 
level of transferability between habiti and capital across related fields as well as 
between fields themselves. For Bourdieu (1993a: 142), ‘specific revolutions, which 
overthrow the power relations within a field, are only possible in so far as those who 
import new dispositions and want to impose new positions find, for example, support 
outside the field, in the new audiences whose demands they both express and 
produce’.  
 
The inter-relatedness inferred in field homology and the horizontal transference of 
capital present the impetus for opportunities in facilitating exogenously-determined 
change. As expected from socialised dispositions, the habitus has different levels of 
integration. While collusio represents habiti in their collective, solidaristic form, there 
are instances when the habitus can become detached or estranged from its social 
                                                 
42
  Unlike Marx’s ‘false consciousness’, the dominated in a Bourdieusian sense are not necessary compliant collaborators practising 
‘voluntary servitude’ but their complicity is the result of power relations that are entrenched in the dispositions and perceptions of 
agents (Bourdieu, 2000: 171).    
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environment. During incidents of hysteresis, external events in a related field 
dismantle the social structure in which the habitus is invested and causes a crisis of 
inertia in the underlying rules and positions within the field. Similar to Durkheim’s 
concept of anomie, in which the individual becomes detached from society, this 
spontaneous rupture, or the ‘critical moment’, which disrupts the doxa of a field and 
the value of capital, generates a structural lag between opportunities, perceptions 
and dispositions. Therefore, hysteresis creates a high-risk environment because ‘for 
a time at least, field struggles take place in the context of an unknown future’ (Hardy, 
2008: 148). As habiti have been constituted by prior structures, hysteresis can initiate 
the Don Quixote effect, in which practice becomes separated and redundant as they 
are attuned to previous objective conditions (Bourdieu, 2010: 104, 2000: 160-162). 
Confused and alienated, agents act inopportunely in a void of meaning and 
subsequently compromise their position (Bourdieu, 2010: 130, Hardy, 2008: 148). In 
this context, and in an interpretation that assists SMT in more effectively identifying 
and understanding the diverse permutations of political opportunity structures, there 
are those less risk-averse agents who viscerally sense opportunities to accumulate 
previously inaccessible capital to enhance their position before they realign with a 
revised or reconstituted field of balanced equilibrium.    
 
Ultimately, the level of influence and permeability an event occurring in a related field 
has on another is dependent on field proximity and homology with regards to 
corresponding or analogous laws (doxa) and stakes (illusio), which, by extension, 
insinuates a similar constituting relationship with agents and thereby a comparable 
value of currency exchange bestowed upon cultural, economic, social and symbolic 
capital that increases prospects for the inter-field transferability of horizontal capital. 
If field synthesis or relationality is evident, hysteresis in one field can act as a catalyst 
for structural change in another. With the habitus forcibly detaching from the field, the 
link between objective structures and subjective expectations is broken allowing for 
‘the opportunity for critical reflection and debate upon previously unquestioned 
assumptions’ (Crossley, 2003: 5). This exposes ‘individual dispositions to change 
differentially to achieve a match between field and habitus and to establish a new 
doxa’ (Hardy, 2008: 147).    
 
Despite conceptually accounting for field fractures and fissures, Bourdieu’s default 
assertion was that while resistance and radical activity can be expressed, they serve 
as ‘the exception to the rule and to his theory’ (Crossley, 2003: 3). Therefore, any 
field fragmentation, whether superficial or substantial, is inevitably constrained by 
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illusio in mounting a credible challenge to doxa and subsequently repudiated with the 
order restructured in its own image as ‘permanence can be ensured by change and 
the structure perpetuated by movement’ (Bourdieu, 2010: 161). In the context of this 
thesis, Bourdieu’s apparent apathy regarding seismic revolutionary shifts in field 
dynamics belies the explanation for potentially substantive transformation provided 
by his conceptual framework. By his own admission, ‘the field is the locus of force – 
and not only of meaning – and of struggles aimed at transforming it, and therefore of 
endless change’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 102). Consequently, by conceptually 
identifying opportunities, modalities and inhibitors for change through the intra- and 
inter-relationality of structuring habiti strategically navigating within structured fields 
under conditions of perennial struggle, Bourdieu’s framework can complement and 
supplement the insights of SMT into collective action. In particular, citing the concept 
of hysteresis, Crossley (2003: 3-9) argued that radical reflexivity emerging from 
episodes of field fragmentation can lead to the formation of a ‘radical habitus’, a 
structured and structuring disposition of practice where assumptions of doxa become 
incessantly appraised and countered by innovative and critical forms of praxis 
through collective social movement.             
 
Conclusion   
 
This chapter has sought to introduce and explain the main tenets of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’ as a prospective conduit for addressing the 
conceptual deficiencies of traditional SMT by proposing a complementary analytical 
framework with which to effectively assess the perception, practice and purpose of 
collective action in Muslim societies. In the realm of Islamic studies, Bourdieu’s 
methods have been invoked as a corrective to methodological practice as well as to 
examine the emergence of the academic field (Martin & Barzegar, 2010; Jung, 
2011). Additionally, sociologists have endeavoured to improve the conceptualisation 
of social movement studies by incorporating elements of Bourdieu’s canon (Crossley, 
2003, 2008; Haluza-Delay, 2008; Husu, 2013). Moreover, social movement theorists 
have underplayed and under-explored the influence of Bourdieu’s perspective in their 
conceptual revisions of the sub-discipline through developing A Theory of Action 
(Jasper, 2004; 2010) or A Theory of Fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; 2012).     
 
While this cadre of scholars have integrated aspects of Bourdieu’s approach in their 
work, these studies neither capitalise on utilising his insights by embracing the inter-
connected relationality of his holistic concepts nor are they engaged in a dialogue of 
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cross-fertilisation concerning social movements across their disciplines. Furthermore, 
there have been no comprehensive attempts to apply the range of Bourdieu’s tools to 
the proliferating phenomena of Islamist mobilisation in the Middle East. By 
suggesting the assimilation of Bourdieusian principles into SMT, the objective is not 
to replace one hegemonic theory with another. In this respect, Bourdieu’s model 
should not be viewed as ‘a king of theoretical deus ex machina by means of which 
Bourdieu relates objective structure and individual activity’ (Di Maggio, 1979: 1464). 
Conversely, SMT provides the basis for a conceptually established, empirically 
tested and methodologically diverse reference for collective action. Nevertheless, 
subscribing to the adapting, customising and modernising mandate of theoretical 
examination, a Bourdieusian lens can assist in reformulating SMT assumptions with 
the intention of complementing and supplementing its analytical relevance in 
investigating episodes of movement mobilisation across time and space. In order to 
advance this aim, this chapter has emphasised the advantages of adopting 
Bourdieusian concepts in offering alternative solutions to four persistent challenges 
confronted by SMT.   
 
Firstly, in terms of the agency/structure dualism, Bourdieu’s tripartite formula of 
practice enshrined in habitus, capital and field plans to transform dichotomous 
assumptions into dialectical discourses. E.H. Carr (1964: 29) wrote that man ‘is not 
totally involved in his environment and unconditionally subject to it…he is never 
totally independent of it and its unconditional master’. Devoid of situational context, 
the individual is ‘both speechless and mindless’ as ‘the development of society and 
the development of the individual go hand in hand, and condition each other’ (Carr, 
1964: 31-32). Similarly, for Bourdieu, practice is predicated on the mutually 
constituted relationship between individual agents and their immediate surroundings. 
Rather than privilege epistemological primacy to one over the other, this inclusive 
and interdependent equation determines the generative or regulative characteristics 
of movement. Consequently, the dispositions and perceptions of the habitus are 
structuring structures that strategically and continuously vie for opportunities to 
improve their positions in accordance to the rules and parameters represented within 
the structured structure of field dynamics. Therefore, whether agents are channelled 
through the habitus or independently of it, improvised practice occurs in direct 
correlation with the field.  
 
Secondly, Bourdieu’s formula can also assist SMT in conceptually accounting for the 
historical context and role of culture and ideology in collective action (Steinmetz, 
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2011: 51). All fields are fields of culture in which history, language, religion, politics 
and mores are negotiated and contested. Through the dynamic interaction between 
habitus and field, the perception, position and purpose of agents is produced and 
reproduced within the historically structured logic and constitution of cultural 
discourses and practice. Although discarding the conceptualisation of ideology as a 
methodological fallacy, Bourdieu posited that all fields are also fields of struggle by 
definition. With each field containing an inherent doxa (law), agents are classified 
either by their propagation of orthodoxy, which intends to preserve their dominant 
interpretation of legitimate practice, or by their promotion of heterodoxy, which aims 
to reverse symbolic domination by challenging the prevailing construction of 
legitimate practice. In each case, the induction and participation of agents into any 
field requires the tacit recognition of illusio, a ‘belief’ or ‘interest’ whereby the stakes 
on offer within the relational dynamics of the field render mobilisation meaningful and 
worthwhile.    
 
Thirdly, exemplified by the scientific idea that ‘the real is the relational’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 97), Bourdieu’s formula injects an encompassing concept that 
enables SMT to consider concurrent yet diversified modes of collective action within 
related spheres of practice. In intra-field dynamics, this not only refers to the intrinsic 
inter-related symbiosis between habitus and field, but with the accumulation and 
deployment of inter-subjectively recognised currencies of exchange, such cultural, 
economic, social and symbolic capital, relationality also entails the prospect of 
collusio, a convergence whereby agents are conjoined in perception, position and 
practice. In inter-field dynamics, although fields are differentiated in terms of logic 
and constitution, fields are also semi-autonomous spheres of competition that are 
susceptible to permeability from related fields. Therefore, depending on the 
identification of common or corresponding characteristics, Bourdieu’s concept of field 
homology also allows for the possibility of shared perceptions and dispositions 
across fields as well as transferability of capital horizontally between fields. 
Consequently, while movement manifestation and mobilisation modalities may 
conform to the specific structures of intra-field relationality, they can simultaneously 
exhibit harmonised practice by virtue of inter-field relationality.  
 
Lastly, Bourdieu’s framework equips SMT with the conceptual reasoning to observe 
the relative extent of change instigated through collective action by inspecting multi-
dimensional processes of movement inception, transition and evolution. By primarily 
focusing on the enduring prevalence of symbolic systems and social structures, 
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Bourdieu’s conceptual framework may appear to privilege reproduction over 
transformation. Commenting on the Kabyle in Algeria, Bourdieu (1979: 94) 
postulated that ‘revolt against the present situation cannot be orientated towards 
rational, explicit ends…until the prevailing order contains the potentiality of its own 
disappearance and so produces agents capable of making its disappearance their 
project’. Regardless, Bourdieu’s approach should not be deemed insufficient ‘to 
explore and account for factors of innovation and change’ (Santoro, 2011: 12). Since 
Bourdieu (2000: 207) emphasised the centrality of perpetual struggles over 
orthodoxy as the default condition in field dynamics, not only are agents able to 
strategically acquire and deploy capital to vertically enhance their position, but the 
concept of field homology and the advent of hysteresis both facilitate opportunities 
for horizontal capital transference that potentially catalyse change.   
 
Overall, Bourdieu (2010: 486) believed that ‘the individual and collective struggles 
aimed at transforming the categories of perception and appreciation of the social 
world and the social world itself’ had been largely neglected. Despite not committing 
attention to examining this phenomenon, Bourdieu frequently insisted that a politics 
of collective mobilisation was required (Swartz, 1997: 136). By applying Bourdieu’s 
conceptual framework to act as an interlocutor between ‘pluralist’ Islamic studies and 
‘critical’ SMT, the overarching objective is to induce inter-disciplinary syncretism for 
the purpose of producing a more accurate understanding and explanation of 
collective action in Muslim societies and more specifically, the emergence and 
evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. The next chapter will explore the advantages of 
adopting Bourdieu’s insights in reconciling theoretical and practical logics in order to 
devise and implement viable methodologies for conducting field research in 
Lebanon.              
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Chapter Three 
Studying (in) Lebanon 
 
‘Research without theory is blind and theory without research is empty’  
- Immanuel Kant (1996, A 51)  
 
‘No Scholar, historian or anyone else is…ethically excused from their own circumstances. We are also 
participants in our own time and place and cannot retreat from it’. 
- Tony Judt (2012: 285-286) 
 
‘Our cause is a secret within a secret, a secret that only another secret can explain; it is a secret about a 
secret that is veiled by a secret’. 
- Ja’far al-Sadiq, Sixth Shi’i Imam (Eco, 2001: 581) 
 
‘They won’t talk to you. It’s not because you are British or a spy or something. They don’t speak to 
anyone because they don’t trust anyone. They’ve had a lot of bad experiences with this… Someone 
could write a whole PhD about the problems of researching in Lebanon’.   
- Interview with Moussa Bishara (Beirut, 11 April, 2012) 
 
Illustrating the methodological problems of their discipline via the analogy of a forest, 
Timothy Snyder and Tony Judt suggested that trees are the allegorical equivalent of 
episodes in history where the forest represents a particular account depending on 
the path one follows. Devoid of a path, ‘you stare at the ground, you search for 
footing, you can’t appreciate the trees’. Offering a step-by-step methodological 
blueprint, they recommended that one should learn about trees before understanding 
that many trees together constitute a forest, explaining that one way to think about a 
forest is as a place containing paths and proposing what they believe to be the best 
path available. Only then is one free to ‘“theorize” about paths: whether they are 
human creations, whether they distort the “natural” shape of the forest and so forth’. 
The ultimate challenge is ‘that more and more of our young colleagues, bored by 
mere tree description, derive greatest satisfaction from teaching the etiology of paths’ 
(Judt & Snyder, 2012: 272-273). 
 
This metaphor demonstrates the methodological importance of reconciling theory 
and praxis. In Lebanon, where the constituent elements of its histories are as 
scattered as the Cedar trees that meander through the country, there exist a plethora 
of paths offering viable routes through the Lebanese forest. Depending on the 
motivations and aptitude of the wanderer, these paved avenues vary in length (brief 
strolls or extensive hikes), focus (observing tree patterns or specific clusters) and 
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direction (following or deviating). When studying the evolution of Hizbullah in 
Lebanon, the available tours venture along prosaic paths constructed in a formulaic 
fashion. Whereas SMT has surveyed opportunities for developing an alternative 
path, by obediently relying on a track of pre-conceived design, it remains beset by 
operational obstacles. Conversely, a more effective approach entails abandoning a 
damaged and over trodden path for the purpose of devising a route forged through a 
dialectical process that returns the epistemological primacy to the tree while re-
routing the path according to empirical enquiry. 
 
In parallel to this methodological theory/praxis nexus is the acknowledgement of the 
insider/outsider dualism. E.H. Carr (1964: 29) emphasised that the researcher must 
navigate between ‘the Scylla of an untenable theory of history as an objective 
compilation of facts…and the Charybdis of an equally untenable theory of history as 
the subjective product of the mind of the historian’. Consequently, this complex 
question consists of more than simply presenting a self-critical balance sheet 
containing an objective assessment of the individual researcher’s (sub)conscious 
practice, priorities, proclivities, prejudices or politics and then mitigating against the 
risk of these subjective perspectives by recognising one’s awareness of their 
presence. Rather, this is an inescapably conceptual process of negotiation of a 
subject’s embedded position within objective structures of pre-existing practice. 
 
For Bourdieu, the habitus of an agent is intrinsically immersed in social structures of 
perception and practice. Since ‘habits of expression’ constrain and corrupt a 
researcher’s practice, the internalisation of these habits can ‘denature, neutralize, 
and finally kill’ the prospect of an ‘independent, autonomous intellectual’ (Said, 1994: 
27, 67-68, 94, 101). Invoking the forest analogy, the question is not simply whether 
the paving of a path differs depending on the origin of its labourers, but also how 
their institutionally socialised knowledge of trees impacts their perception and 
practice in either following or deviating from an existing delineated route. The 
balance of this Cartesian dualism, in which the researcher recognises a meta-
cognitive function in analysing themselves as both a thinking subject and an 
observable object, may have been deconstructed but accurately performing a 
thorough evaluation requires a more formally structured approach.   
 
In mainstream SMT, while the researcher is equipped with the epistemological tools 
with which to identify and examine phenomena, the approach is less rigorous on the 
application of commensurate methodological techniques. Alternatively, the analytical 
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tools outlined within Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’ in the previous chapter 
concurrently serve to provide an in-built and interdependent methodological guide. 
Consequently, this framework features two principles of methodological practice, 
namely self-reflexivity and relationality, which not only endeavour to diagnose the 
recurring roots of research dilemmas, such as the theory/praxis or insider/outsider 
dualisms, but also present a formula with which to reduce the inherent debilitating 
deficiencies and impact of conventional methodological processes.  
 
Firstly, in applying self-reflexivity, each researcher should subscribe to ‘participant 
objectivation’ (Bourdieu, 2003). This concept, which is also linked to relationality, 
requires the researcher to ‘turn the tools of analysis back on the researchers 
themselves through a kind of “auto-analysis” of their own research field’ (Grenfell, 
2010: 96). In particular, throughout methodological practice, there are three biases 
that blur a researcher’s perspective: social origins (class, gender, ethnicity); 
academic position (participating in a politicised field governed by rules, structures 
and interests); and intellectualist partisanship propagating a ‘scholastic fallacy’ of 
confusing ‘the things of logic with the logic of things’, a practice that ultimately 
projects the epistemological assumptions of theoretical practices on ordinary 
activities (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40; Grenfell, 2010: 97; Swartz, 1997: 274). 
While self-reflexivity is more of a preferred field strategy than an achievable 
objective, neglecting ‘to objectify the very intention of objectifying’ or extract oneself 
from the ideological assumptions, operational logics and political dynamics of one’s 
own academic field fails to produce a ‘politically effective practice of science’ 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 43-44; Swartz, 1997: 249, 277)43.  
 
Secondly, through the coining and application of conceptual notions such as habitus, 
field and capital, Bourdieu advocated the practice of relationality to ascertain their 
mutually constituted and inclusive co-habitation as opposed to their objectively 
observable or independent ontological nature. Consequently, ‘it is the link between 
individuals (habitus), field structures, and the positionings both within and between 
fields, that form a conceptual framework for research’ (Grenfell, 2008: 223). 
Translated into methodological practice, relationality can be divided into four phases: 
firstly, identifying fields and evaluating their intrinsic generative/regulative logics; 
secondly, mapping the structured relations between the inscribed dispositions, 
perceptions and positions of social agents while weighting the relative definition, 
                                                 
43
 Bourdieu (1990; 1988b) believed that the paradox of self-reflexivity is that one can never truly separate oneself objectively from the 
interests enshrined in their respective field (Swartz, 1997: 282).  
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value and legitimacy of capital; thirdly, accounting for the mutually reinforcing 
dialectic of relation between field structures and agent practice; and fourthly, plotting 
field boundaries, porosity and homology to determine the susceptibility and 
permeability of fields to capital deployment and transference. Therefore, the aim of 
this chapter is not to discard the path of collective action constructed by SMT, but to 
more effectively redirect its course in convergent methodological compatibility with 
the Bourdieusian principles of self-reflexivity and relationality for the purpose of 
addressing and assessing the emergence of Hizbullah in Lebanon.   
 
The first objective of this chapter is to implement the methodological prerequisite of 
self-reflexivity by not only examining the researcher’s placement within the academic 
field, from where he generates theoretical knowledge and dispositions, but also as an 
inducted observer within the empirical fields of Lebanon, from where he generates 
practical knowledge and perceptions, while considering the implications that these 
juxtaposed experiences of position and process have on the accumulation and 
interpretation of information. Additionally, since Bourdieu has been frequently 
criticised for his lack of clarity on the specifics of field labelling, categorisation, 
borders and inter-connection, the second objective of this chapter is to apply 
methodological relationality by explaining the selection and identification of fields in 
Lebanon, their constitution, composition and relation as well as their relevance for 
plotting the trajectory of Hizbullah44. This practice also presents an opportunity to 
complement and supplement Bourdieu’s ‘useful sensitizing concepts, empirically-
testable hypotheses and suggestions for research’ with SMT findings on movement 
mobilisation (Lizardo in Santoro, 2011: 15-16). Lastly, this chapter argues that by 
omitting theoretical issues pertaining to self-reflexivity and relationality, previous 
literature on Hizbullah, which is already inhibited by its conceptual paucity, continues 
to lack methodological credibility and reliability.        
 
3.1 The Struggle for Capital in the Academic Field  
 
As demonstrated in the first chapter with the palpable friction both within and 
between Islamic studies and sociology over the legitimate epistemological 
foundations of collective action in the Middle East, the Academic field is not exempt 
from competitive struggles. For Bourdieu, these spheres of institutionalised practice 
contain their own relational dynamics with each agent sharing the ‘belief’ and 
                                                 
44
 These accusations have been noted by Bigo (2011: 80), Thomson (2008: 79), Calhoun (1993: 70) and Lipuma (1993: 26) 
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‘purpose’ of participating in academia and subscribing to the intersubjective 
understanding of the ‘stakes’ or ‘interests’ on offer (illusio). Consequently, agents 
propagate orthodoxy (status quo) or heterodoxy (revisionist) towards the prevailing 
laws (doxa) and produce practice based upon their dispositions and perceptions 
(habitus) as well as their allocation and acquisition of capital. In Homo Academicus, 
Bourdieu (1988a: 48) described how the university system was organised according 
to ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ hierarchy, the first representing inherited capital while the 
second referred to ‘scientific authority or intellectual renown’. Although the social 
sciences were relegated in importance compared to the natural sciences, the overall 
objective was to accumulate capital to convert into symbolic capital, a status from 
which one gains student respect, peer legitimacy and enhanced opportunities for 
further progression (funding, publications and promotions)45. Whether intentionally or 
inadvertently pursued, this practice not only curtailed peer advancement, but also 
dictated the parameters of disciplinary debates.  
 
Therefore, there is an entrenched modus operandi in the Academic field, or an 
obsequium of ‘unconditional respect for the fundamental principles of the established 
order’ that preserves hierarchical succession and prevents those who seek to ‘cut 
corners’ (Bourdieu, 1988a: 87). Under the normative structures of this arrangement, 
one is forced into a position of becoming ‘an expert, that is, an intellectual at the 
service of the dominant’ or ‘an independent petty producer in the old mode, 
symbolized by the professor lecturing in his ivory tower’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992: 58). In this paradox, while the pursuit of the latter is commendable for the 
integrity of science, the former is more successful in the realms of practice. 
Generally, those who concentrate on acquiring economic and social capital in order 
to translate it into symbolic capital manage to ensure a tautological circle of perennial 
dominance whereas those who focus disproportionately on cultural capital encounter 
difficulty in converting their capital into influence due to its relative value and 
transferable disparities within the field.   
 
This logic of relational orthodoxy equally applies to new inductees in the Academic 
field. Similar to the institutionalised disincentive that compels established actors from 
publishing material that may have implications for their symbolic status, PhD 
candidates are also dissuaded from heterodoxy and encouraged to pursue research 
that strives for legitimate capital and field advancement. For Bourdieu (1988a: 95), 
                                                 
45
 Bourdieu (1988a: 62; 1993a: 10) suggested that the ‘high faculties’ included theology, law and medicine with social sciences 
suffering a doubly insubordinate position in that it is in the shadow of the natural sciences and therefore additionally inferior in the 
‘cultural stock exchange’ since scientific values derived from the natural sciences are subsequently considered more valuable.  
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‘there is no master who does not recognize the value of the institution and its 
institutional values which are all rooted in the institutionalized refusal of any non-
institutional thought’. Consequently, the dominant orthodoxy imposes prerequisites 
that homogenise the habiti of prospective agents, thereby initiating them into a field 
of ‘similar expectations and probably trajectories’ where the promotion of ‘legitimate’ 
knowledge and the reproduction of orthodoxy are rewarded (Bourdieu, 1988a: 156)46. 
 
The application of self-reflexivity should not boast pretentions of neutrality or 
independence since it neither surmounts these conditions nor emancipates the field. 
On the contrary, self-reflexivity recognises that being a participant in a field involves 
an acceptance of its illusio and therefore any truthful knowledge produced is 
achieved ‘not despite the interest he has in producing that truth but because he has 
an interest in doing so’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 11). Subsequently, this practice reveals 
‘the limits of the social world and so to make difficult all forms of prophetic discourse, 
starting…with the propheticism that claims to be scientific’ (Bourdieu, 1993a: 17)47. 
For the ‘scholastic fallacy’ to be overcome and self-reflexivity to be achieved, the 
objectifying subject should apply the same objectifying logic that they extend to their 
object onto themselves, a process that entails ‘not only everything he is, his own 
social conditions of production and thereby the “limits of his mind”, but also his very 
work of objectivation, the hidden interests that are invested in it and the profits that it 
promises’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 67-68). By doing so, the utility of self-
reflexivity is evident in ‘freeing us from the illusion of freedom, or…from the 
misplaced belief in illusory freedoms’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 15).   
 
Invoking Gramsci’s (1971: 244) treatise that politics is ubiquitous in the Weberian 
definition of referring to the distribution, allocation and appropriation of power, 
science is synonymous with politics (Swartz, 1997: 249). Each agent is directed by 
practical interests, and while self-reflexivity aims to concentrate on the 
institutionalised epistemological foundations of the discipline rather than individual 
introspection, it is important to trace the development of the researcher’s habitus as 
an agent within his structured fields of practice (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 41; 
2000: 10). Although committed to the practice of academic integrity, this research, 
which began in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham 
                                                 
46
 Throughout Bourdieu’s work there is a latent frustration with the nepotistic and elitist nature of the French Academic field. While his 
modest upbringing did not hinder his success, his concept of self-reflexivity may have become a tool of struggle in the very field it 
sought to transcend (Swartz, 1997: 283).   
47
 Bourdieu (2000: 7) admitted that ‘I do not like the intellectual in myself, and what may sound…like anti-intellectualism is chiefly 
directed against the intellectualism or intellectuality that remains in me, despite all my efforts, such as the difficulty, so typical of 
intellectuals, I have in accepting that my freedom has limits’.   
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University in October 2010, was not motivated by the prospect of accruing cultural 
and social capital with which to enhance his symbolic position in the Academic field, 
but by the practical interests of acquiring transferable cultural and social capital for 
advancement within the Field of International Politics (FIP)48. 
 
The son of an English father, who is a self-employed energy consultant, and a 
Scottish mother, who is an academic trained in psychotherapy, the researcher 
attended an independent school in a suburb of west London49. As Maton (2008: 58) 
observes, aspirations are conditioned by the habitus, ‘we learn of our rightful place in 
the world where we will do our best given disposition and resources and also where 
we struggle’. Similarly, social agents gravitate to the corresponding fields that match 
the construction of their ‘subjective expectations of objective probabilities’ (Bourdieu, 
1990: 59). The researcher’s parents, who on account of their working class 
backgrounds had acquired values of cultural and economic capital as opposed to 
inheriting them, conformed to the predominant orthodoxy of their position that 
promoted private schools within the Educational field as the optimal opportunity for 
their children to achieve legitimately symbolic forms of capital. Consequently, these 
educational and social factors, whether consciously or subconsciously, had a 
considerable impact on the development of his habitus. Firstly, as a ‘middle class’ 
product of London’s private education system, university enrolment was an expected 
outcome. Secondly, the morality embedded within a Benedictine Catholic School 
combined with the values instilled at home also contributed to the structuring of initial 
dispositions and perceptions. Thirdly, studying in the Classics Department at the 
University of Edinburgh, both classifications of distinction based on traditionally 
symbolic connotations, further entrenched the researcher’s position and practice in 
the Educational field50. 
 
After graduating with an MA (Hons.) in 2006, rather than follow his peers in 
transferring cultural capital from the Educational field into the fields of professional 
practice, such as Law, Banking, Accountancy and Consultancy, the researcher, 
having cultivated an interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout his 
adolescence, worked for a year as a political analyst at an NGO chaired by a 
Palestinian politician in Ramallah51. This experience, occurring at the embryonic 
                                                 
48
 Durham University is one of the oldest universities in the United Kingdom with an academic tradition dating back to the Venerable 
Bede in the 7th Century. The School of Government and International Affairs, formed in 2004, merged the Department of Politics with 
the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies.   
49
 The researcher’s sister is two years older. She obtained a First Class degree in History from the University of Edinburgh in 2005 
before attending Law School in London. She now works for a notable American law firm in London.   
50
 The researcher received A Levels in History, Greek and Latin.  
51
 The researcher’s mother had spent the majority of the 1970s working in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.  
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stages of his professional development and coinciding with the widening chasm 
between Fatah and Hamas, may have substantially affected his perception of 
broader Middle East politics towards Palestinian-related issues52. The decision to 
return to the UK in 2008 was predicated on the understanding that entry into the FIP 
required further academic credentials and professional experience. After working for 
Middle East Consultants International in London, the researcher completed an MSc 
in International Relations (IR) Theory at the London School of Economics in 2009 
while interning as a Middle East analyst at the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies until early 2010 (IISS).  
 
This environment, which shifted focus from working on the Middle East as opposed 
to in the region, exposed new dimensions in formulating expectations and devising 
strategies for progression. In particular, the logics that govern access to both the 
Academic field and the FIP are inexorably homologous with the horizontal 
transferability of capital mutually compatible. Whereas the IR course structure at the 
reputable LSE provides its students with access to social and cultural capital that 
enables them to manoeuvre vertically within the Academic field or horizontally 
towards the FIP, the social and cultural capital accrued in international affairs think-
tanks located in the FIP can equally be utilised to enhance the credentials of 
someone applying for an IR-related programme in the Academic field. Nevertheless, 
while symbolic distinctions exist within the Academic field (staff/students), an agent 
can still advance by mobilising capital vertically. Conversely, symbolic distinctions in 
the FIP (fellow/intern) are more restrictive with interns unable to supplement their 
cultural capital with economic and social capital thereby limiting opportunities for 
vertical progression. Testament to these constraints and in reaction to the financial 
crisis, the FIP issued more regulating barriers for entry by demanding that 
prospective researchers with a PhD were ‘preferable’. Therefore, after six months 
working as a consultant for private companies in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the 
researcher returned to the UK to embark upon a PhD at Durham University53.  
 
Similar to the decision to undertake a PhD, the choice of topic was not only of 
personal interest, but also instrumentally motivated. At the time of applying, Islamist 
movements were rising in prominence with governments, policy-makers and private 
                                                 
52
 Employing a Saidian critique, the researcher is aware that he would be designated as either a conscious or subconscious 
Orientalist due to his intellectual background within Western pedagogic practice. While acknowledging ontological, epistemological or 
methodological prejudices in Western academia towards the ‘Orient’, the researcher opposes the assumption that his applies to all 
Western-trained academics.    
53
 The reasons for accepting the offer at Durham University were personal (the prospect of working with Dr Jeroen Gunning), 
academic (Durham University has a strong reputation for Middle East studies) and financial (Durham was less expensive than 
remaining at the LSE in London).   
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businesses eager to understand the ramifications of their respective mobilisation and 
politicisation54. In particular, despite its 2006 War with Israel, its brief military seizure 
of Beirut in 2008 and its overwhelming influence in Lebanon, Hizbullah remained 
relatively under-explored within existing literature that provided thick empirical 
information on the movement’s evolution as opposed to applying conceptual models 
for collective action. Therefore, considering that Hizbullah’s organisational structure 
concurrently manages the balance between its military, social and political 
‘Resistance’ while propagating an encompassing narrative of Lebanese Nationalism, 
pan-Arab unity, Shi’i particularism and Islamic universalism, the researcher thought 
that Hizbullah’s inherent complexity was an interesting subject for theoretical 
examination.  
 
Consequently, this dual-field strategy was aimed at enhancing the researcher’s 
cultural and social capital in the Academic field while simultaneously bypassing the 
lower stages of recruitment in the FIP by investigating opportunities for gradually 
transferring this capital. To satisfy the first part, the intention was to instigate an 
innovative contribution by using Hizbullah as the vehicle to offer a complementary 
conceptual framework to SMT for explaining Islamist movement inception and 
evolution. Furthermore, by selecting an internationally pertinent and practically 
relevant topic, the research would appeal to fields beyond academia. In the interim, 
the researcher would pursue efforts to augment his professional acumen in applying 
for part-time work, conducting field research in Lebanon, improving his Arabic 
proficiency as well as amalgamating networks from a range of areas and industries.      
 
3.2 ‘L’Etranger’ (‘The Outsider’): Theoretical and Practical Logics 
 
For Bourdieu (1993b: 271), ‘one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social 
world unless one becomes immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality, 
historically situated and dated’. After spending the first year critically engaged with 
pre-existing literature to identify a conceptual interlocutor that bridged the 
dichotomous chasm between Islamic studies and SMT, the researcher arrived in 
Lebanon at the beginning of his second year for a ten-month ethnographic research 
trip to examine this ‘logic of the social world’. However, especially important for 
practising self-reflexivity, the second half of Bourdieu’s citation contains a caveat: 
‘but only in order to construct it as an instance…in a finite universe of possible 
                                                 
54
 In 2010, whether in Palestine (Hamas), Iraq (Moqtada Al-Sadr), Yemen (Houthis), Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood) or Lebanon 
(Hizbullah), Islamist movements had propelled onto the FIP.  
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configurations’. Ultimately, this approach recognises the presence of theoretical and 
practical logics. While challenging, reconstituting the relationship between the two is 
a precondition for avoiding a ‘scholastic fallacy’ in which practical knowledge is 
transformed into theoretical knowledge (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40). Instead, 
practical knowledge should be reconstructed theoretically ‘by including in the theory 
the distance between practical logic and theoretical logic’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 52). 
 
In a university setting, the agent in the Academic field, or the ‘scientist in the 
machine’, is a product of its dominant rules and practices that reproduces the 
theoretical logic of knowledge institutionalised within the epistemological structures of 
their disciplines (Bourdieu, 2000: 60). In the case of this research, the format reflects 
academic demands in contributing knowledge within the prevailing trends of the 
discipline. As outlined in Chapter One, any cross-disciplinary approach that 
addresses Islamist mobilisation in the Middle East should firstly consider the 
literature published within Islamic studies and sociology in order to place the 
research within its pre-existing academic context. This includes documenting 
traditional debates within Islamic studies, such as Orientalist, modernist and pluralist 
perspectives, while concurrently referencing discussions within different schools of 
sociology, most specifically SMT.   
 
Although this ethnological process occurs within a studious, ‘intellectualocentric’ 
environment that is separated from the social world, it is neither neutral nor devoid of 
political influences since the discourses that define its parameters are the direct 
result of struggles within the Academic field (Bourdieu, 2000: 41). As dominant 
narratives represent ‘scientific’ authority, the power to successfully produce, impose 
and inculcate legitimate representations of the social world, these constructions of 
knowledge equate to symbolic power, a condition of misrecognised and misattributed 
truth (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 51). Indicative of the Academic field, it is 
incumbent on the researcher to yield to rules that promote orthodoxy in order to 
attain the cultural capital required to legitimately progress. Consequently, it is within 
the confines of these politically-infused fields that concepts such as ‘interest’, 
‘ideology’, ‘culture’, ‘theory’, ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ acquire their meaning as the 
barometers for future academic practice. By virtue of their prevalence and symbolic 
status, the application of mainstream theoretical logics becomes a normative function 
of practice. 
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However, as Gaston Bachelard posited, ‘the world in which one thinks is not the 
world in which one lives’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 51). Practical logic, which contains its own 
situational contexts, dynamics and functionalities, does not operate in the same fixed 
space and time as theoretical examination. Therefore, social scientists in the 
Academic field who equip themselves with a formulated scientific lens to transpose 
onto the real world ‘misrepresent the practical and dispositional character of 
practices by projecting onto ordinary activities the epistemological assumptions of 
theoretical practices’ (Swartz, 1997: 274). By exposing this epistemocentrism to the 
social world, a process in which theoretical logic deductively examines practice as 
opposed to practical logic inductively directing theory, the researcher endows the 
agent(s) with the same scientific reasoning that contributed to the composition of 
theoretical logic, thereby observing practice through a pre-configured prism that has 
no pretext in the experiences or perceptions of the corresponding object it presumes 
to explain. In this way, practices are selectively illustrated in isolation rather than 
viewed as dialectical logics that are relationally constituted. As argued by Bourdieu 
(2000: 54), ‘it is no doubt the powerful, fascinating experience of being a stranger 
that makes him forget…that he is no less a stranger to his own practice than to the 
strange practices he observes’. 
 
Testament to the challenge of reconciling theoretical and practical logics, Bourdieu 
(and Wacquant, 1992: 33) also struggled with the propensity of scholars to succumb 
to practical logics while serving as an intelligence clerk for the French occupational 
army by admitting that his intellectual activities in Algeria may have been driven ‘to 
overcome my guilty conscience about being merely a participant observer in this 
appalling war’. In this respect, Bourdieu’s position in Algeria as a ‘political scholar’ 
has been juxtaposed with the ‘scholarly politician’ embodied by Frantz Fanon (1925-
1961), another contemporary, French-speaking ‘outsider’ in Algeria (Celarent, 2011). 
Despite comprehending the ‘interest to objectivize’ in the theoretical logic of the 
Academic field, Bourdieu, who wrote three books and a litany of articles on Algeria, 
also recognised the practical logic of producing politically relevant research that 
would attract more capital in the struggle for legitimate knowledge (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992: 260; 1988a: 152; 2000: 119; Schlthesis & Frisinghelli, 2012: 215-
218)55. Conversely, as an active combatant in Algerian independence, Frantz Fanon 
(1963, 1965, 1967) identified the theoretical logic of the Academic field behind 
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 While serving as a clerk, Calhoun (2012) writes that Bourdieu sought to understand the Kabyle community in the context of capital 
markets and social transformation. In 1958, he released Sociologie de l’Algerie, a study of Berber societies in which he developed the 
concept of ‘real psychological dispositions’. As a lecturer at the University of Algiers, he published Travail et Travailleurs, which 
examined labour migrants in the new metropolitan economy of colonial Algeria, and Les Deracines, which assessed how the colonial 
policy of forcibly removing peasants to quell resistance had resulted in a crisis of traditional agriculture.    
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colonial practice but rejected its practical logic by maintaining that the intellectual was 
not a passive object but a revolutionary catalyst for change56. Albert Camus (1913-
1960), the Algerian-born philosopher, could also be included in this equation as 
‘scholarly apolitical’ by appearing ambivalent to the practical logic of an ‘insider’ while 
distinctively applying Western theoretical logic to study the human subject57.  
 
Akin to Algeria, the balance between theoretical and practical logics is also salient 
when critiquing pre-existing literature on Hizbullah. Despite the proliferation of 
publications over the last decade, a trend that is directly correlated to Hizbullah’s 
expanding role in Lebanon, there has been limited theoretical engagement or 
methodological reflection in assessing Hizbullah’s emergence and evolution aside 
from disjointed attempts by Karagiannis (2009), Alagha (2011) and Azani (2011). 
This deficiency of conceptual immersion has resulted in further inter/intra-disciplinary 
polarisation. Surveying the contours of core texts on Hizbullah, commentators can be 
stratified into three main categorisations: those who reside in the Academic field; 
those who operate in the FIP; and those who practice in the Media field. While not 
explicitly acknowledging the theoretical logics that underpin their field placement, 
each commentator implicitly reflects the dispositions and practices of their respective 
field positions.    
 
The first group comprises either of Lebanese academics (Alagha, 2006, 2011; 
Sharara, 2006; Hamzeh, 2004; Deeb, 2006a; Harb, 2011) or U.S. scholars who have 
spent significant time researching in Lebanon (Harik, 2005; Norton, 2007a)58. 
Adhering to the illusio of the Academic field, in which the generative principle of 
orthodoxy guides practice towards transforming cultural capital into symbolic capital, 
Hizbullah exemplifies an observable phenomenon with which to test hypotheses and 
assumptions derived from theoretical logic59. Since dispositions and perceptions in 
the Academic field are predicated on extant definitions of legitimate knowledge, the 
orthodox practice of capital accumulation and deployment for enhancing one’s 
position is directed vertically. However, by virtue of their nationality or extensive 
experience, these commentators are stakeholders within the practical logic of 
Lebanon. Consequently, they exploited their linguistic and social understanding to 
produce informative analysis into the ideological inception and political evolution of 
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 Fanon thought that sociologists were ‘fools at best, colonial tools at worst’. He saw no contradiction between the intellectual and the 
masses but believed the role of the former was ‘not to educate in the same fashion as they have been educated; the educator 
becomes newly educated by challenging preconceived ideas about the backwardness of the masses’ (Gibson, 2003: 198).  
57
 Camus was a pied-noir, which denotes his ancestry to the initial French settlers in Algeria. Although criticised for his ambivalent 
stance on the War, his books, especially The Outsider (2000) and The Plague (2002), belie a complete antipathy on the subject.    
58
 Dominique Avon and Anas Khatchadourian (2012) could also be included in this group.    
59
 It is worth noting that post-2000 revisionist histories on the Shi’i in Lebanon have invariably been motivated by the rising 
prominence of Hizbullah (Winter, 2010; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008; Chalabi, 2006; Shanahan, 2005).  
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Hizbullah. Nevertheless, this thick empirical description has come at the expense of 
conceptual exploration. While Western-educated Lebanese academics, including 
Mona Harb and Lara Deeb (2012, 2011, 2007), have refreshingly illustrated 
Hizbullah’s manipulation of space in institutionalising a Resistance culture, their 
approach embraces alternative disciplinary logics and methods that are not grounded 
in addressing conventional Hizbullah literature.  
 
The second cadre contains academic analysts that are embroiled in foreign policy 
think-tanks within the FIP. In the illusio for this arena, the theoretical logic of scientific 
enquiry entrenched in the Academic field is supplanted by the practical logic to 
transfer capital horizontally for the purpose of exerting influence in decision-making. 
Propagating generalised discourses on ‘Islam’ and ‘international terrorism’ to gain 
political traction, most of these commentators focus on Hizbullah as an Iranian proxy 
that not only presents a destabilising force in Lebanon, but also poses a ubiquitous 
threat to U.S. and Israeli security (Levitt, 2013, 2014; Gleis & Berti, 2012; Azani, 
2011; Jorisch, 2004; Ranstorp, 1997; Kramer, 1993)60. To preserve their standing and 
promote their status, the dispositions of these agents and their vertical enhancement 
of capital are synchronised to reproducing an orthodox narrative that observes 
Hizbullah through the myopic lens of Iran and Israel. Conversely, while Saad-
Ghorayeb (2002) and Crooke (2009) are also invested in the practical logic of the FIP, 
they problematise its predominant theoretical logic and adopt approaches and 
perspectives that promote revisionist heterodoxy in re-evaluating the discourse and 
practice of the Islamic Resistance61. 
 
The third assemblage consists of journalists in the Media field who specialise on 
Hizbullah. Traditionally, the theoretical logic determining values of capital and 
legitimate practice in this sphere has been a combination of information integrity, 
observer objectivity and audience appeal. Due to its open constitution based upon the 
illusio of investigating and disseminating information to the public, the habitus is 
conditioned by the practical logic of discovering sources and uncovering stories. 
Considering the exponential global interest in Hizbullah, the subject attracts a litany of 
Western correspondents who either approach Hizbullah as the core focus (Jaber, 
1997; Shatz, 2004; Goldberg, 2002; Cambanis, 2010; Blanford, 2011, Totten, 2011; 
                                                 
60
 Levitt, Jorisch and Kramer are all affiliated to the neo-conservative, pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Kramer is 
also a Senior Fellow at the Shalem Centre in Jerusalem while Azani is the Executive Director for Counter-Terrorism at the 
Interdisciplinary Center in Israel. Ranstorp is an expert on terrorism at the University of St Andrews whereas Gleis and Berti are 
political risk consultants.   
61
 After publishing a highly informative book on Hizbullah, Saad-Ghorayeb is now the author of the Resistance-Episteme blog, which 
is a polemical platform for deploring intellectual imperialism and decrying criticisms against the Resistance. Crooke, a former MI6 
agent and EU advisor on Hamas and Hizbullah is the Director at Conflicts Forum (Interview with Alastair Crooke, Beirut, 16 May, 
2012).   
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Filkins, 2013), a peripheral interest (Young, 2010; Hirst, 2010; Fisk, 2001) or an 
instrumental marketing ploy (Dekker & Medearis, 2010; MacFarquhar, 2009). 
Consequently, achieving symbolic capital is less about innovative analysis and more 
to do with substantiating anecdotal evidence while ensuring that the narrative 
resonates with their broad readership. However, not only is Hizbullah’s secrecy a 
barrier for access but Western newspapers are also influenced by both political and 
public opinion that harbour pro-Israeli tendencies and negative sentiments towards 
the Islamic Resistance, a practical logic that risks distorting scientific knowledge. 
Similarly in Lebanon, since local columnists and distributors are embedded actors 
within the practical logic of political polarisation, they become perceived as 
diametrically divided between 14 March (Al-Nahar, Daily Star) and 8 March (Al-Safir, 
Al-Akhbar).     
 
Participant objectivation is challenging because ‘it requires the deepest and most 
unconscious adherences and adhesion break, those that quite often give the object 
its very interest for those who study it’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 253). This self-
reflexivity or ‘epistemic reflexivity’ may be unattainable but it is a methodological 
necessity in unravelling the agent from their own interests and position while 
simultaneously accounting for the constituted categories of perception that 
determine epistemological assumptions (Bourdieu, 2000: 119)62. Most importantly, it 
is a fallacy to disconnect this theoretical logic from its practical counterpoint in 
research. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will assess the methodological 
importance of relationality before explaining the process by which the researcher 
endeavoured to objectify objectification in reconciling theoretical and practical logics 
while studying Hizbullah in Lebanon.      
 
3.3 Spotting Field Relationality in Lebanon  
 
The concept of relationality is not only a methodological priority in understanding 
and practising self-reflexivity, but it is also an imperative contribution in explaining 
movement mobilisation. Although the SMT tripartite of Political Opportunity 
Structures, Mobilising Structures and Collective Action Frames already provide a 
useful model that infers the innate importance of relation in movement inception and 
mobilisation, Bourdieu is pivotal to the reconceptualising of SMT by offering 
analytically robust tools that place relationality as the underlying and ubiquitous 
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 To objectify objectification means to adopt a process where one dispossesses ‘the knowing subject of the privilege it normally 
grants itself (and to bring) to light the presuppositions it owes to its inclusion in the order of knowledge (Bourdieu, 2000: 10; 1988a: 
15).  
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dynamic at the epicentre of the entire framework. Firstly, by introducing the 
continuous constitution of relationality between an agent’s dispositions (habitus), 
positions (capital) and the contextual environment (field), Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation replaces the tautological conundrum of irreconcilable dualisms in 
SMT with a formula in which interactions between agents and structures are 
predicated on mutually compatible dialectics. Secondly, by expanding relationality to 
encompass field homology and capital transference, Bourdieu not only enables SMT 
to perceive Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures and Collective Action 
Frames as symptomatic characteristics manifesting in each field rather than simply 
across them, but it also emphasises the intrinsic interdependence and 
interconnection of identifiably concurrent fields of activity as opposed to spheres 
operating in epistemological independence or isolation. 
 
Due to the practical logics of either ideology or interest in directing pre-existing 
literature on Hizbullah, there remain limited instances of conceptual frameworks that 
guide the parameters of their respective analyses. Rather than explore the 
complexity of Hizbullah’s multi-directional and relational environment, each focuses 
disproportionately on selected drivers that inform and impact the Party from the 
perspective of its internally-determined purpose and practice. Therefore, while 
embracing relationality, this concept is restricted to a selected field of Hizbullah 
activity. For example, whereas some assess the introverted management of 
transition between Hizbullah’s ideological and political positions (Alagha, 2006, 
2011; Norton, 2007a, 2007b; Azani 2011; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002), others omit the 
overtly political or military dimensions to investigate how Hizbullah actively 
inculcates a Resistance culture into conventional daily practice (Deeb, 2006a; Harb, 
2011; Harb & Deeb, 2011). Equally, while some stress the tension in reconciling 
Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance and its parliamentary presence (Harik, 2005; 
Hamzeh, 2004), others are principally concerned with Hizbullah’s regional role in 
‘global terrorism’ (Levitt, 2013, 2014). 
 
Conversely, Hizbullah neither emerged nor does it exist in a containable vacuum. 
While initially conceived by the ideology of the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hizbullah is 
an actor that exists and is embedded within the extant political, social and military 
structures of Lebanon. By extension, the preservation of Hizbullah is contingent 
upon the organisation’s simultaneous management of its military presence, its social 
position and its political placement. Since these competitive fields contain their own 
structured logics and dynamics, intra and inter-field relationality is the critical 
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foundation for comprehending the prospect of Hizbullah’s emergence and the 
possibilities for its evolution in Lebanon. Under these circumstances, Hizbullah is not 
in control of its situational context but adapts accordingly as both a proactive and 
reactive agent. 
 
In Chapter One, proponents of ‘pluralist’ Islamic studies and ‘critical’ SMT converged 
on the importance of contextual relationality. Meanwhile in Chapter Two, Bourdieu’s 
analytical tools were presented as conceptual interlocutors in effectively explaining 
the phenomenon of Hizbullah’s collective action in Lebanon. While engaging in a 
self-reflexive process of experimentation during field research, in which the pre-
determined parameters of a theoretical Bourdieu-SMT logic were not simply 
transposed but constantly informed and corrected by the observable practical logic 
of Lebanon, the researcher identified a number of relational fields for the purpose of 
examining Hizbullah’s creation and reproduction of the Islamic Resistance in 
Lebanon. Although these empirical fields of enquiry intentionally reference and 
correspond in alignment with SMT levels of analysis, they also represent fields that 
have a direct and unavoidable influence on Hizbullah’s multiple positions in 
Lebanon. Therefore, while the selection of these five inter-related and concentric 
fields by no means denies the existence or importance of other fields or sub-fields 
for Hizbullah in Lebanon, they intend to conceptually assess Hizbullah’s relational 
purpose, perceptions, positions and practice within these specific areas of activity63. 
 
Once designated, the aim is to discern the key composition, components and 
characteristics of each field via the analytical tools devised by Bourdieu. Firstly, the 
researcher should describe the constitution of the field, namely its formation, its 
structured laws, its generative/regulative mechanisms and its orthodox and 
heterodox positions. Secondly, the objective is to locate the purpose, position and 
practice of specific agents with each field who are mutually endowed with the 
interest or stakes of participation (illusio) and equipped with dispositions and 
perceptions (habitus) that strategically guide or limit action towards orthodoxy or 
heterodoxy in relation to field dynamics. Thirdly, since agents inherit, acquire and 
deploy legitimately recognised capital (cultural, economic, social and symbolic) in 
order to promote, advance or change their position in relation to predominant field 
structures, it is important to account for the relative values of capital, methods for its 
accumulation and tactics for its activation. Fourthly, in order to deduce opportunities 
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 These may include, but are not limited to, national fields or local sub-fields in Finance, Economy, Judiciary, Education, Religion, 
Family, Literature or Music.   
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and susceptibilities of field homology and capital transference, one should also 
ascertain the relative permeability between fields. By following these four stages, not 
only can one analyse how Hizbullah created, cultivated and consolidated a 
Resistance habitus from heterodoxy to orthodoxy within its fields of operation, but 
also how it concurrently managed and harmonised the balance of this Resistance 
habitus across fields.      
 
1. Social Mobilisational Field (SMF) 
 
This is the sine qua non competitive arena for any episodes of heterodox practice of 
mobilised collective action, such as protest, resistance or revolutionary movements. 
Similar to the notion of Mobilising Structures in SMT, this field contains the pre-
existing bodies and modalities that comprise the core nucleus of Hizbullah’s popular 
support, including, amongst others, individual constituents, familial networks, 
informal tribal groups, grassroots organisations, religious institutions and 
commercial business connections. Through the dissemination of diverse yet 
specifically-catered Collective Action Frames that relate and resonate with its agents 
to form harmonised dispositions and perceptions (habitus), this field not only 
provides Hizbullah recruits for the Islamic Resistance, but it also mobilises voters to 
ensure the Party’s representation in parliament.   
 
Since Hizbullah intends to instigate sustained resistance rather than temporary 
mobilisation, and due to its almost exclusively Shi’i base, the Party must construct a 
series of frames that not only reference and appeal to traditionally prevalent 
mobilising repertoires within the SMF, but also devise and implement 
institutionalised narratives that produce and reproduce new methods for customised 
collective action. Considering the entrenched social structures of established 
confessional mobilisation within Lebanon’s diverse mosaic, Hizbullah could not 
simply rely on independently injecting its values of cultural and economic capital into 
the SMF. Conversely, through the assimilation of discourses and practices in 
localised contexts, Hizbullah had to translate its economic and cultural capital into 
social capital within the Shi’i community by conforming to the inter-subjective 
understandings of mobilising rules and requirements in the SMF, such as 
addressing the structured dynamics of the patronage system, Shi’i religious 
networks and the familial nature of tribal affiliations. Once inducted and deemed 
legitimate, Hizbullah could invest in enhancing the accumulation and deployment of 
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recognised capital to vie for symbolic capital within the Shi’i community by 
entrenching discourses and practices to achieve routinised collective action. 
 
Unlike mainstream SMT, in which the pre-existing dispositions and perceptions of 
agents are subordinated to the rational and material strategies of a structurally 
centralised organisation in identifying opportunities, devising mobilisational 
modalities and translating frames into action, a revised Bourdieu-SMT approach 
places further emphasis on the agent. Consequently, agents already possess 
eclectic varieties of practices (habitus) and positions (capital) in relation to the extant 
structures of the SMF. Therefore, while Hizbullah aims to construct the lens through 
which agents perceive the interest of mobilisation (illusio) and facilitate exchanges of 
capital that coalesce an amalgamation of agents (collusio) conjoined in identity and 
solidarity into a collective Resistance habitus of purpose and practice, the Party 
does not exclusively direct or dictate agential action, but since the structures of the 
SMF exist independently of any one particular movement, Hizbullah must continue 
to adapt and modernise mobilising tactics that complement the dialectic process 
through which an agent negotiates its position in relation to the SMF.             
 
2. Military-Security Field (MSF)  
 
Since the conceptual development of mainstream SMT emanated from a post-1945, 
Western-centric epoch of socio-economic inequalities and civil rights within 
democratic contexts, there was initially minimal attention extended to the role of 
symmetric warfare or asymmetrical violence in the mobilisation of social 
movements. However, as demonstrated by the work of Della Porta (1995) on 
political violence and social movements, a number of scholars, especially on the 
Middle East, have broadened the scope of SMT to integrate incidences of inter- 
state military confrontation, intra-state insurgencies and trans-state terrorism (Hafez, 
2003; Sutton & Vertigans, 2006; Jackson, 2006; Gunning, 2007a; Hegghammer, 
2010; Parsons, 2012). However, these episodes of collective mobilisation motivated 
towards violence are either sporadic manifestations restricted to one particular field 
of activity or sustained activities within more than one field in which the asymmetric 
capacities of the organisation are eclipsed by the symmetrical capabilities of the 
targeted stakeholder. Furthermore, there is no SMT literature that conceptualises 
the phenomenon of Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance, an organised militia that has 
evolved into a legitimate military actor with a multi-field remit in Lebanon, resources 
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that rival the state, an arsenal that deters Israeli intervention and regional affiliations 
that evoke ‘global terrorism’.     
 
Lebanon’s MSF operates in a particular historical and situational context in which 
chronic political polarisation and social suspicion amongst confessional factions 
have debilitated the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) since the conception of the 
modern state. Although widely perceived as a source of national pride, the LAF has 
become institutionally marginalised by the endemic elitism and confessional 
fragmentation within Lebanon’s political and social structures. Consequently, 
Lebanon’s MSF has never fully subscribed to the Weberian assertion that the state 
wields legitimate monopoly over violence but has been embedded with a military 
logic, reinforced by the civil war, in which militia power has directly translated into 
political influence. In 1982, as Hizbullah emerged on the peripheries of the civil war 
and with the LAF ineffectual, a collection of leftist militias confronted Israeli 
occupation while inter-confessional infighting struggled for the predominant 
orthodoxy in the MSF, a sphere primarily governed and managed by Syria. 
 
Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance is a product of this prevailing logic. Predicated on its 
contradistinction to Israel and with the considerable transference of capital from Iran 
and Syria, the Islamic Resistance preserved its modus vivendi in the MSF. Since the 
1990s, through a series of military engagements with Israel, Hizbullah has invested 
in adapting and enhancing its collectively organised practice within the structures of 
the MSF to develop a Resistance habitus endowed with the symbolic capital of an 
orthodox actor. However, the relevance of the Islamic Resistance is not contained to 
the MSF but Hizbullah endeavours to employ its symbolic capital for the purpose of 
elevating or leveraging its position in corresponding fields of activity. Not only does 
Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the MSF possess significant homology with the 
SMF by justifying, galvanising and sustaining the discourses and practices of the 
Resistance habitus within the Shi’i community, but it also provides Hizbullah with an 
invaluable amount of legitimately recognised symbolic capital with which to impose 
and leverage the logic of the Islamic Resistance onto the established structures of 
Lebanon’s political system, a sphere in which it propagates heterodoxy while 
maintaining deficient capital.  
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3. Political Field (PF) 
 
For Bourdieu (1991: 26), the PF is ‘the site par excellence in which words and action 
and the symbolic character of power that is at stake’. Similar to the concept of 
Political Opportunity Structures (POS) in SMT, the construction, constitution and 
composition of the PF is characterised by a range of political indices, such as the 
openness or closeness of the system, the position or access of elites, the existence 
of prominent cleavages and the state’s employment of repression or co-option in 
balancing against threats. Therefore, by focusing on the process through which an 
organisation/agent perceives political opportunities within their relational context and 
subsequently accumulates the relevant material/symbolic resources to enhance 
their practice and position, the POS in SMT and the PF in Bourdieu are linked in 
complementary conceptual synergy. Nevertheless, in practice, and unlike 
assumptions in SMT regarding the origin, form and purpose of collective action 
towards POS, the adoption of the PF can explain the complexity of political 
opportunities within the institutionalised system in Lebanon, the rationale behind 
Hizbullah’s heterodoxy in intentionally declining conventional political opportunities 
and the emergence of political opportunities emanating from fields beyond the PF.  
 
Conceived in the 19th Century and consolidated in the 20th Century, Lebanon’s 
political system resembles a consociational democracy that contains an inherent 
paradox. While citizens have equal voting rights, political influence is distributed via 
a hierarchy of sectarian quotas thereby prioritising confessional balancing over 
democratic representation. Conforming to this logic, executive power is extended to 
a ‘Troika’, a tripartite arrangement enshrined in the Constitution in which the 
President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister is a Sunni and the House 
Speaker is a Shi’i. Consequently, this system produces and reproduces intra/inter-
sectarian cleavages that debilitate the state’s functionality and impact, thereby 
deferring the practice of repression and co-option to the parties themselves. 
Moreover, despite being an inclusive framework in principle, the entrenched 
prevalence of confessional allocations and established elites also inhibits 
opportunities for access.  
 
Since its inception, Hizbullah has consistently deployed Collective Action Frames 
castigating Lebanon’s political system as illegitimate and corrupt. Therefore, rather 
than capitalise upon objective opportunities, Hizbullah’s presence and practice in the 
PF has been predicated on inculcating dispositions and perceptions that promote 
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heterodoxy in relation to the pre-existing logic and structures of the political system. 
Not only can a combined Bourdieu-SMT approach explain Hizbullah’s position on 
the permutation of political opportunities in Lebanon, but it can also examine why 
Hizbullah’s interpretation of interests and opportunities renders induction into the PF 
as more beneficial than immersion. Furthermore, this conceptual framework can 
highlight how Hizbullah strategically pursues bottom-up political opportunities 
without engaging in top-down political processes. By focusing on the enhancement 
of its symbolic capital in the SMF and MSF for the purpose of consolidating its status 
in local politics and advancing its social capital in the PF, Hizbullah seeks to create 
and pressure prospects for political opportunities within the prevailing system.    
 
4. Organisational Field (OF) 
 
In mainstream SMT, the social movement organisation is credited with managing 
the translation of objective political opportunities into the subjective perceptions of its 
mobilising base. Derived from insights in Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), the 
social movement organisation devises and disseminates centralised Collective 
Action Frames that facilitate the accumulation and deployment of material and 
symbolic resources to mobilise and sustain collective action. By representing a 
cohesive body that disseminates diversified yet coherent Collective Action Frames 
and galvanises harmonised practice through its mobilising repertoires, a Bourdieu-
SMT OF is conceptually linked to the notion of a social movement organisation. 
However, deviating from the assumptions of instrumental rationality in RMT, in 
which a centralised organisation has the strategic foresight to identify, seize upon 
and transform opportunities into collective action, a Bourdieu-SMT approach 
focuses on the dialectical challenges of Hizbullah’s intra-field dynamics, the 
placement of the organisation’s CAF for mobilising opportunities between 
predisposed agents and pre-existing structures within respective fields as well as 
the OF’s multi-field management of homologous positions between fields.  
 
From 1982, Hizbullah initiated a process of developing extant discourses and 
practices within the Shi’i community for the purpose of creating a cohesive 
organisation of collective dispositions and perceptions around the orthodox 
principles of an Islamic State in Lebanon, an Islamic Resistance against Israel and 
obedience to the wilayat al-faqih in Iran. Presided over by the majlis al-shura 
(‘advisory council’), which divides day-to-day responsibilities between its Political, 
Executive, Military and Religious departments, Hizbullah’s OF consists of Party 
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members engaged in national (parliament) or local (municipal) politics, military units 
within the Islamic Resistance, extensive social service institutions, media organs, 
networks of Shi’i clerics and private businesses64. Through these multi-faceted 
channels, Hizbullah’s OF is tasked with acquiring and allocating internal resources 
with which to (re)produce holistic CAF and mobilising repertoires that promote 
cogent collective action in its fields of operation.  
 
Nevertheless, a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation emphasises the recurrently 
dynamic negotiation in translating opportunities into action between Hizbullah’s OF 
and its targeted agents in concurrent fields of practice. Firstly, although Hizbullah’s 
OF expends significant capital in maintaining its Resistance habitus in each field, 
and since Hizbullah’s OF inducted itself onto the SMF and MSF, two spheres in 
which Shi’i agents were already engaged in a mutually constituted relationship with 
the pre-existing structures of each field, the Party is unable to command exclusive 
rights over collective action but acts as an interlocutor for facilitating purpose and 
practice while the diversity of its agents also shape dispositions and perceptions that 
simultaneously inform Hizbullah’s OF. Secondly, due to the differentiated logics and 
constitutions of Lebanon’s fields, Hizbullah’s OF must ensure that CAF and 
mobilising repertoires are not only specific enough to solidify its Resistance habitus 
within each field, but also general enough to manage the synchronisation of 
discourses and practices between fields. Thirdly, as all fields are competitive arenas 
by design, Hizbullah’s OF is not immune from competition but is equally immersed in 
internal struggles over the legitimate interpretation of the OF’s prevailing rules 
(doxa) between predominant (orthodox) and revisionist (heterodox) narratives.   
 
5. Field of International Politics (FIP) 
 
In mainstream SMT, the role of exogenous factors and external actors is broadly 
covered by the remit of POS. Nevertheless, in order to effectively identify and 
assess the implications of particular global dynamics on intra-state affairs, the inter-
state system should be conceptualised into a Field of International Politics (FIP). 
Conforming to the logic and constitution of field composition, states, equipped with 
structured dispositions and perceptions, compete with each other by strategically 
acquiring and deploying legitimately recognised values of capital to enhance or 
stabilise their position in propagating predominant orthodoxy or promoting revisionist 
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offered by Diani and Pilati (2011). 
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heterodoxy. The permeation of this international dimension is particularly pertinent in 
Lebanon. Whether historically manifesting in the administrative reforms of the 
Ottomans, the political reforms of the British and French or the persistent influence 
of regional states such as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, these foreign actors have 
had a considerable impact not only in constructing, entrenching and reproducing 
Lebanon’s political and social structures, but also in ensuring the perpetual 
vulnerability and susceptibility of Lebanon to international intervention.  
 
Rather than incorporate the FIP as a vehicle with which to investigate and speculate 
over Hizbullah’s suspected ‘terrorist’ activities of illegal fundraising in North America, 
drug smuggling in Latin America or targeted assassinations in Asia, the objective of 
the FIP is to relationally place and trace Hizbullah within its international context. 
From its inception, Hizbullah has benefited militarily and politically from the 
transference of capital from Iran and Syria. Consequently, a significant proportion of 
its mobilisational discourse and practice has been predicated on the 
contradistinction between the Islamic Resistance and Israel. Additionally, Hizbullah 
frequently derides Israel’s strategic ally, the U.S. or the ‘Great Satan’, as the 
hegemonic, neo-colonial power that presides over the predominant orthodoxy of the 
international system through its institutionalisation of liberal democracy and free 
market capitalism, a status that bestows excessive amounts of symbolic power to 
the U.S. regarding international norms and values. Therefore, Hizbullah is unable to 
ignore or extract itself from the relationality of its position in Lebanon to 
developments within the FIP. As a prominent member of the ‘Resistance Axis’, a 
regional alliance of aligning interests between Iran, Syria, Hamas in Gaza and Iraqi 
militias, Hizbullah is placed within the revisionist, counter-hegemonic heterodoxy of 
the FIP. As a non-state actor in Lebanon, Hizbullah can rely on the transference of 
capital to vindicate and reinforce its agenda in Lebanon from its affiliation within this 
collusio of heterodox practice. Conversely, as an inducted agent within the FIP, 
Hizbullah is also exposed to the effects of capital transfers from orthodox actors in 
the FIP aiming to balance against the influence of the Islamic Resistance.   
 
3.4 Relational Fields of Practice in Lebanon 
 
 
The adoption of a combined Bourdieu-SMT conceptual framework has four distinct 
advantages for explaining the inception, mobilisation and evolution of Hizbullah in 
Lebanon. Firstly, self-reflexivity enables the researcher to recognise the intrinsic 
deficiencies and prejudices not only of their own practice, but also the inherently 
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institutionalised practice of the Academic field. Secondly, in order to mitigate against 
these risks, relationality assists in reconciling and reconceptualising the theoretical 
logics of Islamic Studies and SMT. By providing SMT with a set of analytical tools as 
opposed to a monolithically structured paradigm, relationality injects dynamism in 
transforming traditional dichotomies into dialectics. Thirdly, by identifying five 
relational fields of practice that are largely derived from SMT insights, relationality 
also introduces a multi-dimensional, inter-related and interdependent perspective 
that is largely omitted from existing literature on Hizbullah. Fourthly, by applying 
relationality, conventional notions of opportunity, interest and change are 
problematised. Rather than interpret the space and time occupied by a social 
movement in finite or linear terms, relationality permits a view in which collective 
action is a concurrent continuum in which opportunity is presence, interest is survival 
and change is incremental.  
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occupation, Norton (1987: 4-5) remarked that ‘Lebanon has hardly offered a 
hospitable research environment’ leaving the ‘scholarly cupboard…surprisingly dry’. 
Compounding this broader contextual environment of conflict is the palpably 
historical fomentation of ‘Al-Muamara’ amongst the Lebanese, an inscribed 
disposition in which researchers, especially Western ones, are treated with suspicion 
as they are assumed to be complicit in an eternal ‘plot’ concocted by Western 
powers to manipulate politics in Lebanon.  
 
Similar to other conspiracy theories, although prone to hyperbole, the case for 
Lebanon is based on elements of fact. Whether witnessed by the role of British agent 
Richard Wood in the political arrangement of 1842, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 
1916, the British-French border committee of 1921, British influence in the 1943 
National Pact or coordinated CIA/MI6 operations in 1958 to curtail socialist-inspired 
movements, ‘Western’ fingerprints are sprawled on the pages of modern Lebanon65. 
Most notably, Kim Philby, the mercurial MI6 double-agent within the pro-Soviet spy 
network referred to as the ‘Cambridge Five’, was stationed in Beirut from 1956 where 
the Hotel Saint-Georges became the chosen location for discussions with Kermit 
Roosevelt, the CIA officer who orchestrated Operation Ajax in 195366. In this Cold 
War climate, Samir Kassir (2010: 15), a Lebanese writer who was assassinated 
amidst ominous circumstances in 2005, observed that Beirut was ‘a place where 
nothing was destined to happen apart from secret machinations and dark plotting…a 
place where newspaper correspondents could eavesdrop on the conversations of 
diplomats and gather information’.   
 
Prior to conducting fieldwork, the researcher acknowledged that the intentions of a 
quintessentially British looking/sounding male, studying a PhD on Hizbullah, 
extensively travelled in the region and with an affable proficiency in Arabic may elicit 
nefarious connotations in Lebanon67. Consequently, not only did certain Lebanese 
commentators refuse to be interviewed, but also some of the researcher’s closest 
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 Richard Wood not only incited the Druze notables to revolt against the Christians, but he was also instrumental in structuring the 
qaim-maqams sectarian power sharing agreement in 1842 (Makdisi, 2000: 59-61). In 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement divided the 
Middle East between British and French influence (Barr, 2012). In 1921, British intelligence agent Lieutenant Colonel Stuart 
Newcombe was influential in demarcating the boundaries between South Lebanon and northern Palestine (Blanford, 2006). In 1942 
Charles De Gaulle ordered the arrest future President Bishara al-Khoury and Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh before British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill issued an ultimatum demanding their release (Traboulsi, 2007: 105-108). Following their role in deposing Iranian 
Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953 and after the 1958 coup in Iraq, the US and UK approved clandestine operations in 
Lebanon and Jordan (Traboulsi, 2007: 136).          
66
 Philby was allegedly an inspiration for the James Bond series, especially The Man with the Golden Gun (1965), written by Ian 
Fleming, an MI6 agent turned author. In 1956, journalist Richard Beeston wrote that Beirut was ‘a bazaar for the trading of information 
between diplomats, politicians, journalists and spies’ (Macintyre, 2014: 207).  
67
 The researcher is a blond, blue eyed, 6’2 white male with a southern English accent who prior to Lebanon had worked in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, Jordan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia while also having visited Iran, Egypt and Oman. The researcher 
studied classical Arabic at Umm Al-Qura in Saudi Arabia and Al-Qasid Institute in Jordan as well as studying colloquial Arabic in the 
occupied Palestinian territories and Lebanon.   
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friends in Lebanon remained unconvinced of his genuine motivations68. Furthermore, 
the endemic polarisation of Lebanese politics, fuelled by a Hobbesian culture of 
mistrust that is exacerbated by continued foreign meddling in Lebanon, leads to 
methodological challenges in that approaching an interview with one individual may 
deter the engagement of other prospective interviewees69. Testament to this 
entrenched dynamic of suspicion, the researcher also discovered that tensions 
between Lebanese of the same confession but different political persuasions, as well 
as within confessions on the same side of the political spectrum were just as 
common as strictly inter-confessional or cross-political divisions70.  
 
The second factor guiding the practical logic of the researcher’s methodology was 
the assumption that Hizbullah represents one of the most inaccessible and 
unapproachable political parties in the world (Harb & Leenders, 2005). From its eight-
member al-majlis al-shura (‘advisory council’) to its constituents, Hizbullah’s 
institutionalised discipline renders the movement practically impenetrable for 
researchers. Reminiscent of the religiously-sanctioned Shi’i practice of survival 
through dissimulation (taqiyya), a historical precedent that may encourage 
adherence in local communities, this secrecy is emblematic of the conditions in which 
Hizbullah was conceived, the strategy it seeks to implement, the security it strives to 
guarantee and the ambiguity it intends to stimulate. Operating alongside confessional 
groups tainted by memories of internecine fratricide and duplicity, Hizbullah’s most 
pressing fear, verging on a state of paranoia, is the risk of infiltration from outsiders. 
This meticulously coveted guardianship over its internal dynamics renders 
researchers of both Lebanese and foreign origin exposed to the obstructive 
impediments of what has been crassly referred to as the ‘bureaucracy of God’ 
(Cambanis, 2010: 139).    
 
Devoid of transparency, opinions on Hizbullah inevitably and dramatically vary. 
Consequently, the Party of God becomes rational and irrational; strategic and 
idiosyncratic; pragmatic and erratic; independent and dependent. In a couple of 
illuminating interviews that epitomised the confusion intentionally propagated by 
Hizbullah, the researcher met separately with Ali al-Amin and Qassem al-Qassir, two 
                                                 
68
 There were five prominent and ‘independent’ Hizbullah analysts from Lebanon who refused to be interviewed. The researcher was 
informed by a friend with connections to all five that his background was the reason for their hesitation. Although not extended the 
same courtesy, out of respect for their work, they will not be named. Throughout the course of the fieldwork, the researcher’s friends, 
both Shi’i and Christian, consistently asked questions about his affiliation to the British intelligence agencies.     
69
 While both 14 March and 8 March figures refused interviews or ignored questions due to the specific focus on Hizbullah, the 
researcher was also warned that Hizbullah would not process interview applications if he spoke with anti-Hizbullah Shi’i activists.  
70
 One example occurred when the researcher introduced two Christian friends, one from Achrafieh in east Beirut and one from Ayn 
al-Rummaneh close-by on the edge of the southern suburbs. Although each of them supported the Free Patriotic Movement in 8 
March, a fact that neither disclosed publicly, both refused to speak or meet with the other again.  
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seasoned Lebanese journalists from opposite sides of the political spectrum but who 
both write for Shu’oun Janoubia (‘Affairs of the South’), a magazine based in the 
Hizbullah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut71. However, when asked about 
Hizbullah’s objectives in Lebanon, its popularity amongst the Shi’i, its regional 
strategy, its relationship with Iran or even the authority of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, 
the answers provided were emphatically contradictory. Rephrasing Winston 
Churchill’s remarks on Russia, Hizbullah became the ‘riddle’ wrapped in the ‘mystery’ 
of Lebanon inside the ‘enigma’ of the Middle East. Prior to arriving in Lebanon in 
October 2011, and in a decision that further complicated fieldwork expectations, both 
Ibrahim Moussawi, Hizbullah’s media advisor, and Nicholas Blanford, an experienced 
expert on Hizbullah, informed the researcher that the Arab Spring and the 
subsequent threat posed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of the Party’s 
main allies, had caused Hizbullah to enforce a self-imposed hiatus on permitting 
interviews for the purpose of security72. 
 
Considering these two factors, the researcher both deductively and inductively 
accepted that he neither possessed the capital required to conduct empirical 
research on the Shi’i community in the anthropological style of Lara Deeb (2006a), 
nor would he rely on the temptation to accumulate more accessible wasta 
(‘connections’) that exclusively targeted non-Shi’i or non-8 March sources for 
perspectives on Hizbullah. While the theoretical logic of the first viewpoint differed 
from the focus on this thesis, the practical logic of the second approach also 
threatened to engage in a methodological fallacy. Although interviews are an 
invaluable source of information, it was always unlikely that a Hizbullah official would 
be willing to speak openly and frankly to an outsider of any nationality73. Moreover, 
access to Hizbullah is inevitably contingent on social capital accrued within the Shi’i 
community, a potentially compromising relationship that positions them as invested 
stakeholders in the very field of inquiry under examination. By contrast, and while 
recognising the value of his capital as a Western PhD candidate, the researcher 
referred to himself as ‘Mr Zero capital in Lebanon’ during a conversation with Mona 
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 Shu’oun Janoubia (www.janoubiaonline.com) focuses on the socio-economic development for South Lebanon. Ali al-Amin, the son 
of Shi’i cleric Shaykh Mohammad Hassan al-Amin, is vocally critical of Hizbullah (Interview with Ali al-Amin, Beirut, 26 August, 2012). 
Qassem al-Qassir is ideologically close to Sayyid Fadlallah but is sympathetic to Hizbullah (Interview with Qassem al-Qassir, Beirut, 
31 August). The third notable member of the magazine is Faysal Abdel Satar, a former Hizbullah strategist for Hizbullah who is still 
loyal to the concept of Resistance. 
72
 Interviews with Ibrahim Moussawi (Beirut, 19 February, 2012) and Nicholas Blanford (Beirut, 10 September, 2012).  
73
 Even if an interview is approved, Hizbullah officials rarely deviate from the Party line that regurgitates the core values and principles 
of the Resistance in context. Additionally, in the event that a Hizbullah official relays previously unreleased information, the researcher 
faces the added risk of falsely assuming that this individual is not only a genuine and credible source, but also divulging a testimony 
that is representational within Hizbullah.        
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Harb74. Although the comment was conveyed (and received) in a comical manner, 
the point is methodologically valid with the researcher permanently located as an 
outsider to the struggles within Lebanon’s fields of practice (Callinicos, 1999: 100). 
However, whether this position is advantageous or detrimental is dependent on the 
researcher’s practice of self-reflexivity. 
 
Consequently, rather than plan a practical methodology around producing original 
primary data based on access to Hizbullah’s officials or constituencies, the 
researcher prioritised the accumulation and reorganisation of information that would 
assist in testing an innovative conceptual framework devised to relationally examine 
the creation of reproduction of Hizbullah’s Resistance in Lebanon. Therefore, by 
using Bourdieu’s analytical formula, this approach would primarily concentrate on 
initiating a mutually constitutive dialectic in which the practical logic of Hizbullah’s 
structuring of dispositions and positions within the structured contexts of Lebanon 
was both informed by and informing of a theoretical logic that explained this 
evolutionary phenomenon. In order to supply and supplement this equation with the 
requisite material, the researcher also collated both primary and secondary sources.    
 
The pre-existing and proliferating literature on Lebanon was a useful base with 
which to integrate practical parameters into the devised theoretical framework. By 
incorporating and appraising a wide-ranging canon, the researcher was able to 
obtain detailed insights into pertinent topics, such as the history of the Shi’i in 
Lebanon, the formation of the Lebanon’s political, economic and social structures, 
the dynamics of the 15-year civil war as well as dealing specifically with the 
inception and development of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Aside from containing 
constructive chronological narratives and analyses, this scholarship also entailed a 
litany of primary sources, including archived documentation, political statements, 
socio-economic indices, survey statistics and interviews, that could be extracted to 
guide and inform another proposed perspective. However, in order to personally and 
conceptually triangulate these previous lines of inquiry, as well as supplement them 
within a prevailing context, the researcher simultaneously pursued three alternative 
empirical avenues to emphasise the relational angle, namely semi-structured 
interviews, primary data collection and participant observation.  
 
                                                 
74
 Harb is an Associate Professor in the Department of Agriculture and Design at the American University Beirut (AUB). She has 
published extensively on Hizbullah and is familiar with the work of Pierre Bourdieu.  
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Firstly, despite the aforementioned methodological limitations, the researcher 
conducted interviews with key stakeholders not only to engage and gauge 
subjective opinions on Hizbullah, but also to deduce relational positions between 
agents by casting a broad sample. Complying with official Hizbullah protocol, the 
researcher regularly visited Hizbullah’s Media Relations Department in the southern 
suburbs of Beirut to submit applications for interviews75. Over a period of ten 
months, this department arranged two interviews on the researcher’s behalf: one 
with Dr Mahmoud Mohsen Saleh, a committee member of the Hizbullah-affiliated 
Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD); and another with Dr Ali 
Fayyad, the former Director of the CCSD and Hizbullah MP in parliament76. 
Additionally, in an effort to build a rapport of mutual respect, the researcher had a 
series of discussions with Ibrahim Moussawi, the head of Hizbullah’s Media 
Relations Department77. In each instance, the researcher conducted semi-structured 
interviews with the objective of comparing the answers to a series of questions 
probing the dispositions, perceptions, practices and phases of Hizbullah’s 
Resistance. As expected, almost all of the researcher’s requests, including 
interviews with Hizbullah officials, access to municipal leaders, visits to Hizbullah’s 
social services and meetings with Hizbullah-associated students at Beirut’s 
universities, were denied78.  
 
Consequently, Hizbullah’s introverted nature compelled the researcher to schedule 
other interviews with informed observers from outside the Party who could offer their 
own specific experiences and expertise on Hizbullah. Aside from five notable 
analysts with close links to the Party, who either ignored or refused interview 
requests, over 20 interviews were conducted with a selection of experienced 
journalists, think-tank fellows and eminent academics each with their own 
                                                 
75
 Hizbullah’s Media Relations Department is located on the first floor of an unassuming building off Main Street in Bir al-Abd. On 
arrival to this modest office decorated with portraits of Sayyid Nasrallah and Ayatollah Khamenei as well as Hizbullah and Lebanese 
flags, visitors are welcomed by either Wafa or Rana, two female liaisons operating between applicants and Ibrahim Moussawi. The 
application form for interviews asks for a synopsis and purpose of the research, the information required, prospective interviewees 
and sample questions as well as asking for one’s contact details in Lebanon, a copy of one’s student card and a copy of one’s 
passport.  There are also unofficial channels with which to contact Hizbullah officials. However, on the advice of experienced experts, 
and concerned that these informal avenues would be discovered and thereby hinder any progress through formal means, the 
researcher decided to persevere with conventional methods.   
76
 Fayyad, who wrote a significant portion of Hizbullah’s 2009 Political Manifesto, is one of the Party’s main spokespersons for 
Western journalists and researchers (Interview with Ali Fayyad, Beirut, 29 March, 2012).   
77
 Ibrahim Moussawi has a PhD from the University of Birmingham in the UK on democratisation and the concept of wilayat al-faqih in 
Iran. He is an interesting and interested conversationalist who was eager to hear the researcher’s opinion on both his book and on 
philosophical concepts. He regularly apologised for the ‘bad timing’ and insisted his ‘hands are tied’ when it comes to Party policy, 
especially following breaches of security by foreign researchers prior and following the 2006 War with Israel, such as the work of Avi 
Jorisch (2004). In this climate, Dr Moussawi even admitted that a Party employee working for Al-Manar was advised to change his 
PhD thesis to a topic unrelated to Hizbullah (Interview with Ibrahim Moussawi, Beirut, 13 May, 2012).          
78
 The rejections became increasingly formulaic and farcical. Therefore, the researcher attempted to directly approach Hizbullah’s 
student representatives at Beirut’s universities, especially AUB and LAU, for the purpose of gaining a youth perspective on the Party. 
While this approach initially recorded success, with the first meetings always lucid and informative, the second meeting, testifying the 
entrenched discipline within Hizbullah, began with an apology with the potential interviewee relaying that they had been advised not to 
speak with me by Yousef al-Bassam, the coordinator for Hizbullah students in Beirut. After reaching out to al-Bassam, he declined an 
interview on account of the researcher being British.      
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perspectives on Hizbullah79. Furthermore, since one integral component of this 
holistic methodological process was to examine Hizbullah in relation to its extant 
environment, the researcher also sought the perspectives of other prevalent 
stakeholders operating as invested agents within the same fields as Hizbullah. For 
this reason, the researcher identified and approached non-Hizbullah members within 
the Hizbullah-led 8 March alliance in parliament as well as a cadre of figures within 
the Shi’i community who publicly opposed Hizbullah. These interviews were semi-
structured in containing coherent and formatted lines of questioning while affording 
the interviewee the flexibility to elaborate on their personal interactions with 
Hizbullah.     
 
Secondly, the researcher also explored opportunities for primary data collection. In 
particular, through Philippa Mishlawi, the researcher was offered privileged access 
to her personal archive of Middle East Reporter (MER). Instigated by the late 
Palestinian journalist Toufiq Mishlawi during the civil war, MER served as an 
invaluable media resource for foreign journalists, diplomats and businessmen by 
providing them with daily synopses and weekly analyses of all the Arabic press in 
English. Analysing thousands of entries from 1982 until 2011, the researcher was 
not only privy to original newspaper interviews, statements, polls and surveys from a 
broad selection of Lebanese and regional press outlets, but he was also able to 
extract first-hand information on Hizbullah by contextualising the ascension of the 
Party in relation to its attention in the media. Additionally, in parallel to this process, 
the researcher also monitored the archives of Hizbullah-associated websites, such 
as Al-Manar (‘the Lighthouse’), Al-Moqawama (‘the Resistance’) and Al-‘Ahd (‘the 
Covenant’), to form an impression of how Hizbullah perceives itself, how it moulds 
its dispositions for Resistance and how it disseminates its narrative80. These 
sources contain databases of Hizbullah’s daily news, political charters, party 
manifestos, policy papers, speech transcripts, television programmes and 
documentaries as well as infographics of military victories, the testimonies of fallen 
martyrs and interpretations of symbolic historical events.  
 
Furthermore, through Naji Shaito, the Office Manager at the CCSD, the researcher 
was granted access to a comprehensive database that compiles and categorises all 
news pertaining to Hizbullah’s social services in the local and national press81. With 
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 A full list of interviewees is provided in the Bibliography.  
80
 www.almanar.com.lb; www.moqawama.org; www.alahednews.com.lb  
81
 The office of the Hizbullah-aligned CCSD, which is decorated with Hizbullah posters and portraits, is located in a non-descript area 
in the southern suburbs. The well-equipped library is frequented by a number of young students intending to study a range of 
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the assistance of a friend, the researcher used this resource to track, download and 
translate a selection of approximately 400 articles documenting the activities of 
Hizbullah’s social services from 1992 until 2011. Whereas the MER archive treated 
Hizbullah as a peripheral consideration, this database focused entirely on primary 
information pertaining to Hizbullah’s public welfare programmes in the Shi’i 
community as well as including the implicit perception of the Lebanese press to the 
motivations and purposes behind the Party’s network of grassroots institutions. 
Lastly, on the occasions when thematic reports by the CCSD contained information 
gaps on socio-economic data or demographic statistics of the Shi’i community in 
relation to national figures, the researcher consulted similar studies by the relevant 
Lebanese branches of the United Nations and World Bank.  
 
Although possessing a proficient articulacy in Arabic, the researcher neither had the 
linguistic expertise nor the time required to effectively read and translate 
comprehensive secondary texts in Arabic. Additionally, considering the proliferating 
availability and accessibility of material on Lebanon, and especially on Hizbullah, 
either in English or translated into English, the researcher was able to identify and 
cover the vast majority of relevant existing literature for the purpose of fulfilling the 
stated objectives of this thesis in conceptually and empirically analysing the 
evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. In this context, these two primary sources of 
information on Hizbullah, namely the MER and CCSD archives, enabled the 
researcher to compensate for these deficiencies by including original and invaluable 
Arabic material. Whereas MER, which provided translations of Lebanese and 
regional press outlets spanning three decades, aided this research by placing 
Hizbullah’s development within its situational environment, the CCSD articles, which 
were translated with the assistance of a Lebanese friend, offered insights from the 
perspective of both Lebanese and Hizbullah-affiliated outlets regarding the 
movement’s social activities (see Bibliography for a full list of specific sources).      
 
Thirdly, as part of the self-reflexive practice of immersing oneself into the practical 
logic of fields as an outsider, the researcher aimed to learn about Hizbullah and its 
constituencies through participant observation to obtain more interactive and 
experiential data on public practices in the Shi’i community, especially during regular 
visits to the southern suburbs of Beirut (al-dahiyeh) as well as trips to constituencies 
                                                                                                                                           
subjects. The library contains books in English, French and Arabic with its impressive collection ranging from Islamic Philosophy, 
Political Theory and literature specifically dealing with Hizbullah (both positive and negative) to books such as George Bush’s 
memoirs and ‘The English Constitution’ (1873), a piece written by Walter Bagehot, one of the inspirational vanguards behind the 
liberal democratic and capitalist values of The Economist.          
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in Ba’albeck, Nabatiyeh, Tyre and Bint Jubayl. Since the spotlight is usually shone 
on Hizbullah in reaction to political events and military campaigns, the researcher 
was interested in witnessing how Hizbullah uses and demarcates public space in 
order to instil, inculcate and institutionalise a Resistance habitus of diverse yet 
harmonised practices. In particular, this included Hizbullah’s strategy in adapting 
and modifying orthodoxy within the Shi’i community to project Resistance-related 
semiotics of imagery and iconography, thereby transforming material space into 
symbolic space to promote community identity and mobilisation that transcends 
boundaries of social class or geographical location. During this process, and with 
varying levels of success, the researcher would initiate informal conversations with 
local shopkeepers and young Shi’i in cafes with the intention of engaging them 
about their backgrounds and interests as opposed to directly asking for their 
opinions on Hizbullah.              
 
Furthermore, and by extension, the researcher was also intrigued to observe the 
manifestation of Shi’i celebrated rituals as inaugurated and managed by Hizbullah. 
Whether visiting Hizbullah’s commemorative museums, such as Mleeta, visiting 
cafes in al-dahiyeh to watch Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches, or attending 
religious events, like Ashoura, the intention was to gauge the jaw (‘atmosphere’) 
emitted by Hizbullah’s mutually constituted relationship with its Shi’i constituents. 
While selective and brief, these contemporaneous encounters enabled the 
researcher to observe Hizbullah’s habitat first-hand and explore the dynamic 
interaction between the conception, cultivation and consolidation of Hizbullah’s 
Resistance habitus in ascertaining the impact of its practices on the dispositions and 
perceptions of agents in the Shi’i community.          
 
Conclusion  
 
Illustrating the purpose behind methodological practice, the specific object of 
research is not as important ‘than the method which was applied to it and which 
could be applied to an infinity of different objects’ (Bourdieu et al, 1982: 50). 
Furthermore, any scientific approach that simultaneously ‘fails to question itself does 
not, properly speaking, know what it does’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 236). In a 
logical continuation of Chapter Two, in which Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’ was 
presented as a vehicle to reconcile the inherent dichotomies within Islamic Studies 
and SMT, this chapter has discussed the advantages of applying a Bourdieusian 
conceptual framework for enhancing the methodological precepts of SMT in order to 
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more effectively explain the creation and reproduction of Hizbullah’s Islamic 
Resistance in Lebanon. In particular, this review has focused on the researcher’s 
adoption and implementation of self-reflexivity and relationality.  
 
Principally, ‘self-reflexivity’ is a methodological technique in which researchers reflect 
the analytical tools for accessing and examining the object onto their own practice. 
This process not only entails an acknowledgement that the researcher may 
intentionally or inadvertently construct or reproduce the object based on their 
structured dispositions and perceptions, but also recognises that the researcher is 
embedded within the institutionalised limitations of the Academic field, a politicised 
arena of predominant discourses and practices that have the potential to produce 
‘unthought categories of thought which delimt the thinkable and predetermine the 
thought’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40). Consequently, in theory, ‘it is only by 
freeing the practice of science from all political contamination that one can hope to 
achieve a politically effective practice of science’ (Swartz, 1997: 249). However, in 
practice, since exorcising the agent from the ‘interested fiction’ of ‘neutral science’ in 
the Academic field is an elusive goal, the researcher should endeavour to self-
critically and perhaps counter-intuitively objectify the act of objectivation through self-
reflexivity for the purpose of minimalising the detrimental impact of enabling a 
‘scientific myopia’ that risks pre-constructing ‘objects in the garb of science’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 28; Bourdieu, 1975: 101).  
 
Secondly, immutably intertwined with self-reflexivity is the Bourdieu’s complementary 
concept of relationality. In its scientific form, methodological relationality refers to the 
mutually reinforcing and constituting connection between the theoretical logic of 
academic disciplines and the practical logic of social worlds. For Bourdieu (2000: 52), 
social science should not ‘adopt practical logic for itself, but to reconstruct that 
knowledge theoretically by including in the theory the distance between practical 
logic and theoretical logic’. Regardless of its realisation, prevalent methodologies 
within academic practice remain inhibited by the ‘scholastic fallacy’ or ‘scholastic 
disposition’, a theoretical logic in which the researcher credits ‘agents with the 
reasoning reason of the scientists reasoning about their practices’ as opposed to 
initiating a dialectic with the practical logic of the agent (Bourdieu, 2000: 49, 60). By 
utilising this lens to inspect commentators implanted in either the Academic, FIP and 
Media fields that have contributed to pre-existing literature on Hizbullah in Lebanon, 
this chapter not only discovered distinctions between their theoretical and practical 
logics, but also identified the tendency of the practical logic of interest imbued within 
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the social world to supersede the role of theoretical logic in intellectual practice. 
Similar to self-reflexivity, while overcoming the innate distinction between theoretical 
and practical logics is perpetually unattainable, analytical tools are required to 
mitigate against their influence over methodological practice. Therefore, in response 
to this duality, by invoking the notion of field constitutions and dynamics, Bourdieu 
introduces the inclusive dialectic between theoretical and practical logics so that the 
researcher, regardless of personal interests, is cognisant of the implications of their 
epistemocentrism.  
 
Ultimately, social science requires methodological approaches that ‘accentuate the 
relational dynamic’ (Bigo, 2011: 245). The innovative relational constitution of habitus 
and capital, both within and across fields, is an invaluable methodological 
contribution to social science theory. However, Bourdieu’s conceptual framework has 
been criticised for his lack of detail in practically explaining field identity, the 
determinants of field homology, the overly structuralised concept of habitus and the 
Western-centric interpretation of capital (Swartz, 1997: 110-113; Calhoun, 1993: 70; 
Lipuma, 1993: 26). While Bourdieu would have accepted the basis of these 
criticisms, his analytical tools provide a robust method for relationality, the degree 
and extent of which are revealed and problematised once applied and tested to 
empirical phenomena. In particular, Swartz (1997: 136) commented that a 
considerable deficiency of Bourdieu’s work has been to adequately account for the 
politics of collective mobilisation. By combining Bourdieu’s conceptual instruments 
with SMT, these pillars can inform both a theoretical and practical methodology for 
examining Hizbullah’s collective mobilisation in Lebanon.  
 
More specifically, by reconceptualising rather than replacing SMT’s epistemological 
tripartite of Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilising Structures and Collective 
Action Frames into five concentric and inter-related fields of analysis – Social 
Mobilisational Field, Military-Security Field, Political Field, Organisational Field and 
the Field of International Politics – this chapter has embraced a holistic concept of 
self-reflexivity and relationality to outline a methodological approach that has not only 
provided the practically-infused theoretical reasoning for conducting interviews, 
analysing selected primary data and exercising participant observation, but it has 
also offered a theoretically-instilled practical rationale for examining how Hizbullah 
has introduced, inculcated and institutionalised a harmonised Resistance habitus 
both within and between the homologous fields of activity in Lebanon. In the next 
chapter, the analytical tools of this Bourdieu-SMT framework will be implemented to 
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locate the Shi’i habitus before the emergence of Hizbullah within the construction and 
constitution of fields in modern Lebanon. 
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Chapter Four 
Locating the Shi’i habitus in 
the Construction of Lebanon’s fields 
 
‘From Jabal ‘Amil…that quarry of Shiism and fountainhead of heresy, a damned Rafizi by the name of 
‘Abd al-Al…joined Ismail and supported and helped to propagate this false teaching. Calling himself 
seyhu’l-Islam, he became the seyh of apostasy’82. 
- Treatise on the Refutation of the Rafizis, 1620s (Winter, 2010: 22). 
 
‘South Lebanon is not well known or sufficiently liked...Maybe it is tired because of its resounding past 
so it withdrew from the world little by little for over a thousand years that we forgot about it’.  
- Michel Chiha, one of the authors of La Revue Phenicienne, 1919. 
 
‘The Muslims of the dissident Shi’i sect are peasants who obey their leaders. These have rarely 
expressed anti-Lebanese sentiments…The fact of being a Shi’i is by no means incompatible with being 
Lebanese…as the Mitwalis of the Hermil attached to the Lebanon since 1860 have demonstrated’83.  
- Robert de Caix, Secretary General in Beirut in 1926 (Chalabi, 2006: 97-98). 
 
‘Our name is not Matawlah. Our name is men of refusal (rafidun), men of vengeance, men who revolt 
against all tyranny…even though this may cost our blood and our lives.’ 
- Musa al-Sadr, the founder of Amal (Al-Nahar, 18 February 1974). 
 
The modern state of Lebanon was ‘one of the laboratories of modernity’ (Kassir, 
2006: 20) that emerged out of the Field of International Politics (FIP). On 26 April 
1920, after months of political manoeuvring between Great Britain and France, the 
San Remo Conference concluded that the territories of Greater Lebanon and Syria 
would be administered under a French Mandate following the dismantling of the 
Ottoman Empire84. Consequently, after defeating Emir Faysal’s Arab army in 
Maysalun on 24 July, thereby crushing Arab nationalist dreams of establishing Bilad 
al-Sham (‘Greater Syria’)85, General Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner 
in the Levant, officially pronounced Le Grand Liban on 1 September 1920.  
 
This newly constructed nation not only consisted of the predominantly Christian 
canton of Mount Lebanon (Jabal Lubnan), but it was also augmented by the 
annexation of the traditional coastal cities of Beirut, Saida, Tyre and Tripoli as well as 
                                                 
82
 An Ottoman term for the Shi’i that implied ‘refusal’ of Sunni orthodoxy (Winter, 2010: 1).  
83
 Metouli, Mitwali or Metwallite (pl. Matawila) literally means followers of Imam Ali. Weiss (2010: 40-51) claims the term can be traced 
to an old battle cry of Jabal ‘Amil (‘mut waliyyan li-Ali’). For Firro (2003: 44), it refers to the Matwal, a tribe from the southern Hijaz. 
The name became ‘bound up with notions of sloth, laziness, and all-round passivity’, characteristics foreign travellers attributed to the 
Shi’i of Jabal ‘Amil (Weiss, 2010: 40-51).  
84
 The Syrian Mandate was divided into Aleppo, Damascus, an Alawi state and Jabal Druze.  
85
 Acting on alleged promises from allies in Europe, Faysal was declared ‘King of Syria’ during the Arab Congress on 7 March 1920. 
The King-Crane Commission, established by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, discovered that 80% of respondents supported a 
United Syria (Traboulsi, 2007: 78).   
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four ex-Ottoman cazas (districts) – Hasbaya, Rashaya, Ba’albeck and Akkar 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 80). Jabal ‘Amil, the 3,200 square kilometre area in the south 
stretching 80km from the mouth of the Awwali river north of Saida to ‘the seven 
villages’ in the south and extending 40km from the Mediterranean to the Biqa’ Valley, 
was one of the regions annexed to Le Grand Liban (Mallat, 1988: 1)86. According to 
figures released in a 1921 edition of al-Irfan, Shi’i Muslims made up 48.2% of the 
south, or 62,796 people, and 14.8% of Greater Lebanon, with a total of 104,947 
(Weiss, 2010: 58).    
 
The arrival of Shi’i thought to Lebanon is generally attributed to Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, 
who was expelled from Syria by the Third Caliph, Uthman bin ‘Affan (d.656), for his 
sympathies towards Ali ibn Abi Talib (d.661), a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Al-Ghifari, banished to Jabal ‘Amil, settled amongst the Christian 
population that was descended from the ‘Amili tribe in Yemen (Firro, 2003: 44; Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2003: 278; Shanahan, 2005: 14). However, the Shi’ism espoused by al-
Ghifari, which predates the Battle of Karbala87, should not be perceived as defining 
the dogmatic precedent for the modern politicised manifestation of the contemporary 
Shi’i/Sunni feud in Middle East. Contrarily, ‘Shi’ism’ at this time should be 
characterised by its differentiated challenge to Sunni orthodoxy rather than a distinct 
practice (Hodgson, 1955: 3; Halawi, 1992: 29; Weiss, 2010: 63). Prior to Ja’far al-
Sadiq (d.765), the Sixth Shi’i Imam of the Abbasid period, it would appear that al-
Ghifari’s form of Shi’ism would have focused more on issues of jurisprudence.     
 
Before the First Crusade, the Cairo-based Ismaili Shi’i Caliphate of the Fatimids 
(908-1171), who followed Ismail ibn Ja’far, the son of Ja’far al-Sadiq, extended its 
rule to cover most of modern Lebanon. During this time, the Shi’i enjoyed intermittent 
phases of autonomy while the Buyids of Baghdad and Hamdanids of Aleppo 
demonstrate the spread of Shi’i influence beyond the Mediterranean coast (Halawi, 
1992: 30)88. After the Crusades, Shi’ism was eclipsed by the Ayyubids under Salah 
al-Din and, more saliently for the Shi’i of modern Lebanon, the establishment of the 
Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt89. The latter, originating from Turkic tribes, launched a 
series of military expeditions during 1292, 1300 and 1305 in the northern regions of 
                                                 
86
 Bassa, Khalisa, Hunin, Quds, Yusha’, Sulha and Tarbin, which were later allocated to Palestine (Mallat, 1988: 1). 
87
 The Battle of Karbala (680) in which Mu’awiya, the son of Caliph Uthman, killed Husayn, the Third Shi’i Imam and the second son of 
Imam Ali, is frequently credited as instigating the separation between Sunnis and Shi’is.  
88
 Including Abu Talib bin Ammar in Tripoli (1058-1109), Bani Mirdas in Sidon (1021-1028) and Ayn al-Dawla bi Abu Aqil in Tyre 
(1058-1124). William Harris (2012: 62) comments that many Shi’i fled Jabal ‘Amil during the Crusades. The Buyids (932-1055) 
followed the practices of Ismail ibn Ja’far’s brother, Musa al-Kazim. The Hamdanids were a dynasty combining Imami (Twelver), 
Rafidi, Zaydi, Ismaili and Nusayri Shi’i (Hourani, 2006: 51).     
89
 Salah al-Din offered the Shi’i of Jabal ‘Amil autonomy in 1187 (Harris, 2012: 63).  
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Jabal Akkar, Jabal al-Dinniya and Kisrawan that precipitated a mass Shi’i exodus 
(Shanahan, 2005: 15)90. Consequently, Ismailis and Nusayris left for southern 
Lebanon and Syria while the Twelver Shi’i resettled in Jabal ‘Amil and the Biqa’ 
Valley (Hourani, 2006: 52)91. By the time of the Ottoman Empire, whereas Jabal ‘Amil 
was a relatively organised, geographically contiguous and hierarchical feudal system, 
the Biqa’ was a more nomadic area ‘with a less rigidly defined society’ (Shanahan, 
2005: 15).  
 
Under the Ottoman Empire, in the aftermath of its dismemberment and following the 
inception of an independent Lebanese state, the role and influence of the Shi’i clergy 
(ulama) posed a recurring question both in the context of extant authoritative 
structures within the Shi’i community as well as within the emerging authoritative 
structures of Lebanon. Unlike Sunni Islam, clerical authority in Twelver Shi’ism is 
organised via a transnational and hierarchical leadership structure. Since the 18th 
Century, when proponents the Usuli school of thought eclipsed the traditional 
custodians of the Akhbari branch of Twelver Shi’ism, the predominant orthodoxy of 
practice has been characterised and predicated around the concept of ‘ijtihad. 
Contrary to the Akhbaris, who construed any challenge to the indisputable judgement 
enshrined in the Qur’an and hadith as illegitimate, the notion of ‘ijtihad, or 
‘independent reasoning’, propagated by the Usulis proposed a revision in which 
senior clerics were sanctioned to modernise Shi’i belief within specific situational 
contexts. Consequently, the Usuli interpretation of ‘ijtihad became institutionalised 
within the hawzat, the educational establishment exclusive to Shi’i Islam.  
 
After completing four initial phases of induction, including muqaddimat (‘beginners’, 
3-5 years), sutuh (‘surfaces’, 3-6 years), bahth al-kharij (‘outside research’) and 
ijtihad, a mujtahid was then categorised in ascending order from thiqat al-islam 
(‘Trust of Islam’) to hujjat al-islam wa al-muslimin (‘Proof of Islam and of Muslims’) 
then ayatollah fi al-‘alamin (‘the Sign of God in the World’). In order to become a 
marja, ‘a source of emulation’ entrusted with producing edicts on legitimate practice 
based upon the reconciliation of religious texts and conditional context, an ayatollah 
fi al-‘alamin had to demonstrate al-adala (‘justice’), al-a’lamiyya (‘knowledge’) and al-
hayat (‘life’) in relation to the number of their followers, the proximity of other maraji 
and the impact of their publications (Abisaab, 2006b: 244; Batatu, 1978: 193; 
                                                 
90
 Ibn Taymiyya, renowned for his violent diatribes against the Shi’i, allegedly participated in the third expedition. Maronites were also 
subjected to Mamluk reprisals in 1266, 1268 and 1283 (Hitti, 1965: 127-128). Harris (2012: 68) maintains that the expedition was 
caused by Kisrawan’s strategic location and Mamluk suspicion of the area’s loyalty to the Franks, not by its Shi’i population. In this 
way, Ibn Taymiyya provided the justification not the cause for the campaign.  
91
 Historically, Druze is a branch of Ismaili Shi’ism.  
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Moussawi, 2011: 33-38). Therefore, in a theoretical sense, this marja’iyya network 
functioned at the apex of a hierarchical Shi’i religious authority that superseded geo-
political boundaries. 
 
Following the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad’s companion Abu Dharr al-Ghifari in 
the mid-7th Century, the Shi’i ulama, particularly from Jabal ‘Amil, were instrumental 
in adhering and contributing to the evolution of religious authority in Twelver Shi’ism. 
Initially, not only were the first two martyrs of Twelver Shi’ism, Shamseddine 
Muhammad ibn Makki (1333-1384) and Zayneddine ibn Nureddine Ali (1506-1558), 
from Jabal ‘Amil, but the Shah also imported approximately 100 Jabal ‘Amil scholars 
to teach at religious centres from the 16th Century as part of his effort to entrench 
Twelver Shi’ism into the mainstream Persian narrative (Hourani, 2006: 54-55; Winter, 
2010: 10). On account of their revered status as the guardians of Shi’i religious 
thought, Shi’i clerics possessed considerable levels of localised authority within Shi’i 
communities, especially through the foundation and organisation of educational 
centres. However, indicative of developments within the Shi’i religious establishment 
under the Usulis regarding ‘ijtihad in the 18th Century, and as the contours of 
Lebanon’s political system became delineated around confessional elites in the 19th 
Century, Shi’i clerics, inscribed with divergent interpretations and overlapping 
identities, remained divided and detached from the predominant channels of 
authority within their communities.  
 
Firstly, by observing the dispositions of traditional convention, Shi’i clerics preferred 
to practise political quietism over participation, thereby limiting their prospective 
influence within a widening politicised space in Lebanon. Secondly, since authority in 
the Shi’i community was historically defined through an entrenched patron-client 
system presided over by rival Shi’i notables (zu’ama), the Shi’i ulama not only relied 
on these confessional elites for sponsorship and support, but they also became 
enmeshed in and fragmented by competitive intra-zu’ama struggles for authority. 
Lastly, as demonstrated by the inception of the Ja’fari Court and the Ashoura 
debates in the 1920s, Shi’i clerics were fractured between the transnational religious 
authority of Twelver Shi’ism in Najaf and the sub-national political authority of the 
Shi’i zu’ama in Lebanon. The conflation of these interests, which contributed to a 
deficiency in convergence, coherence or consistency amongst clerics, ensured that 
the Shi’i ulama operated as subordinate actors on the periphery of authority in 
Lebanon. 
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By the 1970s, two prominent Shi’i clerics who had studied under marja al-taqlid (‘the 
highest source of emulation’) Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim in Najaf and were inspired 
by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s writings on revolutionary Shi’i activism, emerged to 
promote alternative approaches for combining religious and political authority 
amongst the Shi’i in Lebanon. Prior and during the initial phases of the Lebanese civil 
war, while Musa al-Sadr formed the Movement of the Deprived (harakat al-
mahrumin) and the Lebanese Resistance Detachments (afwaj al-moqawama al-
lubnaniyya) to mobilise the Shi’i community through pre-existing Lebanese 
repertoires of collective action towards reforming the prevailing system, Sayyid 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah sought to capitalise on Shi’i disenchantment by 
instilling and inculcating grassroots revolutionary change in Lebanon. Amidst these 
developments, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was concurrently espousing the concept 
of wilayat al-faqih (‘Guardian Jurist’), a centralised model of Twelver Shi’i 
governance, opposed by Musa al-Sadr and Sayyid Fadlallah, in which religious and 
political authority was fused under the guidance of a Supreme Leader.  
 
The implementation of wilayat al-faqih by Ayatollah Khomeini following the Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 reverberated resoundingly across Shi’i communities, especially 
amongst a young class of radical clerics intending to reconstitute the boundaries of 
conventional Shi’i practice in Lebanon. Raised on the lectures of Musa al-Sadr and 
Sayyid Fadlallah, ingrained with discourses of revolutionary Shi’i activism from 
attending seminaries in Najaf and galvanised by the revised structure of Shi’i 
authority institutionalised in Iran, these figures seized upon the opportunities 
presented by a protracted civil war, internal differences within Amal and Israeli 
military forays to replicate the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon. It was under these 
conditions that Hizbullah, an amalgamation of radical Shi’i activists equipped with the 
conceptual legitimacy of wilayat al-faqih and the practical justification of Israel’s 
invasion of Lebanon, was conceived as a progeny of the Islamic Revolution to not 
only challenge the traditional quietism of religious authority displayed by the Shi’i 
ulama, but also to revolutionise the perceived authority of Lebanon’s political system.   
 
In the historiography of Lebanon, the history of the Shi’i is virtually unknown (Winter, 
2010: 7). Invoking Kamal Salibi’s A House of Many Mansions (1988), the Shi’i 
‘mansion’ resembles a derelict shack ravaged by the victors of history. There are two 
possible explanations for this oversight. Firstly, since the Ottoman era, the Shi’i 
community has occupied rural and disconnected territory. As Mount Lebanon 
became the epitome and epicentre of the modern state, the Shi’i remained 
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marginalised on the peripheries of this internationalised zone of interaction. 
Consequently, scholars documenting the history of Lebanon focus on Mount 
Lebanon, a practice of historiography implying that the two comparatively 
underdeveloped cantons incorporated into the geographical boundaries of the state 
were perceived as making a negligible contribution to the state process. 
 
Secondly, since a multitude of contending visions of the ‘nation’ exist in public 
discourse in Lebanon, a recurring debate that is often reflected by Lebanese 
historians inscribed with dispositions to propagate one particular narrative, 
establishing a viable historical canon is a challenging methodological objective. Due 
to geographical isolation and marginalised inclusion, valuable archives documenting 
the history of the Shi’i are traditionally localised and largely inaccessible to outsiders. 
For these reasons, reaching a consensus on a unified history of Lebanon that 
synthesises its constituent parts remains a controversial and elusive exercise. Under 
these circumstances, researchers are responsible for adopting a self-reflexive 
approach that acknowledges and negotiates internalised debates regarding sectarian 
narratives, collectively constructed memory and cultural sensitivities.     
 
The emergence of Hizbullah warrants a reassessment of these two factors. Primarily, 
the Party of God is currently an established and influential political actor in Lebanon. 
Throughout its evolution, Hizbullah has promoted a cohesive platform in which the 
Shi’i represent a ubiquitous and integral component of Lebanon’s political and social 
landscape. In this context, there has been a surge of revisionist literature in English 
that attempts to address the deficiency of scholarly work on the Shi’i of Lebanon. 
Although some of these authors do not deal with Hizbullah explicitly, it would be 
inaccurate to assume that the sudden influx of interest is independent of 
developments within the Shi’i community in Lebanon. Rather, it would appear that 
the implicit objective is to de-essentialise Hizbullah’s exclusive representation of the 
Shi’i. Conversely, whether through convenience or conviction, commentators 
focusing on Hizbullah analyse the movement without sufficiently accounting for the 
historical context of the Shi’i community or the Lebanese system. In this way, 
‘Hizbullah represents a stage, not the cause, of the gradual integration of the Shi’i 
community into Lebanon’92.  
 
                                                 
92
 Interview with Lokman Slim, Beirut, 9 August 2012.  
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The previous chapter identified five fields of practice with which to examine 
Hizbullah’s mobilisation in Lebanon. While not contributing primary material to 
enhance the historical canon of the Shi’i, the objective of this chapter is to 
supplement existing sources by utilising a Bourdieu-SMT framework that plots the 
location of a Shi’i habitus and its possession of capital in relation to the construction 
and constitution of fields in Lebanon before the inception of Hizbullah. The first 
section positions the Shi’i within the administrative system designed by the Ottoman 
Empire (1516-1919); the second assesses the placement of the Shi’i within the 
Political Field (PF) under the French Mandate and the nascent phases of 
Independence (1920-1958); and the third addresses the role of Musa al-Sadr in 
inscribing a collective Shi’i habitus in the Social Mobilisational Field (SMF) and its 
transference into an Organisational Field (OF) during the initial stages of the civil war 
(1959-1978).        
 
Salibi (1988: 222) wrote that ‘one need not invent a special history for Lebanon 
before that date [1920] unless the country happens to have one’93. This may be a 
valid statement within the remit of a post-Westphalian interpretation of state 
formation and nationalism. Nevertheless, Lebanon’s path to independence was one 
of imposition, not progression. A ‘Lebanese History’ may take 1920 as its reference 
point but the presence of competing narratives suggests that a ‘History of Lebanon’ 
is required to understand the complex trajectory of communities that would comprise 
the ‘nation’. Cicero quipped that an ignorance of the past assures intellectual 
childhood. Similarly, this chapter argues that the Shi’i past illuminates the Shi’i 
present especially in explaining the resonance of Hizbullah’s Resistance in Lebanon.  
 
4.1 Shi’i mobilisation under the Ottoman Empire (1516 - 1919) 
 
In the early 16th Century, two developments had a significant impact on the Shi’i of 
Lebanon. Traditionally a Sufi order from Ardabil in Azerbaijan, Shah Ismail 
established the Safavid dynasty in Persia in 1501. Influenced by the Qizilbash, a 
rebellious Turkoman tribe from Anatolia, the Shah adopted its ‘esoteric and 
messianic form of Shi’ism’ (Chehabi & Mneimneh, 2006: 1). As part of the conversion 
and institutionalisation process, the Shah imported approximately 100 Twelver Shi’i 
scholars from Jabal ‘Amil to teach at religious centres in Persia (Winter, 2010: 10)94. 
                                                 
93
 Firro (2003: 22) states that despite discursive frames propagated by various groups prior to 1920, the idea of a Lebanese nation did 
not exist before 1920.  
94
 Not all Shi’i religious figures in Jabal ‘Amil concurred with the Shah’s project. The rise to prominence of Jabal ‘Amil scholars in Iran 
is described by Abisaab (2006a: 88-89) and Hourani (2006: 56-59).  
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Moreover, in 1516, Ottoman Emperor Selim I defeated the Mamluks at Marj Dabik, 
expanding his rule throughout the Levant and aggravating the regional rivalry 
between the Sunni orthodoxy of the Ottomans and the Shi’i orthodoxy of the Safavids 
within the FIP95. 
 
Initially, testament to the solidarity of transferable capital between the Shah and the 
Shi’i under the Sublime Porte, Selim I not only proclaimed Fakhr al-Din al-Ma’n as 
the ‘sultan of the Mountain’, but also deployed the Druze notable to repel the 
advances of a pro-Safavid rebellion by the Harfushs in the Biqa’ (Hitti, 1965: 143-
144). Moreover, the millet system was devised to ensure the co-existence of 
confessions and protect minorities in religious worship while subordinating them 
within the Ottoman hierarchy. Nevertheless, unlike Christians and Jews, the Shi’i, 
considered heretical apostates, were denied these rights96. Furthermore, historians 
have identified a tendency in Ottoman edicts to refer to Shi’i in derogatory terms like 
Matawila, Revafiz or Qizilbash, prejudiced designations intended to convey their 
duplicitous and rebellious nature (Abisaab, 2006a: 64; Winter, 2010: 110).  
 
However, whereas the millet system classified subjects within confessional 
segments, the iqta’, or iltizam, model served as a method of effectively transferring 
tax revenues from farming (miri) to Istanbul. Subsequently, the wilaya (provinces) of 
the Mamluks were divided into sanjaks (districts) that were managed by a wali or 
pasha (an Ottoman governor). The multazim, a representative of the wali, was 
responsible for collecting taxes from a muqata’ji, a local notable who rented land to 
peasant tenants (Johnson, 2001: 86). As part of the patron-client relationship, the 
muqata’jis could demand labour and administer justice (Harris, 2012: 117). 
Consequently, the degree of autonomy extended to a muqata’ji was dependent on 
his ability to maintain order, deliver taxes and mobilise forces to assist the Ottomans. 
Fakhr al-Din al-Ma’n epitomises the extent of independence afforded to a compliant 
and efficient feudal lord. Despite hailing from Ismaili Shi’ism, this Druze multazim of 
Jabal Chouf was elevated to the position of emir within the sanjaks of Sidon-Beirut 
and Safad (Traboulsi, 2007: 5). By 1590, the Ma’n domain stretched from the wilaya 
of Damascus in the south to Tripoli in the north (Salibi, 1988: 66). The success of the 
Ma’n/Shihab dynasties in establishing the blueprint of the Lebanese polity may have 
                                                 
95
 This is perhaps the first time when one can identify a clear distinction between doctrines (Winter, 2010: 12).   
96
 Under these circumstances, many Shi’i observed taqiyya, a practice of dissimulation and disassociation in which Shi’i were 
permitted to retire from public displays of faith to escape persecution and discrimination.  
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acted to distort the historical record by overshadowing the contemporary 
developments of their feudal peers97.  
 
However, the Ma’ns/Shihabs were not the only feudal elites that benefited from an 
Ottoman-endorsed system that prioritised administrative efficiency over ideological 
dogmatism. Recognising the local influence of the Shi’i Harfushs, not only did the 
Sultan reinstate their control in the Biqa’ after the rebellion, but he also enlisted Musa 
ibn Harfush against the Shi’i Zaydis in Yemen in 1568 (Winter, 2010: 42). 
Additionally, the Shi’i Hamadas represented one of ‘the most important, perhaps also 
the most feared and reviled feudal faction of what was to become northern Lebanon’ 
with taxation powers even over the Sunnis (Winter, 2010: 58, 85; Shanahan, 2005: 
22). In Jabal ‘Amil, while a hereditary class of landed elite (zu’ama) presided over 
their Shi’i tenants, Shi’i clerics also ensured ‘the survival of a tradition of high learning 
in small villages and market towns’ (Hourani, 1985: 6)98. 
 
Although the discourse of the Ottomans may have privileged Sunni orthodoxy, in 
practice, the Sultanate aimed to establish order and efficacy by instrumentally co-
opting a range of feudal elites with mutually beneficial incentives. In this 
arrangement, non-Sunni leaders ‘constituted viable, even ideal, candidates’ for 
concessions and integration into the imperial hierarchy (Winter, 2010: 43). Therefore, 
it would be inaccurate to interpret mobilisation in terms of a collective habitus, or 
collusio, motivated by confessional loyalty. Whereas Fakhr al-Din allegedly 
presented himself as a Christian, Druze or Muslim depending on his audience, the 
presence of Imamis, Nusayris and Ismailis confused the emergence of a definitive 
Shi’i practice (Hitti, 1965: 163; Abisaab, 2006a: 65). If allegiance to a historical 
identity can be detected, it perhaps lies in the division of tribal lineage between 
Qaysis and Yamanis (Hitti, 1965: 191)99.   
 
                                                 
97
 After Ahmad Ma’n (1658-97) died without an heir, the Shihab clan, a Sunni family related to the through marriage, took over. They 
converted to Christianity around the time the Maronite Church strengthened its position with the Papacy in 1736 (Hourani, 1985: 6-9). 
Whereas Traboulsi (2007: 3) argues that the emirate of Fakhr al-Din constituted the beginning of the Lebanese polity, Harris (2012: 
96) prioritises his role in brining communal elites of Mount Lebanon together. Salibi (1988: 128) and Hourani (1985: 6-8) credit the 
Shihabs of instituting a sort of ‘Lebanese’ system of tax collection in 1711 while Winter (2010: 170) believes that is was not until 1763 
when a Shihabi emir breached the confines of its traditional enclave.         
98
 The Ottomans had divided Jabal ‘Amil into bilad al-shuqayf (north) and bilad bishara (south) (Weiss, 2010: 56). According to a 13th 
Century Arabic dictionary, Lisan al-‘Arab, the word za’im derives from the verb za’ma which stands for damina wa-kafila (‘to 
guarantee’), so a za’im is a damin wa-kafil (‘guarantor’) (Firro, 2003: 92). The predominant zu’ama in Jabal ‘Amil were the Munkars, 
the Sa’bs and the Saghirs (Winter, 2010: 124, 126). Hourani (2006: 52), Harris (2012: 84) and Chalabi (2006: 28) discuss the 
historical lineage of the Saghirs, the successors of the Wa’ils and predecessors of the As’ads. The first two martyrs of Twelver 
Shi’ism, Shamseddin Muhammad ibn Makki (1333-1384) and Zayneddin ibn Nureddin Ali (1506-1558) were from Jabal ‘Amil 
(Hourani, 2006: 54-55).  
99
 The Shi’i were from a southern Arabian tribe (Yamani) whereas the Ma’ns/Shihabs were from the northern Arabia (Qaysi). This split 
is most evident during internal conflicts between the Druze in the 18th Century. The Jumblatts are Qaysi, the Yazbakis (Arslans) are 
Yamani. In 1980, a survey of the Druze community discovered that all but 16 families could be divided into one of these branches 
(Hitti, 1965: 157; Harris, 2012: 114-115; Johnson, 2001: 104).  
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Alternatively, it is more illustrative to construct an internalisation of intra-elite practice 
in which each agent, subsumed in a sub-field constituted by the Sultan, developed 
dispositions to enhance their capital and improve their position within the 
administrative hierarchy. Therefore, ‘vertical divisions and internal conflicts within 
each religious group, the ruling and the ruled, should be given greater expression in 
a historical investigation’ (Abisaab, 2006a: 73). This perspective of elite balancing, 
managed by the Ottomans, could explain the continuity in punitive measures applied 
to elites who violated the rules. In 1635, Fakhr al-Din was killed for supporting 
rebellions against the Ottomans as well as participating in an alliance with Tuscany 
and Pope Gregory XIII before the Sultan permitted Fakhr al-Din’s nephew to resume 
the expected duties of the position (Traboulsi, 2007: 6-7; Harris, 2012: 107)100.  
 
Equally, Shi’i families were also punished for undermining the legitimacy of the 
Sultan. After attempting to independently expand their influence over Tripoli, the 
Ottomans dispatched the Shihabs to expel the Hamadas from the region in 1766 
(Winter, 2010: 88-96; Halawi, 1992: 35)101. In Jabal ‘Amil, the decision by the 
Ottomans in 1660 to separate the wilaya of Sidon led to a century of intermittent 
battles between the Shi’i and the Ma’ns/Shihabs (Salibi, 1988: 66; Winter, 2010: 125-
129). After the Shi’i formed an alliance in 1768 with the Governor of Galilee, Zahir al-
Umar, who was competing with the Shihabs in exporting cotton to Europe, and 
following the seizure of Sidon in 1771 while the Ottomans were fighting the Russians, 
the ‘Amilis were eventually defeated in 1781 by Ahmed Pasha, the Governor of 
Saida (Winter, 2010: 136-141; Gharbieh, 1996; 31; Shanahan, 2005: 23)102. Lastly, 
the Harfushs, having previously escaped the attention of the Ma’ns/Shihabs, also 
became the victims of Ahmad Pasha’s collective punishment in 1784103.  
 
The demise of the Shi’i was precipitated by the convergence of two symbiotic 
currents. Firstly, in the FIP, the Ottomans had become compelled to enact reforms 
that embraced decentralisation to counter-balance the threat posed by encroaching 
European powers, epitomised by Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798. 
Secondly, not only had the Shihabs proved highly efficient administrators, but they 
had also initiated the construction of a national narrative. Converting to Christianity 
                                                 
100
 Fakhr al-Din supported the Governor of Aleppo against the Ottomans between 1605-07. After a period in self-imposed exile in 
1611, Fakhr al-Din returned to launch military expeditions against the Christian enclave of Bsharri, the Shi’i Biqa’ and the wali of 
Damascus in 1623.  
101
  The decline of the Hamadas ushered the emergence of the Maronites in the Kisrawan of Mount Lebanon (Winter, 2010: 88-96).  
102
  The Governor of Galilee allegedly granted Jabal ‘Amil autonomy in return for a monopolisation over cotton production (Shanahan, 
2005: 23). Ahmad Pasha was known as ‘Cezzar’, or ‘the butcher’: ‘the lord of Palestine, viceroy of Syria and arbiter of Lebanese 
affairs’ (Hitti, 1965: 175). Similar to the Hamadas, some Jabal ‘Amil Shi’i sought refuge with the Harfushs in the Biqa’ while the others 
incited uprisings in the 1780s with the result of mass destruction and double taxation (Shanahan, 2005: 24-25; Winter, 2010: 168-70).   
103
 Due to the growing liability of being a Shi’i and the dominance of the Christians, the Harfushs converted to Christianity to improve 
their political fortunes (Shanahan, 2005: 21).   
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following a formal agreement between the Maronite Church and the Papacy in 1736, 
the increasingly organised Shihabs, backed by the French, emerged as the natural 
beneficiaries of Ottoman reforms104. At the advent of the 19th Century, the sectarian 
identity of the Shi’i, which did not prevent their rise, contributed to their decline 
(Winter, 2010: 176). Consequently, the Shi’i became reduced to heterodox positions 
within a sub-field of practice, constituted by a regional logic that aligned with the 
predominant narratives of the elite Bashir-ein duopoly (Shihab II and Jumblatt)105. In 
this context, the Shi’i, devoid of legitimate capital, were ‘anachronistic and 
redundant’, characterised by geographical division and fractured solidarity rendering 
the history of Jabal ‘Amil one of dispossession and marginalisation (Winter, 2010: 
117, 174-178).  
 
Since Bashir Shihab II was expanding his authority to encompass a ‘principality of 
established feudal structure, where everyone knew his place in the hierarchy’, 
scholars suggest that Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon) started to enter common 
vernacular as a distinct political and geographical entity (Salibi, 1988; 111; Makdisi, 
2000: 30)106. Nevertheless, the conflation of endogenous and exogenous forces 
ruptured the alliance between Bashir-ein leading to significant alterations in the 
dynamics of Jabal Lubnan. Firstly, the crippling taxes imposed by Abdullah Pasha, 
Governor of Sidon, and enforced by Shihab II, in addition to his campaign against 
Damascus in 1821, incited a cross-confessional ammiya (‘popular’) movement as 
well as causing friction between Shihab II and Bashir Jumblatt (Harris, 2012: 133-
135)107. Subsequently, Jumblatt was killed in 1825 and the Druze muqata’jis who 
participated in the revolt were forced from their lands. Secondly, due to his interests 
in sericulture, Shihab II was economically beholden to Muhammad Ali, the wali of 
Egypt, during his occupation of the Levant (1832-1840)108. This alliance not only 
evoked resistance from the Shi’i, but with Shihab II compelled by his Egyptian 
patrons to quash a Druze insurrection in Hawran, it also represented the first time 
that elite actors had ‘confronted each other on a sectarian basis’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 
                                                 
104
 Pope Leo X officially recognised the Maronites as an Eastern Christian Community in 1510. By 1584, Pope Gregory XIII 
established the Maronite College in Rome. Fakhr al-Din strengthened ties with Pope Gregory XIII. In 1658, King Louis XIV appointed 
Abu Nawfal al-Khazin as vice-consul in Beirut and granted him full French citizenship before being offered tax farmer status by Sultan 
Mehmet IV in 1671. Under him, Jesuits and Franciscans started coming to Lebanon (Harris, 2012: 109; Hitti, 1965: 161-178; Salibi, 
1988: 106; Traboulsi, 2007: 60). 
105
 ‘Bashir-ein’ refers to Bashir Shihab II, who succeeded Yusuf al-Shihab in 1788, and Bashir Jumblatt, a Druze muqata’ji. 
106
 Except for Jabal al-Dinniya and Jabal Akkar in the north, Shihab II controlled all of what would become known as ‘Lebanon’ (Salibi, 
1988: 108).  
107
  2,000 ‘Amili Shi’i were enlisted in Abdullah Pasha’s military campaign in exchange for the Saghirs reclaiming their land rights over 
the area (Harris, 2012: 133).   
108
  Muhammad Ali sought to take Syrian provinces as compensation after not receiving acknowledgement from the Ottomans for 
suppressing the Wahhabis (Harris, 2012: 136).  
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12)109. By June 1840, Maronites, Druze, Shi’is and Sunnis congregated in Antiliyas 
demanding a reduction in tax, opposing conscription as well as advocating the 
disarming of villagers and the abolishing of the principality (Harris, 2012: 138; 
Traboulsi, 2007: 13).  
 
As the Ottomans struggled to manage the crisis, European powers sensed an 
opportunity to intervene, leading to the expulsion of Muhammad Ali and the exile of 
Shihab II. Addressing the escalating Christian-Druze tensions, European powers 
pressured Ottoman Foreign Minister Sekib Effendi into accepting a Reglement 
agreement in which the Shihab realm of Jabal Lubnan would be split into two self-
governing qa’immaqamiyas (‘lieutenancies’). The initiative, devised in 1842 but 
institutionalised in 1845, stipulated that the northern part, extending from Kisrawan to 
Tripoli, would be governed by Maronites, while the southern enclave, encompassing 
Sidon and the surrounding areas, would be governed by the Druze. Each district was 
headed by a qa’im maqam who presided over an administrative council of 12 
members, answered to the wali of Sidon but remained appointed by the Ottomans in 
consultation with the Europeans110.   
 
For the first time, communal identity was legalised into geographical location and 
political representation to the point where sect became the expression of everyday 
practice (Makdisi, 2000: 78; Traboulsi, 2007: 26; Ziadeh, 2006: 67). This loose 
arrangement, which resonated more with the emerging national consciousness of the 
Maronites than the Druze muqata’jis, widened the chasm between the two sects 
concerning the transition of hysteresis from ‘notable’ to ‘restoration’ politics (Makdisi, 
2000: 63-66)111. While the Druze observed the traditional sub-field logic of non-
sectarian, patron-client practice, the Maronites, who deplored Druze minority 
authority over the Maronite majority, subscribed to religious identity as the basis for a 
‘modern reformed and ambivalent Ottoman sovereignty in Mount Lebanon’ (Makdisi, 
2000: 64)112. The fractures within this duopoly erupted in 1858 when Tanyus Shahin, 
the self-proclaimed emancipator of the Christian underclass, led the Maronite ahali 
                                                 
109
 The occupation rewarded Shihab II with autonomy over Jabal ‘Amil leading to separate rebellions by the Sa’bs and Saghirs. In 
return, the Ottomans granted them rights over Jabal ‘Amil until 1865 (Gharbieh, 1996: 34). The Harfushs also revolted in the Biqa’ 
(Harris, 2012: 138).  
110
 After deliberating over a number of options, the 12 members were comprised of one judge (qadi) and one councillor (wakil) from 
each of the main confessions – Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shi’i, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. The Shi’i were permitted to be on 
the council but were not allowed to hold a judicial position due to the religious disparities in jurisprudence with the Sunnis. The 12th 
member of each council was filled by a vice-qa’im maqam, a Maronite for the north and a Druze for the south (Shanahan: 2005: 25-
27; Makdisi, 2000: 61; Traboulsi, 2007: 26).  
111
 The Reglement was ‘neither a proper constitutional text, nor a blueprint for a state-like political system, not even a recipe for 
permanent communal representation’ (Ziadeh, 2006: 55). Benefiting from Ottoman land reforms, an autonomous and cohesive 
Maronite clergy owned approximately 25% of land in Mount Lebanon and used it to stimulate ‘a sharp-edged Maronite self-conscious’ 
amongst the peasantry (Harris, 2012: 125,130; Johnson, 2001: 92-95).   
112
 The Maronites outnumbered the Druze in the Mountain 200,000 to 40,000 (Makdisi, 2000: 79). In the north, Maronite elites 
collected taxes from their co-religionists where the Druze elites in the south presided over a Maronite majority (Traboulsi, 2007: 16). 
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(‘peasants’) of the north in a rebellion for social justice and economic equality113. In 
retaliation, the Druze targeted Christian communities with the most deadly attack 
occurring in Damascus in July 1860. Before the French intervened, Maronite-Druze 
hostilities claimed the lives of 5,000 people, the destruction of 200 villages and the 
displacement of 100,000 people (Traboulsi, 2007: 39)114.     
 
On 9 June 1861, the mutasarrifiya was announced as a compromise between an 
independent Christian emirate and the submission of Mount Lebanon to the 
Ottomans (Traboulsi, 2007: 41). Consequently, Jabal Lubnan became the ‘official 
and internationally recognized name of a territory of special administrative character 
within historical Syria’ (Salibi, 1988: 69). This Reglement Organique encompassed 
six districts managed by an Administrative Council of 12 councillors and governed by 
a non-Lebanese Christian (mutasarrif) selected by the Sultan in consultation with 
European powers (Makdisi, 2000: 159-161; Shanahan, 2005: 27)115. Consequently, 
the texts of 1861 and 1864 established a geographical entity of ‘multimember, 
multisectarian constituencies’ that created ‘a single public identity, where one’s sect 
defined one’s involvement in the public sphere’ (Harris, 2012: 160; Makdisi, 2000: 
162). Additionally, since the Reglement Organique represented the first international 
text that both extended the autonomy of Mount Lebanon as well as the right of 
European powers to intervene in its affairs, the system produced a reinforcing 
dialectic of sectarianism ‘from below’, in the institutionalised practices of a sectarian 
discourse, and ‘from above’, in the shape of colonial and elite interests (Weiss, 2010: 
11; Ziadeh, 2006: 72-73; Makdisi, 2000: 174)116. This ‘new culture’ enshrined a doxa 
of sectarianism into the structured logic of Jabal Lubnan in which the predominant 
orthodoxy would be constituted by an illusio (‘stake’) that accepted and reproduced 
the legitimacy of its practice.        
 
Languishing In the Shadow of Sectarianism (Weiss, 2010), the Shi’i, who had neither 
participated nor contributed to this process, would have to adapt its dispositions, 
positions and practice to the structured logic of sectarian orthodoxy. Following the 
                                                 
113
 The rebellion, which spread from Kisrawan in the north to Hasbaya in the south, proposed a ruling council consisting of clerics, 
commoners, merchants and rich middle-class farmers (Traboulsi, 2007: 30).  
114
 Notables from both sides, who had been incapable of controlling the militarisation of their subjects, agreed to curb the influence of 
the juhhal (‘ignorant’) mobs and restore order, Napoleon III despatched 6,000 French soldiers to Lebanon (Makdisi, 2000: 144-145; 
Traboulsi, 2007: 37). Demonstrating the fragmentation of the community, the Shi’i of Ba’albeck joined the Druze while the Shi’i of 
Jabal ‘Amil provided refuge to fleeing Christians (Gharbieh, 1996: 35; Makdisi, 2000: 115).   
115
 Kura, Kisrawan, Zahla, Matn, Sahil and Jezzine comprised the mutasarrifiya while Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon remained under the 
wilaya of Damascus (Makdisi, 2000: 161; Traboulsi, 2007: 43). Christians accounted for 79.45% of Mount Lebanon with Shi’i 
representing 5.64% (Gharbieh, 1996: 82). The Administrative Council, initially under a Catholic Armenian called Daoud Pasha was 
based at Beiteddine in Jabal Chouf but moved to Baabda in the 1880s and included 4 Maronites, 3 Druze, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek 
Catholic, 1 Sunni and 1 Shi’i (Ziadeh, 2006: 77; Shanahan, 2005: 28). It was endowed with veto power over the mutasarrif on issues 
relating to Ottoman intervention and tax increases (Traboulsi, 2007: 43). The mutasarrifiya also created a gendarmerie of 1200 
soldiers under a Maronite officer (Harris, 2012: 16).      
116
 France, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia.  
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dismantling of the wilaya of Sidon in 1865 and the subsequent division of Jabal ‘Amil 
into separate administrative enclaves (qadas) within the wilaya of Damascus, the 
mutasarrifiya model exacerbated the fragmentation of the Shi’i between the zu’ama, 
ulama, wujaha (‘new elite’) and the amma (‘working class’). While the As’ads of 
Taiyba continued to wield significant influence in and around Jabal ‘Amil, the 
concepts of privatised land and decentralised authority entailed within the Tanzimat 
reforms of the Ottomans (1839-76) provided opportunities for an emerging mercantile 
class from the coastal regions to target the monopoly of the zu’ama117. As the zu’ama 
possessed the cultural capital required to access the Shi’i community, and with the 
wujaha striving to convert their economic capital into influence, a mutually beneficial 
alignment occurred through marriage alliances118. Nevertheless, these instances of 
social capital did not contain the struggle between the zu’ama and wujaha for 
symbolic capital amongst the amma (Shanahan, 2005: 42). 
 
On account of their revered status as the custodians of Shi’i religious thought, the 
ulama also possessed extensive forms of cultural and social capital. However, since 
these clerics preferred to practise political quietism over engagement, they remained 
detached from the struggle for symbolic capital. Continuing the traditions of their 
ancestors, religious figures concentrated on the domain of education by opening the 
Kawthariyya (1820) and Hamadiyya (1882) schools around Nabatiyeh (Chalabi, 
2006: 39-40)119. Not only were these centres under pressure from the establishment 
of missionary schools in the mid-19th Century, but in the context of Ottoman reforms, 
the introduction of modern secular schools to Jabal ‘Amil and Sidon towards the end 
of the 19th Century also compromised the relevance of religious education120. In 
particular, the ‘Amili Trio of Nabatiyeh, as well as individuals such as Arif al-Zayn, 
Abd al-Karim al-Khalil and Rashid Usayran, attended these schools (Firro, 2006: 
                                                 
117
 Ali al-As’ad was appointed to reorganise the provinces of Syria in 1860; Khalil al-As’ad became mutasarrif of Nablus in Palestine 
while Najib al-As’ad became qa’im maqam of Latakia. Kamil As’ad was the Shi’i representative for Beirut and attended the 
Constitution of Sultan Abd al-Hami in 1876 (Gharbieh, 1996: 36, 54; Firro, 2006: 541-42). The Hatti-I Sharif (‘Sultan’s edict’) of 
Gulhane in 1839 and 1856 proclaimed the equality of all members of the Ottoman Empire (Picard, 1996: 21). In 1858, land reforms 
were enforced not only to weaken the nobility, but also to improve the effectiveness of tax collection in agriculture (Picard, 1996: 21; 
Johnson, 2001: 90). These reforms enabled the influx of wujaha, including the Fadls, Usayrans, Khalils and the Zayns. In particular, 
under the Qajar dynasty in Iran (1785-1925), the Usayrans served as Persian consuls in Sidon (Shanahan, 2005: 41-42).      
118
 The Usayrans had marriage ties with the Zayns, Khalils and Haydars while the As’ads were linked to the Sharaf al-Dins, Zayns and 
Hamadas (Chalabi, 2006: 24; Shanahan: 2005: 40, 43).   
119
 The ulama established a number of educational centres in Jabal ‘Amil between the 14th and 17th centuries. Shaykh al-Maysi 
founded schools in Jezzine and Mays, Shaykh Karaki started one in the Biqa’ and Zayn al-Din bin Ali established the Nuriyya School 
in Ba’albeck and the Shaqra School. As the schools were dependent on the financial backing and religious reputation of their clerical 
patrons, many of the schools had to close after the cleric died (Chalabi, 2006: 38).   
120
 In 1860, the British Syrian Mission had schools in Beirut, Zahla, Ba’albeck, Hasbaya, Ayn Zahaltah and Shimlan. There were also 
Jesuit schools in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Zahla, Bikfaya and Jezzine, not to mention the Jesuit College of 1843 that became the 
Universitie Saint-Joseph in 1875. The Syrian Protestant College of 1866 became the American University of Beirut in 1920 (Traboulsi, 
2007: 60). Epitomised by the schools founded by Rida al-Sulh and Hassan Makki in Nabatiyeh, which followed curricula derived from 
the modern Sunni schools of the Sultan (Firro, 2006: 539).    
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539). This cadre of Shi’i, who represented the vanguard of an emerging intelligentsia, 
aimed to address the notions of Shi’ism within their prevailing environment121.  
 
As the traditional organising structures of the Shi’i community remained static, 
regional developments galvanised the heterodoxy of these intellectual discussions 
regarding identity and nationalism. In the Ottoman Empire, the aborted Constitution 
in 1876 and the subsequent suspension of parliament (1877-1906) by Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II sewed the seed for the 1908 revolution by the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP), or the ‘Young Turks’, a movement that demonstrated the possibility 
of implementing a national project (Picard, 1996: 25). Moreover, while reformist 
thinkers in Egypt, such as Jamal al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, 
contributed to debates on reconciling Islam with modernity, the Constitutional 
Revolution in Iran (1905-1907) also grappled with the prospect of merging Shi’ism 
and nationalism.  
 
Rather than act as passive consumers on the peripheries of these debates, Shi’i 
figures were instrumental in proactively translating discourses into practice. Whereas 
Abd al-Karim al-Khalil created the Association for Arab Renaissance (1906), joined 
the Arab Brotherhood Society (1908) and established the Arab Club (1909), Arif al-
Zayn started al-Irfan, a monthly journal to ‘promote cultural and educational progress’ 
within Jabal ‘Amil by exploring the ‘nation’ problematic by linking aspects of Shi’i 
‘asabiyya (‘tribalism’), the Muslim umma, the Ottoman civic umma and the Arab 
National umma (Firro, 2006: 536-37; Traboulsi, 2007: 69; Shanahan, 2005: 47)122. In 
1913, Rustum Haydar founded the Young Arab Society in Beirut and published al-
Mufid (‘The Useful’), at which point activists from Jabal ‘Amil began flocking to 
Damascus, the thriving epicentre of these symposia (Chalabi, 2006: 34). By 1915, 
after participating with Christians and Sunnis at the First Arab Congress of Paris, Abd 
al-Karim al-Khalil joined the ‘Amili Trio in the Arab Revolt Society (Firro, 2006: 543).         
 
As these Arab Nationalist initiatives gathered momentum and risked transforming 
into rebellion, Fuad Pasha, supposedly on information provided by Kamil As’ad, 
ordered the hanging of 14 activists, including Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, in May 1916 at 
what has become famously known as ‘Martyrs Square’ in Beirut  (Chalabi, 2006: 
                                                 
121
 The ‘Amili Trio refers to Muhammad al-Safa, Sulayman Dahir and Ahmad Rida. Arif al-Zayn was the founder of the Jabal ‘Amil 
newspaper in 1903 and the Sidon-based al-Irfan journal (1909-1973) (Chalabi, 2006: 33, 173; Firro, 2006: 541; Gharbieh, 1996: 36).  
122
 This topic was specifically discussed in a three-part article by Ahmad Rida in 1910 entitled Ma Hiya al-Umma (‘What is a Nation?’). 
Rida defined the nation as ‘a collective ‘usba (group) regrouped by one common bond which held it together…it either comprises 
several religions regrouped by one language, such as the Arab umma, or several languages embraced by one religion, such as the 
Muslim umma, or several religions and different languages… such as the Ottoman umma’ (Firro, 2006: 537).  
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51)123. The repressive response adopted by the Ottoman authorities nullified 
episodes of defiance within a Shi’i community whose members had been 
instrumental in conceiving and cultivating unifying frames and solidaristic practices. 
Consequently, during the First World War, the Shi’i remained geographically and 
ideologically divided. Compounding this situation, the Shi’i lost many men as a result 
of Ottoman-imposed military conscription. Furthermore, not only were agricultural 
fields left abandoned, but Shi’i areas were disproportionately affected by a famine in 
1915 that killed a quarter of the population (Gharbieh, 1996: 50; Chalabi, 2006: 47; 
Hitti, 1965: 217). Economically destitute, many Shi’i chose to emigrate rather than 
face the continuous deterioration of their land.   
 
4.2 Shi’i mobilisation under Mandate and Independence (1920-1958) 
 
In September 1920, General Gouraud proclaimed the inauguration of Le Grand 
Liban. Within the FIP, as demonstrated with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and 
articulated at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, France was competing with the 
British for political and trade influence in the Middle East following the power vacuum 
caused by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Concurrently, the French, who had 
cultivated relations with their Christian counterparts in Mount Lebanon since the early 
17th Century, sought to secure and stabilise their partners in the Lebanist national 
project124. Consequently, the French integrated the predominantly non-Christian 
zones surrounding Jabal Lubnan into the embryonic state, altering the demographic 
dynamics to a point where the population of annexed areas outnumbered Mount 
Lebanon.  
 
By incorporating the Mediterranean ports, the fertile planes of the Biqa’ and the 
agricultural industry in the south, the French ensured that the ideologically 
compatible core was sustained by the geographically advantaged periphery. Jabal 
Lubnan was transformed from a detached enclave to the primary beneficiary of an 
economically prosperous Greater Lebanon125. In Bourdieusian terms, the French 
architectural design for Lebanon’s Political Field (PF) was beginning to demarcate its 
boundaries. The symbolic capital accrued by France in the FIP following the 
hysteresis of the First World War enabled the Maronites to imprint their narrative of 
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 Muhammad al-Safa, Ahmad Rida, Arif al-Zayn and Rashid Usayran were arrested while Rida al-Sulh was exiled. Kamil As’ad 
allegedly divulged the identities of the dissenters (Shanahan, 2005: 48; Firro, 2006: 542; Chalabi, 2006: 50-51). Since Arab Nationalist 
movements threatened the traditional zu’ama system, As’ad sought to preserve his traditional position.    
124
 The Christian canon of nationalism can be traced back to 17th Century Maronite Patriarch Istifan Douaihi and 19th Century Bishop 
Niqula Murad (Johnson, 2001: 145). 
125
 Accordingly, 83% of fiscal revenues accumulated by the new state emanated from the appropriated areas whereas 80% of the 
proceeds were spent on the infrastructural development of Mount Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 81; Halawi, 1992: 42) 
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Lebanese nationalism as the prevailing orthodoxy in the PF. Subsequently, by 
transferring their social and cultural capital in the Social Mobilisational Field (SMF) to 
the PF, the Maronites aligned the homology of their collective habitus to propagate 
perceptions and dispositions privileging the practice of Lebanese nationalism. 
Conversely, the Ottoman crackdown on the Arabist intelligentsia and the defeat of 
Emir Faysal by the French had dented the challenge of pan-Arab heterodoxy that 
connected Sunnis and Shi’is in the SMF during the War. Ultimately, the illusio 
(‘stakes’) of the PF, the doxa of which enshrined the mutasarrifiya system, required 
adherence to an orthodoxy that embraced the durability of the traditional elite 
system. 
 
The Shi’i ‘lacked the political capability, organization, contacts, and resources to 
present a formal case to the Paris Peace Conference’ (Chalabi, 2006: 97). 
Furthermore, exemplified by Kamil As’ad, traditional Shi’i leaders possessed 
dispositions to affiliate with revisionist Arab heterodoxy amidst the dominance of 
French orthodoxy. Initially threatened by the Arab nationalist movement, As’ad 
attempted to manage its impact by declaring loyalty to Sharif Husayn’s 1918 Arab 
government in Damascus, opposing the prospect of a French mandate in 1919 and 
endorsing the ‘King of Syria’ in 1920 (Firro, 2006: 544). Despite French warnings, 
such as the suspension of political activities in Jabal ‘Amil and the replacement of 
Shi’i employees in Saida with Christians, As’ad joined 600 members of the Shi’i 
zu’ama and ulama in publicly pronouncing Jabal ‘Amil as an autonomous component 
within a Syrian federation (Gharbieh, 1996: 81-85; Traboulsi, 2007: 78; Chalabi, 
2006: 78-79; Firro, 2006: 544-545). However, this display of Shi’i solidarity was 
overshadowed by an attack on Christians in Ayn Ibl by a Shi’i guerrilla group126. As 
General Gouraud announced Le Grand Liban in the presence of Maronite Patriarch 
Hawayik and Sunni Mufti Naja, prominent Shi’i figures, including As’ad, were 
accused of aiding the rebels and fled to Syria and Palestine (Firro, 2006: 546; 
Gharbieh, 1996: 94).  
   
At the advent of the state, the Shi’i were ‘paralysed and beaten’ (Chalabi, 2006: 84). 
Geographically, they were detached from Jabal Lubnan, and by extension the locus 
of power. Whereas the Maronites had created contiguous confessional communities, 
and with the Sunnis connected by coastal links between Tripoli, Beirut and Saida, the 
Shi’i were concentrated around Jabal ‘Amil and the Biqa’, two areas that had never 
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 Approximately 7,000 Shi’i guerrillas launched attacks against French positions in the south between 1918-1920 before Colonel 
Nieger was despatched to crush the rebellion (Gharbieh, 1996: 89-91).  
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been joined during the Ottoman era127. This dislocation produced divergent practices 
between the ‘Amili Shi’i, who were predisposed to accept their subservience to the 
zu’ama and political institutions, and the Biqa’ Shi’i, who were ‘more independent, 
less subject to the influence of external authority’ (Shanahan, 2005: 34). 
Nevertheless, the Shi’i were conjoined by their socio-economic status where the 
common archetype was ‘uneducated’ with limited access to basic services and 
‘poorer than his compatriots’ with an ‘occupation likely to be unskilled and 
unremunerative’ (Halawi, 1992: 67).      
 
These conditions were compounded as the Shi’i operated on the margins of 
Lebanon’s Beirut-centric, free-market capitalist oligopoly. Epitomised by Michel 
Chiha, a Greek Catholic and Francophile who advocated for the resurgence of a neo-
Phoenician culture in Lebanon, the country’s economic priorities were directed 
towards the tertiary sector of finance128. Since approximately 90% of the Shi’i labour 
force was employed in agriculture, this economic model precluded the injection of 
investment and development in the primary sector (Picard, 1996: 40; Halawi, 1992: 
52; Chalabi, 2006: 27)129. Rather than unify to alleviate the plight of their 
communities, Shi’i leaders were locked in disjointed practice between Lebanese and 
Arab nationalism. As the Maronite Mountain and Christian Beirut elite coalesced 
around Lebanism, urbanised Sunnis promoted the cause of Arabism. The division 
and exclusion of the Shi’i from this discourse ‘marks the beginning of their ideological 
alienation within the context of the modern state’ (Chalabi, 2006: 73). Considered 
superfluous by the French and subordinate by the Arab government, the Shi’i were 
reduced to espousing incoherent heterodoxy in the form of either Shi’i exceptionalism 
or Lebanese Muslim Resistance.  
 
The Shi’i may have been acutely marginalised but the restructuring of the 
mutasarrifiya system into national institutions presented opportunities for mobilising a 
collective habitus in the SMF with which to translate into active participation in the 
PF. Whether witnessed in the establishment of the Representative Council (1922), 
the inauguration of the Ja’fari Court (1926), the Lebanese Constitution (1926), the 
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 Jabal ‘Amil fell under the administration of wilaya of Sidon whereas the Biqa’ was in the jurisdiction of wilaya of Damascus.  
128
 Chiha attempted to form a pluralist political model to synthesise Lebanism with all Lebanese citizens (Firro, 2003: 37). Through his 
close connections with the influential Pharaon and Khoury families, Chiha represented a crucial link between the Maronite elite and 
the Beirut bourgeoisie, a considerable component of an oligopoly that dominated the banking, utilities and communication sectors to 
amass a fortune superseding Lebanon’s state budget (Traboulsi, 2007: 58, 84,115-117; Zamir, 2000: 36; Picard, 1996: 38). Christian 
entrepreneurs eclipsed their Muslim counterparts in Beirut by a ratio of roughly 5:1 (Sayigh, 1962: 69-71).  
129
 Jabal ‘Amil grew tobacco and cultivated cotton. Originally, the Ottomans seized control of production from local producers in 1883 
and offered the rights to an Austrian-British-French consortium. This contract was renewed for a further 15 years in 1913 (Halawi, 
1992: 57-58). Farmers in Jabal ‘Amil were further impacted when Galilee, an important trade link to the south, became governed by 
the British mandate. Similarly, the Biqa’, which specialised on cereals, raisins and rearing sheep, was also affected by the decision to 
separate Le Grand Liban from its main market in Syria (Halawi, 1992: 52).     
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national census (1932) or the events prior and during Lebanese Independence 
(1936-43), the Shi’i confronted five inter-related obstacles in initiating cohesive 
movement: overcoming competition between Shi’i elites in the PF; preventing the 
permeation of zu’ama rivalry within intra-clerical disputes in the SMF; failing to 
transfer Shi’i grievances in the SMF to the PF; mitigating against non-Shi’i co-option 
by constructing an Organisational Field (OF); and the inability to align capital with an 
external power to ensure privileged Shi’i access to the PF.   
  
Firstly, in May 1922, following a series of Muslim boycotts opposing their allocation of 
five seats (one Shi’i) in the 15-member Administrative Council, General Gouraud 
replaced the body with a partly-elected, 30-member Representative Council 
comprised of 13 Muslims (two Shi’i), a distribution that almost directly correlated to 
the results of the 1922 national census (Traboulsi, 2007: 88; Picard, 1996: 33)130. 
This opening presented an opportunity for the zu’ama to enhance their interests and 
influence. Reinforcing the authoritative structures of the patron-client relationship in 
the Shi’i community, an adherence to the logic of sectarianism within the doxa and 
illusio of the PF not only enabled the zu’ama to legitimately transfer their pre-existing 
capital from the SMF, but their improved access to elites and resources also 
consolidated their positions in the SMF through pledges of patronage and 
development projects. Therefore, the zu’ama responded ‘affirmatively’ to the 
invitation of institutional participation extended by the French who interpreted the co-
option of Shi’i notables as important for the stabilising Lebanon (Firro, 2006: 546).   
 
Rather than encourage intra-Shi’i solidarity through a collective habitus in the PF, the 
institutionalisation of the zu’ama signified an era of matlabiyya, ‘the politics of 
demand’ or ‘a model of patronage-seeking by a community’ (Chalabi, 2006: 115). 
Previously, the zu’ama were locked in competition whereby each aimed to promote 
and legitimise their ‘right to rule’ by evoking ‘powerfully resonant images in the Shi’a 
socioreligious discourse’ (Halawi, 1992: 86)131. The PF simply created a new arena 
for rivalry where the interpretation of matlabiyya was pursued and contested. 
Consequently, zu’ama practice was characterised by the perception of intra-sectarian 
mistrust and the disposition to temporarily align either with another Shi’i za’im or the 
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 Initially, General Gouraud simply increased the number of seats in the Administrative Council to 17 (6 Maronites, 3 Greek 
Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Druze, 4 Sunni and 2 Shi’i) (Chalabi, 2006: 123; Gharbieh, 1996: 97).  
131
 The Hamadas traced their lineage to fighting with Imam Husayn at Karbala; the Fadls claimed descent from Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, 
the Islamic leader who expelled the Crusaders from Jerusalem; and the As’ads derived respect from their links to the Anaza tribe and 
to the Saghirs (Halawi, 1992: 86).   
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non-Shi’i elite to marginalise an adversary132. In the 1920s, the old schism resurfaced 
between the zu’ama, wishing to preserve traditional practice, and the wujaha, 
endeavouring to promote more active modes of integration.  
 
Secondly, the establishment of the Ja’fari court on 30 January 1926 by High 
Commissioner Henri Jouvenel offered the Shi’i an opportunity to neutralise zu’ama 
rivalry, activate the capital of the ulama and produce a harmony of intra-Shi’i 
positions and practice in the SMF. By recognising Ja’fari jurisprudence over issues of 
personal status in the Twelver Shi’i community, Weiss (2010: 30) credits this event 
as a major development in contributing to the ‘reconsiderations and redefinitions of 
collective Shi’i solidarity and identity’133. Nevertheless, this opportunity became 
nullified by intra-clerical disputes and intra-elite rivalry. Primarily, since the Iraqi-
based Grand Ayatollah Taqi Shirazi issued a fatwa in 1920 against cooperating with 
French authorities, the most prominent ‘Amili clerics refused to serve as president of 
the court (Chalabi, 2006: 142)134. The transnational and hierarchical structure of Shi’i 
religious authority (marjaiyya) not only resulted in divergent attitudes, but also 
indicated the increasing importance of a traditionally de-politicised clergy135. 
Consequently, intellectual disputes over the predominant orthodoxy of legitimate 
religious practice presented an opportunity for the ulama and the zu’ama to compete 
for symbolic capital in the SMF.   
 
This was particularly evident during the Ashoura debates over the commemorative 
celebration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala in 680136. In the early 
1920s, Shaykh Abd al-Husayn Sadiq established the first Jabal ‘Amil husayniyas in 
which Ashoura was practised through latam (self-flagellation), a self-harming ritual 
where adherents re-enact the suffering of Iman Husayn. Conversely, Sayyid Muhsin 
al-Amin argued for a reformist approach that focused on the sanctity of body and 
projected an inclusive image of Shi’ism within the eclectic composition of Lebanon 
(Weiss, 2010: 70-91). Sensing an opportunity to politicise the symbolic relevance of 
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 The As’ads were at odds with the Zayns and Usayrans; the Zayns were close to the Usayrans but hostile to the Fadls while the 
Usayrans were allied with the Fadls. These competitions are documented in the pages of outlets such as al-Irfan, al-Barq, al-Bashir 
and Lisan al-Hal (Chalabi, 2006: 119, 124-126).   
133
 The court was granted exclusive autonomy over marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance payments, pious endowments, inheritance 
and property. The court also integrated the Shi’i into the broader sectarian mosaic in which Shi’i identities were ‘reconfigured within 
the multisectarian environment of Greater Lebanon’ (Weiss, 2010: 31, 124).   
134
  Munir Usayran was appointed after Shaykh Husayn Mugniyeh, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin and Sayyid Sharaf al-Din refused (Weiss, 
2010: 107).  
135
 Religious authority in Shi’ism is predicated upon the concept of ijtihad (‘independent reasoning’). Ijtihad acts to adapt and 
modernise Shi’i belief within the prevailing situational context. Therefore, each pious Shi’i, regardless of geographical location, follows 
a designated marja (pl. marjaiyya), a ‘source of emulation’. Through his superior credentials as a senior mujtahid, a marja is entrusted 
with producing edicts on legitimate practice based upon a reconciliation of religious texts and conditional context.      
136
 The first public observance of Ashoura occurred under Mu’izz al-Dawla al-Buwayhi in 10th Century Iraq. The threat of persecution 
by Sunni powers led Shi’is to observe taqiyya, the legitimate disassociation from public ritual for the purpose of preservation. The 
public return of Ashoura to Lebanon is attributed to the influx of Iranian immigrants in the 19th Century as a means of facilitating 
religious integration and solidarity (Weiss, 2010: 65-69; Khuri, 1975: 185).  
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intra-clerical discourse as a means of accumulating capital, the zu’ama exacerbated 
these divisions with the Zayns supporting Sayyid al-Amin while the As’ads and Fadls 
endorsed Shaykh al-Sadiq (Shanahan, 2005: 148; Halawi, 1992: 90). Similarly, the 
Shi’i notables also aggravated intra-clerical differences regarding education. 
Although Shaykh Mugniyeh and Sayyid al-Amin were equally responsible for 
establishing Shi’i schools through the ‘Amili Ulama Society, the latter’s patronage 
with the Zayns and the former’s reliance on the Khalils resulted in an intractable 
collision over location that led to the eventual abandonment of the project 
(Shanahan, 2005: 149; Gharbieh, 1996: 110). Furthermore, Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, 
who developed an extensive network of educational centres in Jabal ‘Amil, frequently 
encountered obstacles from the Khalils due to his alliance with the As’ads (Gharbieh, 
1996: 113)137.             
 
Thirdly, on the 23 May 1926, the announcement of the Lebanese Constitution and 
the subsequent proclamation of the French-inspired ‘Lebanese Republic’ posed an 
additional opportunity for unified Shi’i mobilisation (Ziadeh, 2006: 91)138. The 
Chamber of Deputies and 16-member Senate replaced the Representative Council 
while a President, bestowed with considerable executive power and answerable only 
to the French High Commissioner, presided over the bicameral system (Traboulsi, 
2007: 90)139. However, the Constitution failed to qualify the relationship between 
religious communities and the state (Ziadeh, 2006: 94)140. By legitimising the 
Mandate and institutionalising the principle of muhasasa (‘allocation of shares’) over 
musharaka (‘equal representation’), the Constitution reproduced the 19th Century 
discourse and practice of sectarian quotas in the PF, a system that further 
entrenched elite positions in Lebanon (Ziadeh, 2006: 107). Assisted by the French 
prerequisite for stability, the Shi’i zu’ama were able to solidify their exclusive role as 
the representatives of their confessional community (Firro, 2003: 89).   
 
Under the stipulations of the Constitution, the sectarian orthodoxy of the PF required 
the metamorphoses of ‘traditional communities into political communities’ (Meouchy 
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 Sayyid Sharaf al-Din (d. 1957) started the Jafariyya schools in 1938. By 1941, 400 students were receiving a free education. A 
decade later, the number had reached 640 (Gharbieh, 1996: 113-122). Another example of the zu’ama accentuating feuds between 
the ulama occurred later in 1933 when the Shi’i submitted two separate petitions to the French in attempting to appoint a religious 
representative on the same level as the Maronite Patriarch and the Sunni Mufti: one forwarded by the Zayns and the other 
recommended by the Usayrans and Fadls (Firro, 2003: 161-162).  
138
  The Constitution Committee of 1925 consisted of 12 members, two of which were Shi’i (Firro, 2003: 32). With the British and 
French finalising the demarcation of the southern border in March 1923, the ‘Lebanese Republic’ represented a sovereign state of 
territorial integrity with Beirut as its capital (Traboulsi, 2007: 86-87).  
139
 Before it was abolished in 1927, the Senate contained three Shi’i (Firro, 2003: 101). The first president was Charles Dabbas, a 
Greek Orthodox Christian.     
140
 Article 9 stipulated that the state had a responsibility to uphold the freedom of religious communities to practise their rights and 
Article 95 stated that there should be a fair distribution of government and administrative posts but this did not apply to the Council of 
Deputies (Ziadeh, 2006: 94).  
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in Weiss, 2010: 123). In 1928, Yusuf al-Zayn illustrated the collective condition of 
huquq al-Shi’a al-mahduma (‘Shi’i grievances’), a situation in which the Shi’i had 
become humiliated by the lack of state action to address the sect’s most basic of 
demands (Weiss, 2010: 59-60). For example, approximately 83% of the Shi’i 
community was illiterate, and with 92.5% of Lebanon’s aid budget spent on Christian 
education, the only options available for the Shi’i were either inaccessible 
government schools, expensive private schools or outdated religious schools 
(Halawi, 1992: 42; Gharbieh, 1996: 107)141. Consequently, Shi’i constituencies, 
second only to Maronites, started to channel their frustrations via the ballot box142. 
Although the Lebanese Republic permitted the transference of discontent within the 
SMF to the PF through an electoral process, Shi’i representatives were disposed to 
observe a logic of intra-elite competition in the PF that prioritised the struggle for 
symbolic capital amongst the Shi’i in the SMF at the expense of collectively and 
effectively advocating for the alleviation of Shi’i grievances.  
 
Fourthly, while the national census of 1932 confirmed the potential power of Shi’i 
mobilisation within the political system, the Shi’i were unable to replicate its 
confessional counterparts in transforming this opportunity into a cohesive 
Organisational Field (OF)143. According to the results, the Shi’i accounted for 
155,000, or 19.5% of a population of 793,000 (Shanahan, 2005: 31)144. As the 
landscape of the PF became dominated by the rivalry between Bishara al-Khoury’s 
Constitutionalist Bloc and Emile Edde’s Nationalist Bloc, a number of political parties 
emerged, such as the Lebanese Communist Party (1924), the Syrian National 
Socialist Party (1932), the Phalange Party (1936) and the Najjadeh Party (1936), to 
adapt to the prevailing norms of mobilisation in Lebanon. Despite this trend, the Shi’i 
failed to establish a representative OF145.  
 
Conversely, conforming to the traditional patron/client dialectic, the position of the 
Shi’i zu’ama between the PF and the SMF ensured that services were delivered in 
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 In 1931, 70% of Muslims and Druze attended state schools compared to 70% of Christians who enrolled in private schools (Harris, 
2012: 181). Comparatively, Shi’i illiteracy figures far surpassed its confessional counterparts: Sunnis, 66%; Druze, 48%; Maronites 
39% (Gharbieh, 1996: 108). As for Shi’i religious learning, between 1918-1957 the number of students attending seminaries in Najaf 
dropped from 6,000 to 2,000 (Shanahan, 2005: 141).  
142
 Shi’i constituencies recorded the highest participation figures in the 1929 elections with a reported 48% in South Lebanon and 37% 
in the Biqa’ (Shanahan, 2005: 55).  
143
 At the time of writing (2015), there has yet to be an official census in Lebanon since 1932.  
144
 The 1932 census recorded that Maronites represented 28.7%; Greek Orthodox 9.7%; Greek Catholic 5.9%; Sunnis 22.4%; Druze 
6.7% (Picard, 1996: 61). Disputes concerning the results of the census revolve around the differing methodologies used by the Official 
Gazette, the Lebanese Government and French sources regarding the number and status of emigrants (Firro, 2003: 119-122).     
145
 Whereas al-Khoury, a descendent of the Shihabs, believed in reconstituting Lebanon’s relationship with France, aligning with the 
Beirut bourgeoisie and embracing Lebanon’s ‘Arab character’ in partnering with Muslims, Edde advocated closer ties with France, an 
economic policy that invested in the mercantile aristocracy of Mount Lebanon and a political arrangement that protected a Christian 
monopoly (Shanahan, 2005: 60; Traboulsi, 2007: 93-94; Harris, 2012: 184). There were two unsuccessful attempts at forming Shi’i 
political parties: Rashid Baydoun’s Hizb al-Tala’i (‘Vanguards Party’) in 1937 and Ahmad al-As’ad’s Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance 
Party) in 1947 (Shanahan, 2005: 61; Halawi, 1992: 85).   
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return for votes. This arrangement accentuated inter-elite factionalism and suspicion 
to the point where retaining access to the PF superseded sectarian loyalty in the 
SMF146. The formation of a cogently Shi’i OF would have compromised the privileged 
position and practice of individual interests in the PF. This instrumental, self-serving 
disposition of preservation, in which Shi’i notables balanced and manoeuvred against 
zu’ama adversaries for community support through temporary, cross-confessional 
alliances may have delayed the construction of a cohesive Shi’i OF, but it 
consolidated the capital of Shi’i elites both within the SMF and the PF147. Testament 
to the obedience of this inscribed modus operandi, while the Usayrans and Fadls 
allied with Edde during the 1935 elections, the As’ads supported Khoury (Chalabi, 
2006: 132).       
 
Fifthly, as exemplified by the structured constitution and composition of the 
mutasarrifiya system, Shi’i elites were not only marginalised from the predominant 
narrative of the PF, but they also lacked aligned or transferable capital with external 
powers, thereby diminishing their ability to benefit from developments within the FIP 
pertaining to Lebanon. In 1936, French recognition of Syrian independence and 
Great Britain’s Anglo-Egyptian Treaty invited discussions about the prospect of 
Lebanese independence, a narrative that divided Lebanon along historically 
conventional lines. Whereas President Edde feared that Lebanese independence 
would lead to its annexation by Syria, Muslim unionists were concerned that 
independence would further legitimise Lebanon’s imposed borders (Traboulsi, 2007: 
98). As France recognised Lebanon’s independence in the Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance on 13 November 1936, the protracted economic crisis greatly stymied the 
agricultural sector leading to protests in the majority Muslim cities of Tripoli, Sidon, 
Tyre and Nabatiyeh. Since Shi’i communities were disproportionately affected, 
demonstrations in Bint Jubayl created rifts between the Shi’i zu’ama, the emerging 
wujaha and Shi’i constituents signifying the usurping of the traditional ‘politics of 
demand’ by the ‘politics of protest’ (Chalabi, 2006: 135)148.  
 
Attempting to use Bint Jubayl as a way of emphasising the dire socio-economic 
conditions in the south, Adil Usayran joined Khoury’s Constitutionalist Bloc to project 
an all-encompassing programme for reform, facilitated ulama efforts in matching 
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 As demonstrated by the relationship between the Hamadehs and Haydars in the Biqa’ during the 1920s and 1930s or the joint 
cooperation between the As’ads, Usayrans and Khalils in 1943, the exception to rule of intra-Shi’i rivalry in the PF occurred when 
elites perceived external challengers as a collective threat (Firro, 2003: 168; Shanahan, 2005: 60-67). 
147
 Aware of the fractured relationships within the Shi’i zu’ama, non-Shi’i elites attempted to further expose and exploit divisions 
amongst their Shi’i counterparts.    
148
 Events in Bint Jubayl eroded the reputation of the Shi’i zu’ama, such as Muhammad Bazzi, while enabling opportunities for the 
aspiring Shi’i merchant class, like Adil Usayran (Weiss, 2010: 191-201; Chalabi, 2006: 133-135).  
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clerical salaries to their Sunni counterparts and followed the other six Shi’i deputies 
in withdrawing from the Council in response to the government’s treatment of the 
poor (Traboulsi, 2007: 103; Chalabi, 2006: 135, 143; Firro, 2003: 171)149. 
Nevertheless, these displays of Shi’i solidarity were eclipsed by the homology 
between the FIP and Lebanon’s PF as the hysteresis of the Second World War 
suspended the Constitution. Under these circumstances, Khoury and Riad al-Sulh 
aligned their social capital in the PF to circumvent the impasse of Lebanon’s 
independence culminating in the National Pact, an oral agreement drafted by British 
General Edward Spears and ratified by Free French General Georges Catroux on 31 
July 1943 (Harris, 2012: 196)150. After the September elections, Khoury became 
President while al-Sulh assumed the premiership with a 6:5 Christian/Muslim split in 
the 55-member Council of Deputies151. Despite receiving almost one-fifth of the 
available seats, the Shi’i remained on the periphery of central decision-making and 
reverted back to the conventional practice of intra-elite division.  
 
This cross-sectarian accord, which initially encountered obstacles in revising the 
Constitution152, was a compromise between the two seemingly irreconcilable 
positions of Lebanese and Arab nationalism. While the Maronites agreed not to seek 
Western intervention and accept Lebanon’s ‘Arab profile’, the Muslims would 
abandon aspirations of uniting with Syria and agree to a Lebanon ‘that assimilates all 
that is beneficial and useful in Western civilisation’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 109). The 
tripartite balance of power, namely the appointment of a Maronite President, Sunni 
Prime Minister and Shi’i Speaker, ensured representation for the major sects within 
the PF153. Theoretically, the National Pact advocated citizen equality and religious 
freedoms where the community acted as an ‘intermediary society’ between the 
‘unified sovereign nation’ and the ‘individual citizen’ (Ziadeh, 2006: 124).  
 
However, the National Pact set the precedent for negotiated decision-making in 
Lebanon by further entrenching a culture of dependency subordinating an inherently 
weak and factional elite to the interests of dominant powers in the FIP with regards to 
definitive meanings and operational parameters of independence, confessional 
power-sharing and national identity (Ziadeh, 2006: 124; Firro, 2003: 209). Moreover, 
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 Usayran called for a free democratic state that addressed issues of taxation, economic development, trade, education, culture and 
tourism while providing agricultural training colleges to empower the peasants and diminish the control of the landowners (Chalabi, 
2006: 136). By 1937, the Constitutionalist Bloc included other prominent Muslims from all over Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 103)  
150
 The only written version of the National Pact appears in a ministerial document of 7 October 1943 (Traboulsi, 2007: 109).  
151
 The population percentages of the different sects correspond to the seats allocated: 30.3% Maronites; 20.2% Sunnis; 19.2% Shi’i; 
11.1% Greek Orthodox; 6.1% Druze; 6.1% Greek Catholic; 5% Armenian and 2% for other minorities (Halawi, 1992: 97). 
152
 After attempting to amend elements of the Constitution, the Free French arrested Khoury and al-Sulh before British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill demanded that Free French leader Charles De Gaulle release them on 22 November 1943, a date that signified the 
end of the French Mandate (Traboulsi, 2007: 107-108).   
153
 The position of Speaker was officially offered to the Shi’i in 1947 and remains held by a Shi’i to this day (Halawi, 1992: 97).   
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the National Pact contained a paradoxical notion of equality in that it established the 
equality of Lebanese as citizens inasmuch as it institutionalised their inequality as 
subjects belonging to ‘hierarchised religious communities with unequal access to 
political power and public office’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 109). Rather than distribute seats 
based on demographics, it became incumbent on elites to distort and manipulate 
demographics for confessional purposes (Firro, 2003: 204). Therefore, the National 
Pact was more a ‘Communitarian Pact’ that favoured the two most powerful (Picard, 
1996: 71).  
 
The initial deficiencies within the nascent National Pact appeared after the Second 
World War as the economic prosperity of Beirut, presided over by the Khoury-Chiha 
alliance, contrasted the deteriorating socio-economic conditions experienced by the 
broader Lebanese public (Picard, 1996: 46-48). Intending to mobilise agents in the 
SMF towards a reconstitution of the predominant orthodoxy in the PF, the Patriotic 
Socialist Front, led by Kamal Jumblatt, the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP), in conjunction with Raymond and Pierre Edde, the Lebanese Communist 
Party, the Phalange Party and the Syrian National Socialist Party, released a reform 
programme that aimed to address issues of unemployment, inflation, social services 
and economic inequalities (Traboulsi, 2007: 124). By September 1952, Khoury was 
forced to resign154. Failing to relate or resonate with either of these prevalent trends 
in the PF, the Shi’i elites returned to the familiar heterodox practice of exclusion and 
estrangement.  
 
The presidency of Camile Chamoun contributed further to detaching the Shi’i from 
mainstream Lebanese narratives. Domestically, although Chamoun planned on 
curbing the influence of traditional elites through the adoption of a new election law, 
this initiative not only exacerbated socio-economic conditions by distancing 
government services from the people, but its application also reinforced sectarian 
identities and loyalties on the local level (Shanahan, 2005: 69)155. Regionally, the 
Anglophile president was accused of deviating from the National Pact in 
compromising Lebanon’s neutrality and incurred the wrath of Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser by failing to denounce the Baghdad Pact of 1955, rebuffing the 
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 Chiha acknowledged the failure of the government in September 1952 when he wrote that ‘it may be well that authority and 
responsibility are disassociated whereas they should be joined. That may well be a mistake, but that is the way things are’ (Traboulsi, 
2007: 125).  
155
 In order to dilute elite authority, Chamoun increased the number of electoral districts from 9 to 33 and decreased the number of 
deputies from 77 to 44 (Traboulsi, 2007: 129). The South was divided into 7 electoral districts to diminish the influence of the zu’ama 
while the Biqa’ was divided into 4 electoral districts (Shanahan, 2005: 68).  
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Arab Defence Pact and not publicly condemning the 1956 Suez War156. Confronted 
by a mounting pro-Nasserite movement in Lebanon, Chamoun signed the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, a pledge by the U.S. President to defend nations threatened by 
international communism. When pan-Arab Free Officer General Abd al-Karim 
Qassem conducted a coup d’etat against King Faysal II in Iraq in July 1958, 
Chamoun requested U.S. assistance in securing Lebanon from pan-Arab 
sympathisers, a decision that resulted in an internal crisis that claimed the lives of 
2,500 Lebanese157.      
 
4.3 Shi’i Mobilisation under Musa al-Sadr (1959-1978)  
 
In 1959, Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian cleric from a prestigious family of Lebanese 
ancestry, was invited to replace Sayyid Sharaf al-Din in Tyre158. Two years prior to 
his death in 1957, Sayyid Sharaf al-Din had hosted Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon, 
recognising that the ulama were failing to relate to the aspirations of their followers. 
Rather than interpret bida (‘innovation’) as heresy, the ulama required an 
independent figure, outside the auspices of the zu’ama, who could bridge the chasm 
between modernisation and tradition (Ajami, 1986: 74-75; Gharbieh, 1996: 143). Al-
Sadr, aside from the credibility and transferability of his social and cultural capital, 
was considered an ideal candidate. His journal in Qom, Makatib Islami (‘Lessons 
from the School of Islam’), broke the mould of Shi’i quietism by emphasising the 
need for the Shi’i to transform from passive actors into active agents whereas his 
reformist educational programme of the hawza, which sought to address illiteracy in 
the Shi’i community, also caused reverberations through the Shi’i establishment 
(Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 148-152)159. Initially, the young cleric deliberated over the 
decision before being persuaded by his mentors in Qom and Najaf: Ayatollah 
Mohammad Husayn Borujerdi, the Shi’i marja al-taqlid, and Ayatollah Muhsin al-
Hakim, the most revered marja for Lebanese Shi’i (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 151; 
Chehabi & Mneimneh, 2006: 38-39)160.    
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 Chamoun even flirted with the idea of joining the Baghdad Pact, an agreement orchestrated by Great Britain that joined Turkey, 
Iraq, Iran and Pakistan in a defensive alliance to counter the overtures of the Soviet Union.  
157
 While British troops landed in Jordan to protect King Husayn, Operation Blue Bat, which consisted of 14,000 U.S. soldiers, was 
deployed for three months in Lebanon.  
158
  Born in 1928, Musa al-Sadr was the son of Ayatollah Sadr al-Din al-Sadr (1882-1953), who could trace his lineage back to Musa 
ibn Ja’far, the Seventh Shi’i Imam (Halawi, 1992: 124). Sayyid Sharaf al-Din was Sadr al-Din al-Sadr’s cousin (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 
2006: 143; Ajami, 1986: 43). Musa al-Sadr studied at Qom, the Tehran Faculty of Law and Political Economy as well as Najaf (Norton, 
1987: 39). Notable family members include Ismael al-Sadr, who led the revolt against the Iranian Shah (1891-1892), Sayyid 
Muhammad al-Sadr, who became Prime Minister of Iraq in the 1940s, and Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, arguably the most influential 
Shi’i cleric of the 20th Century (Gharbieh, 1996: 141).  
159
  In 1961, Musa al-Sadr warned that ‘if the call to religion is not accompanied by action…the call will have little impact’ (Chehabi & 
Tafreshi, 2006: 152).  
160
 The reasons for his reluctance include the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 and the opposition to his appointment voiced by Shaykh 
Mugniyeh and Jafar Sharaf al-Din (Gharbieh, 1996: 143-152). However, the 1958 Free Officer Revolution in Iraq, the Shah’s 
censorship of religious activity in Iran and his financial situation following the death of his father acted as incentives to move to 
Lebanon (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 144-151).  
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As al-Sadr arrived in Tyre, Lebanon was under the influence of ‘Shihabism’, a term 
coined by George Naqqash to describe the interventionist etatism of Fuad Shihab, 
who had assumed the presidency after the 1958 Crisis (Harris, 2012: 214)161. Based 
on the slogan of la ghalib wa la maghlub (‘neither dominant nor dominated’), the 
former Commander of the Armed Forces established the Social Development 
Agency to address mobility and inequality, implemented a ‘Green Plan’ to cultivate 
land and a National Social Security Fund to fuel social projects and economic growth 
(Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 31; Traboulsi, 2007: 140-141; Picard, 1993: 6)162. 
Furthermore, the Public Service Council was responsible for practising meritocracy in 
recruitment and ensuring a 50:50 split between Christians and Muslims. Under 
‘Shihabism’, the number of state employees doubled and school attendance 
quadrupled with Muslims accounting for 53% of university students (Traboulsi, 2007: 
140; Picard, 1993: 6; Hanf, 1993: 95-105). However, compared to their urbanised 
Sunni counterparts, the Shi’i were disadvantaged by their underdeveloped 
educational infrastructure and access (Shanahan, 2005: 73). Additionally, despite 
receiving 19.2% of parliamentary seats, the Shi’i remained underrepresented in the 
state system (Halawi, 1992: 98). Between 1946 and 1962, and juxtaposed alongside 
Maronites (40%) and Sunnis (28%), the Shi’i possessed fewer than 4% of 
administrative posts (Gharbieh, 1996: 105-106).  
 
While ‘Shihabism’ recorded a modicum of success in increasing employment 
opportunities, enhancing living standards and bureaucratising Lebanon away from 
traditional patronage, the reforms failed to rectify the structural deficiencies of the 
Lebanese system163. Vindicating the predominant economic model of mercantile 
capitalism, the capital, prospering from the closures of Haifa and Suez, was booming 
as a result of re-routed trade from oil producing states, remittances from abroad and 
tertiary sector expansion that comprised 72% of GDP by 1970 (Gharbieh, 1996: 
156)164. This exponential rise came at the expense of agricultural production, an 
industry that employed 90% of the labour force in the largely Shi’i areas of South 
Lebanon and the Biqa’, which plummeted to represent only 9% of GDP by 1974 
                                                 
161
 ‘Shihabism’ represented the combination of ‘social intervention, mild etatism, and security service influences within a civilian 
regime’ (Harris, 2012: 214).   
162
 A number of state tributaries were formed to ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives, including the Institut de Recherche et de 
Formation en vue de Developpement (IRFED) for planning and data gathering, a Central Bank for monetary policy and regulation, the 
Central Office of Statistics, the Office of Social Development, the Board for Large Scale Projects and the Litani River Authority (Harris, 
2012: 215). 
163
 According to a Quality of Life Index measuring basic living standards from 1960 to 1970, the situation of the Shi’i markedly 
improved with an increase of 36% in the Biqa’ and 44% in South Lebanon (Hanf, 1993: 95-105).   
164
  30% of the world’s private gold transactions went through Beirut (Picard, 1996: 46). In 1959, government statistics calculated that 
Lebanon’s population was almost matched by the number of 1,143,040 Lebanese emigrants (1,143,040 in North America [35%], 
South America [45%] and Africa [11%]). Traboulsi (2007: 159) adds that émigré remittances increased from 5.38% in 1951 to 30% of 
GDP in 1974. 
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(Halawi, 1992: 49-52). The privatisation of homo capitalisticus had encroached upon 
the primary sector to the extent that Lebanon became a net importer of agricultural 
produce despite its abundance of tobacco and sugar beet (Halawi, 1992: 53)165. This 
‘agro-capitalism’ ensured that the traditional tenant system was exploited and 
paralysed by a monopoly of commercial elites privileging imports over investment 
(Picard, 1993: 7; Traboulsi, 2007: 158-159)166.  
 
By 1970, the agricultural industry had lost 100,000 active members (Traboulsi, 2007: 
159). Confronted with economic destitution and unable to rely on the patronage of 
the zu’ama, farmers relocated from the rural periphery to the urban core with almost 
50% of the Shi’i community migrating to the hizam al-bu’us (‘belt of misery’) 
encircling downtown Beirut to comprise 29% of a population that had bloated from 
80,000 in 1921 to 850,000 by 1977 (Picard, 1993: 7; Gharbieh, 1996: 162; Harris, 
2012: 187)167. While Muslims remained outperformed in the tertiary sector, the 
unskilled Shi’i accounted for 80-90% of factory workers in the southern suburbs and 
50-60% in the eastern suburbs (Halawi, 1992: 70)168.  
 
For the Shi’i, these socio-economic conditions elicited a more profound effect on the 
SMF than the PF. Conventionally, the organising principle of orthodox Shi’i practice, 
predicated on the patron-client relationship, was presided over by a za’im at the apex 
of a stratified hierarchy who exercised authority on account of his intersubjectively 
recognised symbolic capital, which was channelled through his cultural (genealogical 
lineage), social (kinship networks) and economic (land ownership) capital. This 
system of domination in feudal society represented a form of symbolic power in that 
the discourses and practices imposed by the zu’ama and their qabaday enforcers 
were acknowledged, accepted and applied as a legitimate ordering mechanism in the 
inscribed dispositions of their dominated subjects169. However, the economic 
hysteresis from capitalist practice precipitated the urbanisation of the Shi’i to the 
southern suburbs of Beirut (al-dahiyeh) and the subsequent rupture of the symbolic 
capital possessed by the zu’ama through the mutually constituted, patron-client 
                                                 
165
  Agricultural exports decreased from 44.5% in 1965 to 24.6% in 1971 (Halawi, 1992: 53).  
166
  In this system, producers were completely beholden to elites and banks for equipment and distribution (Traboulsi, 2007: 158). For 
example, the Regie Co-Interessee des Tabacs de L’Empire Ottoman employed 72% of the peasantry by the mid-1970s (Halawi, 
1992: 57-58). Following a decision by economic elites to import tobacco, production drastically decreased from 1967 until 1972 
(Gharbieh, 1996: 158). The cultivation of sugar beet in the Biqa’ represents another example of this shift in prioritising imported goods 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 158).  
167
 By 1970, 29% of the South and 16.9% of the Biqa’ had migrated to Beirut, numbers that increased to a combined 65% following 
Israeli raids into Lebanon in 1975 (Gharbieh, 1996: 159-161; Norton, 1987: 23). The ‘belt of misery’ stretched from Karantina to Rami 
al-Ali and Laylaki in the West to Judayeh, Sin al-Fil, Mudawar, Burj Hammoud, Naba and Dikwaneh in the east and bordering Nahr 
Beirut, Ghubayri, Ayn al-Rummaneh, Shiyah, Haret Hreik, Burj al-Barajineh and Murayjeh all the way to the airport.    
168
  In the 1960s, only 1 in 6 prominent businessmen were Muslim (Johnson, 2001: 191). In 1973, the Christian/Muslim ratio in the 
tertiary sector was 75.5:24.5 (commercial); 71:29 (Banking); and 67.5:32.4 (Industry) (Traboulsi, 2007: 162).    
169
 A qabaday was a ‘man of the people, a helper of the weak and poor, a protector of the quarter or neighbourhood and a communal 
and confessional champion’ (Johnson, 2001: 48, 54; Lloyd-Peters, 1972: 197). 
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dialectic. The Shi’i habitus, compelled to adjust perceptions of practice due to the 
prevailing context, sought to realign their dispositions and enhance their 
opportunities for capital acquisition. While the constitution and logic of the SMF 
remained structured with the interest of coalescing and cooperating within a 
confessional grouping, al-dahiyeh provided alternative manifestations and modalities 
than the village for mobilisational practice. 
 
The southern Beirut district of Shiyyah offers a microcosm of these shifting trends. In 
1925, Shiyyah grew from a suburb of 575 households into two suburbs – Shiyyah 
(predominantly Maronite) and Ghubayri (mostly Shi’i) – of 4,587 by 1969 (Khuri, 
1975: 21)170. During this transition, the village logic of family allegiances, which were 
initially important in facilitating an introductory connection to the suburbs, was 
incrementally superseded by the urbanised logic of sectarian allegiances in the city 
(Khuri, 1972: 198). The amalgamation of structured familial networks from diverse 
geographical origins into a structuring suburban landscape of loosely defined spaces 
required a collective mechanism of social integration that exceeded the realms of 
zu’ama authority. Consequently, rather than the family, sectarian identity provided 
the material, moral, emotional and occupational assistance in acclimatising to urban 
life (Johnson, 2001: 156). As epitomised by El-Hajj Khansa, not only did the Shi’i 
leader deploy sectarian frames to lobby the municipal council for more Shi’i 
representation (1952) and autonomy (1956) in Ghubayri, but he also inaugurated 
public Ashoura celebrations that shaped and reinforced a collective Shi’i sense of 
solidarity (Khuri, 1975: 181-186)171. 
 
Comparatively, the PF remained largely immune from compositional changes in the 
SMF. At its core, the institutionalised culture of Lebanon’s PF entrenches the 
characteristics of consociation, ‘an alliance of moderate communal leaders who in 
the interests of stability, accepted within the association of the consocies the relative 
dominance of one of the communities’ (Johnson, 2001: 37)172. Testifying to the 
reproductive preservation of this system, traditional patterns were periodically 
transferred within modern socio-economic structures (Firro, 2003: 98). Unlike 
European states, where the bourgeoisie proponents of capitalism were challenged by 
                                                 
170
 Around 75% of the Shiyyah population were migrants, 97% of which were from rural villages (Khuri, 1975: 21). During the 
mutasarrifiya, the Maronite to Shi’i ratio was 5:2. After the First World War, the Maronites left Shiyyah while the Shi’i preferred to settle 
in the village of Ghubayri (Khuri, 1975: 21-30).  
171
 The Khansa family were originally from Ba’albeck. In 1952, following the influx of 22,000 migrants into the area, the two sects 
agreed to rearrange the municipality whereby the Maronites would receive 5 seats and the presidency while the Shi’i got 6 seats. In 
1956, the two areas split into separate municipalities. The increasing identification with sectarian framing not only applied to the Shi’i, 
but also extended to the Maronites of Shiyyah who began to relate to the Phalange Party, which propagated a Maronite vision of 
Lebanese nationalism (Khuri, 1972: 202-206; 1975: 207-210, 231).   
172
  For further explanations of consociation, refer to Hudson (1976), Dekmejian (1978), Lijphart (1977) and Khoury (1976).  
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a unified proletariat opposing industrial structures that determined the means of 
production, the prevalence of clientalism and confessionalism rendered Lebanese 
elites relatively unscathed (Halawi, 1992: 72). Since elite distribution of power within 
the confessional system (al-iqta’at al-siyasiyya) inhibited the mobilisation of the 
masses into a cohesive political force, Mahdi ‘Amil argued that capitalism 
complements, rather than contradicts confessionalism (Firro, 2003: 64)173. This 
dynamic of dominance, expressed in confessional terms, is managed and 
manipulated as a collective dispositional practice of sectarian elites in order to 
sustain the logic of the PF. Therefore, considering the homology between the PF and 
SMF, discontentment with economic inequality and social dislocation was directed 
via the mutually constituted organising principles and frames of sectarianism as 
opposed to class (Khuri, 1975: 234). Consequently, suburban modes of collective 
action in the SMF cut across social classes and recruited primarily on the basis of 
sect (Khuri, 1975: 202, 231).  
 
As a result of this homology, localised political practice in the suburbs reflected its 
national counterpart. The migration of the Shi’i to Beirut may have directly loosened 
the grip of the zu’ama but through the institutionalised logic of hizbiyyah (political 
support), either in the form of taba’iyyah (between leaders and followers) or tahaluf 
(alliances) amongst confessional actors in the PF, Shi’i elites were able to transfer, 
reinstate and reinforce their capital via local leaders to influence the methods by 
which social mobilisation was transformed into political action (Khuri, 1975: 195). In 
particular, the electoral law enabled Shi’i elites to further control political participation 
by stipulating that citizens register and vote in their original constituencies (Norton, 
1987: 32). As the doxa of the PF and SMF was structured on the recognised lingua 
franca of confessionalism, legitimate orthodox practice reproduced traditional patron-
client dynamics. Paradoxically, while the Shi’i elites represented the dominated 
branch of the dominant orthodoxy in the PF, they directed the dominant orthodoxy of 
practice amongst the dominated Shi’i in the SMF.   
 
The prevalence of this system, which had witnessed 250 families occupy 965 seats 
in the Council of Deputies from 1920 until 1975 and produced only four Shi’i 
Speakers in the 40 years following the National Pact, severely stunted and 
accentuated socio-economic conditions with 20% of Lebanon’s workforce 
                                                 
173
  Mahdi ‘Amil, or Hasan Hamdan, was a prominent Lebanese Marxist extensively on the confessional nature of the political system 
(Frangie, 2012: 465-482). 
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unemployed in the early 1970s (Picard, 1996: 54; Halawi, 1992: 71)174. The Shi’i 
were disproportionately affected with the annual revenue per capita in Beirut 
standing at $803 compared to $151 in the South, the average family income for the 
Shi’i $2,000 below the national standard and 50% of Shi’i not receiving any education 
(Traboulsi, 2007: 161; Norton, 1987: 17)175. The combination of socio-economic 
marginalisation, exponential urbanisation and political exclusion not only amplified 
Shi’i dissatisfaction, but also unified Shi’i grievances against a closed system of 
inactivity that was ‘deaf to their demands’ (Norton, 1987: 32; Halawi, 1992: 73). 
 
Bereft of political representation, many Shi’i vented and channelled their frustrations 
through other emerging parties. Karim Pakradouni observed that Shi’i only perceived 
themselves as the ‘proletariat of Lebanon’ once they were exposed to their wealthier 
compatriots in Beirut (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 286). Emphasising this identification, a 
survey conducted at the American University of Beirut, Université Saint Joseph and 
Lebanese University discovered that 61% of Shi’i affiliated with the ‘Left’, 68% 
preferred revolution over reform, 67% wanted to abolish private property and 90% 
supported the embryonic Palestinian resistance against Israel (Barakat, 1977). Due 
to the espousal of a supra-national pursuit of collective justice and identity for 
dominated elements of society, the political ideals of communism and socialism 
resonated saliently amongst the Shi’i with the term ‘Shi’i shuyu’i’ (‘Shi’i communist’) 
becoming a popular invocation (Halawi, 1992: 106; Shanahan, 2005: 103)176. 
Consequently, the Shi’i became the demographic nucleus of the Lebanese left, 
comprising almost 50% of the Lebanese Communist Party (Halawi, 1992: 106) as 
well as contributing considerable members to the Organisation of Communist Action 
in Lebanon (OCAL), the Progressive Socialist Party, the pro-Syrian Ba’ath Party and 
the Socialist Arab Action Party177. Therefore, by the end of the 1960s, the Shi’i were 
geographically divided, socio-economically deprived and politically dispersed, 
burdened with a ‘negative communitarian identification’ in the absence of an 
‘indigenous ideology they could embrace or formulate’ (Chalabi, 2006: 114, 108).    
   
Cognisant of these objective realities, Musa al-Sadr embarked upon a series of 
initiatives to address the core deficiencies and divisions within the Shi’i community 
                                                 
174
 Aside from Greek Orthodox Habib Abu Shahla (1946-1947), only Ahmad As’ad, Kamil As’ad, Sabri Hamadeh and Adil Usayran 
held the Shi’i-reserved post of Speaker (Halawi, 1992: 84; Shanahan, 2005: 65).  
175
 In terms of medical doctors, only 5.5% were stationed in the south, 3% in the Biqa’ and 65% in Beirut (Traboulsi, 2007: 161). The 
south and Biqa’ only contained 28.6% of state schools and 14% of private schools (Barakat, 1977; Halawi, 1992: 108-109).    
176
 Not all Shi’i joined leftist groups. Although few in number and rarely occupying high positions, Shi’i figures were present in the 
predominantly Christian Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party and the Syrian National Socialist Party (Shanahan, 2005: 92-95).  
177
 For example, the LCP’s deputy Secretary General Sa’dlallah Mazra’ani was a Shi’i, around 20% of the Progressive Socialist Party 
was Shi’i, the Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party in Lebanon in 1967 was a Shi’i named Assim Qansu and the Secretary General 
of the Socialist Arab Action Party in 1972, Hashim Ali Muhsin, as well as the majority of the group, which was a branch of George 
Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was Shi’i (Shanahan, 2005: 100-105).  
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for the purpose of transforming social grievances into opportunities for organising 
cohesive mobilisation. In order to challenge Shi’i perceptions and dispositions in the 
SMF, Musa al-Sadr had to observe the structured rules of orthodox practice and 
acquire the recognised capital with which to instil a Shi’i collusio. Initially, by virtue of 
his religious learning, al-Sadr was able to horizontally transfer his cultural capital 
from Qom and Najaf to Jabal ‘Amil. However, politically passive and symbolically 
eclipsed by Shi’i elites, the fragmented ulama focused on providing public services. 
By acknowledging ‘the political potential of social services as a means of outflanking 
the traditional elite’ and framing revised narratives, al-Sadr established the Social 
Institute for Orphans and the Destitute, the Bayt al-Fatat (‘Girls’ home’), the Institute 
of Islamic Studies and accepted a teaching post at Amiliyya in Beirut (Gharbieh, 
1996: 166; Halawi, 1992: 136).  
 
In order to secure the economic capital to cover these ventures, al-Sadr cultivated 
his social capital in two areas. Firstly, al-Sadr’s arrival in Lebanon coincided with the 
formation of SAVAK, the Organisation of Intelligence and National Security, in Iran 
with the Shah tasking Major Mojtaba Pasha’i, the chief of SAVAK’s Middle East 
branch, to ensure that Lebanon identified more with Iran rather than fall under the 
influence of Nasser’s Arab Nationalist overtures (Samii, 2006: 168-169). Although al-
Sadr did not directly ask his domicile country for funds, he benefited indirectly from 
their existing commitments to the Shi’i community, and through his meetings with 
Major Pasha’i and General Teimur Bakhtiar, the head of SAVAK, al-Sadr gained 
access to elites within the PF178. Subsequently, Iran’s meddling in Lebanon perhaps 
pressured Shihab reforms to reach the Shi’i community while also persuading the 
president to grant al-Sadr Lebanese nationality in 1963 (Samii, 2006: 169). Secondly, 
al-Sadr also endeavoured to expand his network beyond the ulama to encompass 
both Shi’i and non-Shi’i circles. While nurturing ties with the Committee of Social 
Struggle, a Shi’i forum specialising on working professionals and youths, as well as 
appealing to the emerging middle class of Shi’i expatriates, mostly based in West 
Africa, al-Sadr also joined haraka ijtima’iyya (‘Social Movement’) with Greek 
Orthodox Archbishop Gregoire Haddad, an inter-confessional group that focused on 
improving socio-economic development on the peripheries of the country (Gharbieh, 
1996: 174; Halawi, 1992: 137-139; Ajami, 1986: 97-99)179.  
                                                 
178
  Before al-Sadr, the Shah funnelled money to Lebanon via Ayatollah Mohammad Husayn Borujerdi and the Pahlavi Foundation 
with 80% reserved for Shi’i schools and the rest forwarded to the ulama via SAVAK (Samii, 2006: 169). SAVAK meetings fuelled 
rumours that al-Sadr was an Iranian spy. Shaykh Mugniyeh wrote that al-Sadr was al-Jasus al-Mu’ammam, or ‘the spy with the 
turban’ (Gharbieh, 1996: 151).   
179
  The Shi’i who emigrated to West Africa in the early 20th Century mainly settled in Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Sierra 
Leone. Nabi Berri, the leader of Amal, was raised in Sierra Leone (Ajami, 1986: 97-99).   
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Nevertheless, ‘for wealth to play its part, it had to be converted into political and 
social power’ (Ajami, 1986: 99). Compounding this equation, the Shi’i were not only 
divided in the PF and the SMF, but they also possessed dispositions that envisaged 
Shi’ism as a cultural identity rather than a conduit for political mobilisation. 
Conforming to conventional Lebanese practice, al-Sadr addressed this impasse by 
establishing an institution exclusively reserved for the Shi’i and legitimised by the 
state. Consequently, despite reservations from Shi’i elites, the Lebanese Parliament 
passed law 72/67 creating the Higher Islamic Shi’i Council (HISC) in May 1967 
before the vote was ratified into statute by the government in December (Traboulsi, 
2007: 178)180. Although the Shi’i were the last of Lebanon’s confessions to institute a 
religious council, the HISC was responsible for issuing fatwas, organising community 
affairs, cooperating with its Lebanese counterparts, fighting underdevelopment and 
injustice and supporting the Palestinian Resistance (Traboulsi, 2007: 178; Halawi, 
1992: 142)181. On 23 May 1969, Al-Sadr was elected President of the Beirut-based 
HISC, a body consisting of a 43-member executive board reflecting the diversity of 
the Shi’i community (Ajami, 1986: 114-119)182. 
 
Despite these developments, 1970 represented a crucial test for al-Sadr in 
organising the Shi’i community. Firstly, following the death of Shi’i marja al-taqlid, 
Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim, al-Sadr angered the Iranian ulama by endorsing his Najaf 
mentor, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, over Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s model 
of wilayat al-faqih (Chehabi, 2006: 191). Secondly, after al-Sadr refused to submit 
intelligence on Lebanese opposition groups to the new Ambassador to Lebanon, 
Major-General Mansur Qader, Iran revoked his passport and restricted its funding to 
the Shi’i leaving the community to rely on the al-Majlis al-Janub (‘the Council of the 
South’), a government programme dealing with development (Samii, 2006: 175-176; 
Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 157; Gharbieh, 1996: 199). Thirdly, having been expelled 
from Jordan after Black September, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
resettled in Lebanon where an estimated 240,000 Palestinians lived amongst Shi’i 
communities in the South (Picard, 1996: 81).          
 
                                                 
180
 Although Shi’i elites felt threatened by the HISC, only one of 20 Shi’i deputies rejected its formation in parliament (Gharbieh, 1996: 
184; Norton, 1987: 44).    
181
 The Sunnis established The Supreme Official Islamic Council on 13 January 1955 with the Doctrinal Council of the Druze 
Community founded on 13 July 1962 (Halawi, 1992: 141).   
182
 Less than half of the Religious Directorate attended and voted for al-Sadr, whose term was extended in March 1975 until his 65th 
birthday in 1993 (Halawi, 1992: 142). The Council comprised of 19MPs, 12 clerics and 12 laymen and was located in a Christian 
suburb of Beirut whereby ‘Shia money was buying into the real estate of the city, even though that money was still without 
commensurate political power of self-esteem’ (Ajami, 1986: 114-118).  
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Under the model of neo-Phoenician free market capitalism, the Military-Security Field 
(MSF) was widely perceived as irrelevant and superfluous to Lebanon’s priorities183. 
After the Syrian National Socialist Party attempted to stage a coup on New Year’s 
Eve in 1961, President Shihab sought to transform the MSF by boosting the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to 15,000 and restructuring its security apparatus 
around the Deuxieme Bureau, an intrusive intelligence network charged with 
collecting information and co-opting Lebanese officials (Traboulsi, 2007: 139; Harris, 
2012: 216)184. Following the defeat of Arab forces against Israel in 1967, Palestinian 
fedayeen fighters began launching raids into Israel from Lebanon. In retaliation, 
Israel bombarded South Lebanon from 1968, sporadic assaults that caused further 
destruction to a depleted community and brought the Palestinians into direct 
confrontation with the LAF (Traboulsi, 2007: 153). Consequently, LAF General Emile 
Bustani and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Cairo Accords in November 
1969, an agreement that paradoxically permitted the Palestinians to wage 
Resistance from South Lebanon while respecting the territorial authority of the 
Lebanese authorities185. The insertion of Palestinian fedayeen and the militarisation 
of the South became a contentious issue not only for the Shi’i, but also the Maronites 
by contributing to the disruption of dynamics in the delicate MSF.    
 
Although al-Sadr sympathised with the Palestinian cause, the Shi’i leader was 
concerned by the detrimental socio-economic implications of the PLO on his efforts 
to mobilise the Shi’i community into a cohesive OF. Exemplified by the Israeli strike 
on Arqoub in mid-May 1970 as well as Israeli retribution on South Lebanon after the 
Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, bellicose Israeli responses to PLO activities 
were resulting in severe civilian and infrastructure damages that disproportionately 
impacted the Shi’i community (Halawi, 1992: 151). Reluctant to criticise the PLO, and 
with the Council of the South comprising only 2.6% of the government’s annual 
expenditure, al-Sadr initiated a public offensive in 1973 calling for mass rallies, sit-ins 
and civil disobedience (Gharbieh, 1996: 205). While al-Sadr promoted collective 
action in the SMF, Syria’s endorsement of the PLO undermined Lebanon’s PF and 
the disintegrating legitimacy of the LAF in the MSF, a crumbling of capital that 
threatened to induct Maronite militias, such as the Kataeb (Phalange) and the 
                                                 
183
  After the National Pact, approximately 60% of the 3,300-strong armed forces were Christians (Harris, 2012: 200). By 1970, the 
poorly equipped Lebanese Army was 62% Muslim and predominantly led by Maronites and Druze (Picard, 1996: 84). Believing that 
an Army would either provoke Israel or encourage a coup d’état, the Christians preferred not to unnecessarily invest in one (Traboulsi, 
2007: 175).     
184
  Under Shihab’s reforms, the position of Public Security Director was held by a Sunni, the military room at the presidential palace 
handled Muslim leaders while the chief of staff managed Druze matters and military intelligence. Gabby Lahoud became head of the 
army’s Deuxieme Bureau and the Commander of the Unified Security Agency (Harris, 2012: 216; Traboulsi, 2007: 144).   
185
 The Lebanese were obligated to respect the right of Palestinians to resist Israel while continuing to exercise full civilian and military 
rights over Lebanon. Palestinian refugee camps were placed under PLO control with fedayeen granted freedom of movement 
throughout Lebanon (Picard, 1996: 81).   
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National Liberation Party, into the MSF to curtail the PLO186. In July 1973, the LAF, 
alongside Maronite militias, confronted the PLO at Tal al-Za’atar, an encounter that 
paralysed the PF by debilitating the ability of Lebanese elites to administer order 
through conventional channels (Traboulsi, 2007: 182).    
 
As an impending hysteresis risked engulfing the PF and MSF, al-Sadr radicalised his 
rhetoric in the SMF and announced the formation of al-Harakat al-Mahrumin (‘the 
Movement of the Deprived’) in March 1974, a unified OF representing the 
mobilisation of a collective Shi’i consciousness through the construction and 
dissemination of a revolutionary frame of reform. Al-Sadr’s rhetoric swiftly 
reverberated in a ruptured PF as his candidate, Rafiq Shahin, defeated the 
traditionally influential As’ads to win the elections in Nabatiyeh (Norton, 1987: 46; 
Gharbieh, 1996: 228). Despite speeches infused with Shi’i references, delivered at 
Shi’i locations and coinciding with Shi’i festivals, al-Sadr combined concepts of 
secularism and sectarianism187. Rather than confessionally determined and in 
contradistinction to the predominant orthodox practice of the SMF, al-Sadr 
propagated a Lebanese movement rejecting feudalism and embracing those ‘who 
feel deprived…as well as those who feel responsibility toward the disinherited’ 
(Halawi, 1992: 155). Testament to his cross-confessional appeal and the growth of 
his social capital, al-Sadr managed to attract endorsements from notable Christian 
and Sunni figures188.  
 
While al-Sadr gathered traction in the SMF, tensions escalated in the MSF. In 
February 1975, Nasserite leader Mar’uf Sa’ad was killed in an LAF attempt to 
suppress a demonstration in Sidon. Moreover, immediately after the shooting of a 
Christian congregation in the Beirut suburb of Ayn Rumayna on 13 April, Phalange 
militiamen killed 27 Palestinians on a bus heading to Tal al-Za’atar. Intending to 
resort to non-violent and inclusive mobilisational methods in the SMF as a way of 
address the intensification of violence towards civil war in the MSF, al-Sadr staged a 
fast stating ‘I will not wield a sword. Our weapons are the words of God’ (Al-Anwar, 
                                                 
186
  After Operation Spring of Youth on 9/10 April 1973, a clandestine Israeli mission that killed three prominent Palestinian figures in 
Beirut, the PLO called for LAF Chief Iskander Ghanim to be sacked. When President Franjiyeh refused, Syria imposed an economic 
boycott on Lebanon and funnelled supplementary Palestinian fighters into the country. As the LAF failed to sufficiently surround 
Palestinian camps in Beirut, President Franjiyeh admitted that the LAF had lost its legitimacy and urged Maronite militia leaders to 
boost their own resources (Picard, 1996: 87; Harris, 2012: 225).     
187
 Al-Sadr employed Shi’i rhetoric by proclaiming that Karbala ‘is a deposit placed in our hands so that…we draw out of it a new 
source of reform, a new position, a new movement, a new revolution, to repel the darkness, to stop tyranny and to pulverize evil’ (al-
Hayat, February 1, 1974). Conversely, Al-Sadr also downplayed sectarian overtones by declaring that ‘I shall fight until there remains 
not one of you oppressed, whether Shi’ite or not, and until every inch of lands is fully exploited’ (al-Nahar, 18 March, 1974).    
188
  Not only did al-Sadr secure the support of 190 intellectuals from a variety of religious communities in November 1974, but he also 
received endorsements from Patriarch Khuraysh and other prominent Christian figures. Furthermore, Sunni clerics, the Islamic 
Association and six other Sunni organisations also sponsored al-Sadr (Ajami, 1986: 134; Gharbieh, 1996: 208-211; Halawi, 1992: 
155). 
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28 June, 1975). Regardless, the Shi’i leader could not defuse chronic division in the 
SMF or an eruption of hostilities in the MSF by adopting tactics that had limited 
resonance to the predominant modes of institutionalised sectarianism entrenched 
within Lebanon’s fields of practice. On the contrary, al-Sadr’s movement was 
conceived and cultivated within the precise structures it claimed to change. By 
extension, al-Harakat al-Mahrumin was subjected to and regulated by the rules of 
organisation that enshrined Lebanese mobilisation. In this way, al-Sadr’s actions 
reflected ‘the revolt of a confession, not a confessional revolt’ (Ghassan Tueni in Al-
Nahar, 18 March, 1974). Therefore, devoid of extensive forms of legitimate capital 
with which to challenge the predominant orthodoxy of mobilisation in Lebanon, al-
Sadr was compelled to adapt to the logic of prevailing practice. Subsequently, ‘in a 
society at war, he had to play by new rules’ (Ajami, 1986: 169).   
 
After a bomb struck Ayn Bunaya in the Biqa’ on 6 July 1975, al-Sadr succumbed to 
revised orthodoxy of practice in Lebanon. Transferring capital from the SMF to the 
MSF, al-Sadr announced the formation and induction of Afwaj al-Moqawama al-
Lubnaniyya (‘The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance’), or Amal, the official 
armed wing of the al-Harakat al-Mahrumin. Initially, Amal aligned with the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM), a pro-Palestinian alliance of mostly leftist militias that 
advocated for the abolition of sectarian quotas (Traboulsi, 2007: 189)189. However, 
sensing an opportunity in the shifting dynamics of dominance in Lebanon, al-Sadr 
defected from the LNM and repositioned his capital with the Syrian intervention under 
the legitimacy of the Arab Deterrence Force in May 1976, a deployment that 
prevented the PLO and its allies from defeating the Christian militias190. Equipped 
with an evolving disposition that interpreted the PLO as a heterodox inhibitor as 
opposed to an orthodox enabler in the inculcation of a collective Shi’i habitus, al-Sadr 
revealed that ‘Palestinian resistance is not a revolution…it is a military machine that 
terrorizes the Arab world…The PLO is an element of disorder in the south. The Shia 
have finally gotten over their inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Palestinian 
Organisation’ (Ajami, 1986: 178).  
 
Conclusion  
 
The inception of Hizbullah did not occur in a vacuum but was dependent upon extant 
discourses and practices within the Shi’i community in Lebanon. The tendency of 
                                                 
189
  The LNM consisted of 12,000 fighters from 15 groups; the PLO possessed 30,000 fighters; and the right-leaning Christian 
Lebanese Front contained 12,000 fighters (Picard, 1996: 101-103; Harris, 2012: 237).  
190
  The Sunnis militias, the Ba’ath Party and the SSNP also deserted the LNM (Harris, 2012: 239).  
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academics to conceive Shi’ism through the prism of its radical permutation in the 
second half of the 20th Century omits ‘multiple forms of political engagement, social 
interconnection, and diverse expressions of cultural identity within the Shi’i milieu’ 
(Weiss, 2010: 223). The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the trajectory 
of Shi’i mobilisation in the history of Lebanon as a way of introducing its most modern 
manifestation. A combined Bourdieu-SMT lens identifies three underlying themes 
that assist in explaining the disposition and position of the Shi’i community before the 
advent of Hizbullah in Lebanon.     
 
Firstly, rather than reductively invoke the innate or linear exceptionalism of Shi’i 
mobilisation, it is imperative to interpret the perception, position and practice of Shi’i 
collective action as inextricably linked to Lebanon’s structured environment through a 
dynamically dialectical process of mutual constitution. Consequently, Shi’i practice is 
‘no more inscrutable or exotic than the politics of any other Lebanese community’ 
(Norton, 1987: 13). Although indications of discrimination against the Shi’i are evident 
during the Ottoman era, the sub-field system was instrumentally structured to 
prioritise administrative stability over religious ideology. Therefore, the cause of the 
Shi’i decline towards the end of the 18th Century was less about confessionalism and 
more to do with elite deviation from the recognised orthodoxy of practice imposed by 
Istanbul. As the convergence of exogenous and endogenous forces institutionalised 
the logic and contours of Lebanon’s PF around the doxa (law) of sectarianism, the 
Shi’i were not estranged from its composition, extraneous to its interpretation or 
immune to its influence. While lacking the extensive capital or unified frames of their 
confessional counterparts, the Shi’i remained exposed and subjected to the rules, 
interests and opportunities embedded within the structured system, albeit from a 
heterodox position. 
 
The establishment of Le Grand Liban under the French mandate further entrenched 
the constitution of the PF to elevate a prevailing orthodoxy of Lebanese nationalism. 
While the Shi’i were geographically, socially and ideologically located on the 
peripheries of this arrangement, the core of the system inherently contained access 
opportunities for the Shi’i to pursue avenues of capital acquisition and political 
participation via the SMF. Additionally, the tactics and modalities employed by Musa 
al-Sadr demonstrated that episodes of collective action within the Shi’i community 
continued to be identified and determined by dispositions that acknowledged their 
implicit, yet marginalised, inclusion within the Lebanese system rather than their 
distinctively explicit exclusion. In this respect, Shi’i mobilisation before 1979 was 
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directed by its heterodox position within the relational structures of Lebanon, not by 
its heterodox practice.   
 
Secondly, a defining characteristic not only in the Shi’i community, but also in 
Lebanon as a whole, was the role of confessional elites in managing structured 
practice within the areas under their authority. According to Salibi (1988: 145), the 
Shi’i ‘never developed the social and political coherence of the Maronites or the 
Druzes’. Contrary to their perennial and intentional victimisation, Shi’i elites were 
systematic in exploiting and exercising their privileged position within a community-
based system. Whereas rivalries amongst fellow elites operated under the 
parameters of propagating confessional interests, the competition between Shi’i 
notables over symbolic capital within their communities inhibited the evolution of a 
holistic mobilisational narrative.   
 
In the Ottoman era, the Sultan enabled landowning elites to benefit from a localised 
patronage system provided they fulfilled their prerequisite duties within the governing 
iltizam model. This structuring orthodoxy for inter-elite practice, in which stakeholders 
had a vested interest in preserving the arrangement, was organised around shared 
inter-elite dispositions over distinct confessional solidarity. In the mid-19th Century, 
while Maronites and Druze reconstituted the link between popular mobilisation (SMF) 
and elite representation (PF) for the purpose of confessional action (OF), Shi’i elites, 
who were geo-politically detached from these developments, traversed the chasm 
between the SMF and PF by reverting to the traditional logic of patronage. Therefore, 
instances of Shi’i mobilisation that contemplated alternative discourses and practices 
were constrained, co-opted or channelled by Shi’i elites. 
 
Under the French mandate, as Maronites, Sunnis and Druze endeavoured to 
capitalise on the opportunities presented by the Lebanese system in creating 
organisations that aligned capital and harmonised practice between the PF and SMF, 
intra-Shi’i competition not only led to division and marginalisation in the PF, but also 
contributed further to the fragmentation of the Shi’i in the SMF as rivalries permeated 
religious, educational and socio-economic affairs. While Musa al-Sadr attempted to 
erode the monopoly of Shi’i elites over representation by accumulating the legitimate 
capital required in the SMF to establish a cohesive OF, the institutionalised logic of 
elite self-preservation represented a considerable obstacle in ingraining dispositions 
of active participation amongst the Shi’i community. 
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Thirdly, throughout the history of Lebanon, it is challenging to identify substantive 
examples of a collective Shi’i habitus (collusio), a harmonisation of perceptions and 
dispositions conjoined in identity and practice. Conversely, the Shi’i community 
exhibited diverse, differentiated and disjointed discourses that inhibited organised 
mobilisation. In the Ottoman period, while Shi’i notables observed intersubjective 
understandings of structured elite practice, this was neither solidaristic nor 
exclusively Shi’i. Consequently, Shi’i tenants coalesced only by virtue of their 
subordination and inactivity within a prevailing patronage system. As their 
confessional counterparts strived to consolidate a collective habitus between the 
mutasarrifiya and Mandate, prospects for establishing a Shi’i collective habitus were 
precluded by differences amongst and between traditional notables (zu’ama), the 
mercantile elite (wujaha), religious leaders (ulama) and the working class (amma).  
 
Under the French Mandate, while the Shi’i elite continued to utilise their superior 
values of capital to nullify and negate any challenge to their position, the Shi’i ulama 
remained restrained by their disposition to observe traditional quietism, their 
disagreements over legitimate religious practice and their reliance on patrons. 
Meanwhile, disproportionately affected by the capitalist policies of Beirut, the Shi’i 
community was unified in socio-economic position but geographically dispersed, 
devoid of organisation and bereft of recognised capital. Although the advent of 
urbanisation exposed the Shi’i to a newly structured space of alternative 
mobilisational discourses and practices, the formulation of a collective habitus was 
impeded by the transposition of patronage systems in urbanised contexts, the 
reproductive strictures of the electoral process and the existence of leftist and 
communist parties that resonated with Shi’i grievances but were not explicit 
demonstrations of Shi’i mobilisation thereby diluting their ability to transfer capital 
from the SMF into the logic of sectarianism within the PF.    
 
By merging the positions of divergent Shi’i agents and revealing the opportunities of 
a cohesive OF through the customisation of pre-existing mobilisational repertoires 
and the construction of unifying collective action frames, Musa al-Sadr was 
instrumental in unlocking and inculcating the basis of a harmonised Shi’i habitus 
(collusio) in the SMF. While the eruption of hysteresis in the MSF accelerated Amal’s 
formation, thereby disrupting the consistency of its intended composition, the 
disappearance of al-Sadr during a visit to Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi in 1978 threatened 
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to reignite extant frictions within the Shi’i community191. Therefore, the objective of 
the next chapter is to explore the emergence of Hizbullah in the context of Sayyid 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the return of Shi’i clerics from Iraq, the disappearance 
of al-Sadr, Israeli intervention in Lebanon, and most saliently, the advent of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, a development signifying the transformation of Iran 
from a passive observer to an active stakeholder in Lebanese affairs.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191
 Norton (1987: 53-56), Halawi (1992: 202-208) and Ajami (1986: 183-185) provide possible reasons behind his disappearance.  
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Chapter Five: 
The Creation and Positioning of Hizbullah in Lebanon (1982-1991) 
 
‘Every politically significant revolution is anticipated by a transformation of the intellectual landscape’.  
- Tony Judt (2005: 535)  
 
‘Had the enemy [Israel] not taken this step [the invasion of Lebanon in 1982], I do not know whether 
something called Hizbullah would have been born. I doubt it’.  
- Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah Secretary General (1992-), Al-‘Ahd, 21 November, 1997  
 
‘Hizbullah is the people’s march; it is a popular state…every believer who fights Israel in the South and 
who defends the honour of the Muslims…has links with the Islamic Revolution belongs to 
Hizbullah…We [Islamic Amal] work for Islam and are bound to the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, we are 
part of Hizbullah’.  
- Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, spokesperson for Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Amal (MER, 
3 December, 1983). 
 
‘There is no connection between the internal administration of the Iranian state and Hizbullah’s 
administration. These are two separate issues, each having its particularities and bodies of 
administration despite the commitment of both to the commands and directions of the Jurist Theologian 
[wilayat al-faqih]’.   
- Naim Qassem (2005: 57), Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah.  
 
The inception of Hizbullah has divided scholars around the relative importance of 
endogenous and exogenous factors in motivating the Party of God’s initial 
mobilisation as well as the level of cohesion and coherence attributed to the 
embryonic movement. The first group, perceiving Hizbullah through the prism of Iran, 
interprets the Party of God as a hierarchically organised and strategically calculated 
proxy of the Islamic Republic with limited independence in decision-making. By 
extension, Hizbullah is synonymous with the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO) and 
therefore implicated in terrorist operations against Western targets throughout the 
1980s192. Conversely, the second group argues that these assumptions deny the 
influence of intrinsically Lebanese factors in the emergence of Hizbullah and endow 
the nascent movement with a consistent logic belying the complexity of multi-faceted 
relations during the civil war. Therefore, the ‘uniformity and solidarity of Hizbullah, 
like that of the Shi’i community itself, can be over-estimated and hence its 
importance magnified out of proportion’ (Piscatori, 1989: 314)193.  
 
                                                 
192
 Commentators include Deeb (1988), Kramer (1993), Ranstorp (1997), Hamzeh (2004) and Levitt (2013; 2014).  
193
 Scholars include Piscatori (1989), Norton (2007a), Jaber (1997), Baer (2003) and Azani (2011).   
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The underlying cause of this polarisation emanates from the arrival of Hizbullah on 
the periphery of a protracted civil war. Not only is access to primary sources on 
Hizbullah sparse, but Hizbullah officials also avoid engaging in detailed discussions 
about the movement’s early activities194. Devoid of the appropriate information with 
which to reliably substantiate their perspectives, each side of the spectrum interprets 
the deficiency of data in dichotomous ways. The first approach applies the 
methodological practice of ‘Hizbullah hindsight’, a correlation of causation in which 
the current reputation of the movement creates a continuous rationale of intentional 
design, organisation and mobilisation that supersedes historical irregularities. Rather 
than speculate by promoting a linear narrative, the second approach construes the 
methodological paucity of discernible facts as an impediment in identifying and 
designating Hizbullah as an organised or cogent actor in Lebanon.  
 
By incorporating a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation, this chapter aims to contribute 
to this debate by detecting shifts in Hizbullah’s perception of opportunities, its 
utilisation of mobilisational resources and its deployment of collective action frames 
for the purpose of illustrating the Party of God’s evolution during the 1980s. The 
Lebanese civil war ushered in a period of intractable hysteresis, a condition in which 
previously constituted laws of position and practice became relationally detached and 
disconnected from the dispositions of agents. As a consequence of this chaotic 
conditional context, each invested stakeholder, operating beyond conventional 
parameters, sought to capitalise on perceived opportunities by strategically adjusting 
or aligning their capital to enhance their prospective position in the restructuring of 
fields in Lebanon. In order to locate and trace the trajectory of Hizbullah within this 
environment, three inter-related processes will be explored.  
 
Firstly, Hizbullah was ‘not an Iranian creation’ and it would be a ‘capital mistake’ to 
directly correlate Iran’s ideology or its financial power with the sudden manifestation 
of Shi’i revolutionary activism in Lebanon (Abu Khalil, 1991: 391; Chehabi, 2006: 
201). On the contrary, the political and socio-economic roots of Shi’i mobilisation had 
a historical pretext. However, while elements of these radical habiti had been 
inducted into the illusio of the SMF via Amal, the orthodox propensities of the latter 
failed to resonate with the growing heterodox dispositions of the Shi’i community. 
Therefore, it is necessary to explain how and why the role of Sayyid Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah, Israel’s Operation Litani into Lebanon, the return of a network of 
                                                 
194
 When questioned about the Party of God’s leadership structure, its connections to Iran, its ties with IJO and its tension with Amal 
as well as leftist groups in the 1980s, the researcher discovered that Hizbullah-affiliated individuals fail to divulge information and 
prefer to redirect attention to the dysfunctional Lebanese system and the threat posed by Israeli occupation.   
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Shi’i Lebanese clerics from Iraq, the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and the Islamic 
Revolution provided the opportunities, mobilising modalities and collective action 
frames required to compel the radical habiti of the Shi’i community to coalesce into a 
heterodox position of collusio in the SMF, a state in which collective agents are 
conjoined in identity, solidarity and purpose.  
 
Secondly, this chapter will analyse the dynamic dialectic of constitution between Shi’i 
collusio in the SMF and the construction of Hizbullah’s OF. Rather than an 
instantaneous conversion, this association was consolidated over time. While it is 
indisputable that Ayatollah Khomeini’s Revolution in 1979 supplied Hizbullah with its 
politico-religious framework and Israel’s invasion in 1982 legitimised the justification 
of its implementation in Lebanon, Hizbullah not only had to induct its narrative within 
the entrenched structures of Lebanon’s SMF, but it also had to abide by the 
orthodoxy of pre-existing networks and repertoires to expand its base while 
simultaneously investing in institutions that transformed disparate heterodox 
dispositions into a collective Resistance habitus. By sharing significant amounts of 
social, economic and cultural capital with the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hizbullah 
seized upon the opportunity to transfer corresponding values of capital into Lebanon, 
a development that fostered field homology between Iran’s PF and Lebanon’s SMF. 
The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and the gradual fragmentation of Amal also 
enabled Hizbullah to assemble its OF and cultivate a Resistance habitus in the SMF 
that promoted an alternative model for Shi’i mobilisation.   
 
Thirdly, this chapter intends to explain the relationship between the IJO and 
Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance in the MSF. Harb and Leenders (2005: 185) posited 
that distinguishing between the social and the military activities of Hizbullah fails to 
acknowledge the interactions between them. By adopting a perspective that 
examines Hizbullah concurrently in relational fields of practice, one can assess the 
demarcation of boundaries between the IJO and the Islamic Resistance. While 
compatible in terms of religious identity and revolutionary ideology, they were 
incongruent with regards to position, practice and purpose. For Hizbullah’s OF, the 
Iranian-endorsed priority was to establish an Islamic Resistance that recruited agents 
from the SMF to combat Israel and compete with other militias in the MSF. 
Conversely, for the IJO, which comprised of a loose network of seasoned Shi’i 
fighters, the objective was to perform the immediate interests of Iran in the MSF 
while the Islamic Resistance was under construction. Therefore, each movement 
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should be evaluated for the different ways in which they transferred, deployed and 
augmented capital from Iran within their respected fields of practice.   
 
Invoking Quentin Skinner’s (1969) methodology of history, there are two inherent 
risks in revisiting the origins of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Primarily, by fixating on the 
contemporary impact of Iran and Hizbullah, one may inadvertently or intentionally 
propagate the ‘myth of parochialism’, a reflective but not reflexive practice that 
privileges a myopic insight into the exogenous influence of the Islamic Republic at 
the expense of endogenous dynamics in Lebanon. While the Islamic Revolution, 
which enshrined the concept of wilayat al-faqih and the principle of Resistance 
against Israel, was pivotal in Hizbullah’s inception, it has ‘been given too much credit’ 
(Piscatori, 1989: 309). Ayatollah Khomeini was the catalyst for change, not the 
fundamental cause or expression of Shi’i mobilisation in Lebanon. The Najaf legacy, 
in which revolutionary activism replaced apolitical quietism as the intellectual norm of 
clerical practice, should not be reduced to Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of Islamic 
government (Shanahan, 2005: 169). Furthermore, Hizbullah advocates for the 
‘Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’ were not restricted to emulating Iran, but as agents 
inscribed with the perceptions and practices of Lebanon’s structured parameters, 
they were responsible for devising methods for an exclusively Lebanese context.    
 
Accompanying this methodological fallacy is the ‘myth of prolepsis’, a 
decontextualising act that credits Hizbullah with a level of coherent logic, strategic 
foresight and cohesive organisation before the manifestation of these characteristics. 
Walid Jumblatt, the long-serving Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, 
admitted that Hizbullah barely figured on his radar during the 1980s and inferred that 
the Islamic Resistance represented a peripheral consideration rather than a primary 
concern195. Reinforcing this claim, surveys of Lebanese press outlets during the civil 
war from both ends of the political spectrum, such as Al-Nahar and Al-Safir, 
demonstrate incremental but not incessant attention to Hizbullah as a formalised 
actor in Lebanon. By omitting a relational perspective that contextualises Hizbullah 
both in conjunction with its field counterparts, as well as in accordance to the 
structures of those fields, the movement’s practices are prone to embellishment.   
 
 
 
                                                 
195
 Interview with Walid Jumblatt, Beirut, 3 July 2012.  
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5.1 From Radical habiti into collusio  
 
Sayyid Fadlallah, a prominent Shi’i mujtahid in Beirut, referred to the Iranian 
Revolution as ‘the earthquake’ that shook the foundations of Lebanon (Sankari, 
2005: 173)196. However, since the Revolution required receptive actors for enacting 
corresponding perceptions of opportunities, mobilising modalities and action frames 
in Lebanon, over-stating the earthquake devalues the tremours within the Shi’i 
community that preceded and contributed to the scale of the resulting rupture. 
Consequently, Sayyid Fadlallah was instrumental in cultivating radical habiti of 
heterodox agents in the SMF with Husayn Moussawi, the founder of Islamic Amal, 
crediting the Shi’i cleric for ‘the socialization and education of this generation’ (Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2003: 302). Exemplifying this important role, ‘Then Came the Earthquake’ 
appeared in the June-July 1980 issue of al-Muntalaq (‘The Source’), a journal 
associated with al-Ittihad al-Lubnani lil Talabah al-Muslimeen (‘the Lebanese 
Federation of Muslim Students’), an organisation Sayyid Fadlallah helped establish 
at the Arab University of Beirut in 1966 (Sankari, 2005: 134, 173).  
 
On the surface, Sayyid Fadlallah replicated the course of Musa al-Sadr. Both clerics 
acquired cultural capital by tracing their educational lineage to Najaf in Iraq, the 
epicentre of Shi’i religious learning, where they studied under Muhsin al-Hakim and 
Abu Qasim al-Khui. Moreover, while exposed to the lectures of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
Najaf, both expressed reservations concerning the concept of wilayat al-faqih and 
preferred to endorse the Shi’i activism espoused by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr197. 
Both also derived social capital in Lebanon from respected familial heritage198. 
Whereas al-Sadr was invited to Tyre by Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, Sayyid Fadlallah owed 
his position at Masjid al-Imam Ali in east Beirut to the Usrat al-Ta’akhi (‘Family of 
Fraternity’). Initially, both sought to address the dispossession and demoralisation of 
the Shi’i community by transforming their cultural capital into enhanced social and 
economic capital for the purpose of instilling a collective habitus through interactive 
networks of formal and informal institutions199.  
 
                                                 
196
 Ijtihad is the process of ‘independent reasoning’ between Islamic principles and the prevailing context. A mujtahid is a qualified 
individual who is authorised to engage in this reconciliation of theory and praxis.   
197
 In particular his work Iqtisaduna (‘Our Economics’) and Falsafatuna (‘Our Philosophy’).   
198Sayyid Sharaf al-Din was related to Musa al-Sadr through the former’s maternal grandfather as well as the latter’s father (Chehabi 
& Tafreshi, 2006: 143). Sayyid Fadlallah’s father, Ayatollah Sayyid Abdul Ra’uf, was a revered figure in the Shi’i community (Sankari, 
2005: 121: 160).     
199
 Supplementing public lectures, al-Sadr assumed the leadership of Jam’iyyat al-Bir wal-Ihsan (‘the Local Benevolent Society’) in 
1961, founded the al-Mu’assasah al-Ijtima’iyyah (‘the Social Institute’) in 1962, the Bayt al-Fatat in 1963 and the Ma’had al-Dirasat al-
Islamiyyah (‘Institute for Islamic Studies’). Sayyid Fadlallah founded a musallah (‘prayer hall’); a husayniyya; a cultural club for 
women; a medical clinic; and al-Ma’had al-Shari’ al-Islami (‘the Islamic Legal Institute’) in 1966 (Sankari, 2005: 127; 131-133).  
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However, the two clerics diverged on the precise route to symbolic capital within the 
Shi’i community. By inaugurating al-Harakat al-Mahrumin and Amal, al-Sadr had 
indicated his disposition to recognise the legitimate orthodoxy of the prevailing 
system in both Lebanon’s SMF and PF as a means of pursuing a reformist agenda. 
Conversely, Sayyid Fadlallah refused to affiliate with orthodox actors believing that 
such an association would not only undermine his focus on grassroots revolutionary 
change, but would also compromise the universal value of his message by limiting 
his influence to Lebanon200. Expediently conforming to orthodox methods of capital 
accumulation in the SMF, Sayyid Fadlallah intended to achieve symbolic capital as a 
precursor to encouraging the inculcation of radical habiti producing heterodox 
practice. Since Sayyid Fadlallah disassociated from conventional practice, the civil 
war presented opportunities for Sayyid Fadlallah to enhance his capital at the 
expense of al-Sadr. 
 
In a military campaign initiated in 1975 to link their cantons into one contiguous 
enclave, Christian militias seized Nab’a in August 1976 and attacked Tal al-Za’atar, a 
predominantly Palestinian camp, in September 1976 culminating in the displacement 
of approximately 100,000 Shi’i, including Sayyid Fadlallah, to the southern suburbs of 
Beirut201. As al-Sadr attempted to mediate a solution via eroding political channels, 
Sayyid Fadlallah disseminated his collective action frames of heterodoxy from the 
Imam Rida mosque at Bir Al-Abd in al-dahiyeh where his publications reached and 
resonated with an audience in search of guidance202. Transcending traditional Islamic 
theory, Sayyid Fadlallah declared that the Shi’i must replace entrenched dispositions 
of oppression and inferiority with a radical spirit of activism led by an organised and 
flexible movement (Sankari, 2005: 158). Augmenting the credibility of Sayyid 
Fadlallah’s capital in the SMF, Ayatollah al-Khui, the Shi’i marja al-taqlid, appointed 
his former pupil as a wakil (‘representative’) in Lebanon203. By adopting a Bourdieu-
SMT analysis, the four contributing factors inspiring Hizbullah’s creation after 1977 
can be reconceptualised to explain the process by which Sayyid Fadlallah’s 
discourse not only expanded beyond Beirut to induct more radical habiti into the 
illusio of the SMF, but also harmonised a Shi’i collusio of heterodox practice.    
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 Interview with Hani Abdallah, Beirut, 11 September 2012.  
201
  Other Shi’i areas cleared by Christian militias in east Beirut included Harat al-Ghawarina, Maslakh and Karantina. Although Tal al-
Za’atar was mostly comprised of Palestinians, around 43% of the camp was Shi’i (Sankari, 2005: 135). Sayyid Nasrallah, the current 
Secretary General of Hizbullah and a regular attendee of Sayyid Fadlallah’s lectures in Nab’a, was forced to move from Karantina to 
Bazouriyah in South Lebanon where he joined Amal before leaving for Najaf later in 1976 (Blanford, 2011: 29; Avon & 
Khatchadourian, 2012: 209).  
202
 These included Al-Islam wa Muntiq al-Quwwah (‘Islam and the Logic of Force’) as well as al-Hiwar fil Qur’an (‘Dialogue in the 
Qur’an’) in 1976 and Khutuwat ‘ala Tariq al-Islam (‘Steps Along the Path of Islam’) in 1977.  
203
 Although Ayatollah al-Khui was a proponent of clerical quietism, he likely believed that, unlike Iraq, conditions in Lebanon were 
conducive to Sayyid Fadlallah’s approach. Sayyid Fadlallah used this heightened position to establish Jam’iyyat al-Mabarrat al-
Khayriyyah (‘the Society for Benevolent Charity’) in 1978 (Interview with Hani Abdallah, Beirut, 11 September 2012).     
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Firstly, following a PLO attack near Tel Aviv in March 1978, Israel retaliated with 
Operation Litani, a two-week long strike on South Lebanon that had three important 
consequences for the Shi’i. Primarily, the assault resulted in an estimated 2,000 
deaths and the displacement of 250,000 people, most of whom were Shi’i (Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2002: 10). The majority that resettled in al-dahiyeh were exposed to 
Sayyid Fadlallah, whose religious rhetoric and social services aimed to channel 
passive frustration into active mobilisation. Moreover, since al-Sadr had distanced 
Amal from the PLO, the Shi’i in South Lebanon who remained in solidarity with the 
Palestinians embodied radical habiti in search of representation within the SMF. By 
propagating a pro-Palestinian and pro-Resistance counter-frame to Amal, Sayyid 
Fadlallah appealed to the dispositions of these dislocated Shi’i. Lastly, the 
endorsement and stationing by non-Lebanese actors of two military forces in South 
Lebanon attracted resentment from the Shi’i population. Whereas UNSC Resolutions 
425 and 426 charged the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a 
six-month peacekeeping mandate to ensure Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, 
restore peace and security to South Lebanon and facilitate the return of the 
Lebanese state to the area, the deployment of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), an 
Israeli proxy comprised of Lebanese, was perceived as formalising the Israeli 
occupation at the expense of UNIFIL204.  
 
Secondly, in 1977, approximately 100 Shi’i clerics returned to Lebanon from Najaf 
strengthening the heterodox movement of radical habiti that was coalescing around 
Sayyid Fadlallah (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 302). Under the Ba’ath Party in Iraq, Shi’i 
clerics were routinely subjected to persecution by an Arab Socialist regime 
threatened by religious activism. By 1978, as Ayatollah Khomeini fled to France, 
Shaykh Abbas Moussawi, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and Shaykh Ragheb Harb 
returned to Lebanon (Alagha, 2006: 28; Shapira, 1988: 129). This vanguard of 
Hizbullah was raised on the lectures of Sayyid Fadlallah and al-Sadr before having 
their dispositions embedded through an education in Najaf influenced by Hizb al-
Dawa, a subversive Shi’i group in Iraq infused with the activism of Muhammad Baqir 
al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini205. Returning to Lebanon, these Shi’i clerics 
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 Under Saad Haddad, the SLA was to create Haras al-Watani li-Qura’ al-Janub (‘National Guard for Villages in the South’) to 
administer order but after his death Antoine Lahd paid recruits from all sects $300 a month to create village militias comprised of the 
sect within the village. The SLA enabled Israel to justify, implement and reproduce its occupation of South Lebanon (Norton, 1987: 
111-112; MER, 7 April, 1984: 14-15).   
205
 Almost all of Hizbullah’s initial leaders were educated at Najaf, including Shaykh Subhi Tufayli, Shaykh Naim Qassem, Shaykh 
Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, Shaykh Mohammad Yazbek, Shaykh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq and Shaykh Ali al-Kurani (Shapira, 
1988: 129). Shaykh Moussawi and Sayyid Nasrallah, both of whom would become Secretary General of Hizbullah, formed a close 
relationship in Najaf. Shaykh Harb studied under Sayyid Fadlallah at the Islamic Legal Institute in Beirut (Shapira, 1988: 129; Alagha, 
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dispersed to stimulate different permutations of Shi’i activism. Although Sayyid 
Fadlallah was not involved in the leadership of Hizb al-Dawa, a number of returnees 
from Najaf who joined the Lebanese Federation of Muslim Students in Lebanon 
continued to sympathise with its cause206. While Shaykh Harb became a prominent 
figure in the Association of Ulama of Jabal ‘Amil, Shaykh Abbas and Sayyid 
Nasrallah led the Hawzat al-Imam al-Mutazar in Ba’albeck as members of Amal. 
Although the transnational transfusion of cultural and social capital through radical 
habiti complemented Sayyid Fadlallah’s objective in mobilising a Shi’i collusio by 
inculcating dispositions and perceptions of heterodox practice, rather than 
concentrate on grassroots modalities of collective action, returnees from Iraq 
calculated that integrating into pre-existing organisations provided the optimum 
opportunity for igniting a radical Shi’i habitus in the SMF.            
 
Thirdly, the disappearance of al-Sadr on 31 August 1978 in Libya produced a 
leadership vacuum in Amal that amplified the structural deficiencies of the 
organisation and increased the allure of heterodox mobilisation. Since the Shi’i 
leader devised a flexible and encompassing frame to enable Amal to progress 
according to the orthodox rules of practice in Lebanon, the movement was ‘as much 
an ideal, socio-political state of mind, as it was a palpable well-organized entity’ 
(Norton, 1987: 87). Following the outbreak of the civil war, al-Sadr’s shifting 
allegiances, the Nab’a exodus, the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon and Amal’s 
detachment from the PLO highlighted the inability of the movement to effectively 
reconcile its diverse Shi’i base with prevailing contextual trends resulting in an 
eclectic reformist movement geographically, socio-economically and ideologically 
divided that lacked the organisational cohesion to unify these cleavages. 
Consequently, after al-Sadr’s disappearance, Husayn al-Husayni, Nabih Berri and 
Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine competed for the symbolic capital to redirect the 
predominant orthodoxy of Amal’s OF207. This internal friction, which caused 
dissonance in field homology between Amal’s OF and the SMF, compelled its 
supporters to re-evaluate their positions thereby exposing them to the overtures of 
competing frames within the Shi’i community and expanding the space for the 
prospect of heterodox practice.   
 
                                                                                                                                           
2006: 28). Shaykh Harb (d. 1984) and Shaykh Moussawi (d. 1992), along with Imad Mugniyeh (d. 2008), are currently revered as 
Hizbullah’s ‘Three Leading Martyrs’.  
206
 Future Hizbullah leaders, such as Shaykh Tufayli, Shaykh Qassem, Shaykh Yazbek and Shaykh Kurani, may have harboured Hizb 
al-Dawa views and joined the organisation established by Sayyid Fadlallah but the latter was not a member of Hizb al-Dawa 
(Interview with Hani Abdullah, Beirut, 11 September 2012).   
207
 Muhammad Shamseddine was also educated in Najaf. On returning to Lebanon in 1969, he led prayers at the Dikwaneh mosque 
in east Beirut, opening the jam’iyyat al-khayriyyah al-thaqafiyya (‘the Cultural and Charity Association’) before moving to Shiyyah and 
becoming the vice president of the Higher Islamic Shi’i Council (Qassem, 2005: 15-16; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 34-35).  
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Fourthly, despite the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, its effect on 
galvanising the radical habiti of agents in Lebanon’s SMF was less about the 
innovation of Ayatollah Khomeini’s political thought and more about the implications 
its implementation would have on transferring capital to Lebanese Shi’i. Not only was 
the concept of wilayat al-faqih highly contested in Shi’ism, especially amongst 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Najaf peers such as Sayyid Fadlallah, Muhammad Baqir al-
Sadr, Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Shamseddine, but the prevalent structures in 
Iraq and Lebanon also appeared practically incompatible with its application. 
Conversely, regardless of the loose field homology between radical Shi’i habiti in Iran 
and Lebanon, the Islamic Revolution exemplified the metamorphosis from 
heterodoxy in the SMF to orthodoxy in the PF. The Lebanese system may have 
precluded corresponding opportunities but the legitimacy of Ayatollah’s symbolic 
capital accentuated the field homology between the orthodoxy of Iran’s PF, SMF and 
MSF and the heterodoxy of radical Shi’i habiti in Lebanon’s SMF. Considering the 
discourse of the Islamic Revolution resonated with radical Shi’i habiti in Lebanon’s 
SMF, particularly in establishing an Islamic state and resisting Israel, these agents 
could expect a significant transfer of cultural, economic and social capital to enhance 
their collective position, especially since most of Ayatollah’s inner circle had received 
military training at PLO camps in Lebanon208.              
 
After the Islamic Revolution, the radical habiti of Lebanon’s SMF strategically aligned 
the framing of their heterodox practice in coordination with the predominant 
orthodoxy in Iran. Despite harbouring reservations with the notion of wilayat al-faqih, 
both Sayyid Fadlallah and Sayyid Shamseddine embraced a position of being 
‘constitutionally non-committal’ by traversing the boundary between supporting the 
revolution while reassuring the non-clerical Shi’i leadership and non-Shi’i population 
in Lebanon (Mallat, 1988: 41)209. As early as 1978, a number of Shi’i in Lebanon had 
started establishing committees in solidarity with the Islamic Revolution (Chehabi, 
2006: 203). In 1979, an amalgamation of loosely affiliated groups converged to form 
the Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 
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  A pact signed on 24 June 1975 by Sayyid Fadlallah and Musa al-Sadr agreed that Amal and pro-Khomeini revolutionaries would 
be trained by the PLO (Sankari, 2005: 153). A reported 700 members of Hizb al-Dawa were trained in PLO camps (Sharara, 2006: 
109). While Ahmad Khomeini, the Ayatollah’s son, received training in Lebanon, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, a student and secretary for 
Ayatollah Khomeini who became Ambassador to Damascus, also graduated from a PLO camp in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997: 79; 
Alagha, 2006: 28; Hirst, 2010: 176-177). Mustapha Chamran, a close associate of al-Sadr who became Defence Minister under 
Ayatollah Khomeini, fought against Christian militias at Tal al-Za’atar in 1976 and trained Hizb al-Dawa and Amal fighters at PLO 
camps (Hirst, 2010: 176; Alagha, 2006: 33). Ahmad Montazeri, the son of Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, one of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s key advisors, not only received training at a PLO camp in Lebanon, but also became the supervisor of the Office of Islamic 
Liberation Movements in the Islamic Republic, which was operated by Mehdi Hashemi, who also received training in Lebanon (Hirst, 
2010: 176-177; Ranstorp, 1997: 80). Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Karrubi also allegedly received training in Lebanon 
(MER, 17 November, 1990: 7-8).         
209
 Sayyid Shamseddine believed in al-‘adadiyya, a system of governance based on pluralist democracy and consultation (Mallat, 
1988: 40). Sayyid Fadlallah believed that his concurrent support for the quietism of Ayatollah Khui and the Islamic Revolution of 
Ayatollah Khomeini were mutually complementary by following the former on religious issues and the latter on political matters 
(Sankari, 2005: 177-179).  
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13). Concurrently, while the Islamic Students’ Organisation of Nabatiyeh, which 
included Shaykh Harb and Shaykh Sa’id Ibrahim, championed radical change in 
Lebanon, the Tajammu’ al-Ulama al-Muslimeen (the ‘Association of Muslim Ulama’) 
was an inter-Muslim collection of clerics inspired by the Iranian Revolution in which 
Sayyid Fadlallah was joined by prominent Sunnis including Shaykh Maher Hammoud 
in Sidon and Shaykh Sa’id Sha’ban in Tripoli (Norton, 1987: 173)210. Furthermore, 
remnant Hizb al-Dawa members in Lebanon also openly promoted an Islamic 
Revolution211. By creating a dense network of pre-existing organisations akin to the 
premise of resource mobilisation theory, these groups provided the foundation of 
organised radical habiti with which to transfer into a cohesive social movement 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Morris, 1986).  
 
Nevertheless, while radical Shi’i habiti endeavoured to translate the symbolic capital 
of the Islamic Revolution for the purpose of attracting agents into the illusio of 
Lebanon’s SMF, rival factions emerged in Iran’s PF over the way in which its 
orthodoxy should be exported and mobilised in Lebanon. Initially the Freedom 
Movement of Iran, such as Mustapha Chamran and Ibrahim Yazdi, spearheaded a 
moderate approach to foreign policy212. Epitomised by their social and cultural capital 
with Musa al-Sadr, these individuals endorsed Amal’s charter, a document that 
favoured the institutional framework of Lebanon and rejected external influence 
(Deeb, 1988: 690-691)213. Conversely, the Islamic Republican Party, embodied by Ali 
Khamenei and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, not only argued that affiliation to both al-Sadr 
and Ayatollah Khomeini was mutually exclusive, but they also sought to cultivate an 
affinity with radical habiti in Lebanon’s SMF that propagated revolutionary change 
(Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 96; Chehabi, 2006: 206-207)214.   
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 Shaykh Sha’ban combined Jundullah with the Movement of Arab Lebanon to form the Islamic Unification Movement (Tawhid) in 
Tripoli. The Movement of Arab Lebanon was a pro-Iranian group of Palestinian students in Fatah and the Popular Resistance of Khalil 
‘Akkawi (Piscatori, 1989: 299). Citing Munir Shafiq, Tripoli demonstrates the transition of Lebanese Maoists to Islamism. Initially, the 
Maoist-leaning Student Squad, which became Katiba al-Jarmaq in 1977, fought alongside al-‘Asifa (‘the Storm’), Fatah’s military wing, 
against the South Lebanon Army before some of its members turned to Islamism. Anis Naqqash converted to Islam in Tehran while 
Ismat Murad and Khalil ‘Akkawi joined the Islamic Unification Movement. Three other leftist fighters, including Trad Hamadeh, Saud 
al-Mawla and Imad Mugniyeh, went on to join Hizbullah. The latter attended Sayyid Fadlallah’s lectures in the mid-1970s before 
joining Fatah’s elite Force 17. As a close associate of Anis Naqqash, it could be argued that he was affiliated with the Maoist Katiba 
al-Jarmaq and shifted to fighting under Islam around this time (Sing, 2011: 1-44; Blanford, 2011: 29).    
211
 These included, Shaykh Tufayli, Shaykh Qassem, Shaykh Yazbek, Shaykh Ismail al-Khaliq and Shaykh al-Kurani.  
212
 In the provisional government in Iran, Mustapha Chamran was Defence Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi was deputy premier, Sadeq 
Tabatab’i (Musa al-Sadr’s nephew) was a government spokesperson and Sadeq Qotbzadeh was foreign minister (Chehabi, 2006: 
204).     
213
 Chamran initially returned to Iran along with Amal members Husayn al-Husayni, Nabih Berri and Sayyid Shamseddine. Following 
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, 600 Amal members left Lebanon to fight for Iran. While a member of the provisional 
government, Chamran was elected to the 24-member council of Amal in April 1980 (Chehabi, 2006: 204-206; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 
102).   
214
 The Islamic Republican Party chastised Amal for following Ayatollah Khui instead of Ayatollah Khomeini after the death of 
Ayatollah Hakim in 1971. Its initial attempts to enlist Fatah to train the Revolutionary Guards and send them to south Lebanon were 
thwarted by the provisional government (Chehabi, 2006: 191; 206-207).  
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The escalating tensions between Iran and Iraq at the beginning of 1980, as well as 
the killing of prominent Shi’i clerics such as Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr under Saddam 
Husayn, presented the radical faction with the political opportunity to eclipse the 
moderates. By 1981, the Islamic Republican Party had discredited and marginalised 
the provisional government in the PF as liberals who were incapable of managing the 
impending crisis with Iraq (Chehabi, 2006: 209; Sankari, 2005: 185). Referring to 
themselves as dowlat-e-hezbollahi (the ‘State of the Party of God’), which invoked 
memories of Sayyid Hadi Ghaffari’s ‘hizbullahis’, the vigilante group of Islamist 
activists who intimidated secular liberals during the anti-Shah protests of 1978,  the 
hardliners gradually disposed of the moderates and monopolised control over Iran’s 
PF (Chehabi & Mneimneh, 2006: 31-35)215.  
 
Following the killing of Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the 
disbanding of Hizb al-Dawa and encouraged its affiliates in Lebanon to infiltrate 
Amal, which as of April 1980 was led by Nabih Berri, for the purpose of informally 
converting the dominant Shi’i secularist party into one amenable to the Islamic 
Revolution in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997: 30)216. By June 1981, in its attempt to enter 
Lebanon’s MSF and legitimise the credibility of its Resistance against Israel, the 
Iranian parliament authorised the Pasdaran forces of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards to be despatched to Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997: 33). After being refused 
access by Syria, the allegedly defunct Hizb al-Dawa, in solidarity with Iran’s war with 
Iraq and in retaliation for Iraq’s targeting of Shi’i clerics, claimed responsibility for a 
suicide attack on the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in December 1981. The vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device (VBIED) set a tactical precedent for future repertoires of 
practice in Lebanon’s MSF. This sequence of events signalled a shift by Iran’s PF to 
an interventionist approach that entailed the active transference of capital in order to 
provide the strategic resources, frames and opportunities for the mobilisation of 
radical Shi’i habiti and the promotion of heterodox practice in Lebanon.            
 
Inspecting pre-1982 trends within the Shi’i community through a traditional SMT lens, 
one can identify and illustrate three inter-related themes: firstly, the objective 
emergence of political opportunities contained within the civil war, the Israeli assaults 
on South Lebanon, the internal friction within Amal and the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic in Iran; secondly, the importance of pre-existing networks and 
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 Chamran died under suspicious circumstances on 21 June 1980; Sadeq Tabatab’i retired from politics; and Sadeq Qotbzadeh was 
killed for allegedly conspiring against Ayatollah Khomeini in 1982 (Chehabi, 2006: 208).  
216
 Sayyid Nasrallah and Shaykh Moussawi were already involved with Amal, as was Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid and Husayn al-
Moussawi. Shaykh Muhammad al-Khaliq (Ayatollah Montazeri’s representative in Lebanon at the Hawzat al-Rasul al-Akram in Beirut), 
Shaykh al-Tufayli, Shaykh al-Kurani and Shaykh Qassem began to join Amal at this time (Sankari, 2005: 172; Shapira, 1988: 127). 
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organisations, whether doctrinal, societal or familial, for mobilising an alternative Shi’i 
movement; and thirdly, the presence of prognostic and diagnostic Collection Action 
Frames within the Shi’i community promoted by either Sayyid Fadlallah, Musa Al-
Sadr, Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr or Ayatollah Khomeini. Nevertheless, by neglecting 
the relational dynamics reconciling the range of Shi’i dispositions, perceptions and 
positions within as well as between respective fields of practice, each infused with 
their own constitutive logics, generative rules and opportunity structures, this 
conceptual framework requires a combined Bourdieu-SMT perspective to effectively 
explain the intricate nuances of Shi’i mobilisation before 1982.  
 
Devoid of cohesive organisation or coherent direction, Shi’i collective action was not 
predicated on political opportunities. While the exacerbated deprivation of the Shi’i 
during the civil war enabled Amal to enhance its symbolic capital in the SMF, the 
prevailing logic of a resurgent MSF over a relinquished PF ensured that the 
perception of political opportunities in the latter would rely on the pursuit of capital in 
the former, a field in which the Shi’i were a relatively disadvantaged and defective 
actor. Furthermore, the lack of Iran’s pre-existing capital in Lebanon precluded the 
Islamic Republic from instantaneously transferring the legitimacy of its revolutionary 
orthodoxy to corresponding radical habiti embedded within the heterodoxy of 
Lebanon’s entrenched fields of practice. Consequently, opportunities for Shi’i 
mobilisation were initially confined to the SMF, a field of dispersed habiti, diverse 
frames and diversified action. As the SMF experienced reverberations from Lebanon, 
as well as Israel, Iraq and Iran, competing Shi’i agents endeavoured to alter their 
capital accordingly to attract habiti into the illusio of the SMF and entrench a collusio 
of dispositions. Rather than instil a Shi’i collusio towards orthodoxy, the Islamic 
Revolution served to actively create field homology between Iran’s PF and Lebanon’s 
SMF to galvanise the heterodox practice of radical habiti, a process which was 
facilitated by the discourse of Sayyid Fadlallah, Israeli military operations in South 
Lebanon, the return of Najaf-trained clerics from Iraq, internal crises within Amal and 
the prominence of the Islamic Republican Party in Iran. 
 
5.2 The Construction of Hizbullah’s Organisational Field (OF) 
 
Referring to 1982, Sayyid Nasrallah, the current Hizbullah Secretary General, 
stressed that originally ‘there was no plan…other than to resist the occupation’217. 
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 Cited in the May/August edition of Middle East Insight (1996: 38).   
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Implementing this aim required the execution of two objectives: to gather, train and 
organise recruits before despatching them to the occupied areas; and to disseminate 
this narrative among the people ‘first, in a bid to raise their morale, and second to 
instil in them a sense of animosity towards the enemy, coupled with a spirit of 
resistance’ (Jaber, 1997: 49-50). Contrary to the assumptions of scholars who 
attribute Hizbullah with a logic of coherence and consistency, this phased process of 
transforming radical habiti into a collusio of heterodox practice, or ‘communities of 
resistance’ (Crooke, 2009: 178), before forming a cohesive OF of harmonised 
mobilisation neither transpires in a vacuum nor represents an immediate act of 
metamorphosis but involves a mutually constituted relationship between the 
inscription of dispositions and the structures of Lebanon’s SMF218.  
 
While the symbolic capital accrued by the Islamic Republic had already facilitated the 
convergence of radical habiti of heterodox practice in Lebanon’s SMF, the attempted 
assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London on 3 June 1982 by the Abu Nidal 
Organisation and Israel’s subsequent invasion of Lebanon compelled the disparate 
Shi’i groups in Lebanon to coalesce219. Furthermore, when Nabih Berri, the leader of 
Amal, joined the Hay’at al-Inqath al-Watani (‘National Salvation Committee’) with 
President Elias Sarkis, which intended to negotiate with Israel, Husayn Moussawi, a 
military commander in Amal, and Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, Amal’s representative in 
Tehran, simultaneously announced their defection and the inauguration of 
Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islamiyya (‘Islamic Amal’)220. Concurrently, after a series of 
negotiations led by Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian Emissary in Damascus, which 
intensified after the kidnapping in Lebanon of Ahmad Motevasselian, the leader of 
the Revolutionary Guards, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad finally consented to the 
deployment of 1,500 Pasdaran fighters under Mohsen Rafiqdost in the Biqa’ Valley 
(Chehabi, 2006: 216; Ranstorp, 1997: 34-36)221.     
 
Under these circumstances, Shaykh Subhi Tufayli, one of the founders of Hizbullah, 
recounted that ‘the instructions of the leader – Imam Khomeini – were to create a 
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 These scholars include Deeb (1988), Kramer (1993), Ranstorp (1997), Hamzeh (2004) and Levitt (2013, 2014).  
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 In April 1982, during the Iranian Conference for Islamic and Third World Liberation, the Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon, 
including eminent Shi’i and Sunni clerics, was officially established (Sankari, 2005: 194-195). Sabri Khalil al-Banna, a.k.a. Abu Nidal, 
formed his organisation after splitting from Yasser Arafat’s PLO in 1974. Husayn Said, Nawwaf al-Rosan and Marwan al-Banna shot 
Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London on 3 June 1982 (Deeb, 2003: 70-71). For Sayyid Nasrallah, the subsequent Israeli 
invasion of South Lebanon was the catalyst for amalgamation of Shi’i groups (Al-‘Ahd, 21 November, 1997). Corroborating this 
statement, Ehud Barak, a former Israeli premier, admitted that ‘when we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah…it was our 
presence that created Hezbollah’ (Newsweek, 18 July, 2006).           
220
 Other figures who joined Islamic Amal were Sayyid Nasrallah, Husayn al-Khalil, Shaykh Qassem, Muhammad Ra’ad, Shaykh 
Moussawi (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 15). 
221
 Immediately after Israel invaded Lebanon, and to protect his monopoly over the situation in Lebanon, Syrian President Hafez al-
Assad rejected the entry of Iranian Revolutionary Guards into Lebanon. President al-Assad perhaps altered his position after 
negotiating a lucrative oil agreement with Iran and/or realising that Syria required assistance in balancing against the threat posed by 
Israel in Lebanon (Hirst, 2010: 185; Chehabi, 2006: 214; Ranstorp, 1997: 34-36).  
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movement that springs from pure Islamic fundamentals; a movement that shakes the 
current situation’ (Hamzeh, 2004: 24)222. Aside from instilling the values of Islam, the 
organisation would wage Resistance against Israel and follow the wilayat al-faqih 
(Qassem, 2005: 19). The primary obstacle confronting this aspiring movement was 
the geographical, social and economic cleavages of Lebanon’s SMF, which 
produced an overwhelming disparity in habiti and capital between the embryonic 
experiment and its more established counterparts. However, the hysteresis caused 
by the civil war, and the militarised dispositions it induced, precipitated a hiatus in the 
conventional structures of the SMF, thereby permitting an influx of capital from 
heterodox challengers intending to capitalise on debilitating conditions to enhance 
their position and negotiate a reconstituted orthodoxy. In this context, the Biqa’ Valley 
exemplified the conducive environment required for a collusio of radical habiti to 
initiate a cohesive OF that would foment a symbiotic synthesis between the Islamic 
Republic and its corresponding counterparts in Lebanon.  
 
Principally, the Biqa’ was a strategically advantageous and relatively concealed 
position inside the Syrian sphere of influence, detached from the battlegrounds of the 
civil war but geographically adjacent to Israel’s occupying forces. Furthermore, the 
area was historically Shi’i but not subject to the delineated leadership structures of 
South Lebanon (Winter, 2010: 175).The Shi’i of the Biqa’ were perceived as ‘wild and 
assertive clansmen’, governed by a fragmented network of tribal relationships that 
were open to alternative modes of mobilisation (Ajami, 1986: 127; Wege, 2012: 772). 
As summarised by Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, ‘their men are courageous and mostly 
armed…they do not submit to government authority…They have fought several 
times…and have won. They like the clergy’ (Chehabi, 2006: 216). This social 
composition not only provided Shi’i agents endowed with revolutionary dispositions 
and perceptions, but also supplied the aspiring movement with recruits experienced 
in local conflict223. Moreover, having received military training at PLO camps in the 
1970s, senior Iranian figures, such as Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Ahmad Montazeri and 
Mohsen Rafiqdost, utilised their pre-existing social capital with Shi’i figures in the 
area, including Shaykh Abbas Moussawi (Nabi Shayth), Husayn Moussawi 
(Ba’albeck), Shaykh Tufayli (Brittal), Shaykh Yazbek (Buday) and Shaykh Ibrahim al-
Amin al-Sayyid (Zahla), to enhance the cross-fertilisation of mobilisational principles 
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 Sayyid Fadlallah, Shaykh Yazbek, Shaykh Afif Nabulsi, Husayn Moussawi, Shaykh Kurani, Shaykh Harb and Shaykh Ibrahim al-
Amin al-Sayyid were also in attendance (Hamzeh, 2004: 24).  
223
 People were also recruited from camps near Ba’albeck, such as Wavel, Janta and Bani Sbat (MER, 7 November, 1987: 9).  
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and practices through the recognised legitimacy of personal and familial networks 
(Malthaner, 2011: 177)224.  
 
Whether displaying religious credentials from Najaf or practical experience from 
Lebanon, the Shi’i that congregated at the Ochak al-Shahada (‘Lovers of Martyrdom’) 
camp in Ba’albeck under the operational tutelage and organisational alignment of the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards shared a common affinity in terms of cultural, social 
and economic capital. Galvanised by the Islamic Revolution, emanating from 
impoverished Shi’i districts and incensed at the effects of the Israeli invasion, these 
Shi’i agents were motivated by a perception of Resistance that sought to reconstitute 
the orthodoxy of Shi’i mobilisation in Lebanon’s SMF225. Initially, since each agent 
was beholden to dispositions that had determined their position and practice prior to 
the Israeli invasion, this exhibition of collusio amongst radical habiti resembled a 
coalition of community-based social movements rather than a cogent organisation. 
Consequently, the groups coalescing in Ba’albeck included the Lebanese Federation 
of Muslim Students, Hizb al-Dawa, Islamic Amal and the Committee Supportive of 
the Islamic Revolution, which consisted of clerics from the Ulama of Muslim 
Scholars, the Ulama of the Biqa’ and the Ulama of Jabal ‘Amil. Additionally, a cadre 
of Shi’i operatives, having become seasoned agents in the MSF through their 
association with Leftist and PLO militias, may have also participated at Ba’albeck 
after Yasser Arafat’s forces were expelled from Lebanon226. 
 
Once assembled, the objective was to crystallise a collective habitus of ‘Islamic 
Resistance’ into a durable OF through a relational process of insemination and 
dissemination. This organisation, ‘Hizbullah’, or ‘the Party of God’, derived from two 
verses in the Qur’an, was an ‘umbrella movement’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 15) or a 
‘rudimentary constellation’ (Sankari, 2005: 198) expounding a unified frame but 
characterised by an amorphous constitution227. Sayyid Fadlallah (1985: 246-247) had 
previously cited the ‘Party of God’ as an ‘organic, generic body, whose fluid terms of 
action include all committed adherents of Islam in perpetual and multifaceted 
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 Ali Akbar Mohtashemi had personal relationships with Shaykh Tufayli, Shaykh Abbas Moussawi and Husayn Moussawi (Alagha, 
2006: 33). Shaykh Yazbek was Iranian President Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid had been 
Amal’s spokesperson in Tehran and Ayatollah Montazeri’s representative in Lebanon was Shaykh Muhammad al-Khaliq (Ranstorp, 
1997: 44-45).  
225
 Following the Israeli invasion, government aid to the South was halted and local commerce stunted as the agricultural market 
became flooded by Israeli produce (MER, 24 July, 1982: 15-17). Furthermore, while the invasion caused a mass exodus of Shi’i from 
their homes, between 1982 and 1985, Israel incarcerated approximately half of the remaining male population at Ansar, Khiyam and 
Atlit (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 301). Additionally, around 25% of those killed during the Sabra and Chatila massacre in 1982 were Shi’i 
(Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 11).  
226
 As discussed below, this group may have included IJO members such as Imad Mugniyeh, Abd al-Hadi Hamadi and Talal Hamiyeh.  
227
 ‘And whoever takes God and His Messenger and those who believe for friends – surely, the Party of God, they shall triumph’ 
(Qur’an, 5:56). ‘These are they into whose hearts He has impressed faith, and strengthened them with a Spirit from Himself, and He 
will cause them to enter Gardens wherein flow rivers… These are the Party of God. Now surely it is the Party of God who are the 
successful’ (Qur’an, 58:22). 
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confrontation with the forces of irreligion, corruption and oppression’. Unlike the 
subversive Hizb al-Dawa that embodied a ‘party of the ummah’, ‘Hizbullah’ signified 
‘the ummah of the Party’, a revision that shifted focus to the mobilisation of a public 
body of religiously pious adherents (Abu Khalil, 1991: 392; Sankari, 2005: 201). 
Considering that Ali Akbar Mohtashemi ‘wrote, produced and directed Hizbullah’, it is 
unsurprising that the movement mirrored the designation of the Islamic Republican 
Party in Iran (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 207). Reinforcing Shaykh Qassem’s 
assertion that ‘up until 1985, Hizbullah was not yet a single entity that could stand up 
and speak for itself’, Hizbullah was conceived as a boundless movement that 
exceeded the limits of a conventional party and whose component parts belied any 
semblance of organisational cohesion (Jaber, 1997: 62; Alagha, 2006: 34; Azani, 
2011: 59; Shanahan, 2005: 113)228.  
 
The priority of Hizbullah’s ta’bi’a (‘mobilisation’) strategy was to transform cultural 
and economic capital into social capital for the purpose of constructing a Resistance 
habitus instilled with heterodox dispositions and perceptions. Akin to the notions of 
al-moqawama al-mujtama (‘Resistance society’) or al-hala al-islamiyya (‘Islamic 
milieu’), the formation of this collusio of habiti in the SMF would be reproduced 
through institutions in which a wajib shari’ (‘religious obligation’) was perceived as al-
malafal thabit (‘a fixed and invariable dossier’) and where iltizam (‘commitment’) 
became ‘the norm for a majority of the community’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 112; Harb 
& Leenders, 2005: 192). Invoking the analogy of the ‘body social’, Hizbullah sought 
to replace labels of Mahrumin (‘disinherited’) or Mustad’afeen (‘disempowered’) with 
a holistic Resistance in which there exists a division of responsibilities between 
functions but no overall distinction in direction (Danawi, 2002: 52-55). According to 
Husayn Moussawi, ‘we [Hizbullah] are seeking to formulate an Islamic society which 
in the final analysis will produce an Islamic state. But this must not be interpreted to 
mean that our objective is to set up an Islamic state in Lebanon’ (MER, 3 December, 
1985: 10).  
 
By the end of 1982, as a nascent stakeholder in Lebanon’s SMF, Hizbullah remained 
deficient of recognisable capital and devoid of a centralised OF capable of managing 
resources as well as mediating between its Resistance habitus and the prevailing 
environment. As a precursor to establishing its own independent institutions, 
Hizbullah initially relied on incorporating its Resistance frames and practice within 
                                                 
228
  Shaykh al-Kurani, a Hizbullah leader formerly of Hizb al-Dawa explained that ‘the path of Hizballah is not that of an organization or 
party in the usual and conventional sense...Hizballah is an organization and an apparatus adapted to what is required for Islamic deed 
and for the masses of its members’ (Shapira, 1988: 124).   
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pre-existing mobilising structures in the SMF. Firstly, Hizbullah attempted to 
legitimise its cultural capital and acquire social capital through mosque networks. As 
the cohort in Ba’albeck attests, Hizbullah’s vanguard possessed significant cultural 
capital within religious networks in the SMF from South Lebanon (Shaykh Harb and 
Shaykh Afif Nabulsi), the Biqa’ (Shaykh Tufayli and Shaykh Yazbek) and Beirut 
(Shaykh Qassem and Shaykh al-Khaliq). Complementing this effort were Hizbullah-
aligned clerics with radical habiti, including Sayyid Fadlallah, Shaykh Sha’ban and 
Shaykh Hammoud. Through the customary Muslim practice of delivering sermons 
and interacting with attendees at mosques, Hizbullah not only created a formal space 
with which to replace the traditional disposition of Shi’i quietism with the revised 
perception of revolutionary activism via the Islamic Resistance, but this direct 
engagement with Shi’i agents also enabled Hizbullah to develop informal 
relationships of trust leading to the legitimate recognition and augmentation of the 
movement’s status within an increasingly beleaguered Shi’i community via familial 
networks, religious consultations and conflict resolution (Malthaner, 2011: 184; 
Hamzeh, 1997: 93-118). This grassroots access assisted Hizbullah in inducting and 
inculcating the mobilisation of radical habiti into the illusio of the SMF229. 
 
Secondly, Hizbullah entrenched its Resistance exegesis into the tabligh (‘curriculum’) 
of the hawzat system in Lebanon. Exclusive to Shi’ism and in existence for centuries 
particularly in Najaf and Qom, a hawza is a religious seminary in which students 
aspire to certified clerical authority230. By 1982, Hizbullah independently administered 
al-Imam al-Mutazar in Ba’albeck and al-Rasul al-Akram in Beirut231. In the 
reconfiguration of this pedagogic institution, Hizbullah clerics represented the new 
‘organic intellectual’, a young breed of Shi’i thinkers that related and appealed to an 
increasingly urbanised Shi’i base by emanating from outside the traditional ulama of 
Jabal ‘Amil as well as comprehending the importance of appropriating scientific 
knowledge for infusing radical dispositions and activating revolutionary change 
(Abisaab, 2006b: 232-233). Unlike Najaf and Qom, the religious intellectualism 
nurtured at the Hizbullah hawzat did not offer an eclectic tabligh of Shi’i thought but 
                                                 
229
 Reinforcing the importance of mosques in accumulating cultural and social capital, Shaykh Tarrad shifted allegiances to Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1981 and changed the name of his mosque in Beirut from the Ghubayri Mosque to the Imam al-Mahdi Mosque (Sharara, 
1996: 200-210). Also, on arriving in Ba’albeck, the ‘cultural unit’ of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards established the Ras al-Ayn 
Mosque as Hizbullah’s headquarters while the al-Zaher Mosque was transformed into a military barracks (MER, 19 March, 1983: 12). 
230
 There a four phases to becoming a Shi’i religious authority: muqaddimat (‘beginner’, 3-5 years); sutuh (‘surfaces’, 3-6 years); bahth 
al-kharij (‘outside research’); and ijtihad (‘interpretative reasoning’). The Shi’i hierarchy is then divided in ascending order from Thiqat 
al-Islam (‘Trust of Islam’) to Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (‘Proof of Islam and of Muslims’) then Ayatollah fi al-‘Alamin (‘Proof of Islam 
and of Muslim, the Sign of God in the World’). To become a marja, an Ayatollah must demonstrate al-adala (‘justice’), al-a’lamiyya 
(‘knowledge’) and al-hayat (‘life’) based on the number of their followers, the proximity of other maraji and the impact of their 
publications (Abisaab, 2006b: 244; Batatu, 1978: 193; Moussawi, 2011: 33-38).      
231
 Al-Imam Al-Mutazar was founded by Shaykh Abbas Moussawi before he was replaced by Shaykh Yazbek in 1984. Al-Rasul Al-
Akram was directed by Shaykh Sulayman Akhtari, an Iranian cleric, with the assistance of Shaykh al-Khaliq, a Hizbullah official. 
Hizbullah had established five more hawzat in Beirut, South Lebanon and the Biqa’ by the end of the 1980s (Abisaab, 2006b: 245-
252; Hamzeh, 1993: 327).    
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prospectively politicised its programme to advance the pre-scripted Hizbullah 
interpretation of Islamic Resistance (Abisaab, 2006b: 245, 252).    
 
Thirdly, Hizbullah usurped and reshaped the historical narrative of ritual Shi’i practice 
by demarcating space, promoting public displays of piety and expounding the virtues 
of ‘martyrological will’ or irada istishhadiyya that physically and socially differentiated 
observant Shi’i agents from their confessional counterparts in the SMF (Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2002: 128). Conforming to the conventional compartmentalisation of 
territoriality and spatiality in Lebanon, Hizbullah adorned its operational microcosm 
with symbolic imagery and iconography that verified its identity. In the first Hizbullah 
camps in Ba’albeck, the area was inundated with slogans, such as ‘Death to 
America’ and ‘Death to Amine Gemayel’, strategically juxtaposed with pictures of 
Ayatollah Khomeini (MER, 19 March, 1983: 11). These insignia acted to affirm, 
confirm and reaffirm each individual Shi’i habitus in relation to the collective collusio 
of radical habiti. Additionally, in a further expressive declaration of piety, Hizbullah 
males became identifiable by their beards whereas women began donning the 
chador, a traditionally full-bodied Shi’i garment worn in Iran (MER, 19 March, 1983: 
11).  
 
This intentional co-option and customisation of Shi’i mores is most evident when 
evaluating Hizbullah’s practice of Ashoura, the event commemorating the death of 
Imam Husayn at Karbala in 680AD. Rather than lamenting Ashoura as exemplifying 
the perpetual victimisation of the Shi’i, the Islamic Revolution sought to revise the 
framing and perception of Imam Husayn’s death into one of empowerment. 
Consequently, despite physical challenges and the prospect of death, the 
revolutionary Shi’i ‘is ready to fight for an Islamic cause. He is so powerful as to even 
change the course of the battle of Karbala with a positive outcome’ (Shaery-
Eisenlohr, 2008: 11)232. Therefore, Karbala was to be transformed from a ‘pertinent 
rite to a revolutionary one, from a chorus of lamentations to one of imprecations, from 
an act of submission to one of rebellion’ (Picard, 1993: 31). Similar to the 
urbanisation of the Shi’i in the 1960s and 1970s, ritual practice would not only 
connect the traditional past with the modern present, but it would also transcend 
individual isolation by cultivating ‘cultural consensus and communitarian cohesion’ 
towards motivating activism (Picard, 1993: 31; Deeb, 2006a: 163). The powerful 
impact of (re)appropriating Karbala manifested on 16 October 1983 when an Israeli 
                                                 
232
 This extract was allegedly recited by the Pasdaran in 1982 when they visited the Umayyad Mosque and the Zaynabiyya, the shrine 
outside Damascus honouring Imam Husayn’s sister, before travelling to Lebanon (Chehabi, 2006: 214).  
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convoy interrupted an Ashoura procession in Nabatiyeh233. By reframing Imam 
Husayn’s apotheosis as triumphant, while simultaneously constructing a direct 
correlation between his defiant rebellion against Caliph Yazid and Hizbullah’s 
Resistance against Israel, this incident, combined with the martyrdom of its fighters, 
especially Shaykh Harb on 16 February 1984, contributed to vindicating the 
legitimate authenticity of Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the SMF234.  
 
Nevertheless, the consistent transmission and management of this programme 
required the establishment of a cohesive OF to enshrine the principles of Hizbullah 
(doxa) while institutionalising and transferring the orthodoxy of its Resistance habitus 
to the structures of the SMF. The appellation ‘Hizbullah’ may have been in circulation 
since 1982, but the formalisation of Hizbullah’s OF cannot be detected until 1984. 
Referring to the congregation of Shi’i in Ba’albeck in mid-1982, Shaykh Tufayli 
compared Hizbullah’s creation to a ‘scuffle of camels…full of dust and noise’ (Hirst, 
2010: 183)235. Initially, Hizbullah was led by the ‘Committee of the Nine’, a coalition of 
three groups with positions divided equally amongst Shi’i clerics within Islamic Amal, 
the Ulama of the Biqa’ and the Islamic Committees (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 304; 
Qassem, 2005: 19-20)236. Subsequently, this assembly composed the ‘Manifesto of 
the Nine’, a document approved by Ayatollah Khomeini that stipulated the 
movement’s Islamic programme, its Resistance against Israel as the ‘ultimate 
confrontational priority’ and its recognition of wilayat al-faqih (Avon & 
Khatchadourian, 2012: 22; Blanford, 2011: 47). By October 1982 and exemplifying 
Iran’s influence in delineating the boundaries of this emerging OF, not only did 
Ayatollah Khomeini send his personal representative, Ayatollah Fazlollah Mahallati, 
to oversee a five-member ‘Council of Lebanon’ in implementing sharia law, but the 
military, cultural, economic and social departments of the Iranian Pasdaran were also 
duplicated in the organisational structures of the ‘Council for Lebanon’ (Chehabi, 
2006: 218; Ranstorp, 1997: 44-45; Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 25).  
 
The ‘Council of Lebanon’, which was convened for the first time in early 1982, was 
responsible for disseminating a coherent frame for mobilisation. As part of this 
process, Hizbullah began distributing its weekly journal, al-‘Ahd (‘the Covenant’), in 
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 Sayyid Shamseddine, an Amal-affiliated cleric, was outraged by the intrusion, calling for ‘civil resistance’ against Israel (MER, 23 
October, 1983: 7).   
234
 Ashoura interpretations were also a source of intra-Shi’i competition with Amal and Hizbullah hosting separate rallies from 1985 
following a sequence of physical and ideological clashes (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 134).    
235
 At this stage, Ahmad Kan’ani, an IRGC Commander, provided assistance to Shaykh Abbas Moussawi and Shaykh Tufayli 
(Ranstorp, 1997: 34-36).   
236
 Based on geographical location, social links and religious credentials, the researcher has speculated the members within this 
‘Council’ at the end of 1982. Shaykh Abbas Moussawi, Shaykh Tufayli and Shaykh Yazbek (Ulama of the Biqa’); Shaykh Ibrahim al-
Amin al-Sayyid, Shaykh Qassem and Shaykh Nasrallah (Islamic Amal); Shaykh Harb, Shaykh al-Khaliq and Shaykh Nabulsi (Islamic 
Committees).    
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1984 and gradually replaced the Iranian radio station (Voice of Revolution) with the 
Voice of Islam (1986) and the Voice of the Oppressed (1987) in Ba’albeck (MER, 19 
March, 1983: 12; MER, 31 October, 1987: 20)237. However, the PLO’s official 
withdrawal from West Beirut in 1982 and Amal’s seizure of the area in February 1984 
enabled Hizbullah with opportunities to expand the scale and scope of its 
programme. Capitalising on its social networks with Amal to shuttle a contingent of its 
leadership to Beirut, including Sayyid Nasrallah, the nascent Hizbullah OF became 
directly exposed to a demographic of Shi’is it had previously been unable to access, 
namely the urbanised Shi’i underclass of Beirut as well as radicalised Shi’i from the 
South who had been forced to migrate to the capital because of Israel’s occupation. 
 
On 16 February 1985, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid presented Hizbullah’s 
‘Open Letter’ to ‘the oppressed in Lebanon and the world’ in the southern district of 
Shiyyah (Alagha, 2011: 39)238. Despite contributing nominally to the Resistance in 
the South due to Hizbullah’s difficulty in geographically or socially accessing the 
hierarchised structures of Jabal ‘Amil, the announcement purposefully coincided with 
the anniversary of Shaykh Harb’s martyrdom and the retreat of Israel to the ‘security 
zone’ in order to firmly associate the inception of Hizbullah and the Israeli occupation 
within the perceptions of the Shi’i community239. Consequently, the ‘Open Letter’, 
which acted as Hizbullah’s ‘diagnostic frame’ in identifying Lebanon’s endemic 
problems and offering an alternative solution, labelled the U.S., the ‘Zionists’ and the 
Phalange Party as ‘enemies’, ‘oppressors’ and co-conspirators accused of 
concocting plots to subvert the true authority of the umma (Karagiannis, 2009). In 
contradistinction, Hizbullah’s Resistance was portrayed as a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic 
movement committed to freeing Lebanon by directly confronting these forces for the 
purpose of reconstituting the Lebanese system towards the Islamic governance 
espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih (Alagha, 2011: 39-55)240.     
 
The ‘Open Letter’ symbolised the arrival of Hizbullah’s OF into Lebanon. However, 
the prospect of a centralised field that declared to exude a synergised homology 
between the Biqa’, southern Beirut and the South but remained constructed and 
framed around the transference of cultural, economic and social capital from the 
                                                 
237
 Al-‘Ahd was soon followed by the publication of al-Bilad (‘the Country’), a monthly Hizbullah journal. Harik (1994: 44) and Hamzeh 
(1993: 327) provide alternative English translations for Hizbullah’s radio stations.    
238
 The full title of the ‘Open Letter’ was Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbullah ila Al-Mustad’afeen (Alagha, 2011: 39).   
239
 Beginning in January 1985, the first phase of Israel’s withdrawal involved relinquishing control over 500 square kilometres but 
retaining 2,300 square kilometres or 225 of Lebanese territory before evacuating from east of southern Lebanon to Hasbaya and then 
retreating to the international border by the end of the year (MER, 19 January, 1985: 7-8).   
240
 Following the ‘Open Letter’, Hizbullah supporters marched into Sidon tearing Lebanese flags, destroying pictures of Lebanese 
President and Phalange Party leader Amin Gemayel, smashing stores and supermarkets selling liquor and raising Iranian flags and 
portraits (MER, 23 February, 1985: 18).   
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Islamic Republic, questioned the operational independence of this emerging OF. 
While Hizbullah’s 12-member Consultative Council, which was inaugurated in 1986, 
represented the core nucleus of the movement’s leadership, Iran’s Higher Defence 
Council allegedly monitored its activities with Ayatollah Khomeini intervening in 
instances of internal contestation (MER, 22 March, 1986: 7-12)241. Additionally, 
Hizbullah’s OF established seven administrative committees that duplicated the 
Intellectual, Financial, Political, Information, Military, Social and Legal departments of 
Iran’s Pasdaran242. The Islamic Republic also provided its progeny in Lebanon with 
an annual package of approximately $140 million, a vital source of economic capital 
for generating further cultural and social capital (Harik, 1994: 41)243. 
 
In particular, the establishment of Hizbullah’s own integrated network of social 
welfare institutions within the mobilising structures of the SMF exemplify the 
influence of economic and cultural capital from Iran in enabling Hizbullah’s OF to not 
only perform its Islamic responsibility in empowering the Shi’i community, but also to 
inculcate and institutionalise an intrinsic and holistic Resistance habitus by producing 
‘a set of meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework’ 
(Harb & Leenders, 2005: 174). Prior to the inception of Hizbullah, the Imam Khomeini 
Support Committee provided the Shi’i community with basic sustenance 
requirements (Malthaner, 2011: 177; Blanford, 2011: 81)244. Subsequently, 
Mu’asasat al-Shahid (‘Martyrs Foundation’) and Jihad al-Bina (‘The Struggle for 
Reconstruction’) embodied two vanguard SMF organisations that while based on 
precedents in Iran became exclusively operated by Hizbullah’s OF. Conceived to 
complement and relieve the Islamic Resistance ‘by assisting the populace in their 
endurance of Israeli aggressions’, these services inscribed Hizbullah-infused 
discourses and dispositions into the routinised practice of the Shi’i community 
(Qassem, 2005: 86). Although centrally structured under Hizbullah’s OF, the 
concurrently organic development of a collusio of radical habiti in the SMF would 
incrementally and independently reproduce Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus. 
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 Iranian President Khamenei, Speaker Rafsanjani and IRGC Chief Mohsen Rafai apparently took personal care of Hizbullah (MER, 
22 March, 1986: 10). Further demonstrating this Iranian influence, it was agreed in January 1986 that any prospective Constitution for 
the Islamic Republic of Lebanon should be based on the Iranian Constitution (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 34). Moreover, in August 
1986, Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Hassan Akhtari, met with Hizbullah leaders in Lebanon to relay messages from Ayatollah 
Khomeini (Wege, 1994: 158).   
242
 Hizbullah’s flag even resembles the Pasdaran flag.   
243
 While exact figures are difficult to ascertain, estimates place Iranian contributions to Hizbullah at between $5 million and $10 
million a month (MER, 17 October, 1987: 10; Piscatori, 1989: 305; Hamzeh, 1993: 328). The confusion not only lies in the clandestine 
nature of Hizbullah’s finances, but also in the complexity of avenues by which funds were transferred to Lebanon. Whereas Iran may 
have provided military equipment directly, financial payments may have been deposited from the coffers of the Iranian state. However, 
this ‘official’ channel does not include indirect proceeds from Islamic charitable foundations in Iran, private donations, expatriate 
remittances or money accrued by Shi’i clerics via religious taxes, such as zakat or khums (Harik, 1994: 41).     
244
 The Imam Khomeini Support Committee had branches in Beirut, Tyre, Sidon and Ba’albeck (Blanford, 2011: 81).  
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The Martyrs Foundation was established the day after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
to offer care for the families of Resistance martyrs and wounded fighters, opening the 
Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ba’albeck and al-Rasul al-Azzam Hospital in south Beirut 
(Danawi, 2002: 29; MER, 19 March, 1983: 12; Harik, 1994: 32)245. By 1987, the 
Islamic Health Committee of the Foundation’s Health Institute was managing 17 
medical centres, allotting $225,000 a month to the families of martyrs, covering 100% 
of expenses for the families of injured fighters and offering 70% of free care for 
affected civilians (Azani, 2011: 72-73; MER, 22 March, 1986: 7-12). From its 
formation in 1982 until the official announcement of its Financial Committee in 1986, 
Hizbullah had assigned $90 million to support these health services (Harik, 1994: 32, 
41; 2006: 280; Hamzeh, 1993: 327)246. 
 
The Social Institute of the Foundation supplied educational support for the families of 
its fighters. Prior to Hizbullah, this service was performed though institutions such as 
the Islamic Religious Education Association, or jam’iyyat al-ta’lim al-dini al-islami 
(JTDI)247. Since a number of prominent Shi’i clerics within the JTDI became Hizbullah 
leaders in 1982, including Shaykh Qassem, the association was gradually 
incorporated into the structures of Hizbullah’s OF to manage the Party of God’s 
Mustapha schools that focused on ‘training Shi’ite religion teachers and publishing 
religion textbooks specifically designed for Shi’ites’ (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 
211; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 63). By 1987, the Social Institute offered scholarships 
and grants for thousands of children to attend Mustapha schools across Beirut, the 
Biqa’ and South Lebanon (Harik, 1994: 26; 2006: 272)248. Furthermore, while the 
Takaful Institute aimed to promote empowered self-sufficiency by providing financial 
assistance to families through interest free loans, philanthropic donors and vocational 
training, the Culture Institute sought to convey Hizbullah’s Resistance discourse and 
its institutional practice as synonymous with the Check and Balance Institute formed 
to cultivate durable relationships between Hizbullah volunteers and the Shi’i 
community through the monitoring of each beneficiary (Danawi, 2002: 32)249.  
 
Jihad al-Bina, which began operating in 1985 under the slogan ‘Together We Resist, 
Together We Rebuild’, was comprised of professional engineers and agricultural 
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 Dar al-Hawra, a Beirut-based Hizbullah hospital opened in 1986, treated around 59,244 women and 10,490 children in its first year 
(Hamzeh: 1993: 327).   
246
 ‘Al Ahd (1 August, 1989) and Hamzeh (1993: 329) provide a list of infirmaries (16), dental clinics (2) and civil defence centres (6) 
founded by Hizbullah in the Biqa’, southern Beirut and the South between 1983 and 1987.  
247
 The JTDI, which received an official licence from the Ministry of Interior in 1981, was established by a group of Shi’i clerics (Le 
Thomas, 2010) 
248
 The Mehdi Scouts, which was also established in the 1980s exposed students to a range of organised assemblies, rallies, marches 
and summer camps (Azani, 2011: 73)  
249
  In the Bir al-Abd district of Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Martyrs Foundation reportedly aided a total of 1,440 families, 2,204 
wounded or crippled soldiers and 1,727 orphans during the 1980s (MER, 24 November, 1990: 10-12; Harik, 1994: 26).    
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experts who were charged with reconstruction and development (Danawi, 2002: 71; 
Blanford, 2011: 81)250. Established on the five core principles of promoting Islam, 
cultivating popular Resistance in areas subject to Israeli occupation, facilitating 
partnerships with local communities, instilling self-reliance and sustainability as well 
as delivering quality projects, Jihad al-Bina performed a range of services from 
building and renovating homes, roads, administrative buildings and mosques in 
addition to installing irrigation systems, communication lines, digging wells, collecting 
garbage and delivering power generators (Bisaat, 2002: 9; MER, 24 November, 
1990: 10-12). Moreover, the organisation also provided agricultural training, technical 
advice and microfinance loans to rejuvenate the traditionally integral agricultural 
sector in Shi’i areas251.   
 
Hizbullah’s OF did not invent heterodox repertoires to promulgate heterodox practice 
but acknowledged the importance of developing a Resistance habitus by adopting 
and customising orthodox mobilising structures within the SMF. Consequently, the 
struggle of Hizbullah’s OF in transforming recognised capital into symbolic 
proportions through the provision of social services to the Shi’i community mirrored 
the orthodox practice of its confessional counterparts in the absence of etatism. Both 
confronted with and contributing to the debilitation of the state, sectarian elites 
established public programmes for moral and instrumental purposes. Not only did 
elites offer basic services to alleviate the troubles encountered by their communities, 
but in the process, this dependency also institutionalised confessional solidarity that 
conferred legitimacy on elite leadership. In 1976, the Christian Lebanese Front 
created semi-autonomous Popular Committees that managed social programmes. 
Invoking a phrase reminiscent of Hizbullah’s rhetoric in 1982, Bashir Gemayel 
referred to these services as representing ‘internal resistance’ in symbiosis with 
‘military resistance’ (MER, 25 May, 1984: 16-18)252. While Walid Jumblatt formed the 
Civil Administration of the Mountain to provide relief assistance to the Druze 
community, Nabi Berri appropriated funds from the Ministry of the South for the Shi’i 
in South Lebanon while all groups capitalised on technological advancements in 
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 Jihad al-Bina became registered as a charitable organisation in 1988 with headquarters located in the Haret Hurayk district of 
Beirut’s southern suburbs but possessing area offices nationwide (Harik, 1994: 27; Danawi, 2002: 71).   
251
 In 1988, Jihad al-Bina received 30 tractors from Iran, issued pamphlets on new agricultural materials and techniques while also 
providing qualified engineers for consultancies free of charge (Harik, 2006: 278).  
252
 By 1977, the 142 Popular Committees consisting of 1400 civil servants and serving around 25,000 people organised community 
assistance in the form of infrastructure maintenance, water delivery, garbage collection and financial assistance to the families of 
dead fighters (Harik, 1994: 16, 33).    
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communication to transmit their narratives and enhance mobilisation practice (Harik, 
1994: 3)253.  
 
Whereas the Maronites and Druze levied taxes on their communities and secured 
funds from foreign patrons, the most lucrative source of economic capital was the 
civil war as formerly legitimate actors within the PF benefited from their access to 
embattled state institutions to augment their private coffers (Harik, 1994: 39-40). 
Omitting the proceeds from a burgeoning informal economy, approximately 25% of 
state revenue was embezzled by militias with the latter’s seizure of Lebanon’s ports 
depriving the state treasury of 60% in annual customs (Traboulsi, 2007: 233, 237; 
MER, 17 October, 1987)254. While its dominant confessional counterparts revised 
orthodox practice to legitimise the transference of their capital by reconstituting a 
field homology that conflated the logics of the PF, MSF and SMF, Hizbullah’s OF, 
devoid of relationally recognisable capital on account of its heterodox position and 
practice within these fields, was unable to replicate ‘a mini-state with its own ports, 
airports, taxation and civil administration’ (Alagha, 2011: 22-23).   
 
Although rejecting the theoretical logic of orthodoxy in the SMF, Hizbullah’s OF tacitly 
accepted participating in the illusio of its practical logic. Restrained by its deficiency 
and inferiority of capital, Hizbullah’s OF would capitalise on the opportunity of 
horizontally transferred capital from Iran to sustain the inculcation of a heterodox 
Resistance habitus while subscribing to the orthodox structures of mobilisation in the 
SMF. By the time of its First Conclave on 11 November 1989, in which Shaykh 
Tufayli was declared Secretary General, Hizbullah’s OF was producing, managing 
and harmonising a collusio of radical habiti in the SMF through a range of social 
services across Shi’i communities in Beirut, the Biqa’ and South Lebanon255. While 
this incremental rather than exponential process may have been activated by the 
permeation of political opportunities, mobilising repertoires and collective action 
frames emanating from Iran, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective renders Hizbullah’s OF as 
more than a proxy of the Islamic republic in a Shi’i microcosm of Lebanon. 
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  The number of radio stations proliferated from one in 1975 to 47 in 1986, including the Voice of Lebanon (Phalange), the Voice of 
Free Lebanon (Lebanese Forces), the Voice of the Mountain (PSP) and the Voice of the Lebanese Resistance (Amal) (MER, 31 
October, 1987: 20).   
254
 Between 1986 and 1989, 140 cargo ships disappeared off the Lebanese coast. During the civil war, 40% of cultivated land was 
used for hashish that was worth $6 billion for those who controlled its trade. The LF, PSP and Amal co-opted all aspects of the state’s 
income-generation including import-export facilities, tourism, real estate, media and banks (Traboulsi, 2007: 234-237). Militias also 
administered Lebanon’s ports: Dbayhe (Chamoun); Selaata and Minyeh (Franjiyeh); Jiyeh, Sidon, Tyre and Khalde (Jumblatt); Ouzai 
(Amal); Beirut and Jounieh (LF) (MER, 11 October, 1986: 21).   
255
 Hizbullah founded the Islamic Charitable Al-Imdad Committee in 1987 and the al-Jarha Association for the wounded and disabled 
in 1989. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the findings of the investigation conducted by Hizbullah’s Security Mobilisation Department’ 
following the assassination attempt on Sayyid Fadlallah on 8 March 1985, Hizbullah had also created an independent body dedicated 
to research (MER, 8 March, 1986: 7-8; Qassem, 2005: 99-100; Sankari, 2005: 209).   
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Firstly, while the Islamic Republic represented the head of the global Islamic 
movement, Hizbullah’s OF ‘are the ones who shall have the final word…we alone 
take decisions in matters concerning the Lebanese scene and political matters 
bearing on us’ (Hizbullah official in MER, 20 April, 1991: 9). Subsequently, Iran 
provided the conceptual doxa and values of transferable capital required to constitute 
the logic and structures of Hizbullah’s OF. However, the practical application of 
orthodoxy in the OF as well as the strategic translation and distribution of capital 
allocated to articulate opportunities, organise mobilisational methods and devise 
action frames in localised contexts for the purpose of inculcating collective 
perceptions and dispositions towards heterodox practice was contingent upon extant 
radical agents that were inducted, inscribed and invested in the relationally 
entrenched dynamics of Lebanon. Consequently, whereas the hierarchical 
administration of Hizbullah’s OF appeared Iranian in design, the substance of its 
direction was Lebanese.   
 
Secondly, and by extension, the use of mosque networks, the reconfiguration of the 
hawzat curriculum, the appropriation of public Shi’i rituals and the cultivation of social 
service organisations demonstrate the intricacies of the Iran-Hizbullah relationship in 
praxis. Although the cultural and economic capital of the Islamic Republic could be 
transmitted to Hizbullah for establishing welfare institutions, Lebanon’s compositional 
complexity and conditional particularities precluded the horizontal transposition of 
Iran’s organically acquired symbolic capital. Therefore, the struggle for symbolic 
capital in Lebanon’s SMF depended upon the ability of Hizbullah individuals and 
institutions to independently adopt a transitional process of capital confirmation for 
mobilising prospective radical habiti into the illusio of the SMF by directly relating to 
their positions, dispositions and perceptions before consolidating a self-reproducing 
Resistance habitus. While the Islamic Republic provided the initial capital for 
Hizbullah to maintain its heterodox position by temporarily complying with the 
theoretical logic of orthodox practice in the SMF, it was Hizbullah’s OF that 
pragmatically manoeuvred, managed and developed its capital to sustain the 
practical logic of its heterodoxy in the SMF.         
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5.3 Identifying Hizbullah in the MSF: Islamic Jihad and Islamic Resistance  
 
The Military law of 1979 had attempted to modernise the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) by diluting confessional loyalties and boosting its strength to 50,000256. By 
1982, despite institutional reforms and injections of assistance from abroad, U.S. 
Colonel Arthur Fintel revealed that the LAF remained plagued by sectarianism with 
the under-resourced brigades existing ‘mostly on paper’ (MER, 23 April, 1983: 18)257. 
The chronic ineffectiveness of the LAF led to the influx of actors vying for the 
dominant orthodoxy in the MSF. As radical Shi’i activists congregated in Ba’albeck, 
the MSF was not only overshadowed by clashes between the PLO-aligned Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) and the Syrian-affiliated Amal, but Israel’s occupation of 
Beirut in September 1982 and the PLO’s withdrawal also complicated an increasingly 
convoluted MSF. Consequently, opportunities for the emerging Islamic Resistance in 
the MSF were inhibited by the presence of symmetrical actors, including Israel 
(80,000), Syria (30,000), UNIFIL (7,000) and the Multinational Forces (3,600), as well 
as asymmetrical forces, such as the South Lebanon Army (1,500) and the Lebanese 
National Resistance (Jabhat al-Muqawama al-Wataniya al-Lubnaniya)258.  
 
On 11 November 1982, Ahmad Kassir, in an action reminiscent of the attack on the 
Iraqi Embassy, killed 75 people after detonating his car at the Israeli headquarters in 
Tyre. This attack, which was purportedly orchestrated by Imad Mugniyeh, was 
followed by the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983, which killed 
52 people, and the joint attacks on 23 October 1983 targeting the U.S. Marine 
Barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 people, and a French military base, which killed 
80 people (Hamzeh, 2004: 83) 259. Moreover, on 12 December 1983, the ‘Kuwait 17’, 
which was linked to Hizb al-Dawa and included Mustapha Badr al-Din, a cousin and 
brother-in-law of Imad Mugniyeh, as well as Yousef Moussawi, a cousin of Islamic 
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 The Lebanese Constitution placed the LAF under the President but bestowed ‘highest military’ authority with the Minister of 
Defence. At the advent of civil war, President Franjiyeh and Minister of Defence Karami ‘pulled in opposite directions and the blanket 
tore’ leading to the disintegration of the LAF (Fuad Lahoud in MER, 26 June, 1982: 12-14). In 1976, whereas Lieutenant Ahmed al-
Khatib deserted the LAF to form the PLO-affiliated Arab Army, Colonel Antoine Barakat left the LAF to pledge allegiance to President 
Franjiyeh. Major Sa’ad Haddad also severed ties with the LAF to head the Israeli-endorsed SLA (El-Khazen, 2000: 332-333; MER, 26 
June, 1982: 13). The Military Law created the Higher Defence Council (HDC) was attached to the Ministry of Defence and above the 
Military Council, which consisted of the President and Prime Minister (MER, 29 January, 1983: 10).      
257
 The LAF was allocated 25% of Lebanon’s national budget and received financial assistance from France, Italy and the U.S. 
Nevertheless, 60% of its 2,200 officers were Christian while most of its soldiers were Shi’i from rural areas. By the early 1980s, the 
LAF consisted of 12 mostly sectarian composed brigades of approximately 25,000 men (MER, 29 January, 1983: 10; 19 March, 1983: 
18; 23 April, 1983: 18; 15 December, 1984: 12-13).  
258
 In its 21 September 1982 manifesto, the LNR is characterised as ‘a movement borne out of parties and political groups of disparate 
doctrines and orientations and different outlooks…but that are united on one particular point, which is the defence of occupied 
Lebanese land, to repel the dangers of occupation and end it’ (MER, 15 September, 1984: 8).  
259
 Imad Mugniyeh, the nephew of prominent Shi’i cleric Shaykh Jawad Mugniyeh, fought with the PLO in the early stages of the civil 
war and allegedly planned the operation in Tyre with the assistance of Abu Jihad, his former Palestinian commander (Seale, 1990: 
468; Blanford, 2011: 53). The 1983 attacks in Beirut were either in response to the involvement of France and the U.S. in the civil war 
or because of their support of Iraq against Iran (Hamzeh, 2004: 83).     
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Amal leader Husayn Moussawi, killed six people in six simultaneous attacks on U.S., 
French and Kuwaiti assets in the Gulf state (Jaber, 1997: 127-129). 
 
The Islamic Jihad Organisation (Munazzamat al-Jihad al-Islami) claimed 
responsibility for all of these attacks260. Citing their collective religious identity, 
ideological compatibility and overlapping social networks, some commentators argue 
that the IJO was a convenient pseudonym for the military wing of Hizbullah in which 
a cohesive collection of Shi’i cells, acting at the behest of Iran, committed terrorist 
atrocities against Western targets261. Substantiating this argument, these authors 
refer to the elevated positions of IJO operatives within the institutionalised hierarchy 
of Hizbullah’s military structures in the mid-1980s. Whereas the Islamic Resistance 
was deployed to the South in 1984 to combat Israel, the Special Security Apparatus 
(SSA), which was ostensibly an extension of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 
National Security (SAVAMA), was responsible for covert surveillance and intelligence 
(Hamzeh, 2004: 70)262. According to Ranstorp (1997: 68-70), Hizbullah’s SSA was 
comprised of prominent IJO members, such as Imad Mugniyeh, Abd al-Hadi Hamadi 
and Husayn al-Khalil263.  
 
Conversely, another cadre of scholars suggests that the IJO was an amorphous and 
semi-autonomous collection of individuals motivated by both instrumental as well as 
ideological factors264. While acknowledging the congruent affinity of Shi’i 
revolutionary activism between Iran, Hizbullah and the IJO, this cohort cites the IJO’s 
idiosyncratic behaviour as indicative of its unorganised and relatively independent 
composition. Moreover, the IJO’s alleged role in Hizbullah’s SSA must be relationally 
examined in the context of Hizbullah’s lack of organisational cohesion in the SMF 
and its limited operational presence in the MSF. As seasoned stakeholders in the 
MSF, structured with dispositions towards Shi’i revolutionary activism, the IJO 
represented a separate entity that could continue to pursue its own practice while 
concurrently facilitating and assimilating into Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance in the 
MSF. By applying a Bourdieu-SMT approach, this section intends to provide a 
conceptual and practical explanation for a perspective that reinforces an 
                                                 
260
 While the IJO initially claimed responsibility for the Tyre operation, Hizbullah took credit for the attack in a communique in August 
1985 and commemorates his death annually on Yom al-Shuhada as one of its 12 ‘self-sacrificing’ martyrs. Due to its organisational 
infancy, it is unlikely that Hizbullah perpetrated this assault but proclaimed its responsibility because the operation targeted Israel 
(Blanford, 2011: 64; Sankari, 2005: 207).     
261
 These commentators include Deeb (1988), Kramer (1993), Ranstorp (1997), Hamzeh (2004) and Levitt (2013, 2014).   
262
 Initially, the SSA was under the command of Shaykh Abbas Moussawi before Wafiq Safa took over in 1985. This unit was divided 
into three branches: the central security apparatus; the Amn al-Hizb (‘Party Security’); and the Amn al-Khariji (‘Overseas Security’) 
(Ranstorp, 1997: 68-69).   
263
 Security policy was supposedly filtered down from Iran’s National Security Council to the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements 
and then to the Pasdaran before being relayed to Hizbullah via Husayn al-Khalil, an IJO operative who managed security in the South 
for Islamic Amal’s Husayn Moussawi before joining Hizbullah’s SSA (Ranstorp, 1997: 85; Wege, 2012: 772).    
264
 This group of scholars includes Piscatori (1989), Norton (1997), Baer (2003), Jaber (1997) and Azani (2011).    
 194
interpretation whereby the Islamic Resistance and Islamic Jihad were convergent in 
identity and ideology but divergent in purpose and practice.      
 
In Part Six of its 1985 ‘Open Letter’ entitled ‘Our Main Enemies’, Hizbullah claims 
that ‘our populace has chastised them [the U.S., Israel and France] on 18 April and 
23 October 1983. The Islamic Resistance launched a war of attrition against the 
invading Israeli forces and was to destroy two leading military headquarters’. This 
extract poses an integral question regarding Hizbullah’s induction into Lebanon’s 
MSF, namely the deliberate distinction made between ‘our populace’ and the ‘Islamic 
Resistance’. Whereas IJO attacks on foreign targets in 1983 were attributed to ‘our 
populace’, Hizbullah appeared to claim credit for the suicide attacks against Israel by 
Ali Husayn Safieddine on 13 April 1984, which occurred after the assassination of 
Shaykh Ragheb Harb on 14 February 1984, and by Hassan Kassir on 7 February 
1985, which followed the assassination of Shaykh Abdullatif al-Amin on 15 
November 1984.     
 
Supporting this division, Hizbullah, which consistently expressed pride in its 
martyrdom operations, condoned but never admitted involvement with IJO activities 
(Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 95-96)265. While Shaykh Tufayli and Shaykh Qassem 
revealed that the IJO emanated from the same ‘Islamic Current’ (al-tayyar al-islami), 
they denied any formal association (Blanford, 2011: 77; Jaber, 1997: 142; Hamzeh, 
2004: 77). Similarly, although confirming the existence of the IJO and its operations, 
Sayyid Nasrallah asserted that ‘it was independent from the party. It is absolutely 
incorrect that the Islamic Jihad was a cover name for Hizballah’ (Al-Wasat, 3 March, 
1996). However, since Hizbullah was predicated on an Iranian-infused logic of 
Islamic Resistance, the core assumption is that the IJO, which was also comprised of 
radical Lebanese Shi’i aligned to the Islamic Republic, represented the operational 
arm of the Party of God in the MSF during the early years of its emergence. 
Therefore, the complex composition and association of these Shi’i agents, such as 
Hizbullah, the IJO and Islamic Amal, strategically aligned in identity yet diametrically 
separated in practice, can be illustrated by examining their underlying purpose and 
uneven development in the MSF in juxtaposition with Iranian interests.   
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 Hizbullah displays biographies, videos and commemorations of its 12 ‘self-sacrificing martyrs’ on its Al-Manar and Al-Moqawama 
websites. In 1985, Husayn Moussawi stated that ‘we know nothing of Islamic Jihad…it does not exist’ (MER, 15 June, 1985: 16). 
Additionally, neither Hizbullah nor Sayyid Fadlallah condoned the policy of kidnapping foreigners on political, moral and religious 
grounds (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 97; MER, 21 September, 1985: 7-8).  
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Contrary to the assertion that his movement and Hizbullah were synonymous, 
Husayn Moussawi explained in 1983 that ‘the Islamic revolution is the source of all 
power and theologian rulings, which are extended through the clergymen of 
Hizbullah, the tributary, and carried out by members in Islamic Amal, the 
instruments’266. While Hizbullah represented a nucleus of clerics charged with 
transferring capital from Iran to cultivate a Resistance habitus within Lebanon’s SMF, 
these figures neither possessed the experience nor familiarity with the logic of the 
MSF. Therefore, the non-clerical elements of ‘Islamic Amal’, mostly derived from the 
security branches of Amal in the MSF, not only provided Hizbullah with an interim 
body of fighters to conduct operations on its behalf, but also assisted in training 
prospective recruits for the Islamic Resistance. Whereas Hizbullah’s development of 
an inscribed Resistance habitus in the MSF was a meticulous process, and with 
Islamic Amal equally ill-equipped to fulfil Iran’s immediate interests in the MSF, the 
Islamic Republic required a temporary and flexible alternative.  
 
Following the eruption of Iran-Iraq hostilities, Lebanon signified a way for Iran to 
retaliate against and leverage the U.S. and France for their tacit support of Saddam 
Husayn. In 1982, two Pasdaran officers, Mehdi Nezhad and Hossein Mosleh, were 
despatched to the Biqa’ to form the equivalent of Fatah’s Black September from 
remnant Lebanese Shi’i fighters who were disbanded after the withdrawal of the PLO 
(Baer, 2003: 883, 889). This IJO unit of professional Shi’i combatants, endowed with 
extensive social and cultural capital from both the PLO as well as Hizb al-Dawa, 
would act as a rapid response conduit for executing Iran’s agenda in the MSF in the 
absence of a more permanent and organised presence267. Subsequently, rephrasing 
Deeb’s (1986: 19) analogy, Hizbullah and the IJO were gravitationally part of Iran’s 
solar system but traced distinct, yet intersecting, orbits. Although orchestrated by 
Iran, these two components were neither beholden to the Islamic Republic nor were 
they organisationally mature enough to be conjoined in coordination. This is perhaps 
why the IJO, ‘the hunting dogs of Iran’, were supplied with diplomatic passports not 
offered to Hizbullah (Jaber, 1997: 117; Hirst, 2010: 226)268. The operational 
distinction in the MSF is evident when comparing the heterodox practice of the IJO 
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  Similarly, Hizbullah was described as ‘the overall title of groups of Shiite clerics and theologians who provide religious guidance for 
activists and operatives engaged in any kind of action, violent or political, for the promotion of the Islamic Revolution’ (MER, 24 
December, 1983: 14). Islamic Amal provided the ‘logistics and operational center for the terrorist acts perpetrated by the first units of 
Hizbullah’ (Shapira, 1988: 125; Piscatori, 1989: 302; Wege, 1994: 154). 
267
 Islamic Jihad was the name of a journal and radio station in Tehran associated with Hizb al-Dawa (MER, December 24, 1983: 12).   
268
 Jaber (1997: 117) refers to Imad Mugniyeh, the Hamiyehs, Moussawis, Aqeels, Shehadehs and Ezzedeens.    
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during the hostage crisis alongside the Islamic Resistance’s struggle for orthodoxy 
against the LNR and Amal269.  
 
As evidenced by the retaliatory seizure of AUB President David Dodge on 19 July 
1982 following the capture of four Iranians by the Lebanese Forces, as well as the 
series of abductions from February 1984 until January 1985 aimed at liberating the 
‘Kuwait 17’, the IJO initially employed kidnapping as a reactive strategy270. Since this 
approach was a relatively low-risk, practically convenient and financially rewarding 
method for leveraging more dominant actors, this heterodox practice became 
recognised as an effective and proactive tactic in the MSF with a plethora of groups 
resorting to kidnapping as a means of achieving personal and ideological 
objectives271. Consequently, the IJO was one of a variety of loose ‘organisations’ in 
the MSF involved in the business of hostage taking. While elements within this 
emerging trend, such as Ahmad Shouker, appeared varied in their motivations and 
allegiances, IJO demands remained mostly consistent in mirroring the interests of the 
Islamic Republic by compelling France to cease its support of Iraq and enticing the 
U.S. to exchange arms for hostages272.  
 
Nevertheless, the bombings of 1983, the killing of Malcolm Kerr (January, 1984), the 
murder of William Buckley (June, 1985) and the hijacking of three airplanes (1985-
1988) not only demonstrated the levels of violence inflicted by the IJO, but also 
revealed the detached dispositions of a semi-autonomous unit directed by an Iranian-
aligned strategy as well as guided by emotively-infused personal vendettas273. 
Incidentally, IJO members were either related by familial ties, their former affiliations 
with the PLO or their links to ‘Ayn al-Dilbah in Beirut’s southern suburbs (Baer, 
2003)274. This collusio of radical habiti, conceived in the SMF but consolidated in the 
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 The hostage crisis, which resulted in the abduction of 87 Western citizens, started with the kidnapping of David Dodge, the 
President of AUB, on 19 July 1982, and concluded on 17 June 1992 with the release of Thomas Kemptner and Heinrich Strubig, two 
German relief workers (Hirst, 2010: 227).  
270
 These included Frank Regier (February 1984), Christian Joubert (February 1984), Jeremy Levin (March 1984), William Buckley 
(March 1984), Benjamin Weir (May 1984) and Laurence Martin Jenco (January 1985) (Baer, 2003: 333). 
271
 Examples include the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims, the 
Organisation of the Oppressed on the Earth, the Believers Resistance Front, the Holy Warriors for Freedom, the Organisation for the 
Defence of Free People (Jaber, 1997: 120-125; Baer, 2003: 300-340; Hirst, 2010: 225-230).   
272
 Despite being a Shi’i and a member of the Organisation of the Oppressed, Ahmad Shouker acted as a freelancer, kidnapping Peter 
Kilburn, Leigh Douglas, Philip Padfield and Alec Collett before selling them to pro-Libyan groups who killed the hostages in retribution 
for the U.S. raid from Britain on Libya in April 1986 (Jaber, 1997: 121. The IJO captured French nationals, including Jean-Paul 
Kaufmann and Michel Seurat (May, 1985) as well as Marcel Coudry and a four-man French television crew (March, 1986), to prevent 
France pursuing arms deals with Iraq while pressuring the country to agree to a $1billion loan to Iran (Hirst, 2010: 227-229). Benjamin 
Weir (September, 1985), Laurence Jenco (July, 1986) and David Jacobson (November, 1986) were allegedly released as part of the 
Iran-Contra affair (Picco, 1999: 101-102).  
273
 The IJO were responsible for hijacking TWA 847 (June, 1985), Iraqi Airways 163 (December, 1986) and Kuwait Airways 422 (April, 
1988). The group has also been accused of murdering Michel Seurat (5 March 1986) and Colonel William Higgins (6 July 1990). 
Whereas the latter is thought to have died of hepatitis while in captivity, Colonel Higgins was reportedly taken by the Believers 
Resistance Front with the IJO unusually not claimed credit for the kidnapping (Hirst, 2010: 225-230).    
274
 The IJO ‘Ayn al-Dilbah familial connection is evident throughout the hostage crisis era. Ri’bal Jallul, one of the hijackers of Iraqi 
Airways 163 was the younger brother of Jihad Jallul, a resident of ‘Ayn al-Dilbah with connections to Abd al-Hadi Hamadi. 
Furthermore, the Islamic Liberation Organisation, a group formed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Shaykh Sha’ban in July 
1985, kidnapped four Soviets later that year to stop Syria’s offensive on Tripoli. Subsequently, a Shi’i named Khudur Salameh, later 
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MSF was a bond of inscribed identity and solidarity that transcended the 
transference of capital from Iran. This camaraderie may illustrate the cause for the 
IJO’s erratic behaviour and the discernible discrepancies during the hostage crisis in 
reconciling Iranian interests with personal agendas.      
 
Firstly, whereas the ‘Kuwait 17’ were not a strategic priority for Iran, the IJO’s 
exhaustive efforts to secure their release may be explained by the fact that Mustapha 
Badr al-Din was both the brother-in-law and accomplice of Imad Mugniyeh. 
Secondly, Anis Naqqash, who was arrested for attempting to assassinate Chapur 
Bakhtiar, the former Iranian prime minister, was Mugniyeh’s mentor in Katiba al-
Jarmaq, the Maoist militia that fought alongside the PLO275. Thirdly, the decision to 
detain Terry Anderson for over six years (18 March, 1985 – 4 December, 1991) may 
be connected to the assassination attempt on Sayyid Fadlallah on 8 March 1985, an 
attack that killed Jihad Mugniyeh, the cleric’s bodyguard and Imad’s brother. 
Fourthly, the incessant obstinacy of Abd al-Hadi Hamadi in releasing hostages may 
be related to his insistence on freeing his brothers, Muhammad Ali and Abbas Ali, 
both of whom had been arrested in Germany276. Lastly, the demand to release 
Lebanese Shi’i prisoners from Israeli prisons was more likely an appeal driven by 
personal networks than a calculated directive from Iran.  
 
Speaking one year since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War and two months after 
the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the newly elected Iranian 
President, admitted that ‘we have had no relations for some time with those holding 
the hostages. They are not traditional Hizbollah’ (Picco, 1999: 113). While the 
kidnappers were Shi’i, endowed with the shared spiritual and political beliefs of the 
Islamic Republic, they were also rogue Lebanese actors adamant not to ‘give up 
something in exchange for nothing’ (Chehabi, 2006: 291; Picco, 1999: 165). 
Therefore, when reviewing the relationship between Iran’s PF and the IJO in 
Lebanon’s MSF, the advantages of access and flexibility that attracted the Islamic 
Republic to the IJO’s composition was counterbalanced by the disadvantages of a 
semi-autonomous body subjected neither to the control nor the co-option exerted 
over a structured organisation. As Iran shifted from revolutionary confrontation with 
the West to pragmatic accommodation, especially by attempting to amend Paragraph 
                                                                                                                                           
revealed as Ali Dib, was arrested. Ali Dib had not only served Fatah in ‘Ayn al-Dilbah in 1975, but he was also linked to the hijacking 
of Kuwait Airways 422. Moreover, Imad Mugniyeh negotiated the release of the Soviets with Yasser Arafat (Baer, 2003: 366-370, 405-
406; MER, 2 November, 1985: 11-12).  
275
 Naqqash, who was eventually pardoned by French President Francois Mitterrand, also maintained personal ties with Ahmad 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini’s son, and Mohsen Rafiqdost, the head of the Pasdaran.  
276
 Muhammad Ali was arrested on 13 January 1987 for his role in hijacking TWA flight 847 whereas Abbas Ali was detained shortly 
afterwards for his role in kidnapping Rudolf Cordes and Alfred Schmidt (Baer, 2003: 405-406).   
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6 of UNSC Resolution 598 in attributing blame for the Iran-Iraq War to its 
adversaries, Iran’s PF initiated a relational realignment of its field homology with 
Lebanon’s MSF to reflect its perception of capital within a revised FIP. In this 
recalculation, the IJO’s inscribed disposition of heterodoxy was rendered irrelevant in 
a post-civil war epoch of reconstituted orthodoxy.  
 
Conversely, the principal priority for Hizbullah in 1982 was to institutionalise a 
collusio of Resistance habiti through a cohesive OF before despatching military units 
in the MSF. In the interim, as demonstrated with the seizure of the Shaykh Abdullah 
barracks in 1983, Islamic Amal acted as the conduit for Hizbullah’s interests in the 
MSF277. Therefore, the official entrance of Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance (al-
moqawama al-islamiyya) into Lebanon’s MSF as a ‘unified organisation’ occurred in 
mid-1984 (Chehabi, 2006: 225). On 13 April 1984, the Islamic Resistance had 
announced its first suicide operation. Furthermore, in an effort to boost its limited 
social capital in the MSF, the Islamic Resistance began coordinating with the 
predominantly leftist LNR in its attacks against Israel (MER, 15 September, 1984: 
10)278. By the end of 1984, the Iranian Pasdaran had established six Islamic 
Resistance military centres in the Biqa’. Although Hizbullah’s 1985 Open Letter 
embellished its operational impact, the Islamic Resistance remained eclipsed by the 
LNR in the MSF with the coalition claiming responsibility for 1,219 attacks on Israeli 
and SLA positions between 20 September 1982 and 16 February 1985 (MER, 23 
February, 1985: 9). Moreover, of the 24 suicide attacks in 1985, the Islamic 
Resistance had only orchestrated two of them279. During its first year of combat, the 
Islamic Resistance, despite erroneously claiming credit for 90% of operations against 
Israel, had lost 156 fighters with its tactics characterised as militarily reckless, ill-
disciplined and displaying limited strategic nous (Malthaner, 2011: 224)280. 
 
In order to address its operational deficiencies while concurrently competing with the 
effectiveness of the LNR in the MSF, Hizbullah’s OF decentralised military command 
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 Islamic Amal’s Husayn Moussawi allegedly masterminded the attack on the Shaykh Abdullah barracks (MER, 19 March, 1983: 11-
12). The Shi’i leader claimed that by December 1983, 8/10 attacks on Israel in the South were conducted by Islamic Amal (MER, 3 
December, 1983: 10). Additionally, the Fajr Brigades, an Iranian unit affiliated to the Revolutionary Guards, had begun fighting with 
the LNR against Israel by this time (MER, 17 December, 1983: 18). The IJO purportedly held hostages at the Shaykh Abdullah 
barracks. While sharing a common identity and regional patron, it is likely that the IJO were based in the same area as Hizbullah 
without being organisationally linked.  
278
 The formation of the LNR was declared on 16 September 1982 by the Lebanese Communist Party and the Organisation for 
Communist Action in Lebanon (Barda, 2004). By January 1983, the LNR claimed responsibility for 41 operations and the death of 282 
Israeli soldiers (MER, 15 January, 1983: 6). Amal, a member of the LNR and which had seized considerable territory in West Beirut in 
February 1984 after the defection of Colonel Lofti Jaber from the LAF with his mostly Shi’i brigade, probably acted as a key 
intermediary in linking the Islamic Resistance with other militia groups (MER, 3 March, 1984: 8).  
279
 Hassan Kassir on 5 February 1985 and Amer Kalakesh on 12 March 1985. The SSNP was responsible for 5, the Ba’ath Party for 5 
and the Nasserites for 3 (Malthaner, 2011: 205).  
280
 Comments relayed during an interview with Timur Goksel in Beirut, 9 May 2012. Hamzeh (1993: 322) states that the Islamic 
Resistance was responsible for the majority of attacks against Israel between 1984 and 1985. Considering its geographical scope and 
organisational immaturity compared with the LNR, this is likely an attempt to augment the stature of the Islamic Resistance. 
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to its geographical enclaves in the Biqa’, Beirut and the South. By mid-1985, the 
intricate two-phase, two-year process for entrenching dispositions of takalif al-shari 
(‘loyalty’) amongst new recruits through ta’bi’a (‘mobilisation’) and intizam 
(‘discipline’), as well as the heterodox practices of the Islamic Resistance, were 
managed by the centralised structures of Hizbullah’s OF (Deeb, 1988: 696-697)281. 
However, recognising the need for operational flexibility and efficiency, area 
commanders in the Islamic Resistance were extended responsibility in planning and 
executing military tactics (Jaber, 1997: 38). In the South, the area was divided into 
four administrative spheres (Iqlim al-Touffah, Nabatiyeh, Tibnine and Tyre) then 
subdivided into sectors (qita’at) of around 12 villages with groups (majmuat) 
operating on the local level (Blanford, 2011: 80; Hamzeh, 2004: 71).   
 
Regardless of the operational restructuring, the challenges for the Islamic Resistance 
in the South oscillated around its inability to replicate the compatibility of its MSF 
Resistance habitus in the Biqa’ and Beirut with its manifestation in the South, an 
integral component in legitimising Hizbullah’s confrontation with Israel. Whereas 
Hizbullah’s preferred mobilisational practice of ‘utilitarian exchange’ between 
traditional loyalty and contemporaneous Resistance through semi-autonomous 
networks generated traction in Beirut and the Biqa’, the embedded social structures 
of the South prioritised the collective solidarity of Shi’i individuals against Israel over 
the imposed integrity of the Islamic Resistance (Malthaner, 2011: 198). Considering 
Amal’s consolidated influence and privileged position, Shi’i from the South 
contributed disproportionately fewer martyrs to the Islamic Resistance between 1983 
and 1985 (Malthaner, 2011: 197). However, the War of the Camps (1985-1988), 
which polarised the orthodoxy of the MSF between pro-Syrian and pro-Palestinian 
actors, combined with the internecine battle between Hizbullah and Amal (1988-
1990), presented the Islamic Resistance with opportunities to capitalise on LNR 
disintegration and subvert Amal’s dominance amongst the Shi’i community in the 
South.  
 
Firstly, with Syria intending to monopolise the MSF by curbing resurgent PLO activity 
in the camps of south Beirut, President Hafez al-Assad mobilised Amal to neutralise 
the perceived Palestinian threat. Conversely, Amal’s LNR allies, such as the PSP 
and LCP, who had assisted the Shi’i movement in dismantling the pro-Palestinian 
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 The first phase focused on religious aspects of Hizbullah’s Resistance while the second involved practical military training. If a 
recruit received a recommendation from a Hizbullah cleric, they would be exempt from the first phase (Hamzeh, 2004: 76).    
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Mouribitoun in west Beirut in 1984, opposed the crackdown on the PLO282. 
Consequently, Nabih Berri’s adherence to Syria’s agenda in the PF, his 
abandonment of the Palestinian cause in the SMF and his preference for security 
over resistance in the MSF not only contributed to the deterioration of the LNR, but 
also exposed recurring contradictions within Amal’s OF. Comparatively, by rejecting 
the logic of the PF, remaining supportive of the Palestinians in the SMF and 
prioritising Resistance over internal disputes in the MSF, Hizbullah’s OF projected 
the ideological coherence and operational consistency that led many of Amal’s 
members into becoming ‘influenced by the Iranian model of political activism’ 
(Shanahan, 2005: 112). Most notably, Mustapha Dirani, the head of Amal’s Security 
in the South, defected to Hizbullah in 1985 and formed the Believers Resistance 
Front (Azani, 2011: 64)283. Furthermore, Hassan Hashim, Amal’s Executive 
Chairman, instigated an uprising against the movement in 1987 while Mahmoud al-
Faqih and Daoud Daoud, two prominent figures in Amal’s southern command, were 
also relieved of duty (MER, 4 April, 1987: 7-10)284. 
 
Moreover, Hizbullah profited from a campaign targeting prominent leaders of the 
LCP, a core component of the LNR. In the weeks following the assassination of 
Husayn Mroue on 17 February 1987, nine LCP leaders were killed and 17 kidnapped 
(MER, 14 March, 1987: 13-14)285. Since the LCP posed a significant threat to 
Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus within the Shi’i community both in its collective action 
frame, as the non-sectarian champions of liberating the oppressed from Western 
capitalism, and in practice, as the vanguard of the anti-Zionist Resistance in 
Lebanon, leftist figures blamed the Hizbullah for orchestrating these attacks286. 
Despite these accusations, intra-LNR fragmentation increased Hizbullah’s popularity 
as the Islamic Resistance recorded 283 attacks against Israeli positions in 1987 
alone (Malthaner, 2011: 92). Furthermore, contrary to earlier figures, 75% of the 357 
Hizbullah fighters who died between 1986 and 1988 were from the South (Malthaner, 
2011: 207-214). Nevertheless, the rising stature of the Islamic Resistance caused 
Syria to reset the balance of actors in Lebanon’s MSF. As 7,000 Syrian soldiers 
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 Syria’s Lebanese allies in this campaign consisted of the anti-PLO Palestinian National Salvation Front, which included the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Saiqa, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, the Palestine Liberation Army 
and Fatah al-Intifada. This coalition also comprised of LAF General Michel Aoun and the SSNP (Deeb, 2003: 129-130).    
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 The Believers Resistance Front was responsible for the kidnapping of Israeli pilot Ron Arad on 16 October 1986 (Jaber, 1997: 29).  
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 Hassan Hashim was subsequently expelled from Amal along with his co-conspirators on 6 March 1987. Aql Hamiyya, Amal’s chief 
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 Other assassinated LCP leaders included Ahmed al-Ayoubi, Mahdi ‘Amil, Suheil Taweli, Khalil Naaous, Michel Wakeed, Nour 
Tawqan (Barda, 2004).   
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March, 1987: 13-14). During interviews conducted by the author, two Lebanese academics associated with the LCP claimed that 
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deploying to Beirut to prevent Amal’s capitulation, on 24 February 1987, 23 members 
of the Islamic Resistance were killed by Syrian forces in Basta287.       
 
Secondly, the eruption of Hizbullah-Amal hostilities in 1988 also acted to enhance 
the capital of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF. Traditionally, while Hizbullah and 
Amal tacitly observed cordial relations to prevent the destructive ramifications of 
intra-Shi’i sedition (fitna), Iran and Syria mediated this arrangement to preserve their 
political interests. However, the abduction on 17 February 1988 of Colonel William 
Higgins, a U.S. Military Observer for UNIFIL, acted as the catalyst igniting Hizbullah-
Amal tensions288. Since Colonel Higgins was under his protection in the South, Nabih 
Berri accused Hizbullah of attempting to undermine Amal and ordered his 
commanders to expel 1,000 Hizbullahis from the South or face dismissal (MER, 23 
April, 1988: 14)289. As Abd al-Majid Saleh, Amal’s Chief Political Officer, warned of an 
impending ‘head-on collision’, Shaykh Qassem (2005: 101) referred to this imminent 
confrontation as a ‘fight for existence’ (MER, 5 March, 1988: 9)290. The first five days 
of clashes in Beirut killed 100 people (MER, 14 May, 1988: 9). 
 
As Syria and Iran strived to contain the situation by initiating negotiations, Hizbullah 
and Amal were engaged in a national struggle for symbolic capital within the Shi’i 
community291. Whereas Amal fought to reassert its authority, Hizbullah sought to 
legitimise the insertion of the Islamic Resistance. Acknowledging the importance of 
accumulating social capital, Hizbullah not only deployed its cultural capital to 
discredit the Amal-aligned, ‘un-Shiite’ Higher Islamic Shi’i Council, but also deployed 
its economic capital by doubling the salary of prospective Amal defectors to $150-
200 a month (MER, 23 July, 1988: 7; Picard, 1993: 37)292. In an effort to demonstrate 
its symbolic capital amongst the Shi’i, Hizbullah concurrently executed two suicide 
operations against Israel in 1988293. With Amal also adopting this tactic, the various 
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(MER, 5 March, 1988: 11).  
290
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 Haytham Dbouk on 9 April and Abdullah Atwi on 19 October.  
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elements of the Lebanese Resistance conducted approximately 700 attacks on 
Israeli positions in 1988 (MER, 4 February, 1989: 8)294.  
 
Especially after the assassination of prominent Amal leaders, such as Daoud Daoud, 
Mahmoud al-Faqih and Hassan Sbaiti, in Ouzai on 22 September 1988, Hizbullah 
began to tighten its grip over Beirut’s southern suburbs as well as consolidating its 
positions in the South by the time the first official ceasefire occurred in February 
1989 (MER, 10 December, 1988: 8; 18 March, 1989: 11; Picard, 1993: 37)295. 
Simultaneously, as evidenced by the suicide operation of Assad Berro on 9 August 
1989 in retaliation for the abduction of Hizbullah recruiter Shaykh Obeid ten days 
earlier, the Islamic Resistance continued to respond to Israeli activities in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, despite this independently amplified capital, the Islamic Resistance 
remained susceptible to manoeuvres within the FIP due to the field homology 
between Iran’s PF and Hizbullah’s OF, as well as Syria’s command over the 
predominant orthodoxy of Lebanon’s MSF. 
 
Primarily, following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989, President 
Rafsanjani seized the opportunity to pursue a pragmatic policy of realigning his 
position in the FIP regarding the United States. Subsequently, the Pasdaran 
withdrew from Lebanon, Mohsen Rafiqdost was sacked and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi 
was reassigned (Chehabi, 2006: 228, 288). As its first official conclave was 
inaugurated on 11 November 1989, Hizbullah’s OF had nurtured its own endogenous 
capital in Lebanon but remained reliant on the complementary transference of 
exogenous capital from Iran. Although deriding this strategic shift, Hizbullah 
reluctantly accepted that it was futile ‘to wage jihad against the West when Iran itself 
was calling for a truce’ (Hamzeh, 1993: 323). Moreover, Hizbullah’s OF was 
beholden to the symbolic power of Syria in Lebanon. In the space of a year, 
President al-Assad reconstituted Lebanon’s PF by finalising the Ta’if Accord on 22 
October 1989, augmented his position in the FIP by supporting U.S. intervention in 
Kuwait in August 1990 and rebalanced Lebanon’s MSF by defeating LAF General 
Michel Aoun in October 1990. A month later, Amal and Hizbullah were pressured to 
cease a two-year conflict claiming 500 lives (MER, 3 November, 1990: 8)296. Amal 
retained its hegemony over the South while Hizbullah was restricted to conducting 
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Minister), Shaykh Tufayli, Mohammad Shamseddine and Sayyid Fadlallah. Hizbullah lost an estimated 261 fighters between 1989 and 
1991 (Malthaner, 2011: 224).    
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Resistance operations against Israel with the stationing of Syrian troops in Beirut 
ensuring that Hizbullah’s activities in the southern suburbs would be monitored297. 
 
The shared confessional identity and revolutionary ideology exhibited by Shi’i actors 
in Lebanon during the civil war has caused scholars to presumptuously conflate the 
practices and purposes of Hizbullah and the IJO. In revisiting the evolution of these 
movements, the objective has been to conceptually explain and reinforce the 
argument that their respective inceptions and trajectories were mutually divergent. A 
Bourdieu-SMT approach illustrates the existence and expression of concurrent 
opportunities, mobilisational modalities and collective actions frames within relational 
fields of practice. While both represented corresponding consumers of horizontally 
transferred capital from Iran, Hizbullah was the embodiment of a durable movement, 
conceived in the SMF to cultivate and consolidate a Resistance habitus via the 
constitution of an OF before the institutionalisation of a cohesive Resistance habitus 
in the MSF. Conversely, the IJO symbolised an amorphous cell of experienced Shi’i 
operatives connected by familial networks, guided by semi-autonomous dispositions 
and activated solely in the MSF to execute Iran’s immediate interests.             
 
Conclusion 
 
Following the Lebanese civil war, Sayyid Fadlallah stated that ‘revolutionary 
dynamism has little to do with the present state of Iran and Syria…Although they may 
have the necessary forces and possibilities, their scope of action has become more 
limited’ (Chehabi, 2006: 297). The pre-existing canon on Hizbullah’s inception tends 
to be divided as to the causal factors behind its framing and practice. Subsequently, 
Hizbullah is either a ‘palpable organization that receives orders and directions from 
Iran’ or a ‘fluid collection of groups over which Iran’s real influence may be only 
nominal’ (Norton, 1987: 101). Therefore, this chapter applied a Bourdieu-SMT 
approach to problematise the assumptions of previous examinations and to explain 
the relative balance of influence between endogenous and exogenous forces in the 
embryonic stages of Hizbullah’s evolution in Lebanon.  
 
Firstly, while the Iranian Revolution was instrumental in galvanising the disparate 
strands of radical habiti in the SMF, the transference of capital from the Islamic 
Republic should not be solely credited with igniting revolutionary dispositions or 
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creating collusio amongst radical Shi’i habiti in Lebanon’s SMF. Following the Najaf 
debates in the 1960s, in which the heterodoxy of revolutionary activism replaced the 
orthodoxy of apolitical quietism as the normative collective action frame for a new 
generation of Shi’i clerics, Musa al-Sadr and Sayyid Fadlallah were in the process of 
inducting the Shi’i into the illusio of the SMF. As the civil war aggravated the 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the Shi’i underclass, Sayyid Fadlallah’s 
heterodox mobilisational frames of revolutionary activism, which contrasted al-Sadr’s 
preference for orthodox practice, resonated more with a proliferating mass of radical 
habiti in the SMF.  
 
Consequently, Israel’s Operation Litani into South Lebanon, the influx of hundreds of 
thousands of internally displaced Shi’i into Beirut, the expulsion of hundreds of young 
Shi’i clerics from Iraq and the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr all contributed to the 
harmonisation of radical Shi’i habiti in the SMF. In this context, the Iranian Revolution 
augmented the opportunities for radical Shi’i habiti to legitimise their capital rather 
than provide the impetus for these disjointed movements to coalesce into an 
organised collusio. Adopting conventional SMT terminology, it broadened the 
constituency of people susceptible to radical mobilisation, but it did not immediately 
result in social movement organisations capable of structuring or directing this 
constituency. In this way, ‘Hizbullah was by no means the brainchild of any Iranian 
personality; in fact, its leadership nucleus had formed before the Islamic Revolution 
unfolded’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 306).  
 
Secondly, Hizbullah’s OF should neither be assessed as Iran’s proxy nor perceived 
as organised and consistent. Those who view Hizbullah as purely a proxy of Iran 
refer to the movement’s mobilisational tactics, such as the cultivation of mosque 
networks, the establishment of the hawzat system, the appropriation of Shi’i public 
rituals and the creation of social welfare organs as evidence that Hizbullah’s OF 
represented duplications of pre-existing practices and institutions designed by the 
Islamic Republic. Moreover, not only is the construction of Hizbullah’s OF interpreted 
as being imported from Iran, but its hierarchical structures are construed as 
centralised and cogent from its inception. Reinforcing this inseparable homology 
between Hizbullah and Iran, Shaykh Harb famously proclaimed that ‘my house in 
Lebanon is the embassy of the Islamic Republic’ (The Times, 23 February, 1984)298. 
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(Alagha, 2011: 50).   
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Naturally, as adherents of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary activism, Hizbullah 
intended to inculcate a Resistance habitus based on the Iranian prototype, one in 
which a Shi’i agent is ‘a fighter, a religious person, a pious, an ascetic, an intellectual, 
and a political person, all incorporated into one person’ (Sayyid Fadlallah in Shaery-
Eisenlohr, 2008: 111, 113). Subsequently, Hizbullah endeavoured to produce 
collective dispositions and perceptions within al-moqawama al-mujtama (‘Resistance 
Society’) that became ‘the norm for a majority of the community’ (Harb & Leenders, 
2005: 192). However, rather than horizontally transfer and transpose capital from 
Iran, Hizbullah had to devise mobilising methods that adjusted and customised 
heterodox practice to the structural dynamics of Lebanon’s SMF. Whether 
demonstrated by its efforts to reframe the concept of Resistance in localised 
contexts, its attempts to engage communities through grassroots mediation or its 
endeavours to relate to the specific needs and expectations of Lebanese Shi’i in the 
provision of social services, Hizbullah pursued heterodox practice by transforming 
imported capital into mobilisational modalities that were derived from and developed 
orthodox repertoires of confessional practice in Lebanon’s SMF. While mainstream 
SMT may emphasise the objective presence of political opportunities, it is unable to 
explain that perceptions or permutations of opportunities are dependent on the 
homologous constitution within and between divergent fields of practice.  
 
Furthermore, Hizbullah’s OF should not be assumed as possessing a hierarchised 
structure or an institutionalised leadership from its inception. Conversely, entrenching 
harmonised dispositions and perceptions into consistently organised practice is an 
ongoing as opposed to a predetermined process. Although the Council of Lebanon 
was formed in 1983 and the majlis al-shura inaugurated in 1986, Hizbullah’s OF only 
established a formalised Executive Consultative Council and Politburo that covered 
the Biqa’, Beirut and the South during its First Conclave in 1989 (Harik, 2005: 54). 
Between 1982 and 1988 it was ‘hard to define exactly who or what Hizbullah was’ 
(Harik, 1994: 53). Additionally, until 1988, Hizbullah ‘were paranoid…too suspicious 
and secretive, impossible to talk to and communicate with and extremely, 
unrealistically, fundamentalist’299. Therefore, attributing continuously cogent decision-
making capabilities to a centralised OF undergoing its nascent stages of 
development threatens to bestow a strategic foresight that Hizbullah had yet to 
consolidate.   
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Thirdly, existing literature on Hizbullah confronts challenges in clarifying the 
relationship between the IJO and the Islamic Resistance in the MSF. While both 
converged with the Islamic Republic in confessional identity and revolutionary 
ideology, this chapter argued that they should be interpreted as distinct movements 
on account of their differentiated purposes and practices in the MSF. For Hizbullah, 
the priority was to establish a collective Resistance habitus in the SMF managed by 
a cohesive OF. Since the cultivation of a sustainable military force was a meticulous 
process, Hizbullah did not deploy the Islamic Resistance into the MSF until 1984. 
Contrarily, devoid of hierarchical leadership structures or organisational cohesion, 
the IJO was an amorphous composition of seasoned Shi’i operatives trained by the 
PLO, linked to Hizb al-Dawa, conjoined by familial networks and tasked with serving 
Iran’s immediate interests in Lebanon’s MSF during its war with Iraq. Therefore, the 
IJO, originating from the collusio of radical habiti in the MSF, and Hizbullah, 
emanating from the collusio of radical habiti in the SMF, were plotted on parallel, not 
synonymous trajectories. A classical SMT perspective would not readily be able to 
capture the nuanced relationship between the divergent logics of these fields. 
 
Similarly, the progressive incongruity between the Islamic Republic, the IJO and the 
Islamic Resistance can be explained by their respective evolutions. As evidenced by 
the IJO’s semi-autonomous activities or the reticence of the Islamic Resistance to 
cease hostilities with Amal, Iran may have contributed capital to enhance the position 
of endorsed agents in the MSF but it was unable to dictate their practice. Ultimately, 
Lebanese actors were not passive receptacles but inscribed with pre-existing 
dispositions and perceptions that interpreted opportunities, strategically calculated 
the value of their capital and generated practice in dialectic relation to Lebanon’s 
situational context. As Iran and Syria adjusted their capital to adapt to the revised 
reconstitution of the FIP following the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, the IJO 
and the Islamic Resistance also realigned their positions in Lebanon. Whereas the 
heterodoxy of the IJO was rendered irrelevant in a post-civil war epoch and 
compelled its members to seek alternative avenues in the MSF, the Islamic 
Resistance, which had morphed into an organised force of approximately 4-5,000 
fighters, was preparing to capitalise on the opportunities presented in the FIP to vie 
for the legitimate orthodoxy of its Resistance habitus in the MSF (Malthaner, 2011: 
92; Ranstorp, 1997: 67; Wege, 1994: 155). 
 
Although traditional SMT offers constructive explanatory concepts, such as political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and collective action frames, this chapter has 
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argued that a comprehensive examination of Hizbullah’s evolution in the 1980s 
requires these principles to be supplemented by the analytical tools provided by a 
Bourdieusian perspective. Firstly, not all opportunities perceived by Hizbullah were 
limited to the political sphere. Rather, the introduction of concurrent fields, each 
determined by their specific logics, generative rules and structured opportunities, 
enables the identification of a diverse range of possible prospects and tactics for 
mobilisation. Secondly, each Shi’i agent propagates either orthodox or heterodox 
practice depending on their pre-existing dispositions, perceptions and positions. 
Therefore, Hizbullah cannot simply construct encompassing heterodox mobilisational 
repertoires but must firstly acquire and expend the recognised capital required to 
induct, integrate and inculcate agents into its modalities of collective action by 
acknowledging orthodox methods of practice in each field. Lastly, Hizbullah cannot 
project discursive frames unilaterally but must simultaneously maintain field 
homology by not only ensuring the convergence of transferred capital from Iran to its 
prospective agents, but also in reproducing the symbiotic synergy of its positions 
both within and between fields of practice in Lebanon.                 
 
Emerging on the peripheries of the Lebanese civil war, Hizbullah evolved from a 
collusio of radical habiti to a cohesive OF that presided over an embryonic yet 
synchronised homology of its Resistance habitus between Lebanon’s SMF and MSF. 
Translating the transference of capital from the Islamic Republic, Hizbullah promoted 
heterodox practice by devising and adapting mobilisation strategies that resonated 
with Shi’i agents operating under the prevailing orthodoxy of Lebanon’s structured 
SMF and MSF. Although cultivating and consolidating a Resistance habitus based on 
its endogenously accrued and legitimately recognised capital, the continued 
enhancement of Hizbullah’s position remained mitigated against by the existence of 
more established actors in Lebanon. Furthermore, akin to the other warring factions 
in Lebanon, Hizbullah was also susceptible to a rearrangement of the FIP in which 
Syria augmented its symbolic power in Lebanon while Iran shifted from espousing 
revolution to embracing pragmatism. The next chapter will explore how Hizbullah’s 
OF responded to these developments in order to maintain and sustain its positions in 
Lebanon.     
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 Chapter Six 
Infitah and the ‘Lebanonisation’ of Hizbullah (1992 – 2000) 
 
‘This charter wastes the blood of the martyrs. It implies the return to a regime worse than the one we 
have fought…It puts chains on the Lebanese people and transforms the country into a large Maronite 
prison’.  
- Hizbullah’s Shaykh Tufayli in response to the Ta’if Accord (MER, 23 December, 1989: 10).  
 
 ‘If the Army is essential for the presence of the homeland, the State and sovereignty, the presence of 
more than one Army is the main cause for the loss of sovereignty, the disintegration of the State and the 
extinction of the homeland’.  
- Brigadier General Fuad Aoun (MER, 25 March, 1989: 10-11).  
 
‘Whoever wants to take away our weapons must first liquidate us…we will not give them up and will 
continue to fight until all of our land is liberated’.  
- Hizbullah’s Shaykh Qassem (Azani, 2011: 89).  
 
‘They resist with their blood. Resist with your vote’.  
- Hizbullah campaign slogan in 1996.  
 
Addressing Lebanon’s post-civil war settlement, Ghassan Tueni (1985, 2004) 
commented that the ‘War of Others’ inevitably led to the ‘Peace of Others’. Although 
62 Lebanese MPs were shuttled to Ta’if in Saudi Arabia to discuss terms, Syria 
directed the negotiations that resulted in the signing of the National Unity Charter for 
Lebanon on 22 October 1989, otherwise known as the Ta’if Accords (Harris, 2012: 
255)300. Exploiting the opportunities emanating from the hysteresis of civil war, 
President al-Assad utilised Syria’s geo-political and socio-economic links with its 
historically inseparable counterpart to augment the legitimacy of its symbolic power, 
a status in which Syria’s capital was institutionalised as normatively indisputable in 
Lebanon. Whereas the Ta’if agreement cemented Syria as the custodian over the 
predominant orthodoxy of Lebanon’s PF, by successfully mediating internecine Shi’i 
tensions between Amal and Hizbullah while also nullifying the threat of Christian 
actors, such as Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and General Michel Aoun, Syria 
simultaneously consolidated its monopoly over Lebanon’s MSF.  
 
President al-Assad’s calculated repositioning within a transitioning FIP further 
enabled Syria to reinforce its symbolic power over Lebanon. By facilitating the end of 
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the civil war, leveraging its social capital with Iran and publicly endorsing the U.S. in 
condemning Saddam Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, thereby adjusting Syria’s 
alignment away from the impending collapse of its former Soviet Union ally towards 
the looming prospect of U.S. unipolarity, President al-Assad ensured that its 
exclusive hegemony of Lebanon was not opposed by external actors. Consequently, 
Syria was elevated to an ‘Ottoman arbitrator’, a paradoxical embodiment of a 
‘destabilising stabiliser’, ‘an equilibrator of disequilibrium’ and a hamiha haramiha, ‘a 
guard who is a robber’ (Ziadeh, 2006: 175). For Hizbullah, Syria’s unbridled 
supremacy was perceived both as an enabling opportunity and a disabling threat.         
 
The revision of orthodoxy within Lebanon’s PF via ‘novation’, a concept that 
renegotiated the 1943 National Pact rather than reconstitute its inherent doxa (law), 
the Ta’if Accords directly undermined Hizbullah’s Collective Action Frames by 
preserving the prevailing system (Salam, 2003: 43). Subsequently, the political 
settlement simply converted the impasse of the civil war into a new arrangement of 
fragmentation whereby mutual suspicion within and between communities 
reproduced competition and dependency (Leenders, 2012: 162-163). Regarding 
executive authority, the inauguration of the Troika, or the ‘Three Presidencies’, a 
governing triumvirate in which the President (Maronite), Premier (Sunni) and 
Speaker (Shi’i) divided the instruments of state power through a continuous process 
of interpersonal conciliation. With the influence of confessional actors neutralised, 
Syria maintained the balance and regulated conflicts from outside the institutional 
framework (Karam, 2009: 53). In the Council of Ministers, despite the Ta’if Accords 
allocating seats evenly between Muslims and Christians, stipulating equal 
representation and enshrining proportional representation amongst confessional 
groups within each religious community, the agreement repeated the implicit 
contradiction of the National Pact in that ‘the three major communities were 
recognised as equal in principle, although in practice proportional priority was applied 
both among the three and vis-à-vis the other communities’ (Ziadeh, 2006: 141; 
Halawi, 1992: 215). Within the muhasasa (‘allotment’) of an enlarged 128-member 
legislative, the Maronites were afforded 34 seats (26.5%) while 27 (21%) were 
distributed to both the Sunni and Shi’i (Nir, 2009: 178).    
 
Therefore, although inter-communal dialogue was identified as the route to 
abolishing political sectarianism, its perception was informed by agents embedded 
within systemic practices of political sectarianism rendering its dissolution dependent 
on an indeterminate Lebanese timeframe (Hanf, 1993: 588). Consequently, the Ta’if 
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Accords created one nation, divided into two equal parts, sub-divided into three equal 
parts, ‘supplemented by a row of equally un-subtractable parts of the One Lebanese 
People’ who are ‘divided equally on unrelinquishable regions of the One Lebanese 
Land’ (Ziad Rahbani in Ziadeh, 2006: 143). Underneath the veneer of this 
compositional arrangement, Syria presided over the dominant orthodoxy of the PF, 
managed elite cleavages and defined legitimate forms of capital. However, since the 
doors were allegedly ‘open to any actor accepting the rules of the game’, this 
potential opportunity navigated Hizbullah between the Scylla of inclusion and the 
Charybdis of exclusion301. 
 
Derived from links to Iran and the Islamic Resistance against Israel, Hizbullah had 
acquired considerable supplies of cultural capital in the MSF to serve as a strategic 
asset in Syria’s dealings with Tel Aviv and Tehran. Subsequently, while Lebanese 
Defence Minister Michel Murr declared on 23 March 1991 that ‘all Lebanese and 
non-Lebanese armed groups must disarm’, the Islamic Resistance was exempt from 
this order (MER, 30 March, 1991: 16; 13 April, 1991: 9)302. This approach would 
legitimately authorise Hizbullah’s OF to pursue symbolic capital in the SMF and MSF 
without the risk of compromising the precepts of the Resistance discourse by 
engaging with the restrictive structures of the PF. Nevertheless, considering Syria’s 
symbolic power in the MSF, a decision that spurned an inclusive process would not 
only threaten to reduce the independence of Hizbullah’s OF by relying 
disproportionately on political protection from an historically unreliable Syrian partner 
intent on prioritising its interests in the FIP, but the Lebanese identity of the Islamic 
Resistance would also be tarnished with Hizbullah’s OF perceived as a perennial 
outsider, detached from its counterparts in the PF and associated with the policies of 
external actors.   
 
Contrarily, participation would launch Hizbullah’s OF onto terra incognita, an 
unchartered course that implied a compromise in practice between military 
resistance and political representation whereby the relative benefits of engaging in a 
debilitating PF would be weighed against the possible implications of this shift on the 
integrity of its Collective Action Frames in the MSF and SMF. By implicitly bestowing 
legitimacy on the prevalent system, Hizbullah’s OF would become exposed to the 
divisive cleavages Syria planned to exploit. Although premised on pluralism, the elite 
                                                 
301
  These rules included accepting the Ta’if Accords, demobilising militias (except the Resistance), rejecting violence in public life and 
swearing allegiance to Syria (Karam, 2005: 320).  
302
 Militias were expected to handover their weapons and integrate into Lebanese military institutions. The document also banned 
illegitimate tax collecting, non-licenced media, parallel security and intelligence organs while offering amnesty to compliant militia 
leaders and approving the repatriation of displaced people (MER, 30 March, 1991: 16-17).   
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sectarianism of the PF remained predicated on a governing Troika to which Hizbullah 
had no access. Additionally, Amal, a seasoned Shi’i party that enjoyed extensive 
social capital with Syria, would endeavour to marginalise its Shi’i rival from the 
corridors of influence. Conversely, by realigning its Collective Action Frame to 
acknowledge the illusio of the PF in contesting the 1992 parliamentary elections, 
political presence would provide Hizbullah’s OF with the opportunity to diversify its 
mobilising strategy to project a holistic platform with which to protect the Islamic 
Resistance in the MSF and the Shi’i community in the SMF in accordance with the 
orthodoxy of Lebanon’s structured context.   
 
Hizbullah’s subsequent ‘Lebanonisation’ has been widely cited in pre-existing 
literature303. However, this work struggles to problematise and reconcile the 
theoretical and practical logics of Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’. Overall, while this 
canon conceptually construes ‘Lebanonisation’ as an objectively observable and 
uniform process, it assumes that Hizbullah was compelled not only into engaging 
with the orthodoxy of political participation, but also in accepting the practical 
distinction of its ideological and political interests in Lebanon. From a traditional SMT 
perspective, the strategic calculations of a rational organisation would recognise the 
opportunities entailed in attaining political access and accordingly adjust its 
Collective Action Frames to translate the benefits of this shift to the subjective 
perceptions of its mobilising base. Alternatively, a Bourdieu-SMT approach, which 
interprets theoretical and practical logics as mutually constituted dialectics, offers a 
more comprehensive explanation for Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’. The objective of 
this chapter is to utilise this conceptual perspective to elucidate the evolution of 
Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in Lebanon by examining two inter-related and 
durable processes.  
 
Firstly, ‘Lebanonisation’ was a term coined by Sayyid Fadlallah to imply a temporary 
accommodation of the situational context as a means to facilitate change (Hamzeh, 
1993: 18). While tacitly acknowledging the existence of Lebanon’s PF, Hizbullah’s 
OF neither submitted to its predominant orthodoxy nor succumbed to its institutional 
structures, its legitimate values of capital and its generative practices. Considering 
the inscribed dispositions of a structured and structuring Resistance habitus in the 
SMF and MSF that contested the constitution of the system, Hizbullah’s OF 
promoted heterodoxy in the PF to preserve the convergence of its ideological and 
                                                 
303
 Including Ranstorp (1998), Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), Harb and Leenders (2005), Harik (2005), Alagha (2006), Badran (2009a) and 
Azani (2011). 
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political interests. For Hizbullah’s OF, perceived opportunities in the PF related to its 
illusio (‘stakes’) rather than the advantages of complying with orthodox practice. 
Therefore, Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’ was one that prioritised presence over 
substance. By entering Lebanon’s PF, Hizbullah’s OF conceded that the objective 
opportunities presented by an entrenched illusio superseded subjective reservations 
concerning its legitimacy. Nevertheless, by inducting itself as a heterodox agent, 
retaining the homology of its Resistance habitus and refusing to subject itself to the 
expected orthodoxy of the PF, Hizbullah’s OF advocated a position and practice 
antithetical to the notion of ‘Lebanonisation’.  
 
Secondly, Hizbullah’s OF has consistently discarded the ambiguous connotations of 
‘Lebanonisation’ while invoking infitah (‘opening up’) as a more sufficient term to 
describe the politicisation process (Jones & Catignani, 2010). By applying a 
Bourdieu-SMT framework, the multi-faceted complexities of this transitional policy 
can be illustrated through the dynamic multi-field management of Hizbullah’s OF in 
maintaining the homology of its Resistance habitus within and between the PF, SMF 
and MSF as opposed to simplifying its activities to a linear equation of transforming 
objective opportunities into the subjective perceptions of mobilising agents via 
Collective Action Frames. By the end of the civil war, Hizbullah’s OF had cultivated 
an analogous Resistance habitus between the SMF and MSF but remained unable to 
exercise exclusive command of individual practices since their agents were 
embedded within pre-existing fields of differentiated logics. Primarily, Hizbullah’s OF 
aimed to transfer its capital in the SMF and MSF to the PF, a sphere in which 
Hizbullah possessed no recognisable capital, positional presence or practical 
experience. Moreover, Hizbullah’s OF was responsible for reconciling the 
compatibility of its Resistance habitus between these three fields. This challenge 
required balancing its aggregated symbolic capital derived from orthodoxy in the 
SMF, its aspiring symbolic capital dependent on Syria’s orthodoxy in the MSF and its 
annulment of symbolic capital on account of its heterodoxy in the PF.    
             
6.1 Realigning the Resistance  
 
From the latter stages of 1990 until the official proclamation of participation by 
Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah on 3 July 1992, Hizbullah was embroiled in 
internal discussions over the theoretical legitimacy and practical feasibility of 
engaging with the PF (Qassem, 2005: 191). Rather than confined to a discourse 
where agents within Hizbullah’s OF juxtaposed the consequences of politicisation in 
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relation to the structured principles of the 1985 Open Letter, these deliberations 
considered the prospective impact of this decision on the perceptions and practices 
of its Resistance habitus across the SMF and MSF. The combination of realigning its 
Resistance habitus while sustaining organisational cohesion posed considerable 
opportunities and threats for Hizbullah’s development. Initially, the majority of the 
majlis al-shura, presided over by Shaykh Tufayli since 1989, rejected any adherence 
to the intrinsic doxa and illusio of the PF. Consequently, Hizbullah’s OF dismissed 
Prime Minister Omar Karami’s post-war administration and released a declaration 
urging the government to safeguard independent ‘political, intellectual, ideological 
and media freedoms’ (Alagha, 2006). Reflecting this position, a senior Hizbullah 
official revealed that ‘the political scene is not of any importance to us, and we don’t 
want to interfere in it. The real issue lies in the South and the role of the Resistance 
in confronting the Israeli enemy’ (MER, 20 April, 1991: 10).  
 
Despite this rhetoric, the Ta’if Accords had caused a hysteresis within Hizbullah’s OF 
over its future. Whereas Shaykh Tufayli represented the orthodox approach of 
emphatically opposing the Lebanese system, Shaykh Abbas Moussawi adapted his 
dispositions to propose a revised orthodoxy based upon his assessment of the Shi’i 
community as well as Iran’s shifting practices in the FIP. Perceiving political 
pragmatism as an opportunity to ensure the durability of Hizbullah, Shaykh Abbas 
Moussawi replaced Shaykh Tufayli as Secretary General during the second conclave 
in May 1991 with the radical components of Hizbullah’s OF, emanating from either 
Hizb al-Dawa or Islamic Amal, relegated to heterodox positions304. Subsequently, 
Hizbullah’s OF reconstituted the orthodoxy of its strategic priorities towards the 
continuation of Resistance, the cessation of all intra-Lebanese disagreements 
through dialogue, the endorsement of infitah that propagates pluralism and national 
unity as well as supporting the alleviation of socio-economic and communal issues 
(Alagha, 2006: 150-151)305. This calculated policy signified Hizbullah’s 
acknowledgement of survival within the status quo but did not indicate a substantive 
intention of allegiance. Akin to Ayatollah Khomeini’s acceptance of the ‘poisoned 
chalice’ that concluded the Iran-Iraq War, the rules of the PF compelled Hizbullah’s 
OF to submit to the ‘Rhythm of Reality’ (MER, 25 May, 1991: 8). In order to ensure 
that this symbolised an opportunity to be capitalised upon as opposed to posing a 
threat of co-option, Hizbullah’s OF strived to internally reconcile the concept of 
                                                 
304
 This group included Shaykh Tufayli, Mohammad Fneish and Mohammad Ra’ad (Hizb al-Dawa) as well as Husayn Moussawi and 
Husayn al-Khalil (Islamic Amal) (Wege, 1994: 157; MER, 25 May, 1991: 10). The 1991 conclave established a 15-member Political 
Council and a 9-member Executive Council. The latter’s three branches included Security, Jihad al-Bina as well as Enforcement, 
Recruitment and Propaganda (Hamzeh, 1993: 326).     
305
 Hizbullah started negotiating with Christian parties across Lebanon at the beginning of 1992 (MER, 7 March, 1992: 16-17).  
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wilayat al-faqih while adjusting the diversification of its Collective Action Frames to 
maintain homology within and between its Resistance habitus in the SMF and MSF. 
 
Sayyid Fadlallah, assuming the role of al-Murshid al-Ruhi (‘Spiritual Guide’) rather 
than a Hizbullah leader, had addressed this conundrum in 1985. The Lebanese 
cleric, whose emphasis on implementing a democratically non-confessionalist dawlat 
al-insan (‘a state for mankind’) deviated markedly from Hizbullah’s approach, 
believed the endemic corruption of the system and the improbable prospect of an 
Islamic state in Lebanon warranted revolutionary activists ‘to strive to create an 
Islamic societal milieu...that would ultimately pave the way to revolutionary change’ 
(Fadlallah, 1985: 31)306. For Hizbullah, the challenge lay in pursuing a course of 
action that demanded involvement in a reprehensible system for the purpose of 
initiating change. While the Party of God risked being exposed to laws and practices 
that subordinated Islamic values, the cost of stringently upholding conceptual 
principles at the expense of political access was potentially more detrimental to 
Hizbullah’s sustainability in Lebanon. As articulated by Shaykh Qassem, ‘we want to 
change the situation and one way to do that, no matter how many limitations it 
involves, is entering the parliament’ (Azani, 2011: 97).   
 
Even from a heterodox position, interacting with the PF presented four distinct 
opportunities for Hizbullah. Firstly, Hizbullah could garner cross-confessional support 
against the Israeli occupation by expounding the ethos, justification and legitimacy of 
the Islamic Resistance within the parameters of the PF. Secondly, by using 
parliament to lobby against kleptocracy, clientalism and the inequity of socio-
economic initiatives, Hizbullah could grant the PF ‘de facto recognition’ to amplify the 
needs of the Shi’i community on a ‘de jure basis’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 28). Thirdly, 
by entering the illusio of the PF, the parliamentary subsidiary of Hizbullah’s OF, and 
by extension the Party’s core leadership, would be recognised as a legitimate 
Lebanese actor. Fourthly, by rivalling Amal’s orthodoxy in the PF, Hizbullah could 
augment its symbolic capital in the SMF as a credible representative of the Shi’i 
community. Ultimately, since ‘political life dictates practical interaction with other 
groups without delving into the ideological background of every party’, Hizbullah 
would enhance its agenda of achieving symbolic capital and affecting change by 
accessing new channels for boosting its cultural and social capital through legislative 
votes, parliamentary committees and political fora (Alagha, 2006: 151).      
                                                 
306
 A detailed account on the aspects of democracy, accountability and justice within Fadlallah’s approach is included in the rest of the 
article that appeared in al-Muntalaq on 27 February 1985 (Sankari, 2005: 238-239).    
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Therefore, Sayyid Nasrallah ridiculed any ‘contradiction between participating in the 
elections and serving in parliament and between continuing the battle for your true 
rights’ (Azani, 2011: 98). While the inherent doxa of the PF in Lebanon precluded the 
acquisition of symbolic power, Hizbullah could use the PF to increase its symbolic 
capital in the SMF and assist in striving for symbolic capital in the MSF. Since there 
was no discernible incompatibility between pluralist democracy, albeit consociational, 
and Hizbullah’s philosophy, political accommodation was not perceived as an 
alternative to its Resistance habitus. Rather than an equation contingent upon 
reconciling polarised narratives, Hizbullah could adapt Shi’i political thought within 
the relative flexibility and openness of Lebanon’s PF. Consequently, although 
Hizbullah’s OF managed to acclimatise its dispositions to the preconditions of the PF, 
the Party could not unilaterally embark upon this transitional process without 
realigning the perceptions of its constituents in the SMF. Despite accruing symbolic 
capital in the SMF, Hizbullah did not possess unwavering loyalty within a dynamic 
Shi’i community. After 15 years of civil war, the Shi’i were directed as much by socio-
economic concerns as they were by questions of identity and ideology.  
 
The conflict resulted in 144,240 deaths and an estimated 1.2 million internally 
displaced people from a post-war population of 2.7 million (MER, 14 March, 1992: 
12; Nasr, 2003: 144-148)307. By 1990, Lebanon’s budget deficit was 387 billion 
Lebanese Pounds (LP), or 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a mounting 
debt of 1,200 billion LP, or almost 200% of GDP (MER, 5 May, 1990: 17). According 
to Premier Omar Karami, the overall cost of reconstruction would be $4.5 billion over 
five years (MER, 14 December, 1991: 7)308. Aggravating these conditions, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait denied Lebanon of Saudi Arabia, its major trading partner, as well 
as a significant proportion of its remittances since Lebanese expatriates were forced 
to return from the Gulf (MER, 15 September, 1990: 12-14). While the Lebanese 
Central Bank managed to avoid liquidation, the plummeting depreciation of the 
currency, the decline in exports, the fall in foreign reserves and stagnating GDP 
rendered the economy in need of $8-10 billion (MER, 5 May, 1990: 18; 16 June, 
1990: 17)309. After failing to deliver a viable economic strategy, riots over the price of 
food led to the resignation of Premier Karami on 8 May 1992 (MER, 9 May, 1992: 7). 
The influx of 200,000 Syrian workers as well as goods flooding the Lebanese market, 
                                                 
307
 Approximately 670,000 Christians and 157,500 Muslims emigrated from Lebanon (Khalaf, 2003: 134). 
308
 Around 57.6% was needed for infrastructure, 26.9% for social needs, 13.1% to boost productive sectors and 2.4% for project 
expenses. Lebanon subsequently received pledges of $2.7 billion from Arab and international donors (MER, 14 December, 1991: 7). 
309
 One short-term positive was that since the government borrowed from the Central Bank rather than raising revenue from the 
public, the decline in public spending decreased the deficit and foreign debt (MER, 6 July, 1991: 13).  
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combined with the liberal economic doctrine of Rafiq Hariri, Karami’s successor, that 
preferred to rely on foreign investment to boost domestic growth, caused increased 
income inequality, alienated the lower classes and prioritised Beirut as a source of 
stimulus (Gambill, 2009: 134-135; Harris, 2012: 260).  
 
Under these circumstances, Sayyid Nasrallah admitted that Hizbullah conducted 
surveys prior to the elections to gauge Shi’i public opinion (Azani, 2011: 97). 
Presumably compiled by the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation 
(CCSD), a Hizbullah-affiliated institute responsible for producing scientific research 
on socio-economic issues, the findings would have mirrored two surveys by AUB that 
aimed to measure Hizbullah’s popularity within an increasingly heterogeneous Shi’i 
community310. While a poll of 1,427 respondents in 1992 reported that 62% of Shi’i 
would vote for the Resistance, a 1993 survey of 405 respondents revealed that 
Hizbullah (41%) was the most popular Shi’i party in Lebanon (Harik, 1996: 41-67; 
2005: 50)311. Most saliently, dispelling the assumption that Hizbullah represented the 
pious Shi’i underclass, 44% identifying with ‘high socio-economic status’ indicated an 
affiliation with Hizbullah compared to 35% for Amal (Harik, 1996: 55). Moreover, of 
the 76% that recorded ‘moderate’ or ‘low’ religiosity, only 12% described their 
primary identity as Shi’i with 43% considering themselves Lebanese first and 41% 
supporting the current political system over an Islamic state (Harik, 1996: 53-56; 
Azani, 2011: 96).      
 
Although the methodology of these samples encountered geographical limitations, 
the general trend demonstrated that the provision of social services, for which 
Hizbullah scored a 64% approval rating compared to Amal’s 20%, in addition to 
Hizbullah’s campaigning on good governance, implied that socio-economic and 
administrative considerations resonated more pertinently than the creation of a 
Resistance society within the Shi’i community (Harik, 1996: 56; Gunning, 2007b: 
172). Therefore, when Sayyid Nasrallah announced Hizbullah’s participation in 
parliamentary elections on 3 July 1992, the moderate direction of Hizbullah’s rhetoric 
appeared to be conducive with the demands of Shi’i habiti in the SMF, symbolising a 
mutually constituted convergence reinforcing a ‘prognostic frame of representative 
                                                 
310
 Interview with Dr Mohsen Saleh in Beirut, 27 March 2012. Refer to Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008: 186-187) for more information on the 
work conducted by the CCSD.  
311
  By contrast, Amal received 31%.  
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governance that favours the establishment of a pluralistic political system where 
justice and fairness prevail’ (Karagiannis, 2009: 375)312. 
 
Consequently, with the impact of a chronic economic paralysis factoring as the core 
driver of concern amongst the Shi’i community, and having restructured its OF to 
prepare for its impending engagement with the PF, Hizbullah sought to capitalise 
upon the mobilising opportunities of politicisation. Firstly, by accentuating the 
dysfunctional capabilities of the state in responding to the needs of the Shi’i, 
Hizbullah would concurrently invest in its own institutions to demonstrate its capacity 
in effectively providing sustainable assistance for its constituencies. Secondly, in a 
post-war epoch in which the Ta’if Accords represented the prevailing orthodoxy in the 
PF, Hizbullah reconstituted the holistic narrative of homology amongst its Resistance 
habitus within and between the SMF and MSF.  
 
During the civil war, the provision of social services by all warring parties produced a 
situation in which ‘warlords have actually held the fragile state together’ (Harik, 1994: 
54). However, the lack of scale and scope within the state’s post-war reconstruction 
initiatives enabled Hizbullah to apply the same logic in ‘perpetuating the Shi’a 
community’s dependence on its social welfare institutions and discrediting rival 
political forces’ while commanding support in justifying the incorruptibility of its social 
justice (Gambill, 2009: 134-135). For the purpose of expansion and professionalism, 
Hizbullah’s OF centralised the management of its pre-existing welfare services under 
the remit of an Executive Assembly that was divided into three institutes (mu’asasat): 
Educational (al-tarbawiyya), Social (al-ijtima’iyya) and Health (al-suhiyya). In turn, 
these were compartmentalised into three geographical regions – southern Beirut, the 
Biqa’ and the South – to effectively meet the specific demands of each Shi’i 
constituency.     
 
The objective of Hizbullah’s ta’bi’a tarbawiyya (‘educational mobilisation’), in which 
heterogeneous Shi’i habiti were transformed into a Resistance society via the 
inculcation of a homogenised Resistance habitus, consisted of four complementary 
components. Firstly, Hizbullah established Mahdi schools through the formation of 
the Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching (Le Thomas, 2010)313. Directly 
                                                 
312
 Out of the 12 members of the majlis al-shura, 10 approved of entering into politics while 2 rejected the motion. Iran’s Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei authorised the results of the vote.  
313
 Between 1992 and 1993, Hizbullah opened three of these schools (Jaber, 1997: 164). While following the Lebanese school 
curriculum, each school also promoted Hizbullah’s Islamic values. Girls and women had to wear the hijab, the school calendar 
commemorated Shi’i imams and victories of the Islamic Resistance while school slogans, symbols and trips focused on Hizbullah’s 
discourse thereby reinforcing the next ‘Resistance generation’ (Le Thomas, 2010).    
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funded and managed by Hizbullah, Mahdi schools institutionalised a Resistance 
habitus through pedagogic practices. Secondly, the JTDI, which was ideologically 
synchronised to Hizbullah but practically independent as a subsidiary of the Higher 
Islamic Shi’i Council, continued to oversee the development of Mustapha schools (Le 
Thomas, 2010). Unlike the Mahdi schools, which focused on deprived children within 
the Shi’i community, the Mustapha schools catered for an emerging Shi’i middle 
class (Le Thomas, 2010). Thirdly, al-Imdad, which was established in 1987 before 
registering with the Ministry of Interior in 1988, supplied vocational training schemes 
and micro-finance support through al-Qard al-Hassan (‘The Good Loan’)314. 
Ideologically aligned to Hizbullah but functioning with a degree of managerial 
autonomy, al-Imdad opened its first school in 1993 as part of its mandate in 
delivering educational services to Shi’i outside the community’s traditional 
strongholds (Le Thomas, 2010)315. Lastly, Hizbullah maintained solid relationships 
with universities that criticised the elitist power structures of traditional academia, 
such as the Lebanese University, the Beirut Arab University and the Islamic 
University of Lebanon (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 61).  
 
Furthermore, unlike the Amal-affiliated Council of the South or the PSP-associated 
Ministry of Displaced, Hizbullah continued to rely on the mobilisation of Jihad al-Bina 
for reconstructing and rehabilitating neglected Shi’i areas316. Between 1990 and 
1994, Jihad al-Bina delivered more than 20 million litres of water to Beirut’s southern 
suburbs at a cost of $960,000 (Harik, 2006: 273). Additionally, the organisation built 
power stations, supplied generators, dug wells and provided storage tanks (Jaber, 
1997: 156). Not only did Jihad al-Bina repair mosques and schools, but the 
organisation also revived pride and expertise in the Shi’i community’s dilapidated 
agricultural sector by installing irrigation canals, laying roads and establishing a 
series of Agricultural Centres and Cooperatives to stimulate interest and offer 
technical training on modern techniques (Jaber, 1997: 163-166; Danawi, 2002: 
81)317. To supplement these services, Jihad al-Bina approved loans of up to $3,000 
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 Al-Imdad arranged professional training programmes, such as bread-making initiatives, sewing courses, hairdressing workshops 
and generally injected funds for local commerce, including mini-markets and grocery stores. Al-Qard al-Hassan offered imbursements 
of $2 million to 6,885 families in 1992 (Harb & Leenders, 2005: 187; Fawwaz, 2000; Jaber, 1997: 149).    
315
 Al-Imdad reached Shi’i minorities in West Beirut, Batroun and the Western Biqa’ Valley. While a progeny of a parent organisation in 
Iran, al-Imdad administered schools funded by the Lebanese Ministry of Education (Le Thomas, 2010).  
316
 Between 1992 and 1999, the Council of the South was allocated LL730 billion for reconstruction projects while the Ministry of the 
Displaced received LL900 billion (Bissat, 2002: 3).  
317
 Jihad al-Bina operated with an annual budget of $5 million comprising of contributions from Iran, donations from associations and 
private individuals, the proceeds from Islamic taxes as well as fees from contracted work and consultations. Before implementation, 
prospective projects were subject to feasibility assessments and identified potential partners. Between 1988 and 1995, Jihad al-Bina 
established Veterinary Centres, Agricultural nurseries and 16 Agricultural Cooperatives as well as setting up a company that sold 
agricultural equipment to farmers at a reduced cost. Jihad al-Bina also formed relationships with a range of government ministries as 
well as with the UN and other international bodies (Bissat, 2002: 8-11; Danawi, 2002: 81-82; Harik, 2006: 279).   
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and founded two Farmers’ Solidarity Funds to compensate for the neglect of many 
Shi’i families in the National Security Fund (Bissat, 2002: 7; Harik, 2006: 279)318.  
 
Rather than function purely as a reactive service provider, Hizbullah’s relief 
organisations served as a proactive resource for assessing the needs of the Shi’i 
community as well as instilling its constituents with the impetus to discover their 
collective agency in precipitating change. In 1991, Hizbullah commissioned the 
CCSD to analyse the condition of infrastructure in Beirut’s southern suburbs to 
ascertain what services were available and to examine the government’s 
development policy for the area (Harik, 2006: 274)319. Similarly, in 1992, when the 
government prohibited the plantation of hemp and poppies, not only did the CCSD 
compile a report on alternative solutions, but Jihad al-Bina also instigated Agricultural 
Extension Services (Danawi, 2002: 82)320.  Overall, when combined with the Health 
Institute, which reviewed hundreds of thousands of cases a year through its 
management of 46 medical centres, clinics and infirmaries across Lebanon, 
Hizbullah spent approximately $8.7 million on welfare institutions in 1993 (Jaber, 
1997: 168). Having previously received the majority of its funding from Iran, the 
decline in revenues from the Islamic Republic on account of its policy of pragmatism 
led Hizbullah to become more self-sufficient. By 1992, its consolidated social capital 
with the Shi’i expatriate community, its collection of obligatory religious taxes derived 
from its cultural capital, such as Khums, Zakat, and Sadaka, as well as income 
raised via its system of professional institutions, contributed the majority of 
Hizbullah’s economic capital in Lebanon (Harik, 1996: 63; Fawwaz, 2000)321. 
 
At the advent of elections, Hizbullah was undergoing a process of converting its 
cultural, economic and social capital into symbolic capital within the SMF. Alongside 
its mosque networks and media outlets, such as Al-‘Ahd, Al-Nour and Al-Manar, 
Hizbullah was performing its al-amal al-salih (‘good works’) through social welfare 
organisations that strived to instil taqwa (‘a state of absolute piety’), promote iltizam 
(‘commitment’) and encourage the reproductive self-discipline and self-sufficiency of 
takaful ijtima’i (‘mutual responsibility’) (Deeb, 2006a: 169-207). Consequently, 
Hizbullah’s OF was institutionalising a homogenous Resistance habitus in the SMF, 
possessing dispositions of solidaristic practice that would enliven its corresponding 
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 In South Lebanon, 3,344 family members joined the Farmers’ Solidarity Fund whereas 700 families signed up to the one in the 
Biqa’. Charging a LL10,000 membership fee, the Fund had raised LL162 million by 1999 (Bissat, 2002: 7).  
319
 In 1991, Hizbullah called on the Dahiyeh Activists and Residents Committee to lobby the government to improve the situation in 
the area.  Following the findings of the CCSD report, Hizbullah issued a press release entitled ‘the Southern Suburbs: An Area of 
Misery Awaiting Solution’ on 14 January 1992 (Harik, 2006: 275).    
320
 Interview with Dr Mahmoud Mohsen Saleh in Beirut, 27 March 2012.  
321
 Gambill (2009: 134-135) states that expatriate money was collected through illegal dealings, such as the blood diamond industry in 
Sierra Leone, drugs and cigarette smuggling from Syria and audiovisual bootlegging from South America.  
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components in the PF and MSF. However, in order to sustain the mobilisation of this 
Resistance habitus in the SMF, commensurate developments were required in the 
MSF to fulfil the objective of synchronising relationally constituted practice. In 
conjunction with social services, the second component of Hizbullah’s strategy 
before the elections was to juxtapose the endemic ineffectiveness of the LAF with the 
proliferating sophistication of the Islamic Resistance. Endeavouring to strike a 
balance between perceptions that either associated the Islamic Resistance with 
intentionally fomenting violence or accused it of substituting military action with jihad 
bil lisan (‘struggle by tongue’), Hizbullah aimed to ‘create social solidarity around the 
resistance’ (Azani, 2011: 110; Karagiannis, 2009: 375). 
 
The disarming of the militias and the disarray of the LAF resulted in a security 
vacuum. During the civil war, LAF Commander Michel Aoun had declared that ‘you 
are either soldiers of sects and mercenaries…or soldiers of the homeland’ (MER, 17 
May, 1986: 14). The Maronite General, who regularly invoked Christian rhetoric 
throughout his ‘War for Liberation’ against Syria in 1990, was exiled after the civil war 
while the symbolic capital of the LAF became further diluted by sectarianism and 
emasculated by Syria’s symbolic power in Lebanon. Although the al-alaqat al-
mumayyaza (‘privileged relations’) in the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination (15 May, 1991) and the Common Defence and Security Pact (1 
September, 1991) engendered a semblance of equality between Syria and Lebanon, 
they were more a courteous ‘code for control and domination’ (Kassir, 2003: 87). 
Nevertheless, as expressed by Brigadier General Fuad Aoun, the ‘Army remains the 
best representative of the Lebanese people’ in the face of governmental stasis 
(MER, 25 March, 1989: 10).   
 
After the civil war, the fortunes of the Islamic Resistance became inextricably linked 
with Emile Lahoud, who was appointed Commander in Chief of the 37,000-strong 
LAF on 28 November 1990, issuing a warning to President Elias Hrawi not to 
‘interfere in Army affairs and I and the Army will not interfere in politics’ (MER, 2 
June, 1990: 7-10)322. A staunch ally of the Assad family, Lahoud believed that Israel’s 
occupation of the ‘security zone’ in the South represented Lebanon’s most pressing 
threat. In the short-term, as a proponent of Resistance and recognising the 
limitations of an ill-equipped LAF, Lahoud aimed to support Hizbullah while 
restructuring his forces away from sectarianism. In the long-term, Lahoud planned on 
                                                 
322
 Emile Lahoud was the son of Major General Jamil Lahoud, who was chosen by Syria to set up a military academy in Homs after 
independence in 1943 (MER, 28 September, 1998: 14; 12 December, 1998: 10).  
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implementing a series of reforms to enhance the LAF’s capabilities in facilitating 
national reconciliation and administering internal security. Ultimately, Lahoud insisted 
on endowing the LAF with ‘a real national resistance nature and…legalizing the 
Resistance by setting up complementarities between the latter and the army for the 
defence and security of Lebanese territory’ (Pakradouni, 2012: 10).    
 
This unequivocal endorsement of Hizbullah in the MSF was partly due to the inability 
of the government to allocate sufficient resources to the LAF. Initially, Defence 
Minsiter Michel Murr declared that the LAF required $240 million to complete the 
integration of former militia fighters and boost its total size to 54,000 (MER, 2 May, 
1992: 9-10)323. This plan, which sought to prepare Lebanon for the eventual 
withdrawal of 35,000 Syrian soldiers, was deemed ambitious considering the state of 
the economy and the existing budget for defence, which stood at $5 million (MER, 2 
May, 1992: 9-10). Subsequently, under significant pressure from Syria, the Lebanese 
government pledged to support the Islamic Resistance as long as Israel occupied 
South Lebanon and on the condition that the Islamic Resistance did not operate 
where the LAF was stationed (MER, 18 January, 1992: 18). Therefore, having 
returned the Abdullah barracks to the LAF in August 1991 and backed by Damascus, 
the Islamic Resistance received approval as an orthodox actor in the MSF. 
Exemplifying its elevated status of recognition, the military law banning militias 
neither mentioned Hizbullah as an exception for national resistance nor did its 18 
articles stipulate that the LAF was the exclusive proprietor of weapons in Lebanon 
(MER, 1 February, 1992: 11-12).  
 
Consequently, having amplified its cultural capital of Resistance by consolidating its 
social capital with Syria and maintaining the transference of economic capital from 
Iran, the acceptance of the Islamic Resistance by the PF enabled Hizbullah’s habitus 
in the MSF to transition from illegitimate heterodoxy to participant orthodoxy. The 
Syrian Arab Army, and to a lesser extent the LAF, remained the symbolic 
embodiment of the MSF but the Islamic Resistance had become internally legitimised 
by aligning its capital with the predominant orthodoxy. In this context, Hizbullah 
officials began publicly reiterating their ability to uphold the responsibility of 
Resistance. Following the assassination of Hizbullah Secretary General Shaykh 
Abbas Moussawi by Israel on 16 February 1992, the Islamic Resistance responded 
by displaying the variety of repertoires at its disposal, ranging from symmetrical 
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  A draft law proposed at the beginning of 1992 had wanted to incorporate 20,000 Christian and Muslim militia fighters into the LAF. 
By May, only 6,000 had been included (MER, 1 February, 1992: 11-12; 2 May, 1992: 9-10).   
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warfare, such as launching of Katyusha rockets, to asymmetrical tactics, including 
guerrilla attacks targeting Israeli and SLA positions in the ‘security zone’ as well as 
the deployment of suicide bombers, epitomised by Ibrahim Daher’s operation on 12 
August 1992 (MER, 29 February, 1992: 13)324. Commenting on the exponential 
sophistication of the Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah commander Shaykh Nabil Qaouk 
revealed:    
 
‘the Resistance today can boast of having specialised regiments each 
with its own particular weaponry…we have all the ingredients of a 
regular army. The Resistance is on a different psychological level than it 
ever was before…we are strengthened by the people’s support for us 
and their adoption of our cause’ (Jaber, 1997: 39).  
 
As parliamentary elections began on 23 August 1992, Hizbullah had reorganised its 
OF to accomplish a cohesive homology of practice between the SMF and MSF while 
creating opportunities to transfer capital to the PF. A month earlier, Hizbullah released 
its official political programme that not only echoed its intention to employ political 
access to protect the Resistance and eliminate confessionalism, but also to demand 
reforms in securing people’s rights and defending their dignity (Alagha, 2011: 63-69; 
Hamzeh, 2004: 11). Politically, Hizbullah campaigned for an end to kleptocracy and 
clientalism while calling on the government to uphold media freedoms. Militarily, 
Hizbullah endorsed a partnership with the LAF, emphasising the existential threat 
posed by Israel and the duty of the government to assist martyrs’ families. Socially, 
Hizbullah advocated for initiatives that improved social security, health, education and 
training as well as infrastructural development and agricultural investment. 
 
Despite this encompassing programme, Hizbullah’s OF had to adapt its practice to an 
institutionalised electoral system in the PF that was intentionally structured to 
marginalise radical challengers and dilute monopolies by encouraging moderately-
inclined multi-confessional lists (Harik, 2005: 77)325. After Ta’if, Syria had reorganised 
the country into five muhafazat (districts), namely Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the Biqa’, 
South and North Lebanon (Alagha, 2006: 43). Under these stipulations, the Shi’i were 
allocated 14 seats in the South, eight in the Biqa’ and two in Beirut (Nir, 2009: 182)326. 
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 A particular example was Hizbullah’s killing of SLA Intelligence Officer Husayn al-Nabi in Bint Jbeil on 5 October 1992 (MER, 10 
October, 1992: 10).  
325
 Between 1943 and 1992, five electoral systems had been applied: 1947 (55 deputies from five districts); 1951 (77 from nine); 1953 
(44 from 33); 1957 (66 from 25); and from 1960 until 1972 (99 from 26) (MER, 9 December, 1995: 9).  
326
 Unfortunately for Hizbullah, not only was its main sphere of influence in al-dahiyeh not considered part of Beirut, but the majority of 
its residents were registered in Amal’s strongholds in the South (Nir, 2009: 182).   
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In preparation, Hizbullah mobilised 600 members trained in managing campaigns in 
order to enhance constituency turnout and to devise strategies for facilitating 
cooperative alliances327. In the Biqa’, Hizbullah formed the La’iha Mutaharikah 
(‘Moving List’) to balance against Amal’s Husayn al-Husayni, the incumbent House 
Speaker, and won eight seats in Ba’albeck-Hermel with half consisting of non-Shi’i 
partners (Hamzeh, 1993: 330)328. While Hizbullah allied with the Druze and Basim al-
Saba to secure the nomination of Ali Ammar in Baabda, the Party negotiated a 
coalition agreement with the Islamic Group and the Islamic Society of Philanthropic 
Projects to guarantee a place for Mohammad Berjawi in Beirut (Hamzeh, 1993: 332). 
In the South, Hizbullah begrudgingly complied with al-saqf al-suri (‘the Syrian ceiling’), 
a mitigation measure designed to negate intra-Shi’i competition under the overarching 
interests of Syria in the South. Subsequently, Hizbullah and Amal combined lists with 
the former recording success with the election of Mohammad Ra’ad in Nabatiyeh and 
Mohammad Fneish in Tyre (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 54)329.  
 
By the close of voting on 6 September 1992, Hizbullah’s 12-member bloc, wafa’ lil 
moqawama (‘Loyalty to the Resistance’), which included four non-Shi’i MPs, became 
the largest representative grouping in parliament330. As the majority of Christian 
parties boycotted the elections in protest against Syria’s hegemony over Lebanese 
affairs and the discriminatory effect of the amended election law, the average voter 
turnout across the five districts was only 30.34% (Salam, 2003: 47)331. Alongside 
President Elias Hrawi, the other parts of the ‘Troika’ were filled by Amal leader Nabih 
Berri (Speaker) and Rafiq Hariri (Premier), a Sunni billionaire businessman. The 
Cabinet Statement, released on 9 November 1992, epitomised the structural 
idiosyncrasies of the Syrian-imposed Ta’if system. Whereas Syria’s military presence 
and prospects for abolishing political sectarianism were expunged from the agenda, 
the status of Hizbullah in relation to Israel’s occupation remained ambiguous. Since 
the wording of the document insisted on the ‘right of Lebanon and the Lebanese to 
confront Israeli occupation’, Hizbullah immediately castigated Prime Minister Hariri for 
his omission of the ‘Resistance’ (MER, 14 November, 1992: 8-16).         
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 Hizbullah’s al-majlis al-shura issued a fatwa (religious decree) calling on Shi’i to vote for Hizbullah. Lebanese newspapers reported 
that Hizbullah’s security apparatus were present at polling stations to intimidate voters while some claimed that Hizbullah bribed 
government departments for the identification cards of deceased citizens (Hamzeh, 1993: 332-333; MER, 29 August, 1992: 9).         
328
 These eight candidates were: Shaykh Ibrahim al-Sayyid (Hizbullah); Muhammad Yaghi (Hizbullah); Khodr Tlays (Hizbullah); Ali 
Taha (Hizbullah); Ibrahim Bayan (Sunni); Munir al-Hujayri (Sunni); Rabiha Kayrouz (Maronite); Saoud Rufayli (Greek Orthodox) 
(MER, 17 October, 1992: 15-20).  
329
 Testament to the complexities of social structures in the South, Amal submitted a mixed list of 26 candidates in the South with only 
three standing as representatives of the party (Harik, 1996: 42).  
330
 Hizbullah failed to elect only two candidates (Harik, 1996: 42).   
331
 According to Hamzeh (1993: 331-332), voter turnout was below average in the predominantly Christian areas of Baabda (12%) 
and Beirut (13%) and above average in the predominantly Shi’i areas of Ba’albeck-Hermel (35%) and South Lebanon (37%). While 
the four major Christian leaders, namely Amin Gemayel, Michel Aoun, Raymond Edde and Dory Chamoun, had relocated to Paris 
after the civil war, Samir Geagea was arrested on 21 April 1994 for committing a series of atrocities from the massacre of the 
Franjiyeh family on 13 June 1978 to the assassination of Danny Chamoun on 21 October 1990. Additionally, in terms of the election 
law, Syria diluted, diversified and divided Christian enclaves to diminish their influence in Lebanon (El-Khazen, 2003: 67).      
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The ‘Troika’ system, manipulated by Syria, was both enabling and disabling. While 
Hizbullah was empowered by its parliamentary presence, it lacked access to the 
‘Troika’ and relied on Syria for preserving the Resistance. Concurrently, Syria 
ensured Amal’s acquiescence by using Hizbullah as a neutralising influence on Nabih 
Berri in his relations with the President and Premier. Similarly, Syria’s power over the 
Presidency and parliament could check Rafiq Hariri’s attempts to pursue economic 
initiatives or address issues of Lebanon’s security that contravened Syria’s interests. 
Demarcating the boundaries for sanctioned manoeuvrability, Ghazi Kan’an, Syria’s 
power broker in Lebanon, judged that that the role of the Lebanese in Lebanon was to 
‘engage in trade and commerce’ whereas the domain of Syria in Lebanon was to 
command ‘politics and security’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 245-246). 
 
Citing Hizbullah’s electoral success, Alagha (2011: 23) concluded that in terms of 
maslaha (‘interest’), the ‘logic of operating within the bounds of the Lebanese state 
has prevailed over the logic of revolution’. Conversely, Shaykh Qassem (2005: 188-
189) interpreted Hizbullah’s decision to pursue the inherent political opportunities with 
the Lebanese state as complementing rather than contradicting the principles of 
revolution. The difference between these dichotomous perspectives emanates from 
their respective perceptions of interest. Whereas Alagha construed the constitution of 
interest in the PF as precluding Hizbullah from propagating its revolutionary 
principles, Qassem viewed access to the PF as enabling Hizbullah to solidify its 
interest in simultaneously inculcating a principled Resistance habitus across 
Lebanon’s fields of practice. By 1992, Hizbullah’s OF had demonstrated its ability to 
balance its interests and principles. By disseminating Collective Action Frames that 
incorporated the needs expressed by the Shi’i community, Hizbullah diversified its 
mobilising modalities in the SMF. Furthermore, not only had the Syrian-endorsed 
Islamic Resistance become acknowledged by the PF as an orthodox actor in the 
MSF, but the Loyalty to Resistance, despite engaging in heterodox practice, also 
represented the largest bloc in parliament. Consequently, Hizbullah’s OF successfully 
realigned the homology of its Resistance habitus between the SMF and MSF while 
horizontally transferring its accumulated capital to the PF.  
 
Nevertheless, the 1992 experiment had also demonstrated that Lebanon’s PF was 
institutionalised to elicit and reinforce a perpetual practice of supporting the system 
through compliance while progressively adjusting to ‘the anomalies of the political 
process’ (El-Khazen, 2003: 72). Once initiated, Hizbullah’s opportunities for 
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navigating around the PF and balancing its heterodox position would be determined 
by a continual, mutually constitutive dialectic of persuasion and validation. Primarily, 
Hizbullah’s OF, lodged between the MSF and PF, would be charged with reproducing 
the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance as a defensive force against Israeli 
occupation. Concurrently, Hizbullah’s OF, reliant on maintaining its symbolic capital 
within the Shi’i community, would also be responsible for adhering to the structured 
rules of the Lebanese system in facilitating confessional mobilisation in the SMF for 
preserving its position in the PF.   
 
6.2 Striving for symbolic capital in the MSF 
 
For the Islamic Resistance, the route to symbolic capital in the MSF depended on the 
conversion of its cultural and economic capital into social capital with Syria and the 
LAF. In particular, and having ascended the hierarchy to represent an orthodox actor, 
the enduring legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF was contingent upon 
recognising the parameters and regulations of practice imposed by Syria, such as 
targeting UNIFIL or provoking Israel beyond the designated 1,200 square kilometres 
of occupied land in South Lebanon. By the end of the 1990s, in diligently observing 
and optimising opportunities within the prescribed ‘rules of the game’, the Islamic 
Resistance had acquired enough symbolic capital through what Major General Robert 
Scales referred to as a ‘revolution in warfare’ to initiative an alteration of the prevailing 
orthodoxy in the MSF (Gleis & Berti, 2012: 84).  
 
Following calls in 1991 for the deployment of the LAF to the South, Hizbullah’s OF 
further devolved ‘resistance-related endeavours’ in the MSF to the Jihad Assembly, 
one of five bodies in the majlis al-shura reporting directly to the Secretary General, a 
position that primarily focused on supervising and coordinating the members of the 
Council rather than personally directing military affairs (Qassem, 2005: 63-64; 
Blanford, 2011: 124)332. The remodelling of Hizbullah’s leadership structure not only 
acknowledged the importance of prioritising field experience for executing military 
activities over structuring rigidly bureaucratic procedures, but also intended to 
promote professional expertise and operational efficiency333. Consequently, senior 
commanders in the Islamic Resistance were extended ‘the status of an autonomous 
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 These endeavours included oversight, recruitment, training and security while the other four assemblies were the Political, 
Executive, Parliamentary and Judiciary (Qassem, 2005: 63). Although the representative of the Jihad Assembly is anonymous, it is 
believed that the position could have been held by either Sayyid Nasrallah himself or by Hajj Muhsin al-Shakar (Hajj Fouad Shikr) 
(Alagha, 2011: 161; MER, 3 July, 1993: 7-8).     
333
 According to Hizbullah’s Deputy Secretary General Shaykh Qassem (2005: 72), ‘liberation operations’ were planned and executed 
independently without the interference of political interests.  
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body, able to deal with the day-to-day attacks on Israeli targets without having to refer 
to the leadership in Beirut’ (Jaber, 1997: 38)334.   
 
As demonstrated by the launching of its first Katyusha rockets after the assassination 
of Shaykh Abbas Moussawi in February 1992 as well as the firing of its first AT-3 
Sagger anti-tank and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles by the end of that year, the Islamic 
Resistance was advancing its military capabilities beyond small arms and light 
weapons (Blanford, 2011: 132). Moreover, Lebanese newspapers cited enhanced 
instances of cooperation between the LAF and Islamic Resistance in southern Beirut, 
the Biqa’ and around the ‘security zone’ in the South (MER, 2 January, 1993: 7-8)335. 
This coordination was largely due to Hizbullah’s social capital with LAF Commander 
Emile Lahoud, who refused Rafiq Hariri’s requests to curtail the Islamic Resistance by 
asserting that ‘my conscience does not allow me to strike the Resistance that 
confronts Israel when all I want is to put together a national army capable of taking up 
this role’ (Alagha, 2011: 118; Pakradouni, 2012: 13).  
 
The first official test of the Islamic Resistance occurred on 25 July 1993 when Israel, 
in the midst of negotiating the Oslo Accords with the PLO, launched Operation 
Accountability, a seven-day strike in retaliation for the killing of five Israeli soldiers in 
the occupied zone. As the name implied, Operation Accountability aimed to inflict 
damage on Hizbullah’s positions in the South in order to expose tensions between 
the Islamic Resistance and the Lebanese authorities (Harik, 2005: 115-116). During 
the campaign, Israel conducted 1,244 raids and fired 28,000 shells, killing 130 
civilians and displacing 300,000 people from 120 villages (Qassem, 2005: 110-111). 
In response, Hizbullah, which claimed the loss of only 13 fighters, countered with 300 
rockets and 30 military operations, killing two Israeli civilians (Blanford, 2011: 147). 
Although Israel publicly declared victory, Operation Accountability failed to elicit its 
desired outcomes since the Lebanese government remained relatively mute on 
Hizbullah’s activities while Syria boosted its stature by mediating the ceasefire.  
 
Conversely, the oral ‘understanding’, brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, in which both sides were expected to restrict operations away from 
civilian centres, acted to indirectly enhance the credibility of the Islamic Resistance 
and confer legitimacy as an orthodox actor within Lebanon’s MSF. Not only had 
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 Timur Goksel revealed that it was Sayyid Nasrallah who first appointed a Hizbullah liaison officer for UNIFIL in the South (Interview 
in Beirut, 9 May 2012).  
335
 This relationship was not always cordial. On 13 September 1993, the LAF killed 9 Hizbullahis in the southern suburb of Ghubayri 
during a protest against the signing of the Oslo Accords (MER, 15 September, 1993: 7). 
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Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus been consecrated to symbolic proportions, exacting 
national respect for surviving an onslaught from the most powerful military in the 
region, but Hizbullah’s hybrid of conventional and guerrilla tactics, especially the use 
of Katyusha rockets as a defensive response to Israeli occupation, were also justified 
as a recognised amendment to the structured laws of military practice. After the 
death of nine Israelis on 19 August 1993 in Shihin, the launching of Katyusha rockets 
was described as ‘an equilibrium of terror’ (MER, 25 September, 1993: 7). Explaining 
the logic behind Hizbullah’s interpretation of a proportionate response, a Hizbullah 
official warned that ‘let aggression on Lebanon and shelling against civilians stop and 
we shall launch rockets no more…As long as there is occupation, there will be 
Resistance’ (MER, 25 September, 1993: 9)  
 
While the decentralised decision-making structures of the Islamic Resistance in the 
MSF were ideologically prompted and financially endorsed by Iran within redlines 
delineated by Syria, Hizbullah did not surrender its agency or submit to the 
instructions of its regional partners336. Rather, by strategically navigating within the 
inter-subjectively understood remit of structured opportunities, Hizbullah’s 
Resistance habitus incrementally developed its practice as it became increasingly 
exposed and experienced in the MSF, thereby enabling the Islamic Resistance to 
cognitively identify and effectively capitalise upon contextual opportunities. In 1993, 
the Islamic Resistance conducted 450 attacks, killing 12 Israeli soldiers and losing 
69 fighters (Blanford, 2011: 145; Malthaner, 2011: 219). However, by 1995, the 
Islamic Resistance had executed 908 operations, killing 23 soldiers and losing 72 
fighters (MER, 6 January, 1996: 9; Blanford, 2011: 148-149)337. 
 
Allegedly enshrined in Khalil Harb’s ‘Principles of Warfare’ of 1995, the tactics 
employed by the Islamic Resistance were evolving beyond vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices (VBIEDs) and suicide vest improvised explosive devices 
(SVIEDs), exemplified by Salah Ghandour’s attack on 25 April 1995, to encompass 
embedded cells in coordinated ‘hit and run’ attacks or simultaneous diversionary 
decoys on 3-4 Israeli/SLA positions using Saggar-3 anti-tank missiles, mortar teams 
and Katyusha rockets as cover (Blanford, 2011: 123; MER, 19 February, 1994: 
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 Sayyid Nasrallah reported that ‘Syria does not tell us to heat it up at this time or scale down at another time…the fighters are in an 
open-ended state of war, and they act depending on when, where and how many targets are accessible’ (MER, 27 August, 1994: 13). 
Similarly, in the context of Iran, Sayyid Nasrallah stated that ‘we have a lot of respect for the Islamic Republic of Iran, but our 
decisions are self-made. We confer with our Iranians friends and listen to their views, but they cannot impose anything on us (MER, 6 
April, 1996: 8).     
337
 The Islamic Resistance also killed an estimated 33 SLA members in 1995 (MER, 6 January, 1996: 9).  
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15)338. Exploiting its superior knowledge of the terrain, the Islamic Resistance also 
replaced wire-controlled IEDs with radio-controlled ones that were disguised and 
detonated from a distance. Meanwhile, Hizbullah’s communication systems, which 
intentionally transported messages via couriers as well as through privately 
integrated networks, rendered it difficult for Israel to intercept transmissions. 
Moreover, the Janus-faced strategy of the Islamic Resistance, which concurrently 
defended land like a conventional military force while adopting unconventional 
modalities for military offensives, caused considerable confusion for Israel in 
formulating a corresponding response (Biddle & Friedman, 2008: xii)339. 
 
Testament to Hizbullah’s observation and obedience to the ‘rules of the game’ in the 
MSF, the Islamic Resistance reportedly violated the oral agreement 13 times 
between 1993 and 1996 whereas Israel contravened the arrangement 231 times 
(Blanford, 2011: 154-155). Israel was beginning to lose its symbolic status and 
competitive edge since the fragile rapprochement with the Palestinians compelled 
the government to refrain from any military campaigns that could be perceived as 
unjustified or disproportionate. As Israeli Deputy Defence Minister Mordachai Gur 
admitted that ‘we are suffering…and we are hurting greatly’, Timur Goksel 
highlighted the deteriorating relations between UNIFIL and Israel in the South (MER, 
7 January, 1995: 8; 8 April, 1995: 12). Additionally, following the abduction of 
Mustafa Dirani in Kasernaba on 21 May 1994 and the raid on Ain Kawkab in the 
eastern Biqa’ two weeks later, the Lebanese government was furious at Israel’s 
encroachment on its sovereignty340. As opposed to risk proactively engaging in 
these debates, Hizbullah’s OF recognised the potentially negative ramifications of its 
public intervention and allowed Lebanese discontentment with Israel to gain 
momentum independently. By apprehending and handing over the suspected 
collaborators behind the two operations to the Lebanese authorities, Hizbullah 
augmented its symbolic capital in eclipsing the diminishing status of the LAF and 
presenting itself as the only actor capable of protecting Lebanon from Israel341.    
 
On 11 April 1996, the Islamic Resistance confronted its second significant military 
test when Israel initiated ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ by striking the southern 
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 Motorcycles ostensibly transported carriers of Saggar-3 anti-tank missiles to and from their positions whereas mortar teams 
travelled via Toyotas or Volvos. The Islamic Resistance had also acquired Dutch-made night-vision equipment, advanced body 
armour and new American-styled military helmets (MER, 19 February, 1994: 15).  
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 In July 1995, Israel’s Egoz Reconnaissance Unit was tasked with waging an anti-guerrilla, micro-warfare campaign against 
Hizbullah (Blanford, 2011: 148-149).    
340
 Mustapha Dirani, who was accused of the kidnapping of Israeli pilot Ron Arad in 1986, was seized from his home northeast of 
Zahla by Israeli commandos. The Israeli attack on Ain Kawkab, which was a Hizbullah training base located only six kilometres from 
the Syrian border, killed 26 people (MER, 28 May, 1994: 13; 4 June, 1994: 6).    
341
 Hizbullah handed over 7 ‘spies’ to the Lebanese authorities. By the beginning of 1996, Hizbullah had captured and handed over 70 
men and women to the Lebanese authorities for conspiring with Israel in Lebanon (MER, 1 April, 1995: 13-15; 6 January, 1996: 10).   
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suburbs of Beirut, the first attack on the capital since 1982. Although the casus belli 
was predicated on halting Hizbullah from firing rockets, Israeli Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres intended to satisfy the security concerns of the Israeli public following 
the assassination of former premier Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 and prior to 
the 1996 elections by demonstrating his ability to protect Israel while concurrently 
capitalising on the prevailing political paralysis in Lebanon between President Hrawi 
and Prime Minister Hariri to cripple Hizbullah342.  
 
The 16-day assault attempted to disable Hizbullah’s central nervous system by 
striking its headquarters, institutional infrastructure and military apparatus to ‘sow 
dissension between the Resistance and the people’ as well as ‘seeking to push the 
state to pressure the Resistance’343. Israel conducted 2,350 air sorties and 600 raids 
killing 160 people (including 14 from the Islamic Resistance) and displacing 400,000 
while Hizbullah launched 746 Katyusha rockets into Israel (Blanford, 2011: 159-
160). On 18 April 1996, 100 people were killed after Israeli shells struck a U.N. 
compound in Qana344. Aside from the civilian casualties, Operation Grapes of Wrath 
also caused almost $700 million of damage, including the destruction of two power 
stations that provided electricity to Beirut (MER, 20 April, 1996: 9; Blanford, 2011: 
159). Nevertheless, although Israel fulfilled its objective in stirring resentment 
amongst the Lebanese, it was the government and the LAF that were incapacitated 
as Hizbullah attracted national support345. As articulated by Prime Minister Hariri:         
 
‘we cannot rein in the Resistance while Israel occupies part of Lebanese 
territory…That would spark a civil war worse than what the Israelis are 
doing in our country right now…There is nothing we can do today 
because the people would see us as traitors’ (MER, 20 April, 1996: 7).  
 
In a repeat of Operation Accountability, Syria diplomatically intervened to mediate an 
end to hostilities. Whereas the oral agreement of 1993 signified the induction of the 
Islamic Resistance as a legitimate actor in Lebanon’s MSF, the ‘April Understanding’ 
of 26 April 1996 legally institutionalised the Islamic Resistance as a regionally 
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 Only 14 Israeli civilians had been killed by Katyusha rockets since February 1992 while nearly 500 Lebanese and Palestinians had 
been killed by Israeli attacks (Norton, 1999: 27).     
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 This is an extract from a report produced on Operation Grapes of Wrath by Hizbullah’s Al-‘Ahd journal: 
http://english.alahednews.com.lb/uploaded1/essaysimages/big/2013/04/april1996-en.JPG; 
http://english.alahednews.com.lb/uploaded1/flashes/infograph/nissan1996-en/index.html  
344
 Contradicting Israel’s claims that ‘regrettably, a few rounds had overshot and hit the U.N. compound’ while targeting Hizbullah’s 
launching sites, a U.N. inquiry into the attack on Qana, led by Major General Frank van Kappen, concluded that ‘while the possibility 
cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely that the shelling of the U.N. compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors’ on 
the part of Israel (MER, 11 May, 1996: 16-18).      
345
 The LAF refrained from militarily engaging with Israel while Hizbullah’s reputation grew. Hizbullah advertised funding opportunities 
for the Islamic Resistance in local papers with Christian woman donating $15,000 provided it was used to fire Katyusha rockets into 
Israel (MER, 12 August, 1995: 9; Jaber, 1997: 196-198).     
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recognised stakeholder propagating the orthodoxy of Lebanon’s MSF. The document, 
which was overseen by a five-member Monitoring Committee including the U.S., 
Israel, France, Lebanon and Syria, insisted that all parties must commit to avoiding 
civilian areas while stipulating that all parties exercise the right to self-defence. 
Therefore, although the Islamic Resistance was prohibited from firing Katyusha 
rockets into Israel, it received international authorisation to resume its pre-existing 
practice of militarily combating Israel in the occupied zone for defence and deterrence 
purposes.  
 
The developments of 1993 and 1996 demonstrated that the Islamic Resistance was 
maturing in the MSF to achieve results ‘within the rules’ that required Israel to 
contemplate strategic revisions (Hirst, 2010: 249). By May 1996, Israel voted in 
Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu, a hardliner whose interpretation of Israeli security and 
the peace process acted to vindicate Hizbullah’s position. Subsequently, Hizbullah 
Commander Shaykh Qaouk argued that ‘the Resistance managed to transfer that 
distress from the military field to the field of security and to the public and political 
fields’ (Azani, 2011: 199). The restructured ‘rules of the game’, in which Hizbullah and 
Israel were expected to observe an inter-subjectively understood logic of interaction, 
‘allowed for both sides to conduct periodic, indirect negotiations for the return of 
prisoners and bodies’ (Norton, 2007a: 87-88). On 21 July 1996, Hizbullah exchanged 
the remains of Rachamim Alsheikh, Yossi Fink and 17 SLA bodies in return for 45 
prisoners from Khiyam and 123 Lebanese bodies (MER, 27 July, 1996: 7; Qassem, 
2005: 140). 
 
Nevertheless, despite this elevated standing, the Islamic Resistance persisted in its 
targeting of Israel and the SLA in the occupation zone. Replenishing stockpiles with 
more advanced weaponry, enhancing the efficiency of its activities and escalating its 
attacks, Sayyid Nasrallah announced that the Islamic Resistance had conducted 
825 operations by the end of 1996 resulting in the deaths of 27 Israeli soldiers 
(Azani, 2011: 196; Blanford, 2011: 180)346. From 1996 until 2000, the Islamic 
Resistance launched 4,963 attacks on Israeli and SLA targets (Zisser, 2009: 161). 
Most saliently, not only was Hizbullah’s fatalities per mission ratio decreasing, but 
the Islamic Resistance had also comparatively narrowed the gap in overall 
                                                 
346
  These included Hizbullah’s 10th and 11th suicide operations: Ali Ashmar (20 March, 1996) and Bilal Akhras (10 June, 1996). Not 
only was the Islamic Resistance becoming more adept at designing and detonating explosives, but Hizbullah was also receiving more 
advanced rockets than the Katyusha, including the long-range, Iranian-made Fajr-3 missile (MER, 9 November, 1996: 15-16).  
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casualties, accomplishing almost parity with Israel by 1997 (Hirst, 2010: 263)347. In 
particular, the Islamic Resistance exhibited its sophistication on 4 September 1997 
in Ansariyeh when it ambushed and killed 12 members of Shayetet 13, Israel’s elite 
naval commando unit348.  
 
The victory of qualitative methods over quantitative capabilities in the MSF had 
profound implications for the orthodoxy of Israel’s practice. Primarily, Israeli 
strategists and soldiers were becoming demoralised by their collective inability to 
curtail or defeat the refined efficiency of multi-faceted tactics employed by the 
Islamic Resistance. As summarised by a Hizbullah commander, Israel was 
‘hysterical over the impotence of their advanced weaponry as far as the guerrilla war 
is concerned’ (MER, 26 December, 1998: 10). Ultimately, hit and run attacks on 
fixed positions as well as ambushes on patrols using a combination of IEDs, 
machine-gun fire and AT-3/4 missiles negated Israel’s conventional technology and 
overstretched its resources (MER, 26 December, 1998: 11). Additionally, as 
epitomised by Ansariyeh, the Islamic Resistance was developing its own human and 
signals intelligence systems through a combination of SLA informants and 
customised information techniques not only to uncover Israeli spy networks, but also 
to circumvent Israel’s advanced detection technology in monitoring and executing 
missions across the occupation zone (MER, 12 June, 1999: 11-12)349.  
 
Compounding Israel’s frustration, the Islamic Resistance was not contravening the 
prescribed principles of military confrontation but abiding by established ‘rules of the 
game’ within the predominant orthodoxy of the MSF that Israel had assisted in 
constructing, structuring and legitimising (MER, 26 December, 1998: 11). Therefore, 
by violating international agreements, tacitly recognising its occupation of Lebanon 
and implicitly engaging with Hizbullah’s Resistance, Israel was veering towards 
heterodox practice within a standardised orthodoxy it had contributed to 
institutionalising. After all, Israel ‘never challenged the right of Hizbullah to attacks its 
soldiers in Lebanon’ (Norton, 1999: 27). The Islamic Resistance fighters were 
‘Lebanese on their own land’, embedded as ‘the shepherds, the farmers, the 
shopkeepers in all the villages under occupation…No one can ever stop them from 
                                                 
347
 In 1997, Hizbullah lost 60 fighters from 855 missions killing 39 Israelis and 25 SLA soldiers. In 1998, Hizbullah lost 38 men but 
killed 24 Israelis and 33 SLA soldiers. In 1999, Hizbullah launched 1500 operations at a loss of 36 fighters (Hirst, 2010: 263; 
Malthaner, 2011: 219).  
348
 Sayyid Nasrallah revealed in 2010 that the mission’s success was due to Hizbullah’s intelligence apparatus discovering how to 
intercept Israeli transmissions sent via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Blanford, 2011: 192-194). 
349
 Hizbullah was able to persuade SLA members to defect by exploiting the conditions of their original recruitment, such as poor living 
environments, bribery, involuntary conscription, threats of imprisonment or the confiscation of property (MER, 12 June, 1999: 11-12).   
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fighting on their land against Israeli occupation’ (Timur Goksel in MER, 19 
December, 1998: 12). 
 
Politically, rather than diminishing its reputation in the SMF, Israel inadvertently 
reinforced and expanded Hizbullah’s appeal by providing further ammunition to 
mobilise the Party of God’s extensive network of institutions and galvanising the 
broader Lebanese public. One of the most effective conduits for Hizbullah to convert 
its symbolic capital in the MSF into social capital within and beyond the Shi’i 
community in the SMF was through media. Reflecting on the Qana massacre of 
1996, Tele Liban’s Zahera Harb (2008: 150) recalled that ‘the nation was in shock 
and we, the journalists, were part of the nation’. Al-Manar, Hizbullah’s official TV 
station, was instrumental in devising and disseminating Hizbullah’s Collective Action 
Frames through ‘liberation propaganda’350. Hizbullah’s qanat al-moqawama (‘Station 
of Resistance’) projected and translated Hizbullah’s discourse not only to the Shi’i 
community and the Lebanese public, but also to the Israeli public with its Hebrew 
subtitles and the international community with its English translations (Harb, 2009: 
53). Following the killing of Hadi Nasrallah, Sayyid Nasrallah’s 18 year-old son, by 
the Israeli Egoz Unit on 12 September 1997, media outlets may not have 
independently generated evocative reverberations inciting Lebanese mobilisation 
but the repetitive accentuation of unifying frames presented an opportunity to display 
the unrelenting commitment of Hizbullah’s Secretary General, heighten the public’s 
awareness of the Islamic Resistance’s cultural capital and attract social capital by 
aligning the sympathetic sentiments of those who could relate to the death of a son 
in conflict. Therefore, the cause and content of the Islamic Resistance became more 
accessible to the Lebanese public. 
 
In this context, and with Hizbullah eager to ‘shed the Iranian label’ and adopt a more 
‘flexible formula’ that aimed at giving all Lebanese the opportunity to participate in 
the war to liberate the homeland, Sayyid Nasrallah announced the formation of al-
saraya al-lubnaniyya li-moqawamat al-ihtilal (‘The Lebanese Brigades for Resisting 
Occupation’) on 3 November 1997 (MER, 18 October, 1997: 13). Although 
operationally distinct from the Islamic Resistance, this ‘Lebanonisation of 
Resistance’, which represented an amalgamation of volunteer fighters from a variety 
of confessionalist, nationalist and secularist backgrounds, conducted 175 attacks 
                                                 
350
 In 1994, the Public Information Centre coordinated all of Hizbullah’s communication activities. In 1996, following Operation Grapes 
of Wrath, the Lebanese cabinet granted Al-Manar an official state licence. By July 1997, Hizbullah held a 55% stake in the Lebanese 
Communication Group, which merged Al-Manar and Al-Nour (Jorisch, 2004: xiii, 24-25; Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 62).     
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between 14 March 1998 and 15 November 1999 (Alagha, 2006: 47)351. While the 
purpose of inaugurating the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB) was not 
motivated with the intention of ‘Lebanonising’ Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the 
MSF, the inclusive gesture supplied Hizbullah’s OF with the opportunity to 
‘Lebanonise’ the framing of the Islamic Resistance in order to enhance its social 
capital with the SMF, a development that would enable Hizbullah’s OF to solidify its 
symbolic capital in the MSF while accumulating recognised forms of social capital in 
the PF.    
 
During this process, Al-Manar also functioned to expose, emphasise and embed 
these symbolic victories at the expense of the ‘Small Satan’ or ‘Zionist entity’. On 28 
May 1998, Israel agreed to release the bodies of 40 Hizbullah fighters, including 
Hadi Nasrallah, and 65 Lebanese prisoners in exchange for Itamar Ilyah, one of the 
Israeli soldiers killed at Ansariyeh (Alagha, 2006: 49; Qassem, 2005: 141). Al-Manar 
broadcast live images of the military reception as the Troika attended the return of 
the martyrs at Beirut Airport and covered Sayyid Nasrallah’s speech addressing the 
sacrifice of the martyrs at the Imam Al-Mahdi School in Ouzai (Harb, 2009: 58-60). 
Supplementing the reporting of commemorative events, comprehensive news 
accounts as well as reels of amaliyat istishahidiya (‘martyrdom operations’) and 
feeds of Israeli ambushes through its coordination with the military media service of 
the Islamic Resistance, Al-Manar sought to undermine the Israeli ‘military machine’ 
and psychologically implanted doubt amongst the Israeli public while simultaneously 
informing, empowering and harmonising the natural compatibility of Hizbullah’s 
Resistance habitus between the MSF and SMF (Jorisch, 2004: 22)352.  
 
The killing of Brigadier General Erez Gerstein on 28 February 1999, the highest 
ranked military figure targeted by the Islamic Resistance, epitomised the influential 
congruence between Hizbullah’s ‘military ability and media credibility’ (Harb, 2009: 
58). While Hizbullah’s security apparatus was tasked with monitoring his movements, 
Hadi Nasrallah’s former unit in the Islamic Resistance was responsible for planting 
three bombs in the occupation zone (MER, 12 June, 1999: 11-12). Testament to the 
                                                 
351
 Prerequisites for membership included having no ties with Israel, possessing no political or ideological commitment besides 
resisting Israel and demonstrating physical and mental ability. After extensive military and ideological training that redesigned 
affiliation on a ‘nationalist basis’, the Lebanese Brigades conducted its first attack on 14 March 1998 to mark the 20th anniversary of 
Operation Litani. Almost half were between 25 and 30 with 35.7% possessing university degrees. They contained Sunnis (38%), Shi’i 
(25%), Druze (20%) and Christians (17%) with recruits coming from Beirut (40%), North Lebanon (20.6%), South Lebanon (17.4%), 
the Biqa’ (12.4%) and the Chouf (8.6%) (MER, 21 March, 1998: 12-13; 16 January, 1999: 9-10; 18 December, 1999: 19).          
352
 In particular, on 27 February 1998, while Israel denied the existence and success of Operation Beir Kalab, al-Manar not only 
released footage that substantiated the event, but also conducted an interview with the Hizbullah commander in charge of the 
operation. Additionally, on 15 May 1999, when Hizbullah regained control over Beit Yahoun, al-Manar ensured that a connection was 
made between Hizbullah’s activities and its pro-Palestinian credentials by invoking the anniversary of al-Nakba in 1948 when Israel 
compelled approximately 800,000 Palestinians to leave their homes (Harb, 2009: 56-58, 63-65).     
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clandestine nature of Hizbullah’s intelligence gathering and precise execution, 
Brigadier General Erez Gerstein’s motorcade of four armoured cars was struck three 
kilometres north of the Israeli border in Markaba (MER, 6 March, 1999: 7). Almost 
immediately, Al-Manar broadcast a full brief of the operation and a complete profile of 
Brigadier General Gerstein. Commenting on Israeli TV, which relayed the report, 
military personnel revealed that such detailed analyses of the operation could only 
have been possible through extensive research and preparation beforehand (Harb, 
2009: 61-63). Mirroring the fatigue of the Israeli public and militarily confounded, 
Israel’s retaliation consisted of a few air raids over the southern suburbs of Beirut 
and the Biqa’. Despite threats from Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz and Defence 
Minister Moshe Arens, ‘it wasn’t a lion that roared. It was a mouse crying before it 
wriggled back into its hole’ (Alex Fishman in MER, 6 March, 1999: 8).  
 
Six months after Ehud Barak, the impending Israeli premier, declared a unilateral 
withdrawal from the ‘security zone’, the Islamic Resistance demonstrated the 
audacity of a military actor on the ascendency with the suicide operation of Ammar 
Hammoud on 30 December 1999, the twelfth and last of its kind. From a mediocre 
position as one of a plethora of heterodox militias sharing in the illusio of Resistance 
against Israel in the MSF, the Islamic Resistance, presided over by the 
predominantly consistent leadership structures within Hizbullah’s OF, strategically 
accumulated and deployed capital to adapt, develop and evolve its Resistance 
habitus in accordance with the parameters permitted by the intrinsic dynamics of the 
MSF. By the time of Israel’s withdrawal, the Islamic Resistance had cultivated and 
consolidated its symbolic capital as a legitimately orthodox actor353.   
 
The innovative ingenuity and reproductive quality of the Islamic Resistance in 
relation to the structured rules of practice enabled the amassing of symbolic capital, 
a resource that bestows authentic acceptance upon the means and meaning of the 
capital utilised. Due to conserved field homology between its Resistance habitus in 
the SMF and MSF, not only was Hizbullah’s OF able to transfer symbolic capital 
from the MSF to influence the practice of its Shi’i agents in the SMF, but the 
unprecedented hysteresis the Islamic Resistance triggered in Israel presented 
Hizbullah’s OF with an opportunity to mobilise its media organs in projecting a 
‘Lebanonised’ Resistance narrative that also appealed to non-Shi’i agents within the 
                                                 
353
 During Hizbullah’s Fifth Conclave (1998), the majlis al-shura remained largely similar to its previous composition. One notable 
change was the alleged appointment of Jawad Nour al-Din, a.k.a. Hajj Radwan or Imad Mugniyeh, as the head of the Jihad Council 
(MER, 1 August, 1998: 5; Alagha, 2011: 162; Blanford, 2011: 124). The increased efficiency of Hizbullah’s military tactics may be 
attributed to enhanced experience with the average age of martyred fighters rising from 21-22 (1983-1991) to 26 (1998-2000) 
(Malthaner, 2011: 223).            
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SMF. By extension, this inclusive dialogue between the Islamic Resistance and 
Lebanese civil society acted to augment Hizbullah’s social capital within the 
institutionalised corridors of the PF. However, despite these unparalleled 
accomplishments in the MSF and SMF, Syria remained the custodian of symbolic 
power in exerting authority over practice in Lebanon. Therefore, retaining and 
transmitting viable forms of capital into Lebanon’s PF ultimately relied on 
opportunities produced or provided by Syria.         
 
6.3 The Politics of Resistance 
 
Following the ‘April Understanding’ of 1996, Hizbullah’s OF had created a harmonious 
Resistance habitus between the MSF and SMF in which cultural and economic capital 
was simultaneously being reinforced into symbolic capital. Exemplified by its 
relationship with LAF General Lahoud as well as its military engagements with Israel, 
Hizbullah had also expanded its social capital beyond the Shi’i community. 
Nevertheless, the priority for Hizbullah’s OF was to translate this symbolic capital to 
the PF without compromising the management and meaning of its existing status. As 
the 1996 parliamentary elections approached, Hizbullah’s OF was confident that the 
exploits of the Islamic Resistance combined with the provision of welfare programmes 
could be adjusted to the logic of the PF in embodying the antithesis to the free market 
capitalism advocated by Premier Hariri. Since 1992, the Sunni businessman had 
sought to address Lebanon’s post-war malaise by securing loans and grants from 
foreign creditors. Benefitting from his established networks with international 
governments, Hariri initially received $1.5 billion to instigate a series of projects 
centred on the reconstruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure354. 
 
For the opportunities of this ‘Harirism’ to succeed, the premier recognised the 
importance of navigating around the structured restrictions of the PF by constructing 
‘his own sphere, mixing public and private to conquer his own place alongside the 
“presidents’ club”’ (Leenders, 2012: 213, 216). Through SOLIDERE, a private 
company established by Hariri to oversee Beirut’s transformation, the state’s Council 
for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a public ‘technopolitical organization’ 
vulnerable to Hariri’s clientalism, announced $1.7 billion of initiatives in Electricity, 
Telecoms, Transport, Water, Education and Health (Leenders, 2012: 211; MER, 4 
                                                 
354
 Contributors included Italy ($439m), the European Council and Central Bank ($285m), the Saudi Development Bank ($130m), the 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development ($92m), the World Bank ($175m), France ($31m), UNDP ($20m), OPEC ($10m), the 
Islamic Development Bank ($33m) and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development ($25m) (MER, 6 November, 1993: 10). 
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March, 1995: 13-15)355. Despite injecting foreign investment into Lebanon, Hariri’s 
policies were criticised by opposition MPs, including Hizbullah, for excessive 
borrowing and irresponsible spending. Furthermore, the premier was denounced for 
prioritising the core of Beirut at the expense of the Lebanese periphery as well as for 
adopting a unilateral stance that promoted a culture of nepotism and corruption within 
SOLIDERE and the CDR (MER, 2 December, 1995: 10-11)356. 
 
In its 1996 electoral statement, Hizbullah’s OF focused on deploring the morality of 
this ‘Harirism’ on socio-economic grounds as opposed to deploying exclusively Shi’i 
frames in the PF. The text, which endorsed ‘a state of development with no 
discrimination and participation with no exclusion or elimination’, emphasised the 
need to protect equality and justice by investing in human development and public 
services (Alagha, 2011: 69, 71-74)357. In response to Hariri’s counter-claim that 
Hizbullah simply intended to weaken the state while incubating the Islamic Resistance 
from Lebanon’s society and institutions, Hizbullah insisted on the continuation and 
nationalisation of the Islamic Resistance (MER, 1 June, 1996: 12). Testament to this 
commitment, the document referred to the ‘faithful Lebanese’ and ‘our vast cultural 
affiliation with all its diversity, richness and sublime human value, within a framework 
of integration and unity’ (Alagha, 2011: 69). While the Resistance was primarily 
incumbent on Hizbullah, its purpose was an inclusive ‘endeavour with all the 
Lebanese people’ as well as with the state (Alagha, 2011: 71).    
 
Although composed by an actor becoming more familiar with the rules of practice in 
the PF, the authenticity of Hizbullah’s orthodox framing failed to convince its field 
counterparts. During Operation Grapes of Wrath, Hariri had admitted that if the 
Israelis were unable to defeat the Islamic Resistance, the Lebanese state should not 
be expected to defeat Hizbullah (Harik, 2005: 118). While Lebanon’s elite neither had 
the political nor the military muscle to disobey Syria’s symbolic power with regards to 
the Islamic Resistance in the MSF, they were able to manoeuvre around the 
structured parameters of the PF to limit Hizbullah’s influence. Converging on the aim 
of ‘clipping the wings of the bird that has outgrown all others so fast’, Rafiq Hariri, 
Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, in a move authorised by President Hrawi, coalesced 
their respective values of capital to publically portray Hizbullah as propagating 
                                                 
355
 SOLIDERE is the French acronym for the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District 
(MER, 6 November, 1993: 9).  
356
 By the end of 1996, Hariri had secured pledges of approximately $3.2 million for development and reconstruction projects in 
Lebanon (MER, 21 December, 1996: 8).    
357
 Hizbullah also lobbied for increased media freedoms, an attempt to ensure the state’s legitimacy of the Party’s media organs, 
specifically Al-Manar.    
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extremism over moderation while concurrently espousing the notion that the 
Resistance should be the preserve of the nation (MER, 24 August, 1996: 7)358. 
  
These seasoned campaigners mobilised their superior experience in the PF to 
balance against a commonly perceived threat. While Ali Ammar, Hizbullah’s MP for 
Baabda, was defeated as the Druze and Christians united to support Shi’i 
independent Bassem al-Saba, Muhammad Berjawi, Hizbullah’s MP for Beirut, lost to 
Muhammad Baydoun, a traditional figure of the Shi’i elite endorsed by the Christians 
and Sunnis. Amal also caused Hizbullah problems within the saqf al-suri in the South 
and the Biqa’. After intense deliberations with Nabi Berri, mediated by President 
Hafez al-Assad, Sayyid Nasrallah reticently agreed at the 11th hour to honour the 
Syrian-imposed Shi’i partnership with Amal by consenting to the composition of 
electoral coalitions that prevented Hizbullah from maximising its political 
representation (Hamzeh, 2004: 114)359. Consequently, Hizbullah’s wafa’ lil 
moqawama bloc in parliament dropped from 12 to 9 with four MPs representing the 
South and five in the Biqa’, which included two non-Shi’i allies. Meanwhile, Hariri and 
Berri, with the assistance of Christian voters, managed to negate the gains made by 
‘fundamentalist’ groups in 1992 (Khashan, 1997)360. Commentators judged that 
Hizbullah had learned ‘in Lebanon only Syria decides and you have only one sponsor 
– Damascus not Tehran’ with some predicting that ‘when the right time comes, the 
Party will be evicted from the country’s political life’ (MER, 21 September, 1996: 8; 
Khashan, 1997). Overall, the election results had inflicted a ‘double humiliation’ on 
Hizbullah, not only in compelling the Party into coalitions against its will, but also in 
revealing that coalitions neutralised any competitive edge the Party may exhibit over 
its opponents (MER, 14 September, 1996).   
 
However, the elections served as a reminder of Hizbullah’s heterodox position in the 
PF, not a symptom of its inevitable demise. While Hizbullah continued to maintain 
field homology between its Resistance habitus in the MSF and SMF, it had failed to 
effectively employ this capital to challenge the extant orthodoxy of the PF. Rather 
than rely on passively berating the government as a unilateral actor, Hizbullah had to 
actively implement a strategy that sought to combine its symbolic capital in the MSF 
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 Whereas Berri commented that ‘resistance is a national trait’ and not the exclusive property of one group, Jumblatt demanded that 
Lebanon be ‘spared the colossal losses it has been paying for Katyusha rockets fired across the border’ (MER, 24 August, 1996: 7).  
359
 An example of Hizbullah’s marginalisation in the PF can be seen with the announcement in 1996 of a new $225 million motorway 
in the South from Saida (a Hariri stronghold) to Naqoura (an Amal enclave). Circumnavigating Hizbullah’s wishes, the contract was 
offered to Shafiq Hariri (Rafiq’s brother) and Randa Berri (Nabih’s wife) with the construction outsourced to Kassyoun, a Syrian 
contractor (MER, 7 September, 1996: 10).       
360
 Both Hariri and Berri received 20 seats in parliament. By contrast, Islamic groups lost five sears in total with the only successful 
‘fundamentalist’ candidate in northern Lebanon receiving the lowest number of votes compared to the ten other elected Sunni 
deputies (Khashan, 1997). 
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and SMF with the accumulation of social capital in the PF. Prior to the elections, 
there were indications of this shift in policy towards the nationalisation of the 
Resistance for political purposes. Principally, Hizbullah’s OF had mobilised its 
welfare institutions and media organs to nationalise the scope and appeal of the 
Resistance by conducting extensive polls on public opinion, demonstrating its ability 
to address socio-economic needs in the context of Israeli aggression as well as 
discarding the exclusive and subversive nature of its operations in the MSF in 
relation to the state (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 187; MER, 19 June, 1999: 11-12; 
Azani, 2011: 129). Nevertheless, the acceleration of this approach appeared after 
Hizbullah’s mediocre performance in the 1996 elections.        
 
After the death of Hadi Nasrallah in 1997, not only were Lebanese flags used to 
commemorate his martyrdom, but Hizbullah also formed the Lebanese Resistance 
Brigades (Azani, 2011: 129). While these gestures of ‘Lebanonisation’ were 
important, they were not imperative for the intrinsic legitimacy of the Islamic 
Resistance in the MSF since Hizbullah possessed significant forms of symbolic 
capital on account of its operational practice as well as its relations with Iran, Syria 
and General Lahoud. Instead, the aim of Hizbullah’s OF was to use its recognised 
symbolic capital in the MSF as a conduit to consolidate and expand its influence in 
the SMF, the integral mobilising source in transferring capital into the PF. However, 
unlike the MSF, the rules governing the SMF were considerably more dynamic and 
competitive in aspiring for symbolic capital within the Shi’i community, let alone the 
wider field itself. In order to enhance its political position, Hizbullah’s OF pursued a 
two-pronged strategy in the SMF: to expand its appeal and accessibility amongst the 
Shi’i community while seeking and solidifying cross-confessional coalitions.  
 
The first challenge confronting Hizbullah’s infitah was the reconciliation of allegiances 
in praxis between wilayat al-faqih and Lebanon’s structures of authority. After the 
Islamic Revolution, Hizbullah cadres supported Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran whereas 
most Amal members followed Ayatollah Khui. From 1992, Hizbullah’s OF had framed 
this nexus as mutually inclusive since the structured constitution of Hizbullah’s OF, 
which institutionalised the concept of wilayat al-faqih, was legitimately sanctioned 
within the Shi’i enclaves of Lebanon’s SMF as long as revered figures within the 
hierarchical establishment of religious Shi’i leadership were also respected. 
However, the deaths of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989), Ayatollah Khui (1992), Ayatollah 
Golpayegani (1993) and Ayatollah Araki (1994) created a temporary vacuum in Shi’i 
religious authority, namely between Sayyid Fadlallah, who called for Ayatollah Sistani 
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of Najaf to be the next marja al-taqlid, and the incumbent holder of the wilayat al-
faqih, Ali Khamenei, who claimed religious jurisdiction not only inside Iran, but also 
outside the country (Chehabi, 2006: 300)361.   
 
Although positioned in Lebanon, Hizbullah’s OF was conceptually predicated on and 
predisposed to the strictures of wilayat al-faqih. For Sayyid Nasrallah, ‘the secret of 
our strength, growth, unity, struggle, and martyrdom is wilayat al-faqih, the spinal 
cord of Hizbullah’ (Hamzeh, 2004: 34). Conversely, the pre-revolutionary framing that 
had galvanised and inscribed the collective Shi’i habitus (collusio) in Lebanon’s SMF 
prior to the formation of Hizbullah was primarily supplied by Sayyid Fadlallah. While 
obedience to wilayat al-faqih permitted flexibility in the private domain, especially 
regarding ibadat (‘ritual practices’) and mu’amalat (‘daily dealings’), Hizbullahis were 
publicly obligated to follow one source of emulation (Shaykh Qassem in Alagha, 
2006: 99). Therefore, Sayyid Fadlallah’s belief in al-marja’iyya al-ta’adudiyya (a 
collective of revered clerics) and his elevated status as a marja al-taqlid in 1995 
brought him into direct confrontation with his former students within Hizbullah362.  
 
This struggle for symbolic capital within the Shi’i community led to a smear campaign 
orchestrated by Hizbullah to discredit Sayyid Fadlallah, which included distributing 
pamphlets accusing the cleric of fitna (‘sedition’), chastising his religious exegeses 
on Islamic history and Ashoura, castigating his sermons through the counter-
mobilisation of Shi’i imams as well as raiding his property (Sankari, 2005: 256-
257)363. However, the relational balance in symbolic capital between Hizbullah and 
Sayyid Fadlallah amongst the Shi’i community in the SMF prevented either party 
from exercising symbolic power, a state in which symbolic capital, in the absence of 
a counterpoint or adversary, is promoted to unrivalled proportions to the extent that 
force is perceived as legitimate. Therefore, this use of coercive practice, particularly 
in support of a foreign actor against a locally revered figure, was largely deemed as 
unjustified by the broader Shi’i community in Lebanon. This behaviour was also 
invoked as evidence for Hizbullah’s disingenuous and distanced stance from 
revitalised efforts at promoting national unity.  
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 The standoff between Sayyid Fadlallah and Ali Khamenei was ultimately a political struggle over the religious nucleus of the Shi’i 
ulama. Whereas Sayyid Fadlallah believed that Najaf should remain separated from the wilayat al-faqih in Iran as the epicentre of 
Shi’i thought, Ali Khamenei intended to merge Shi’i religious authority under the auspices of Qom and the wilayat al-faqih in Iran 
(MER, 29 January 1994: 8-9; Chehabi, 2006: 299).  
362
 Interview with Hani Abdallah in Beirut, 11 September 2012.  
363
 Audio recordings of Sayyid Fadlallah’s ijtihad (‘reasoning’) were tampered with while the Shi’i cleric’s house was looted in Bir al-
Abd (Sankari, 2005: 256-257).   
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By 1996, Hizbullah’s OF started to alter its tactics to construct a modus vivendi that 
was more synchronised to the eclectic structures of Lebanon’s SMF rather than 
enforce imported interests. In recognition of this shift, Ali Khamenei appointed Sayyid 
Nasrallah and Shaykh Yazbek as his official representatives in Lebanon from 1995, a 
move that enabled them to directly collect funds from religious taxes thereby 
enhancing Hizbullah’s independence in Lebanon and projecting a more Lebanese 
image of the Party (Alagha, 2011: 53). Furthermore, rather than simply instigate its 
own organisations, Hizbullah’s OF began engaging and challenging pre-existing 
institutions in the SMF via conventional channels. Aside from rhetorically berating 
Amal over the partisan procedures of the Higher Islamic Shi’i Council (HISC), 
Hizbullah concluded its assault on Sayyid Fadlallah before the parliamentary 
elections and instrumentally exploited his rivalry with the HISC’s Amal-affiliated 
President Sayyid Shamseddine by supporting the cleric’s right to deliver Friday 
prayers in the southern suburbs on 17 May 1996 (MER, 1 June, 1996: 11)364. By 
endorsing Sayyid Fadlallah, Hizbullah expected to incur the wrath of Amal in the 
short-term but intended to embolden its position within the Shi’i community in the 
long-term by goading Sayyid Shamseddine into reforming the pro-Amal leadership 
structures and electoral processes of the HISC365.  
 
Moreover, since the 1996 elections proved that achieving efficacy in the PF required 
adequate investment in an assortment of inter-confessional social capital, Hizbullah’s 
OF inaugurated robust and interdependent relationships beyond the Shi’i community. 
Reiterating its 1996 epistolary statement, Hizbullah released a document of 
principles in April 1997 that demanded acceptance for Lebanon’s cultural diversity 
and promoted national identity over political sectarianism (Azani, 2011: 129). As a 
means of activating this discourse, Hizbullah firstly appeased Syria by authoring the 
‘Charter of Collective Action to Enrich Political Life in Lebanon’, an initiative that 
unified Hizbullah not only with two pro-Iranian Sunni groups, namely Tawhid and 
Jama’at Islamiyya, but also with the Ba’ath and the SSNP, two pro-Syrian secular 
parties (MER, 12 April, 1997: 13)366.  
 
                                                 
364
 Musa al-Sadr was replaced by Sayyid Shamseddine as the HISC’s President at the expiration of his term in 1994. On 17 May 
1996, Sayyid Fadlallah undermined the authority of Sayyid Shamseddine by delivering a sermon to 20,000 residents from his mosque 
in Haret Hurayk. Sayyid Fadlallah, whose actions were supported by Ali Khamenei, was accused by the HISC and Amal of politicising 
his religious authority (MER, 1 June, 1996: 11).   
365
 While Amal wanted to amend the HISC’s by-laws to extend Sayyid Shamseddine’s mandate, Hizbullah pushed for the leadership 
of the HISC to run for election. Rather than an electoral college comprised of figures associated with the generally pro-Amal zu’ama in 
the South, Hizbullah lobbied for an electoral body of 10,000 members consisting of professors, lawyers, doctors and engineers as well 
as clerics and businessmen (MER, 3 April, 1999: 9-10).  
366
 Al-Ahbash, a pro-Syrian group, was excluded. Its leader, Shaykh Halabi, was assassinated in 1995 by three supporters of Abu 
Mohjen (Abd al-Karim Saadi), the head of the Islamic Partisans Brigade, a movement founded in Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camp by 
Shaykh Shreidi in 1985 (MER, 12 April, 1997: 13).      
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Secondly, considering that the re-emergence of the Christian electorate in 1996 was 
a key impediment to its success, Hizbullah sought grassroots rapprochement with 
Christian representatives in Lebanon (MER, 31 May, 1997: 7). Although Hizbullah 
had conducted preliminary discussions over religious pluralism with Maronite 
Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir from 1992, the political substance of these overtures only 
gathered momentum after the pro-Syrian Karim Pakradouni became Secretary 
General of the Phalange Party in 1993 (MER, 12 December, 1992: 9; Pakradouni, 
2012: 100)367. Coinciding with a visit from Pope John Paul II in May 1997, Hizbullah 
released ‘A Reading in Papal Guidance’, a publication that called for ecumenical 
dialogue under the united values supplied by religion (Alagha, 2006: 154). Thirdly, on 
18 August 1997, Hizbullah arranged a symposium that assembled 27 political 
parties, including those who had marginalised them in 1996, including Amal, the PSP 
and the Phalange, to construct a plan for Lebanese unity in supporting the 
Resistance and strengthening ties with Syria and Iran (MER, 23 August, 1997: 16-17; 
Qassem, 2005: 82). The Charter of this coalition, which was announced just weeks 
before the establishment of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB), portrayed 
Hizbullah as the vanguard movement responsible for rehabilitating and harmonising 
national unity368. 
 
This centralist pivot by Hizbullah’s OF in the SMF, both in diluting the notion of 
wilayat al-faqih and in eroding the insular character of its practice, precipitated a 
corresponding shift in the growth of heterodox positions within the organisation. 
Deploring the abandonment of the Shi’i in the Biqa’, Hizbullah’s former Secretary 
General Shaykh Tufayli declared that Sayyid Nasrallah had deviated from the 
principles of the movement. Citing government legislation that banned the cultivation 
of hemp and poppies, an industry worth $1 billion, without investing in alternatives, 
Shaykh Tufayli reported that half of Hermel’s 100,000 residents were hungry with the 
other half forced to sell their land (MER, 28 June, 1997: 9-10). Attempting to refocus 
Hizbullah’s attention away from the monopoly of the Resistance in the South towards 
the socio-economically oppressed in the Biqa’, Shaykh Tufayli, confirming that ‘I am 
not looking for a post in government or in Hizbullah’, managed to direct $97 million 
                                                 
367
 At the end of 1992, Hizbullah delegates Nawwaf Moussawi and Shaykh Tlays visited the Maronite Patriarch before the latter’s 
assistant met with Sayyid Nasrallah on 22 January 1993 (Qassem, 2005: 206-207). From 1993, Karim Pakradouni conducted political 
discussions with Hizbullah through Ghalib Abu Zaynab before Mahmoud Qomati, a member of Hizbullah’s politburo, and Husayn al-
Khalil, the head of Hizbullah’s Political Assembly and the personal advisor for Sayyid Nasrallah, were specifically tasked with the 
Christian portfolio (Interview with Ibrahim Moussawi in Beirut, 7 September 2012). In 1996, Pakradouni organised a conference in 
Achrafieh, the Christian enclave of eastern Beirut, in solidarity with the Resistance (Pakradouni, 2012: 100).    
368
 The coalition, which consisted of two committees, also included the Ba’ath Party, the SSNP, the LCP, pro-Syrian Sunni parties, the 
Nasserites and three Armenian parties (MER, 23 August, 1997: 16-17).   
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for development in eastern and northern Lebanon (MER, 12 July, 1997: 10; 19 July, 
1997: 17)369.  
 
This popular movement headed by one of the founders of Hizbullah not only irritated 
Sayyid Nasrallah, but also threatened the geographical and ideological core of 
Hizbullah’s nucleus by highlighting internal discrepancies within a movement that 
prided itself on cohesion as well as attracting the sympathy of prominent Shi’i figures, 
such as Sayyid Fadlallah and Shaykh Mechaymesh (MER, 28 June, 1997: 9-10; 15 
November, 1997: 11)370. In a response that acted to vindicate Shaykh Tufayli’s 
objections, Hizbullah consented and cooperated with the state in permitting 3,000 
LAF soldiers to deploy in the Biqa’. During the assault that ensued, Shaykh Tufayli’s 
supporters raided a Hizbullah hawza while Shaykh Tlays, Tufayli’s son-in-law and a 
Hizbullah MP, was killed (Chehabi, 2006: 304; Alagha, 2006: 48). On 30 March 1998, 
Sayyid Nasrallah announced the end of the episode affirming that Shaykh Tufayli’s 
‘expulsion has been decided and it doesn’t require a General Congress to make it 
effective. The problem is behind us’ (MER, 18 April, 1998: 10). Subsequently, as part 
of Hizbullah’s Fifth Conclave in 1998, Shaykh Tufayli became the first prominent 
figure to be officially exiled from the Party371.    
 
By embarking on a post-1996 policy of aligning its cultural capital with the prevailing 
structures of the SMF while simultaneously expanding its social capital across 
sectarian lines to ostensibly embrace ‘Lebanonisation’, Hizbullah’s OF had diversified 
the framing of its symbolic capital in the MSF to fit the configurations of the SMF. 
Moreover, by maintaining its position between these fields, Hizbullah’s OF had 
mobilised this revised stance to evade the internal fragmentation caused by its 
strategic pivot in adapting to institutionalised rules of practice, thereby enabling 
Hizbullah to enhance its position in the SMF for the purpose of targeting capital 
deployment in the PF. The inception of municipal elections in May 1998, the first 
since 1963, presented an opportunity for Hizbullah to circumvent traditional avenues 
for political access within the Lebanese system by providing alternative channels for 
the transference of capital between the logics of social and political mobilisation. As 
acknowledged by Sulayman Takieddine, municipal elections represented ‘a mobbish 
                                                 
369
 This bias was reflected in the composition of Hizbullah’s al-majlis al-shura where only one member, Shaykh Yazbek, was from the 
Biqa’.  At this time, 80% of Hizbullah’s Resistance martyrs hailed from the South (Malthaner, 2011: 222).  
370
 Sayyid Nasrallah was allegedly so frustrated that he threatened to resign (MER, 28 June, 1997: 9-10). Shaykh Mechaymesh, 
previously a media advisor for Hizbullah under Shaykh Tufayli in 1989, defected from the Party in 1998 after siding with Sayyid 
Fadlallah in his interpretation of applying wilayat al-faqih in Lebanon (Interview with Reda Mechaymesh in Beirut, 3 September 2012).    
371
 During the Fifth Conclave, Sayyid Nasrallah’s term was extended indefinitely. Other members of the majlis al-shura were: Husayn 
al-Khalil (Political Advisor); Shaykh Qassem (deputy Secretary General); Shaykh Safieddine (Executive Council); Muhammad Ra’ad 
(Political Council); Shaykh Yazbek (Judicial Council); and Sayyid Nasrallah (Jihad Council although believed to be Imad Mugniyeh).    
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democracy or democracy of the mob...a massive assault against the established 
elites of pre-war traditional clans and political parties’ (MER, 23 May, 1998: 15).   
 
According to a legislative decree of 1977, which outlined the official mandate of 
Lebanon’s 708 registered municipalities, decision-making powers were devolved to 
local councils while the mayor was bestowed with the authority to implement 
decisions under the consultative supervision of the council (MER, 23 May, 1998: 
17)372. The implications of this seismic shift, in which the onus of representation was 
redirected from regional districts reliant on electoral coalitions to the localised 
autonomy of municipal councils, allowed Hizbullah to play to its organisational 
strengths in achieving four objectives: firstly, to implant and expand its grassroots 
inculcation of Resistance in small communities; secondly, to legitimise and 
institutionalise its social service programmes in the SMF; thirdly, to fulfil its aim of 
loosening the grip of, and gradually replacing, mainstream parties and traditional 
families in majority Shi’i areas; and fourthly, to cement its appeal as a coalition 
partner for non-Shi’i actors or parties attempting to operate in majority Shi’i 
constituencies.  
 
Consequently, the promulgation of Hizbullah’s proliferating public programmes, 
orchestrated by the Education, Social and Health Institutes, would not only receive 
credit through municipal elections, but also increased access, functionality and 
legitimacy by aligning their work and employees with local councils373. Additionally, 
Hizbullah-run municipalities would be charged with collecting taxes as well as 
dictating expenditure, granting the Party with the ability to invest and reinvest in 
development and reconstruction efforts compatible with their interests while 
approving, instructing and inscribing the imagery and projection of local identity 
through the control of physical and social space, such as the adornment of posters 
and slogans, the erection of mosques, the location of meeting centres, the issuance 
of business licenses for local commerce and the organisation of public events.     
    
Hizbullah’s ubiquitous involvement in local affairs guaranteed that it ‘dominated local 
councils’ in the 1998 elections (Alagha, 2006: 49). In Beirut, Hizbullah temporarily 
suspended its animosity towards Premier Hariri to compete for one of three allotted 
                                                 
372
 Local council responsibilities included: drafting laws and regulations; setting and collecting fees and taxes; processing bills; 
designing town planning and development projects; accepting grants and issuing licenses; implementing public works and services; 
(re)naming streets, towns and villages; repairing infrastructure; organising transportation; providing for social needs. The mayor was 
tasked with budgets; drafting bills on revenues and expenditure; representing councils; protecting the environment and antiquities; 
issuing housing and construction permits; and setting regulations. Decrees presented by the mayor did not require the approval of 
ministers, governors or administrative divisions (MER, 23 May, 1998: 15-17; Hamzeh, 2004: 122-123; Alagha, 2006: 48).    
373
 By the end of the 1990s, Hizbullah had 15 coordinated NGOs all based in the southern suburbs (Fawwaz, 2000).  
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Shi’i seats in Beirut’s 24-seat council by running on his Beirut Accord List (Harik, 
2005: 101)374. In al-dahiyeh, Hizbullah utilised its social capital with local families to 
win all 22 seats in Ghubayri and recorded a landslide in Burj al-Barajneh while Amal 
failed to gain any seats (Hamzeh, 2004: 128)375. Despite Amal’s historical affiliation 
with the zu’ama of the South, Hizbullah also managed to dent its monopoly. Nabih 
Berri’s associates scored 12 municipalities (94 seats) to Hizbullah’s 11 (97 seats) in 
Nabatiyeh while in Tyre and Bint Jubayl, Hizbullah secured 11 municipalities (122 
seats) compared with Amal’s 27 (231 seats) (Harik, 2004: 130). In the Biqa’, Hizbullah 
won 18 municipalities (224 seats) to Amal’s 9 (158 seats) but could only muster four 
out of 21 council seats in Ba’albeck and were prevented from a landslide victory in 
Hermel due to the popularity of Shaykh Tufayli in Brittal (Hamzeh, 2004: 130; Alagha, 
2006: 49)376. 
 
Primarily, Hizbullah owed its success to the effective transmission of its symbolic 
capital in the MSF to the SMF through its network of grassroots services and media 
outlets377. However, while a significant proportion of Hizbullah constituents were 
willing to display their gratitude and loyalty to the Islamic Resistance via the ballot 
box, social services were not offered unconditionally (Danawi, 2002: 43-50; 60-62). 
Through self-regulating networks such as Al-Akhawat al-Moutatawe’at, or the 
‘Volunteer Sisters’, Hizbullah could indirectly monitor recipients of aid and judge 
whether they were morally deserving of assistance or whether they were betraying 
the sanctity of the Resistance by failing to observe the pious precepts expected by 
Hizbullah’s welfare programmes (Fawwaz, 2000)378. Subsequently, those who failed 
to comply with socio-religious practices or register their vote correctly during elections 
were not only publicly ostracised, but also denied access to Hizbullah’s services 
(Danawi, 2002: 62)379.  
 
                                                 
374
 Hizbullah not only joined Hariri’s list, but also cooperated with the Christians by urging its supporters to vote for the whole list 
(Harik, 2005: 96-101).  
. 
375
 In Ghubayri, Hizbullah allied with Muhammad al-Khansa, a prominent leader in local politics with an extensive familial network as 
well as a popular figure in the area for spearheading social services (Harik, 2005: 103). In Burj al-Barajneh, the popularity of 
Hizbullah’s Rasul al-Azzam Hospital ensured its success (Harik, 2005: 104).      
376
 Out of 97 municipalities in the South, Hizbullah won 22, Amal won 39, the Christians won 23, 11 were disputed, one was split and 
one was called for the leftists (Harik, 2005: 107; Hamzeh, 2004: 130).    
377
 In mid-1999, al-Hayat reported that Hizbullah’s social serves had expanded their operational reach. The Martyrs Foundation was 
providing 1400 orphans with a free education while the Takaful programme was assisting 1,419 children and supplying 244 university 
grants. The Educational Institute managed 9 schools and 5,300 students. Between 1996 and 2000, Hizbullah spent LL16 billion on 
education aid. Meanwhile, the Health Institute was providing assistance to hundreds of thousands of people at subsidised rates with 
21 dispensaries, 9 medical centres, 13 clinics, running 95 ambulances and 5 roving infirmaries as well as training 360 volunteers and 
119 rescuers. The Institute for the Wounded addressed 3083 cases that offered salaries, housing, medical care, allowances, 
rehabilitation and support for incapacitated fighters and their families (MER, 19 June, 1999:11-12; Danawi, 2002: 42; Harb & 
Leenders, 2005: 187, Hamzeh, 2004: 55).   
378
 In particular, the Volunteer Sisters, which operated throughout Hizbullah’s NGO network, offered support and subsequently 
monitored 161 widowed wives of fallen martyrs between 1995 and 1999. If a recipient of assistance remarried or drifted from piety, 
she would not qualify for aid (Danawi, 2002: 43-46).   
379
 Since each eligible voter was listed, local delegates, ordinarily affiliated to Hizbullah, were able to tell which registered individuals 
did or did not vote (Danawi, 2002: 62).  
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Secondly, since the composition of the SMF represented an eclectic mosaic that 
restricted ‘the ability of one religious current to reign supreme’, Hizbullah developed 
its mobilising frames beyond the reliance of exclusively partisan rhetoric to embrace a 
conceptual and practical pivot towards an encompassing national narrative (Harik, 
2005: 109). Conforming to its post-1996 policy of developing social capital within and 
across its constituencies, Hizbullah diversified its profile to the non-Shi’i community 
and facilitated cross-confessional coalitions prior to the elections that contributed to 
its broadening appeal. As witnessed throughout the elections, whether coalescing 
with local Shi’i families, Sunnis or Christians, Hizbullah evolved into an orthodox actor 
capable of attracting the attention and respect of its counterparts by accumulating 
forms of recognised social capital within the structured rules of the SMF380. Not only 
did Hizbullah remove all religious and ideological symbols surrounding Christian 
polling stations in al-dahiyeh, but the Party also demonstrated its intention to enact 
‘Lebanonisation’ by announcing that the 1985 Open Letter no longer acted as 
Hizbullah’s ‘primary frame of reference’ (Alagha, 2006: 48-49).   
 
Despite Hizbullah’s tangible success in the 1998 elections, this enhanced position in 
local politics symbolised a Pyrrhic victory since municipalities remained largely 
disconnected from the PF. Compounding the assertion that the PF incessantly 
‘attempts to alienate Hizbullah from internal political and public-service gains’, 
Hizbullah was endowed with ‘sources of authority, the ability to act, and means and 
budgets that directly influence the daily life of the Shiite community’ but ‘these do not 
have the political-public responsibility existing the public-executive-national system’ 
(Qassem, 2005: 202; Azani, 2011: 125). Ultimately, Hizbullah was still at the whim of 
Syria and the governing Troika, especially Amal, which remained ‘the political cover 
for the Resistance in Lebanon and no other group can compete with it in that regard, 
even if that group spearheaded military activities’ (MER, 5 September, 1998: 7).  
 
Although Hizbullah exhibited adeptness in reacting to the inherent game within 
Lebanon’s PF by cognitively developing its dispositions and resourcefully 
amalgamating capital to alter its position, the municipal elections evinced that as the 
Party advanced towards the orthodox end of the PF spectrum, ‘the game will become 
more competitive’ (Farid El-Kazen in MER, 13 June, 1998: 8). Consequently, 
regardless of Hizbullah’s maturing prowess in the MSF and SMF, the institutionalised 
intransigence of positions and interests within the PF signified the main obstacle to 
                                                 
380
 While recognising that the zu’ama were open to co-option in seizing municipalities from Amal in the South, Hizbullah 
underestimated their influence in the Biqa’ (Hamzeh, 2004: 130-131).    
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access. Therefore, opportunities for Hizbullah’s enhanced political induction and 
legitimation would emanate from the alignment of pre-existing elites in the PF with 
favourable perceptions regarding the Islamic Resistance.  
 
Following the conclusion of President Hrawi’s term in November 1998, LAF General 
Lahoud was appointed as his replacement. The staunchly pro-Syrian and pro-Islamic 
Resistance incumbent had consistently opposed Prime Minister Hariri since 1992 
when he admitted that ‘we will not get along’ (Pakradouni, 2012: 4-5). Similarly, 
Premier Hariri accused General Lahoud of being too lenient on Hizbullah and 
deliberately abusing his position by personally mobilising the security forces to 
influence and intimidate381. Subsequently, this rivalry had permeated into the political, 
business and security arenas of Lebanese affairs. In particular, Premier Hariri 
proposed a reform package for the police to balance against pro-Lahoud Colonels, 
including Jamil al-Sayyid, a pro-Syrian Shi’i, and Mustapha Hamdan, a pro-Syrian 
Sunni, who held security positions traditionally filled by Christians (MER, 20 
September, 1997: 10). Justifying General Lahoud’s political interventions, his aide 
stated that ‘the military establishment is not willing to see the whole of Lebanon 
become part of Hariri’s personal holdings’ (MER, 21 June, 1997: 13)382. Nevertheless, 
once Syrian President Hafez al-Assad assigned the Lebanese portfolio to his son, the 
equilibrium of this feud was tipped towards General Lahoud who benefited from his 
close relationship with Bashar al-Assad whereas Premier Hariri, who had extensive 
personal ties with Ghazi Kan’an and Abdul Halim Khaddam, was suddenly associated 
with the increasingly marginalised Syrian faction in Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 27).     
 
Before becoming President, General Lahoud, who had been instrumental in 
restructuring the sectarian complexion of the LAF, insisted that a military man ‘will 
have no role in politics, and if elected, will simply don a civilian suit and walk into 
parliament as a plain citizen’ (MER, 28 September 1998: 16-17)383. Rather than 
allaying fears by recognising the entrenched dynamics of Lebanon’s PF, President 
Lahoud continued his assault on Hariri from a different podium. During his first 
speech, President Lahoud reiterated the right of citizens to know how taxes are spent, 
how contracts are implemented and how investments are managed (MER, 28 
                                                 
381
 Hariri argued that Lebanon could not take responsibility for the Resistance until Hizbullah started coordinating with the Lebanese 
authorities, especially the LAF (Pakradouni, 2012: 11). In 1994, the LAF raided the office of Fuad Siniora with planned military cuts 
under review and with Hariri stalling on the promotion of Lahoud’s candidates for Colonel. Moreover, while Hariri endorsed Ghaneim 
al-Zoghbi as Chairman of the General Workers’ Congress, Lahoud deployed troops to the GWC headquarters to ensure that Elias 
Abu Rizk assumed the position (MER, 21 June, 1997: 12-13).    
382
 Not only was most of Lebanon’s Finance Ministry occupied by Hariri aides, but his confidants were also positioned in the Central 
Bank, the Banking Control Committee and the Ministry of Justice. Hariri also had personal relationships with the heads of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (MER, 23 January, 1999: 7-8).  
383
 General Lahoud had introduced mixed ranks with geographical assignments while ensuring the return of the 12th Brigade, affiliated 
with Walid Jumblatt, and the 6th Brigade, associated with Nabih Berri, to the authority of the LAF (MER, 28 September 1998: 16-17).   
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November, 1998: 7). Less than a week later, and despite enjoying a parliamentary 
majority of 85/128, Hariri resigned by invoking a ‘constitutional technicality’ in Article 
53 after swiftly realising that his activities would be considerably inhibited by the new 
figurehead of the triumvirate (MER, 5 December, 1998: 5)384. Hariri was subsequently 
replaced by Selim al-Hoss, a two-time premier who had long decried Hariri’s frivolous 
expenditure and crony capitalist policies385.    
 
The combination of President Lahoud, Premier al-Hoss and Speaker Berri at the helm 
of the PF confirmed the absolute dominion of the saqf al-suri. The Troika, often 
described as ‘a snake with three heads each biting the other’ (Elias Hrawi in MER, 4 
April, 1998: 9), now represented the convergence of three figures, each with 
dispositions equally beholden to Syria and committed to the practice of reproducing 
the predominant orthodoxy of the PF in conjunction with their patron. Prior to 1998, 
Hizbullah was politically vulnerable having experienced fractious relations with Hariri, 
tenuous links to Hrawi and temperamental fraternity with Amal. With limited direct 
access to the corridors of power, Hizbullah ultimately relied on the fickle and 
unpredictable whims of Syria in sustaining the Islamic Resistance. For the first time, 
whether through compulsion or volition, the new Troika arrangement on the eve of the 
millennium offered a congruent front with which to provide political leverage for the 
Islamic Resistance within the internal dynamics of the PF.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Rather than dispute the conceptual identification and practical implementation of 
Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’ or infitah, this chapter has sought to explore the 
authenticity and extent to which Hizbullah assimilated into the post-war Ta’if system. 
Alagha (2006: 201) argued that the 1990s proved that Hizbullah had ‘put its political 
ideology in the drawer and practiced a down-to-earth pragmatic political program’. 
Subsequently, within the parameters of its conditional context, Hizbullah’s masaleh 
(‘interests’) were to suspend Islamisation and adapt accordingly to the al-qawanin al-
wadiyya (‘man-made laws’) entailed in ‘Lebanonisation’ (Alagha, 2006: 205). From 
the perspective of SMT, the objective opportunities of Lebanon’s post-civil war system 
encouraged Hizbullah’s OF to ‘Lebanonise’ its Collective Action Frames and 
mobilisational modalities for the purpose of realigning the subjective perceptions of its 
                                                 
384
 Hariri argued that Nabih Berri’s gesture allowing President Lahoud to use the Speaker’s bloc in parliament to vote as he wished 
contravened Article 53, which stipulated that one must either pick or abstain (MER, 5 December 1998: 5).   
385
 At the end of 1997, al-Hoss had helped defeat a bill proposed by Hariri for the allocation of $800 million to finance specific 
development projects denouncing the lack of transparency and accountability in the process (MER, 4 October 1997: 7-8).  
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supporters to the prevailing tide of its situational environment. This transformation is 
evident when inspecting the internal rearrangements of Hizbullah’s OF, the Party’s 
parliamentary presence in the PF, the diversification of messages and techniques 
from exclusively Islamic rhetoric in the SMF and the nationalisation of the Islamic 
Resistance with the inauguration of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades in the MSF. 
Reinforcing the notion that the 1990s signified an epoch of substantive change for 
Hizbullah, the Party’s slogan of ‘the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’ was replaced with 
the ‘Islamic Resistance in Lebanon’.       
 
Nevertheless, interpreting Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’ as an objectively uniform and 
observable phenomenon threatens to distort the Party’s transition from revolutionary 
ideology to political pragmatism. Firstly, this approach not only fails to problematise 
the various permutations of perception and meaning within the term ‘Lebanonisation’ 
depending on the placement and position of agents within differentiated fields of 
practice, but it also implies Hizbullah’s strategic metamorphosis in tacitly 
acknowledging and accepting Lebanon’s predominant orthodoxy. Secondly, even by 
substituting the designation of ‘Lebanonisation’ with infitah (‘opening-up’) to 
characterise Hizbullah’s post-1992 practice, this assumption neglects to consider the 
relational complexity confronted by Hizbullah’s OF in devising tactics to advocate an 
alternative direction while maintaining a positional balance and cohesion between its 
fields of operation. Overall, throughout the 1990s, Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’ or 
infitah was far from coherent, consistent or complete since its policy primarily 
intended to persuade the Lebanese towards the orthodoxy of the Resistance in the 
MSF rather than infer Hizbullah’s assimilation into the orthodoxy of Lebanon’s PF 
(Badran, 2009a: 61). A Bourdieu-SMT approach assists not only in examining how 
Hizbullah was able to navigate and enhance the position of its Resistance habitus 
within and between Lebanon’s fields of practice, but also why this method was 
employed as its preferred policy.  
 
Hizbullah’s OF was constructed and subsequently structured on the tenets of 
resisting Israel, propagating Islam and obedience to wilayat al-faqih. These values 
acted as the prerequisite criteria for inducting agents, designing its predominant 
orthodoxy of practice and defining the currency of capital within the dynamics of 
Hizbullah’s OF. While the theoretical logic underpinning the rules of reproductive 
conformity in the field (doxa) are immutable, the practical logic of its implementation is 
reliant on an agent’s strategic perception and interpretation of these inherent laws. 
Consequently, the conveyors of Hizbullah’s orthodoxy in the OF may not have been 
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able to reconstitute the field by changing its doxa towards ‘Lebanonisation’, but they 
could deploy their symbolic capital within the structures of the organisation towards 
infitah, a negotiation of a revised rendering of ‘Lebanonisation’ that altered Hizbullah’s 
discourse and dispositions.                       
 
In the MSF, considering the symbolic capital accrued by the Islamic Resistance under 
the auspices of Syria’s symbolic power, the ‘Lebanonisation’ of the Islamic 
Resistance in the 1990s was cosmetic as opposed to concrete. Consequently, the 
inauguration of the LRB in 1997 was more a public concession than a demonstration 
of integration. At the end of the civil war, Weberian notions affirming the legitimate 
monopolisation of force as the preserve of the state were largely defunct. Faced with 
a decrepit and dysfunctional military apparatus, Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the 
MSF, on account of the transferability of cultural and economic capital from Iran, 
aligned its practice to the institutionalised laws (doxa) composed by Syria and 
modified its dispositions towards orthodoxy. By diligently observing its operational 
remit, the Islamic Resistance strategically adapted its dispositions and perceptions to 
accumulate recognised capital, evolve in experience and enhance its position in the 
MSF. Despite being labelled as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ by the U.S. State 
Department in 1997, the qualitative success of the Islamic Resistance against Israel, 
exemplified by the ‘April Understanding’ of 1996, resulted in Hizbullah emerging as a 
legitimate participant and possessor of symbolic capital both in the eyes of Lebanese 
as well as in Israel386.  
 
The inherent doxa engendering the structures of illusio in the SMF required a 
considerably more customised adjustment to warrant ‘Lebanonisation’. Traditionally, 
SMF orthodoxy was determined by efforts of actors to instigate, develop and inculcate 
confessional repertoires of mobilisation while framing these modes of collective action 
within a ‘Lebanese’ context. Initially, through the improved efficacy of its social 
welfare programmes and the professionalism of its media organs, Hizbullah’s OF 
appeared content with entrenching its position and vying for symbolic capital within 
the Shi’i community. By synchronising field homology between its agents in the MSF 
and SMF, Hizbullah’s OF aimed to continually achieve symbiotic synthesis through 
                                                 
386
 In March 1992, Islamic Jihad was blamed for the killing of 30 people in a suicide attack targeting the Israeli Embassy in Buenos 
Aires in Argentina. On 18 July 1994, Islamic Jihad was accused of orchestrating the bombing of the Jewish Cultural Centre in Buenos 
Aires that killed 95 people. Islamic Jihad was also allegedly responsible for an attack on the Israeli Embassy in London on 26 July 
1996 as well as the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Jorisch (2004: 11-12) argues that these events are 
‘indicative of the expansion in Hizbullah’s worldwide operational capabilities during the 1990s’, epitomised by the extensive expatriate 
Shi’i population in the Tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. As noted in Chapter 5, while not denying congruencies in 
identity and ideology, a distinction should be made in purpose and practice between Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance, an organised 
military unit focused on combating Israel in Lebanon, and Islamic Jihad, an amorphous composition of transnational Shi’i combatants 
who were not subject to the rules of Lebanon’s fields.         
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the institutionalisation of a holistic Resistance habitus. However, recording 
commensurate success in the PF required actively fostering cross-confessional 
coordination and devising inclusive frames that invoked the orthodoxy of Lebanon’s 
eclectic organising structures in the SMF. Since Hizbullah’s OF was unable to 
effectively translate the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance into the PF during 
the 1996 elections, the Party reverted to the innate laws of the SMF and sought to 
supplement its discourse with practice by reconciling the Resistance within the pre-
existing parameters of Lebanon’s SMF.   
 
As evinced by the shifting expression of intra-Shi’i competition, the augmenting 
autonomy of Hizbullah’s OF, the management of Shaykh Tufayli’s ‘Revolution of the 
Hungry’, the facilitation of inter-party coalitions and the results of the 1998 municipal 
elections, Hizbullah’s OF was publicly carving an edifice resembling a Lebanese 
design. Moreover, the frequent deployment of Lebanese imagery and iconography in 
the context of military operations enabled Lebanese citizens to engage with the 
Resistance, bestow acknowledgment on its legitimacy and contemplate opportunities 
for the aggregation of cross-confessional collusio, in which habiti converge in 
solidarity but not in practice. For example, in 1999, Hizbullah ritualised Qana as a site 
for national mourning by combining historical invocations in Islam and Christianity to 
unite Lebanon against a common enemy with the slogan ‘Qana is the Karbala of the 
Twentieth Century; it is a land made holy by the Lord Jesus and contaminated by the 
Zionist Satan’ (Norton, 1999: 25). Principally, Al-Manar, which by 2000 was 
broadcasting for 18 hours a day, had become the third most watched TV station in 
Lebanon and the sixth most popular news source in the Arab world (Avon & 
Khatchadourian, 2012: 62; Jorisch, 2004: 24). Through the content of its 
programmes, Al-Manar was instrumental in periodically projecting, consecrating and 
reproducing the intrinsic association between the Islamic Resistance and Lebanon. 
 
In the PF, Hizbullah’s ‘Lebanonisation’ was tangential. The 1992 elections, in which 
Hizbullah comprised the single largest bloc in parliament, demonstrated that the Party 
was not only willing to engage with Lebanon’s political system but could also compete 
effectively. Nevertheless, the 1996 elections proved that the institutionalised 
dynamics of the PF could obstruct Hizbullah’s OF from transferring and converting 
capital accumulated in other fields into further political gains. Paradoxically, while the 
post-war Lebanese state was undeniably debilitated, ‘the state’s omnipresence 
constituted a major ingredient of the elites’ strategies aimed at self-enrichment and 
political outmanoeuvring of their rivals’ (Leenders, 2012: 231). As Hizbullah 
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possessed minimal influence with the ruling Troika, its role was reduced to 
heterodoxy, a position not only antithetical to ‘Lebanonisation’ by definition in 
harbouring dispositions of incessant opposition, but also overly dependent on the 
whims of Syria in providing political cover for the preservation of the Resistance. 
Vindicating the extent of access restraints, Hizbullah’s elevated political protection 
was only possible at the end of the decade with the election of Emile Lahoud and the 
appointment of Selim al-Hoss, two traditional elites whose perceptions inclined them 
to recognise the necessity of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (Azani, 2011: 156). 
 
Consequently, ‘Lebanonisation’ should be assessed through the prism of the Islamic 
Resistance since the primary objective of Hizbullah’s OF in the 1990s was to 
concurrently create symmetry between its Resistance habitus within differentiated 
spheres of practice through the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF. As 
an invested stakeholder in a variety of fields, each governed and operating under 
their own institutionalised norms of practice, Hizbullah’s integration within these 
spheres produced uneven degrees of ‘Lebanonisation’. Ultimately, as an inducted 
participant, Hizbullah’s OF had to tacitly abide by the logic of each respective field by 
devising tactics to accumulate legitimate capital for the purpose of facilitating 
incremental change.  
 
Nevertheless, the motivation behind Hizbullah’s understanding of infitah in the context 
of ‘Lebanonisation’ was determined by, and inextricably correlated to, capitalising on 
opportunities within the specific requirements of each field in legitimising and 
transferring the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF. Framed in the 
equation of means-end rationality, ‘Lebanonisation’ was an unavoidable yet 
subservient epiphenomenon to access and affect acceptance rather than a significant 
display of approval or compliance with the prevailing system. At the advent of the 
millennium, as Israel prepared for its impending withdrawal, Hizbullah’s OF had 
achieved its goal in maintaining a balanced equilibrium of practice within and between 
the MSF and SMF while the 1998 reshuffle in the PF cemented a pro-Syrian Troika 
that ensured a favourable stance towards the political legitimacy of the Islamic 
Resistance in Lebanon.       
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Chapter Seven 
Reproducing a State of Permanent Resistance (2000 – 2010) 
 
‘Hizbullah has lowered its profile, but not its presence. Its guerrillas will simply melt into conveniently 
situated Shi’i villages along the border...If they maintain their much-publicised discipline, coexistence will 
be manageable. But, if they get intoxicated with the power of the gun, then we are in trouble’.  
- UNIFIL official (MER, 12 August, 2000: 8).  
 
‘The Christians have conquered their fear of the Syrians. Even the Muslims are demanding a correction 
of the relationship with Syria nowadays…all are loudly demanding an end to malpractices and for a 
sounder relationship with Syria, but not at the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence’.  
- Sarkis Naoum (Al-Nahar, 27 September, 2000).  
 
 ‘I found out that politics is more difficult than the Resistance’.  
- Hizbullah’s Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah (Pakradouni, 2012: 99).  
 
‘Have you seen that film with Al Pacino? It’s an offer you can’t refuse...We are engaged in dialogue but 
we are wasting our time…We can still argue for 10 or 15 years more but they [Hizbullah] aren’t going to 
give you their weapons’.    
- Walid Jumblatt, Druze head of the Progressive Socialist Party (Interview, 3 July 2012).  
 
On 25 May 2000, Israel officially completed its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanese 
territory in accordance with UNSC Resolution 425 after 22 years of occupation387. A 
day later, Sayyid Nasrallah delivered his inaugural ‘Liberation Day’ speech in Bint 
Jubayl proclaiming that ‘Israel, which has nuclear weapons and the strongest air 
force in the region, is weaker than a spider’s web’. Speaking in the shadow of the 
Lebanese flag, Hizbullah’s Secretary General praised the sacrifice of 1,276 Islamic 
Resistance martyrs but declared that ‘this victory belongs to all of the Lebanese 
people’ and reassured the Lebanese government and public by claiming that ‘we are 
not a security authority and we are not going to be’ as well as confirming that ‘you’re 
going to find Hizbullah and the Islamic Resistance, in particular, more modest than 
ever before’388.  
 
The exodus of Israel represented an opportunity for Hizbullah in vindicating its 
modus operandi while concurrently acting as an existential threat that compromised 
                                                 
387
 Overall, Israel withdrew from 933 square kilometres (45% of the South or 10% of Lebanon). Antoine Lahd, the leader of the Israeli-
sponsored SLA, stated that ‘I was angry with Israel for giving the order without notifying me, and uprooting the inhabitants of the 
security zone in such a humiliating way’. Although Hizbullah discouraged retribution, members of the Party objected to the limited 
sentences and fines imposed on SLA fighters who remained in Lebanon leading to a series of reprisals in the South. Approximately 
6,000 SLA militiamen poured into Israel to seek asylum (MER, 9 October, 1999: 7-8; 24 June, 2000: 9-11; 5 July, 2003: 10).  
388
 Between 1983 and 2000, 69.6% of Hizbullah’s 1,276 martyrs came from the South, 21% from the Biqa’ and 8.9% from Beirut 
(Malthaner, 2011).  Extracts from Sayyid Nasrallah’s speech were taken from Hizbullah’s Al-‘Ahd website.  
http://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=14178&cid=446#.UgoBloVko7A 
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its modus vivendi. Domestically, the homology of Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in 
the SMF and the MSF, cultivated by the Party’s OF, had reached its zenith in 
producing harmonised practice in mutually reinforced compatibility. Regionally, the 
Islamic Resistance had elevated its strategic profile in enabling Syria and Iran to 
enhance their capital to promote revisionist heterodoxy within the Field of 
International Politics (FIP). However, the extraction of the causal component of the 
Manichean equation would inevitably impact the effective justification of its diametric 
counterpart. While the symbolic capital accrued by Hizbullah in the SMF and MSF 
was framed in contradistinction to Israeli occupation, the legitimacy and leverage of 
the Islamic Resistance in the FIP was predicated on the enduring presence of a 
belligerent Israeli occupier. Consequently, Israel’s withdrawal risked undermining 
Hizbullah’s domestic credibility, questioning its regional raison d’être and placing it in 
danger of becoming a ‘rebel without a cause’ (ICG, 2003).   
 
According to Ad-Diyar, ‘it is no secret that it will be quite hard for Hizbullah to survive 
in Lebanon’s turbulent politics bereft of the Resistance flame’ (MER, 14 October, 
2000: 8-9). Therefore, in order to reproduce the orthodox legitimacy of its symbolic 
capital in the MSF, Hizbullah’s OF had to implement three inter-related objectives: 
firstly, to locate and devise probable cause for continuing the Islamic Resistance in 
the MSF thereby maintaining the source of its domestic and regional relevance; 
secondly, for the purpose of reinstituting its symbolic capital amongst the Shi’i 
community in the SMF, Hizbullah’s OF would have to embark upon a process of 
reframing its discourse, relating this position with extant practices as well as initiating 
new mobilisational modalities that could complement this revised course; and thirdly, 
since the Party remained ‘an authority without authority’, and with Lebanon’s elite 
system contingent upon inter-confessional alliances, Hizbullah would have to seek 
social capital in the PF to protect its alternative direction (Fayyad, 2006: 2).  
 
Firstly, for Hizbullah’s OF, Israel’s withdrawal could not be perceived as a symbolic 
victory that negated the Islamic Resistance and diminished the impetus of its 
mobilisational strategies in the SMF. Conversely, the aim was to realign the framing 
of the Islamic Resistance to emphasise its relentless appeal and application. 
Whereas the Palestinian cause embodied a flexible ‘master frame’ that reinforced 
regional Resistance against Israel, Hizbullah’s OF also employed a rationale that 
directly resonated with the Shi’i community and the broader Lebanese public389. 
                                                 
389
 Shaykh Qassem asserted that Israel will never receive security guarantees because ‘it is still involved in the Palestinian question, 
still occupies the Golan Heights and still has problems in Jerusalem’ (MER, 3 April, 2000: 7).  
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Conforming to conventional practice, Hizbullah’s OF insisted on the liberation of 
Lebanese prisoners incarcerated by Israel, especially Shaykh Obeid, Mustapha 
Dirani and Samir Kuntar390. Nevertheless, the primary foundation for validating the 
existence of the Islamic Resistance would be Israel’s continued occupation of 
Lebanese land, namely the Sheba Farms. 
 
Following the demarcation of the ‘Blue-Line’ by the UN on 7 June 2000, which 
classified the Sheba Farms as Syrian territory annexed by Israel in 1967, and after 
the issuing of UNSC Resolution 1310 on 27 July 2000, Israel had been judged as 
fulfilling its obligation in vacating Lebanese land (Spyer, 2009: 206)391. Consequently, 
from a UN perspective, the fate of the Sheba Farms was inexorably linked to the 
status of the Golan Heights and therefore subject to UNSC Resolution 242, which 
called on Israel to withdraw from territory occupied in 1967 (Harik, 2005: 139). 
However, Lebanese authorities disputed this interpretation by citing agreements with 
Syria in 1943 and 1951 proving that the territory had been transferred to Lebanon 
(Hajjar, 2002: 25)392. This diplomatic debate over the ownership of the 14 Sheba 
Farms, a remote area of 25 square kilometres between the northern ridges of Mount 
Hermon and comprising 2% of Lebanon, was extended to include Al-Ghajar, the Kfar 
Shouba Hills and the ‘Seven Villages’ (ICG, 2006b: 17; Harik, 2005: 139)393. 
Regardless of cartographic semantics, the unequivocal support of Syria on this issue 
provided the Islamic Resistance with the legitimate authorisation to resume its 
rebranded remit.  
 
Secondly, the Israeli withdrawal posed two challenges for Hizbullah’s OF in 
sustaining its capital within the SMF. While the Party would have to adapt, diversify 
and modernise its social service institutions and disseminating outlets for the 
purpose of developing frames and practices within the Shi’i community that 
inculcated its revised approach, Hizbullah’s OF also had to assuage reservations by 
expanding upon the opportunity of transferring its symbolic capital in the MSF to 
connect with a broader demographic of non-Shi’i agents in the SMF. Either motivated 
                                                 
390
 Shaykh Obeid, a Hizbullah recruiter, was seized on 28 July 1989 while Mustapha Dirani, the leader of the Believers Front, was 
kidnapped on 31 May 1994. Samir Kuntar, a Druze Lebanese member of the Palestinian Liberation Front, was sentenced by Israel in 
1980 for his role in the kidnapping of an Israeli family in Nahariya. 
391
 The ‘Blue-Line’, which runs for 110 km from Ras Naqoura on the Mediterranean coast in the west to the foothills of Mount Hermon 
in the east, was based on the 1949 armistice line (Blanford, 2006: 78; Hajjar, 2002: 22).    
392
 Despite the UN displaying a series of Syrian and Lebanese maps showing the Sheba Farms in Syria, Lebanon submitted maps 
from 1961 and 1966 that demonstrated the opposite. Not only was the Sheba Farms identified as Syrian on the Lebanese LL1,000 
note, but Nabih Berri was also unable to point to the area on a map (MER, 21 June, 2000: 11-12; Blanford, 2011: 253-254).     
393
 In 1923, the Alawite village of Al-Ghajar was divided with the northern two-thirds sectioned to Lebanon while the southern third was 
given to Syria. The Israelis occupied the village along with the Golan in 1967 and imposed citizenship on its residents in 1981. By 
2000, the southern section of the village, which is also important due to its access to the Hasbani River, remained under Israeli 
control. According to newspaper reports, residents of the village have never expressed an interest in being liberated (Blanford, 2011: 
283; MER, 1 September, 2001: 7-9; 21 September, 2002: 7). The ‘Seven Villages’ refers to Terbikha, Saliha, Malkiyeh, Kades, Hunin, 
Nabi Yusha and Ibl al-Qamh, predominantly Shi’i villages on the Israeli side of the blue-line. In 1920, they were part of Greater 
Lebanon before becoming part of Palestine in 1924 (ICG, 2006b: 19).           
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by conviction or compulsion, Shi’i agents within Hizbullah’s demarcated 
constituencies were already engaged in the visceral reproduction of a Resistance 
habitus that was privately and publicly institutionalised into daily practice394. 
Therefore, adjusting discursive frames and practices to ensure homologous 
mobilisational modalities required a process that supplemented Hizbullah’s pre-
existing organisational structures.     
 
Beyond the Shi’i community, Hizbullah’s OF exploited the advent of the 2000 
parliamentary elections to nationalise the accomplishments of the Islamic Resistance 
by using its symbolic capital in the MSF to project the inclusivity of its agenda in 
Lebanon. Consequently, Hizbullah’s OF focused on upholding ‘the security of all the 
citizens, without discrimination among their groups and sects’, praised ‘the 
cooperation of the public government and the Lebanese Army’ in defeating Israel and 
reiterated initiatives to create a National Body for the Abolishment of Political 
Sectarianism in promoting national unity, advocating state reform and addressing 
socio-economic issues (Alagha, 2011: 76-81). Demonstrating this commitment, none 
of Hizbullah’s parliamentary candidates were clerics, the Party changed its logo from 
the ‘Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’ to the ‘Islamic Resistance in Lebanon’ and 
renamed its journal Al-Intiqad (‘The Critique’), a revamping that sought to display a 
more secular image (Alagha, 2011: 116; 2006: 159)395.  
 
Thirdly, while Syria had traditionally protected Hizbullah’s position in Lebanon’s PF to 
serve its interests in exerting strategic leverage over Israel and Iran as well as 
balancing the influence of parities in Lebanon, the Israeli withdrawal on 25 May 2000 
and the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on 10 June 2000 solidified the 
Party’s social capital in the PF. Whereas Hafez al-Assad perceived Hizbullah as an 
inferior proxy, his son and heir, Bashar al-Assad, surrounded himself with a young 
cadre of fellow Alawites that shared his political vision of enhancing the status of the 
Islamic Resistance396. Furthermore, through his previous role as head of Syria’s 
Lebanese portfolio, the incumbent Syrian President also had a close relationship with 
his Lebanese counterpart and staunch Hizbullah advocate Emile Lahoud.   
 
                                                 
394
 Hizbullah constituents were not only religiously and legally required to vote for the Party, but they were also coerced into doing so 
by Hizbullah’s intrusive welfare networks (Norton, 2007b: 481; Malthaner, 2011; Danawi, 2002). By 2000, 15,000 children were being 
educated in 15 Hizbullah-affiliated schools while the Martyrs Foundation was directly assisting over 1,000 families and providing 
medical care for 5,000 people per month (Le Thomas, 2010; Bortolazzi, 2011: 33-36).   
395
 Nevertheless, over half of Hizbullah’s majlis al-shura was comprised of clerics. Hizbullah removed the opening Qur’anic verse on 
the opening page of Al-‘Ahd as well as the portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei (Alagha, 2006: 169).  
396
 Bashar al-Assad promoted the ‘Alawite component’ of the new Syrian regime, including his brother (Maher), his sister (Bushra), his 
brother-in-law (Assef Shawkat) and his cousins in the Makhlouf family at the expense of Sunni Syrian officials, such as Abdul Halim 
Khaddam and Hikmat Shehabi (Blanford, 2006: 54). Despite being an Alawite, Ghazi Kanaan, Syria’s head of intelligence in Lebanon, 
was replaced by Rustom Ghazaleh in December 2002 (Harris, 2012: 267).   
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A week after Bashar al-Assad was unanimously elected, the Camp David Accords 
between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat 
concluded without any tangible results. The Israeli premier, who approved the 
unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, pivoted to the Peace Process after accepting 
that his decade long policy of ‘Syria first’ had failed but now confronted a revitalised 
Resistance in Lebanon and the ruptures of a renewed Palestinian intifada, resulting 
in a resurgent Syria augmenting its capital within the revisionist heterodoxy of the 
FIP. In this context, while Hizbullah retained its heterodox position in the PF on 
account of Syrian cover, and despite its role in expelling Israel from Lebanon, the 
Party would ultimately remain beholden and restrained by the applied regulations of 
al-saqf al-suri, one of the imposed mechanisms of Syria’s symbolic power in 
Lebanon. 
 
Although Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid revealed that Hizbullah could have 
received 25% of the popular vote in 2000, the complex Syrian diktats entailed within 
the ‘Ghazi Kan’an’ election law reduced the combined yet temperamental Hizbullah-
Amal ‘Resistance and Development Bloc’ to 29 seats in parliament with Hizbullah 
attaining 12 compared to Amal’s 17 (MER, 16 September, 2000: 12)397. As Nabih 
Berri resumed the position of Speaker, Hariri received 106/128 of the vote to become 
Prime Minister with Hizbullah comprising part of the group that withheld its support 
(Harik, 2005: 151)398. In the MSF, the Islamic Resistance symbolised a formidable 
guerrilla force with material capabilities to rival any competitor in Lebanon while 
Hizbullah’s extensive social institutions directed an expansive and sophisticated 
network of mobilisational structures in the SMF that disseminated holistic Resistance 
frames and practices. Additionally, by 2000, Hizbullah’s OF was financially self-
sufficient with its independent revenues exceeding donations from Iran (Gambill, 
2009: 135). Nevertheless, despite this successful accumulation of capital and the 
gradual evolution of its position, Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the PF had not 
substantially progressed since 1992.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the management and development of Hizbullah’s 
Resistance habitus in the context of two episodes of hysteresis in Lebanon. Firstly, 
the objective is to evaluate how Hizbullah’s OF readjusted its Collective Action 
                                                 
397
 Primarily, the composition and delineation of the five governorates within the revised 2000 election law were intentionally designed 
to balance the scales of influence in Lebanon (Blanford, 2006: 78; MER, 11 December, 199: 12). Before the elections, clashes 
erupted between Hizbullah and Amal with Sarkis Naoum commenting that the relationship between the two parties ‘will be 
unshakeably solid…on the summit level, but…precarious on a rank-and-file baseline’ (MER, 22 July, 2000: 12; 19 August, 2000:7). Of 
Hizbullah’s 12 MPs, nine were Party members, two were Sunni and one was Maronite.   
398
 Hariri possessed a parliamentary alliance of 55 MPs. Meanwhile, 19 MPs were loyal to President Lahoud and 25 were listed as 
independents (Harik, 2005: 151).   
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Frames and mobilisation modalities to maintain and reproduce the homologous 
synergy of capital immediately following the Israeli withdrawal. Considering Syria’s 
symbolic power over Lebanon’s PF, the scale and scope of Hizbullah’s perception of 
political opportunities were predominantly restricted to advancing its Resistance 
habitus in the MSF and SMF. Secondly, this section intends to ascertain how 
Hizbullah’s OF mitigated against the implications of Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 
following the assassination of Premier Hariri. The unprecedented shattering of the 
saqf al-suri caused significant reverberations amongst agents in the PF. For 
Hizbullah’s OF, Syria’s physical retreat from Lebanon presented both an enabling 
opportunity and a debilitating risk. Either way, the opening of a previously closed 
sphere for capital accumulation and deployment demanded corresponding shifts in 
reconstituting the dispositions and practice of Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus within 
and between its fields of operation. 
 
By analysing the withdrawals of Israel and Syria through a conventional SMT lens, 
there is a tendency to credit or attribute Hizbullah’s reactions with a uniform and 
unilateral process of strategic calculation. Accordingly, in bestowing the agents of 
Hizbullah’s OF with decision-making capacities that privilege the notion of 
instrumental rationality, the Party is perceived as discursively and practically 
translating objective opportunities into subjective mobilisation while appropriating and 
allocating the capital required to independently facilitate this phased transformation. 
This conceptual assumption not only fails to consider the diversified limits of 
opportunities that exist within the structured logics of each the PF, SMF and MSF, 
but also lacks the ability to detect differentiated dynamics of mutual relation between 
Hizbullah’s OF and the pre-existing perceptions and practices of its analogous 
agents across designated fields. Alternatively, by applying a combined Bourdieu-
SMT approach that assists in explaining this inter-related complexity, Hizbullah’s 
strategic (mis)perceptions, (mis)calculations and (mal)practices can be 
conceptualised to examine how Hizbullah’s OF identified opportunities, constructed 
tactics to disseminate complementary Collective Action Frames, ensured that these 
discourses were inculcated in practice and institutionalised cohesive mobilisation 
across its operational fields.          
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7.1 Fissures within Pax Syriana   
 
The rationale behind Ehud Barak’s decision to unilaterally withdraw without 
establishing a Lebanese partner was informed by the assumption that Israel’s 
departure would nullify Hizbullah’s Resistance and negate Syria’s military presence 
(Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 22). Contrarily, on the strategic level, whereas Ayatollah 
Khamenei endowed Hizbullah with the conceptual legitimacy to continue its jihad 
against Israel, Syria supplied Hizbullah with the practical legitimacy for preserving the 
Islamic Resistance (Norton, 2007a: 90). However, Hizbullah required a tactical 
approach that reflected its revised situational context but remained commensurate 
with the recognised ‘rules of the game’ in the MSF. As conceded by Sayyid 
Nasrallah, ‘Resistance liberates land, but Resistance to prevent an aggression 
against a country is something new’ (Blanford, 2011: 305). Consequently, the post-
2000 Islamic Resistance would surrender its offensive proclivities and embrace 
defensive principles, acting as a deterrent rather than a belligerent that adopted 
‘means of defying the enemy without necessarily firing a shot’ (ICG, 2003: 8).  
 
Hizbullah’s military commanders, who ultimately defined the adjusted practices of the 
Islamic Resistance, were responsible for calculating and preparing for the inevitability 
of war with Israel399. In the long-term, considering that the Islamic Resistance could 
not compete with Israel’s military arsenal by resorting to symmetrical warfare, and 
since Katyusha rockets were pivotal in determining the outcome of any potential 
conflict by pressuring the Israeli public to compel the government to desist, Hizbullah 
began constructing a network of underground bunkers in the South to conceal their 
launching sites from pre-emptive Israeli attacks400. In the short-term, with Hizbullah 
intent on avoiding ‘terrorist’ appellations, the Islamic Resistance would cease its 
martyrdom missions and focus on executing a sequence of guerrilla-styled ‘reminder 
operations’ in the Sheba Farms against ‘enemy-held, hostile, or defined territory’ 
(Harik, 2005: 169). Reserving its rockets for retaliatory purposes, Hizbullah also 
redirected its efforts to kidnapping Israeli combatants through the creation in 2000 of 
Amn al-Muddad (‘Counter Intelligence’), a highly independent and clandestine 
department allegedly directed by Jawad Nur al-Din, later identified as Imad 
Mugniyeh, who was appointed head of the Jihad Council of Hizbullah’s majlis al-
shura during the Party’s Sixth Conclave in July 2001 (ICG, 2003: 3; Wege, 2012: 
                                                 
399
 Interview with Nicholas Blanford in Beirut, 10 September 2012. Similarly, epitomised by ‘Defence of the Land’ (2002) and ‘Elevated 
Waters’ (2003), Israeli generals were also devising contingencies for military operations in Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 61-
62).   
400
 By 2000, the Islamic Resistance allegedly possessed approximately 7,000 Katyusha rockets (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 23).   
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774)401. Ramzi Nohra, who was instrumental in planning the capture of Ahmad Hallaq 
in 1996 and the death of Israeli Brigadier General Erez Gerstein in 1999, was one of 
the most prized assets within this secretive cell402.  
 
Furthermore, testament to the increasing legitimacy bestowed upon the Islamic 
Resistance by the PF, Hizbullah’s alternative strategy in the MSF received approval 
from President Lahoud during a meeting with Sayyid Nasrallah on 26 June 2000, in 
which it was agreed that the former would ‘pursue political action for the liberation of 
Lebanese territory and the Resistance would pursue whatever action was necessary 
to free what could not be freed politically’ (Pakradouni, 2012: 123). In terms of 
coordination, General Jamil al-Sayyid, the head of the General Security Directorate 
(GSD), mediated between President Lahoud and Hizbullah while General Michel 
Sulayman, the head of the LAF, liaised with the Islamic Resistance in the South403. 
Demonstrating Hizbullah’s discipline in adhering to the revised ‘rules of the game’ in 
the MSF, the Israeli-Lebanese border remained relatively dormant. In the first three 
years after 2000, Al-Intiqad reported that although Israel had violated Lebanon’s 
airspace 7,171 times, between 2000 and 2006, only 17 Israelis (one civilian) were 
killed in the Sheba Farms and during skirmishes across the Blue-Line (ICG, 2003: 8; 
Norton, 2007a: 91)404. 
 
This effective method of military engagement was directed by shifting the tactical 
focus towards kidnapping as a means of compelling Israel into negotiating the 
release of Lebanese prisoners. On 7 October 2000, the Islamic Resistance seized 
three Israeli soldiers in the Sheba Farms during an operation calculably conceived to 
coincide with the Palestinian Al-Aqsa intifada and therefore elicit a minimal response 
due to the prevalence of Israel’s policy of ‘restraint and containment’ that avoided 
inciting simultaneous conflicts on two fronts (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 39-41)405. A 
week later, Sayyid Nasrallah announced that Elhanan Tannenbaum, an alleged 
Israeli Colonel masquerading as a businessman, had been captured in Beirut406. By 
                                                 
401
 Imad Mugniyeh reportedly started working for the Iranian secret services after the civil war (MER, 20 October, 2001: 9). During the 
Sixth Conclave, Sayyid Nasrallah, Shaykh Qassem, Hajj al-Khalil, Shaykh Safieddine and Shaykh Yazbek all retained their positions 
while Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid became head of the Political Council and Jawad Nur al-Din (Imad Mugniyeh) became head of 
the Jihad Council (MER, 4 August, 2001: 6; Alagha, 2011: 163).       
402
 Ahmad Hallaq was an Israeli agent accused in 1994 of organising a car bomb in southern Beirut that targeted Imad Mugniyeh but 
instead killed his brother Fuad, a local supermarket manager (MER, 14 December, 2002: 8).   
403
 General al-Sayyid was described as ‘not only the ruler of Lebanon, he was almost the ruler of Syria’ (Blanford, 2006: 93). Another 
Lahoud ally, General Mustapha Hamdane, became Commander of the Republican Guard with the combination of these respective 
heads encompassing a ‘political power centre’ of their own (Pakradouni, 2012: 124; MER, 26 April, 2000: 7). General Sulayman 
commented that ‘there is constant coordination with the Resistance movement in the South…our common vision leads to automatic 
coordination’ (MER, 15 February, 2003: 7).       
404
 During the same period, the Amn al-Muddad was responsible for identifying 20 Israeli spies in Lebanon (Wege, 2012: 774).  
405
 Responding to the operation, President Lahoud claimed that not only was it impossible for the LAF to prevent Hizbullah’s activities, 
but it was also impossible for it to prevent Israeli retaliation thereby placing the LAF in the crossfire (Pakradouni, 2012: 127). 
406
 In an operation supposedly orchestrated by Imad Mugniyeh and executed by Qais Obeid, Tannenbaum was lured to Dubai via 
Brussels on the pretence of finalising a drug deal before being taken to Beirut (Blanford, 2011: 299; Qassem, 2005: 143).  
 260
29 January 2004, Hizbullah had returned all four Israelis in return for 435 prisoners, 
including Shaykh Obeid and Mustapha Dirani (MER, 31 January, 2004: 7)407. 
Hizbullah not only received significant values of symbolic capital within the Shi’i 
community, but since only 11 of the freed prisoners were Hizbullahis with the total 
number comprised of 400 Palestinians, 12 Lebanese and 12 Arabs, the transference 
of capital from the Islamic Resistance in the MSF also permeated into Lebanon’s 
broader SMF and PF (Norton, 2007a: 87-88). A survey of 1200 people compiled by 
the Beirut Research and Information Centre revealed that 70% of Shi’i and non-Shi’i 
respondents supported the liberation of the Sheba Farms by the Islamic Resistance 
(Qassem, 2005: 148)408.  
 
Due to the tangible results of kidnapping, rockets served as a preventative and 
retaliatory function. By 2003, the Islamic Resistance reportedly possessed 8-10,000 
missiles but refrained from launching them to prevent drawing attention to the 
construction of underground bunkers or the location of its artillery409. Ironically, it was 
Palestinian groups that compromised Hizbullah’s strategic military balance in the 
South (Norton, 2007a: 92). As an orthodox actor in the MSF, the Islamic Resistance 
derived a considerable proportion of its symbolic capital by upholding the rights of 
Palestinians against Israel. However, it could not permit heterodox practice, namely 
the firing of rockets by radical groups in Palestinian camps in Lebanon, from 
disrupting the intricate dynamics of the MSF. Highlighting the dilemma, Muhammad 
Ra’ad asserted that ‘we cannot reject Palestinian cross-border activity and we cannot 
accept it’ (MER, 3 February, 2001: 9)410. Aside from this conundrum, the Islamic 
Resistance concentrated on developing its information-gathering capacities within 
the Amn al-Muddad, preparing its Mirsad-1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and 
expanding its covert HUMINT (human intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence) 
programmes411.   
 
For the first five years following Israel’s withdrawal, the Islamic Resistance managed 
the process of transition in redefining and adjusting its dispositions of orthodox 
                                                 
407
 In August, Shaykh Obeid became the head of Hizbullah’s social services (Alagha, 2011: 165-166). Mediated by the Germans, 
Israel also promised to repatriate 59 Lebanese fighters, provide information on 24 missing people and supply landmine maps for 
information on Ron Arad, the Israeli pilot kidnapped in 1986 (Blanford, 2011: 365). For Israel, the case of Samir Kuntar remained 
linked to Ron Arad whereas Hizbullah insisted on the whereabouts of four Iranians kidnapped in 1982 (Qassem, 2005: 146).    
408
 As for those who disagreed, Hajj al-Khalil stated that ‘we don’t care…they have always existed…such voices have no impact on 
the Resistance’ (MER, 16 December, 2000: 10). 
409
 Hizbullah’s arsenal included Katyusha rockets with a range of 23 kilometres as well as the Iranian-made Fajr (72km) and Zelzal 
(200-300km) missiles that enabled the Islamic Resistance to reach beyond Israel’s northern areas to water reserves in Tiberias and 
nuclear facilities in the south (MER, 9 November, 2002: 7-8).   
410
 In September 2005, a 40km missile was fired into Israel. Since the Islamic Resistance did not claim responsibility, Timur Goksel 
remarked that ‘we have to start wondering about the vaunted discipline of the Party of God or someone else who has those 
capabilities’ (MER, 3 September, 2005: 13). 
411
 The Mirsad-1, which was piloted in November 2004 and April 2005, was Hizbullah’s name for the Iranian Ababil-T UAV (Blanford, 
2011: 323-324).  
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practice to the demands presented by the revised regulative structure in the MSF, as 
defined by Israel and Syria, while maintaining the legitimacy of its symbolic capital. 
The practice of defensive deterrence through kidnapping operations and retaliatory 
rocket fire was not only proving effective in elongating the durability of the Islamic 
Resistance, but prisoner exchanges, approved by the Israel’s PF, also contributed to 
the recognition and reproduction of these activities. Therefore, threats to Hizbullah’s 
position in the MSF would not emanate from discrepancies within its own internalised 
logic of practice but would occur as a consequence of its relational homology with 
developments in Lebanon’s PF, a compositionally convoluted sphere of porous 
constitution whose endogenous agents were disproportionately susceptible to capital 
deployment from exogenous actors.  
 
After 9/11, the upgrading of Hizbullah by the U.S. from a ‘terrorist organisation’ 
(1997) to a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation’ (2001) caused the 
Islamic Resistance to cease any erratic operations in the MSF (Addis & Blanchard, 
2011: 20)412. In particular, Imad Mugniyeh, Hassan Ezzedine and Ali Atwah, all 
ostensibly senior leaders in Hizbullah, were placed on America’s ‘Most Wanted List’ 
for their activities from 1983-1992 (MER, 17 November, 2001: 8-9)413. Reacting to 
this alteration in the orthodox discourse of the FIP, Sayyid Nasrallah proclaimed that 
‘we have not carried out operations anywhere in the world’, a statement backed by 
President Lahoud who pledged that ‘Hizbullah will keep its operations and various 
other activities confined to Lebanese territory’ (Hirst, 2010: 293: MER, 24 November, 
2001: 7). Even Prime Minister Hariri, who had previously been humiliated when 
Hizbullah conducted a foray into the Sheba Farms one day after he reassured 
investors in Paris that the Islamic Resistance would cease these operations, 
asserted ‘let no one think that we will stand hand-cuffed toward the demand of 
liquidating the Resistance’ (MER, 10 November, 2001: 7)414. Following UNSC 
Resolution 1373, which institutionalised the admonishing of global terrorism as a 
legitimate orthodox discourse with the FIP, both Syria and Lebanon refuted the 
inclusion of the Islamic Resistance.    
 
                                                 
412
 The appellation extended to implicate suspected Hizbullah members (Sayyid Nasrallah, Sayyid Fadlallah, Imad Mugniyeh, Shaykh 
Tufayli and known financers including Qassem Aliq as well as Husayn and Ahmad al-Shami) and organisations (the Islamic 
Resistance Support Organisation, Bayt al-Mal, the Yousser Company for Finance and Investment, Al-Qard Al-Hassan, the Martyrs 
Foundation, Jihad al-Bina and the Lebanese Media Group). Israel (2002), Canada (2002), Australia (2003) and Holland (2004) 
followed the U.S. designation (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 20; Azani, 2011: 201)   
413
 Most notably, their role in the 1983 bombings, the kidnapping of William Buckley (1984), four Soviet diplomats (1985) and Colonel 
Higgins (1985) as well as the hijacking of planes (1985) and the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina (1992) (MER, 17 
November, 2001: 8-9).  
414
 On 16 February 2001, Hizbullah raided the Sheba Farms and killed one Israeli soldier one day after Hariri claimed that there would 
be no more raids across the Israeli border (Blanford, 2006: 83). Hariri argued that the Islamic Resistance could not take full credit for 
Israel’s withdrawal as it would not have been possible without the support of the government, the LAF, the internal security forces and 
the business community (Shatz, 2004; MER, 24 February, 2001: 7-8).  
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The urgency of the U.S. in confronting global terrorism placed Syria in a precarious 
predicament. As a state intent on projecting influence in the FIP without the 
advantage of geo-strategic resources, Syria traditionally swung between Hariri’s 
economic liberalism and Hizbullah’s asymmetric warfare with the pendulum 
predominantly fixed in the direction of Resistance over rehabilitation415. Emulating his 
father’s bandwagoning policy during Saddam Husayn’s invasion of Kuwait, Bashar 
al-Assad initially endorsed President Bush’s ‘War on Terror’ against Al-Qaida. 
However, as evidenced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s remarks that 
‘there cannot be a situation where you support the war against Al-Qaida and at the 
same time support Hizbullah’s terrorist activities’, the U.S. categorised the two 
groups within the same stratification with the prevailing narrative depicting Hizbullah 
as ‘the A-team of terrorists’ and Al-Qaida as ‘a sort of benched reserve’ (MER, 15 
December, 2001: 9; 5 October, 2002: 8)416.  
 
Under this international pressure, Syria was vulnerable and devoid of the legitimate 
capital required to sufficiently protect the Islamic Resistance from an emerging U.S.-
inspired collusio that enveloped the orthodoxy of the FIP. Perceiving Syria’s retreat 
from view as an opportunity to enhance his position within the Troika of the PF, 
Prime Minister Hariri exploited his independently-accrued social capital in the FIP, 
especially with French President Jacques Chirac, to accumulate leverage by 
persuading the European Union not to indict Hizbullah as a ‘terrorist organisation’. 
Not only did this augment his relationship with Syria, but the premier also capitalised 
on the impasse to implement ‘Harirism’. With Lebanon’s debt at 140% of GDP and its 
budget deficit at 51% of GDP, Hariri signed onto the European-Mediterranean 
Partnership and in return for securing $5 billion in financial aid at the Paris II 
Conference, the premier promised to apply economic reforms aimed at privatising 
state industries while cutting public spending (Blanford, 2006: 88)417. 
 
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 compelled Syria to undertake more 
drastic measures beyond exerting influence over Hizbullah in observing a 
moratorium on operations. After redeploying 6,000 soldiers from Beirut in June 2001, 
President Assad withdrew 4,000 in 2003, leaving a total of 16,000 in Lebanon (MER, 
                                                 
415
 Syria’s grasp over Lebanon’s economic fortunes were most pertinently evident regarding oil requirements. Receiving discounted oil 
as part of its ‘oil-for-food’ programme with Iraq, Syria exported oil to Lebanon at almost twice the price and regularly scuttled attempts 
by Hariri to strike a similar arrangement with Iraq (MER, 3 March, 2001: 8-9; Blanford, 2006: 86).     
416
 For U.S. Senator Bob Graham, Hizbullah was more threatening to the U.S. than Saddam Husayn while David Wurmser, U.S. Vice 
President Dick Cheyney’s policy advisor, expressed his preference for a pre-emptive war against Syria and Hizbullah, a position 
shared by other prominent neo-conservatives, John Bolton and Richard Perle (Shatz, 2004).     
417
 By February 2002, Hariri had boosted opportunities for European trade, secured 500 million Euros form the World Bank, the 
European Commission and the Mediterranean Development Agency of the European Investment Bank and explored ways into 
privatising Electricite Du Liban, Middle East Airlines, Lebanese Telecom and Lebanon’s water industry (MER, 17 March, 2002: 10-11). 
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1 March, 2003: 7-8). Commenting on the initial aftermath of Iraq and U.S. statements 
declaring that Syria may be next, Sarkis Naoum quipped that since Damascus and 
Tehran will inevitably be held responsible for Hizbullah’s activities, ‘this could be the 
beginning of the end of the Resistance’ (MER, 19 July, 2003: 9). On 12 December 
2003, the official U.S. ultimatum arrived through the ‘Syrian Accountability and 
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act’, a document that threatened to issue 
sanctions on Syria unless President Assad agreed to withdraw from Lebanon, 
dismantle Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance, close the offices of rogue Palestinian 
factions in Damascus and discontinue its nuclear programmes (Schenker, 2009: 
222)418.   
 
The friction caused by the Syrian Accountability Act was directly channelled into 
Lebanon, resulting in the increasingly irreconcilable polarisation of the PF. Primarily, 
the Accountability Act galvanised the practice of an emerging heterodoxy, a 
movement centred on Qornet Shahwan, a broad Christian coalition amalgamated by 
Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, and PSP leader Walid Jumblatt, which had been 
propagating a redefinition of Syrian orthodoxy since 2000419. Conversely, the 
orthodox trend was represented by President Lahoud and Speaker Berri, two 
vehement proponents of Syria in the PF. Although embodying heterodoxy in the PF, 
Hizbullah was an integral ally for the President and Amal based on a combination of 
its pro-Syrian dispositions, the popularity it accrued from prisoner exchanges and its 
dominant display in the May 2004 municipality elections420. Although Prime Minister 
Hariri personally associated with the sentiments of the oppositional camp, and 
despite incessant slurs from President Assad accusing the premier of scheming 
against the Syrian regime, the third component of the Troika straddled the schism in 
the interest of maintaining order and averting anarchy in Lebanon’s PF421. 
Exemplifying the strategic decision to prioritise long-term reconstitution over short-
term rupture, Prime Minister Hariri accelerated efforts to dissuade French President 
                                                 
418
 Prior to the signing of the Act, Michel Aoun, the exiled Lebanese Christian leader, emphasised to U.S. Congress the damaging 
effects of Syria’s military presence in Lebanon and called for the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which enables the use 
of force (Pakradouni, 2012: 202). Due to the specific content and lobbying of the Act, it has been accused of privileging Israeli security 
over Lebanese sovereignty (Hirst, 2010: 299). Sanctions began in May 2004 when President Bush authorised the prohibition of 
exporting U.S. goods to Syria, prevented Syria from obtaining humanitarian supplies from the U.S. and ceased all Syrian Airways 
flights to and from the U.S. (Blanford, 2006: 89).       
419
 Qornet Shahwan consisted of Amine Gemayel, Butros Harb and Nassib Lahoud as well as the Lebanese Forces (Samir Geagea), 
the Free Patriotic Movement (General Aoun) and the National Liberation Party (Chamoun) (MER, 5 May, 2001: 8-9).   
420
 Hizbullah recorded triumphs the southern suburbs of Beirut (98 seats to Amal’s 10), the South (87 seats out of 142) and the Biqa’ 
(36 to Amal’s 21). Both Hizbullah and Amal joined Hariri’s list in Beirut while the premier lost in his home constituency in Sidon as 
President Lahoud and the intelligence agencies rallied a combined list of Hizbullah, Sunni groups and prominent Sidon families 
(Hamzeh, 2004: 132-135; Alagha, 2006: 55-56; Blanford, 2006: 96).   
421
 Ali Hajj, Hariri’s aide and a prominent figure in the ISF, worked for the Syrian intelligence services (Blanford, 2006: 94).  
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Chirac from adopting the Accountability Act while engaging in secret meetings with 
Hizbullah’s Sayyid Nasrallah (Blanford, 2006: 94, 97)422. 
 
As Emile Lahoud prepared to extend his presidency for another three years, the 
chasm within the PF widened with prominent religious leaders from across the 
confessional spectrum, such as Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, President of the 
HISC Shaykh Qabalan and Sunni Mufti Qabbani, also publicly declaring their 
disapproval with the proposal. Marwan Hamadeh, a key figure in the PSP, argued 
that the opposition understood the reason for amending Article 49 in this specific 
case but it was reticent to set a precedent that undermined the principle of power 
transfers in the PF (Pakradouni, 2012: 218). Concurrently, news circulated in the FIP 
of an imminent UNSC Resolution that would augment the prerequisites of the 
Accountability Act with stipulations enshrining fair presidential elections free from 
foreign intervention. Consequently, Prime Minister Hariri, whose parliamentary bloc 
would prove decisive in acquiring the two-thirds majority required to amend the 
Constitution and extend President Lahoud’s term, was wedged between the revised 
preservation of Syrian orthodoxy and the risky elevation of a UNSC-endorsed 
heterodoxy in Lebanon’s PF423.  
 
On 26 August 2004, and with President Lahoud still short of a quorum of two-thirds, 
President al-Assad allegedly relayed to Premier Hariri that ‘I am Lahoud and Lahoud 
is me. If your friend Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I would sooner break Lebanon 
on your head and the head of Chirac than break my word’ (Blanford, 2006: 100). A 
week later, UNSC Resolution 1559, which omitted direct reference to Syria and 
Hizbullah, was passed with nine votes and six abstentions424. Despite this 
development, President Lahoud was re-elected with the assistance of all but one of 
Hariri’s 18 parliamentary seats on 3 September 2004 (Schenker, 2009: 222)425. 
Alluding to the trepidation of deviating from the predominant orthodoxy in the PF, 
Prime Minister Hariri admitted ‘it is true I was against extending the president’s 
                                                 
422
 Both Sayyid Nasrallah and Hariri believed that riots during the May 2004 elections were organised by the intelligence services and 
executed by Amal to drive a wedge between Hizbullah and the premier. Private meetings between Sayyid Nasrallah and Hariri were 
arranged by Lebanese journalist Mustapha Nasr and attended by Husayn al-Khalil. Even Yehya Arab, the head of Hariri’s security, 
was not present (Blanford, 2006: 97). Around this time, Hizbullah also convened its Seventh Conclave with the only notable change 
being the promotion of Shaykh Hassan Ezzedine as the Party’s representative in the South. Sayyid Nasrallah’s personal media 
advisor, Hajj Muhammad Afif, replaced Shaykh Ezzedine as the chief of Hizbullah’s central press office (Alagha, 2011: 165-166).     
423
  President Lahoud required 86 MPs to change the Constitution but could only count on the support of 77: 49 from Hizbullah, Amal, 
Sulayman Franjiyeh, the SSNP, the Northern Metn Bloc, the Ba’ath Party, the National Gathering and the Bsharri Bloc; 20 
independents; and 8 from other political parties (Al-Safir, 4 September, 2004).     
424
  UNSC Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; the disarmament of all the militias; Lebanese 
control over all its territory; and fair presidential elections free from foreign intervention (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 53). After 
negotiations with Russia, China and Algeria as well as considerable lobbying from Hariri, Syria and Hizbullah were not mentioned by 
name (Blanford, 2006: 106). The Resolution was voted for by Angola, Benin, Chile, France, Germany, Romania, Spain, the UK and 
the US while Algeria, Brazil, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and Russia abstained.      
425
 President Lahoud received 96/128 votes. Ghattas Khoury, a close friend of Hariri, was the only member of the premier’s bloc to 
vote against an extension (Blanford, 2006: 106-107).  
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term…yet I cannot accept breaking Syria’s decisions in Lebanon…My relations with 
Syria are good...I will not allow anyone to disturb them’ (MER, 2 October, 2004: 13). 
 
Regardless of his political concessions and demonstrations of obedience, President 
al-Assad remained sceptical of Prime Minister Hariri’s intentions regarding UNSC 
Resolution 1559 and continued to marginalise the premier. After Syria undermined 
his authority in forming a cabinet and following the attempted assassination of 
Marwan Hamadeh, Rafiq Hariri resigned declaring ‘enough. I’m not playing this game 
anymore’ (Blanford, 2006: 108)426. Nevertheless, since Hariri was entrenched as an 
invested stakeholder in the illusio of the PF, he swiftly resumed efforts to accumulate 
and deploy capital in the interest of redefining rather than replacing Syrian-imposed 
orthodoxy. While publicly avoiding rallies against UNSC Resolution 1559, Hariri also 
reconvened discussions with Sayyid Nasrallah affirming that ‘I am not with 
Resolution 1559. I am with Ta’if’ (Blanford, 2006: 118)427. Promoting a partnership 
with Hizbullah that advocated a relationship of mutual equality with Syria, Hariri 
suggested that the issue of the Islamic Resistance be internalised as a Lebanese 
and not a regional or international concern. Simultaneously, Hariri indirectly indicated 
his support for the rapidly unifying, heterodox-promoting oppositional movement at 
the Bristol Gathering in December 2004428.  
 
This tactically balanced manoeuvring employed by Hariri in Lebanon’s PF provoked 
both confusion and alarm in Syria. On hearing that the former premier had informed 
Rustom Ghazaleh of his intention not to consent to Syrian appointments on his 
electoral lists, Sulayman Franjiyeh, Lebanon’s pro-Syrian Interior Minister, designed 
an electoral law aimed at neutralising Hariri’s influence within the Sunni community 
while concurrently targeting the composition of his cross-confessional alliances429. 
While President Assad warned UN envoy Terje Roed Larsen that Hariri was ‘playing 
dirty roles against Syria’, the aspiring premier was consolidating his relationship with 
Hizbullah by convincing France not to designate the Islamic Resistance as a ‘terrorist 
                                                 
426
 Not only did Syria present Hariri with a list of pro-Syrian candidates for posts in government, but Nabih Berri also informed Hariri 
that seven cabinet ministers would collapse the government if he chose to resign (Pakradouni, 2012: 221). On 1 October 2004, an 
attempt was made on the life of Marwan Hamadeh, a close friend of Walid Jumblatt and the uncle of influential journalist Gebran 
Tueni (Blanford, 2006: 108-114). It was the first high-profile assassination attempt since the killing of Elie Hobeika, a former head of 
the Lebanese Forces, in January 2002 (Pakradouni, 2012: 176-177). Hariri was replaced by Omar Karami.           
427
 In November 2004, around 100,000 Lebanese congregated in Beirut to protest against UNSC Resolution 1559. Hizbullah retired to 
the rear of the demonstration, refrained from polarising language and wielded Lebanese flags as opposed to party banners (Blanford, 
2006: 117; Alagha, 2006: 58).  
428
 By October 2004, the Qornet Shahwan/Democratic Gathering coalition had enlarged to include the Lebanese Communist Party, 
Nassib Lahoud’s Democratic Renewal Party and Elias Atallah’s Democratic Left Party (MER, 16 October, 2004: 14-15). In December 
2004, the largest multi-sectarian oppositional bloc in Lebanon’s history congregated at the Bristol Hotel. This ‘Bristol Gathering’ 
denounced the amendment of the constitution that extended President Lahoud’s term, called for a fair and just election law as well as 
an impartial government to supervise the upcoming elections (MER, 18 December, 2004). Ghattas Khoury and Bassil Fleihan, two of 
Hariri’s most trusted colleagues, attended the meeting (Blanford, 2006: 116-117).    
429
 The revised electoral law privileged the qada system over the larger muhafazat constituencies. Not only were Beirut’s districts 
redrawn to dilute Sunni representation with Shi’i and Christian candidates, but in Saida, where Hariri’s sister Bahiya was running, the 
predominantly Sunni city was combined with its Shi’i suburbs for the first time (Blanford, 2006: 121).   
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organisation’ and even agreeing to run a Hizbullah candidate on his list (Harris, 2012: 
268)430. In return, Sayyid Nasrallah promised to arbitrate a rapprochement between 
Hariri and President Assad scheduled for 14 February 2005 (Blanford, 2006: 126).  
 
Rafiq Hariri was killed that afternoon as his convoy approached the St Georges Hotel 
on Beirut’s corniche. The reverberations of the explosion, which left 23 people dead, 
shook the foundations of Lebanon’s PF and ushered in a period of protracted 
hysteresis. Whereas President Lahoud accused Israel and Islamic radicals of 
corroborating to destabilise Lebanon, opposition activists blamed the Syrian and 
Lebanese intelligence services for orchestrating the assassination431. As UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan despatched a team led by Irish Deputy Police 
Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald to conduct preliminary investigations, President 
Assad tentatively agreed to an arrangement with President Lahoud whereby Syrian 
troops would gradually withdraw from Lebanon (Harris, 2009b: 68; MER, 12 March, 
2005: 7)432. Internally, the assassination of the former premier evoked a diametrical 
split that produced a competitive struggle for the new predominant orthodoxy in 
Lebanon’s PF. On 8 March, in a rally that Gebran Tueni credited as signifying 
Hizbullah’s shift to ‘the internal political game’ by ‘engaging in political life like other 
parties’, Sayyid Nasrallah addressed a crowd of approximately 500,000 people 
wielding Lebanese flags and espoused the unshakeable bond between Syria and 
Lebanon (MER, 19 March, 2005: 8). Conversely, on 14 March, Rafiq Hariri’s son, 
Sa’ad, announced the commencement of the ‘Cedar Revolution’ and ‘independence 
intifada’ against Syrian intervention to an estimated one million supporters433. 
 
The sudden eruption of hysteresis that engulfed Lebanon’s PF, in which ‘domestic 
forces and trends expanded to fill the political space…and to reposition themselves 
in a new political constellation’ threatened the political protection of the Islamic 
Resistance (Fayyad, 2006: 2). Before 14 February 2005, Hariri and Syria ensured 
that the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF was insured in the PF, 
                                                 
430
 UN diplomat Terje Larsen was in Damascus to suggest merging the Ta’if Accord with Resolution 1559 and encourage Syria to 
redeploy its soldiers to the Biqa’. On returning to Beirut, he warned Hariri of President Assad’s comments (Blanford, 2006: 123).  
431
 Initially, Ahmad Abu Adass, a 22 year-old Al-Qaida-inspired salafi-jihadist of Palestinian origin living in the Tarek al-Jadideh 
neighbourhood of West Beirut, was implicated as the perpetrator. Substantiating this claim, Interior Minister Elias Murr revealed in 
September 2004 that the government had uncovered an Al-Qaida cell intending to target Beirut (Blanford, 2006: 108, 141). However, 
opposition activists claimed that preliminary evidence pointed to the joint involvement of Syrian intelligence chiefs, such as Rustom 
Ghazaleh and Jamaa Jamma, in coordination with their Lebanese counterparts, including Jamil al-Sayyid (the head of the General 
Security Directorate), Mustapha Hamdan (the head of the Presidential Guards) and Ali Hajj (Hariri’s former security liaison and head 
of the ISF) (MER, 30 April, 2005: 8; 9 July, 2005: 11-12).    
432
 The deal consisted of three phases: a) withdrawing the remaining 15,000 Syrian troops to the Western Biqa’; b) establishing a joint 
military commission to determine the size and length of stay for the remaining forces and clarify the relationship between these forces 
and the authorities of the Lebanese states; c) agreeing on the completion date for the full withdrawal of Syrian forces (MER, 12 
March, 2005: 7).         
433
 It is noteworthy that the date 14 March is also supposedly of symbolic importance to 8 March aligned Free Patriotic Movement 
because it was the day that General Aoun launched his ‘Liberation War’ against Syria in 1989 (Interviews with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 
September 2012 and Hagop Pakradounian in Beirut, 6 September 2012).       
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affording Hizbullah the freedom to avoid political disputes and exhibit a heterodox 
position. However, after Hariri’s death, and although Hizbullah had not been publicly 
accused of executing the assassination, the European Parliament passed a non-
binding resolution on 10 March designating Hizbullah a ‘terrorist organisation’ (Azani, 
2011: 201). Moreover, on 7 April, UNSC Resolution 1595 was enacted to create an 
International Independent Commission to assist the inquiry into the killing of Hariri 
(Harris, 2009b: 68). Exposed by Syria’s dwindling presence in the MSF and its 
diminished ability to enforce orthodoxy in the PF, Hizbullah’s OF sought to shield 
itself by repositioning its Resistance habitus in Lebanon.   
 
Firstly, as Syria completed its withdrawal at the end of April and despite the intent of 
the interim authority to support UNSC Resolution 1595 and secure the resignation of 
President Lahoud’s pro-Syrian intelligence officers, Hizbullah not only voted in favour 
of Najib Miqati’s government, but also pushed for a cabinet position for the first time 
through its associate, Labour and Agriculture Minister Trad Hamadeh (MER, 23 April, 
2005: 7)434. Secondly, Hizbullah participated in the 2005 parliamentary elections as 
part of a quadripartite coalition with Sa’ad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri 
(Fayyad, 2006: 4). Nevertheless, despite its recourse to this accommodating 
perspective, Sayyid Nasrallah’s speech in Bint Jubayl to commemorate the fifth 
anniversary of Israel’s withdrawal illustrated the transitional challenges in 
independently balancing discourse and practice between the orthodoxy of the Islamic 
Resistance in the MSF and Hizbullah’s heterodoxy in the PF. Referring to the status 
of Hizbullah’s 12,000 rockets, the Secretary General proclaimed that ‘any hand that 
reaches to take those weapons away is an Israeli hand that will be cut off’ while 
paradoxically pledging that ‘we don’t want to fight anyone…the weapons we have are 
not meant for internal use’ (MER, 4 June, 2005: 8).  
 
In a frenetic contest, Sa’ad Hariri’s 14 March alliance became the first anti-Syrian 
coalition in three decades to hold a majority in parliament after receiving 72 seats 
compared with the 35 seats attained by 8 March (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 55)435. 
Arguably, the biggest surprise was the performance of Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) whose 21 seats accounted for 70% of the Christian vote, deprived 
Sa’ad Hariri the two-thirds quorum required to rescind President Lahoud’s extension 
                                                 
434
 Jamil al-Sayyid, Ali Hajj and Raymond Azar were replaced by Wafiq Gezzini, Ashraf Rifi and Georges Khoury respectively. 
Mustapha Hamdan remained President Lahoud’s chief aide until he was arrested (Pakradouni, 2012: 256).   
435
 The 72 seats won by 14 March were spread across a variety of parties: Hariri’s Future Movement (36); Jumblatt’s Democratic 
Gathering (15); Qornet Shahwan (14); Tripoli Bloc (3); Democratic Left (1); Democratic Renewal (1); and Independents (2). For 8 
March: Hizbullah (14, eleven of which were Shi’i); Amal (17); the SSNP (2); the Ba’ath Party (1) and the Christian Phalange (1) (MER, 
18 June, 2005).  
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and led Al-Safir to judge that ‘the Christians at long last have a leader’ (Pakradouni, 
2012: 243). In an act that demonstrated its decreasing dependence on Iran and 
Syria, Hizbullah’s OF responded to these results by seeking approval from Lebanese 
Shi’i cleric Shaykh Afif Nabulsi before joining the government (Alagha, 2011: 54). 
Although Sayyid Nasrallah had previously declared in 1999 that ‘the entry of one or 
two ministers in government would not change a thing’, Hizbullah’s Secretary 
General announced that ‘we have decided to get involved in Lebanese politics from 
A to Z’ with Muhammad Fneish and Trad Hamadeh representing Hizbullah in Fuad 
Siniora’s 24-member cabinet (Azani, 2011: 155; MER, 16 July, 2005: 7-8)436. After 
the initial findings of the Detlev Mehlis directed UN inquiry into the assassination of 
Rafiq Hariri led to the arrest of President Lahoud’s four generals, Fuad Siniora 
released his government’s cabinet statement. Rather than implant its revisionist 
heterodoxy, the document succumbed to the institutionalised orthodoxy of the PF by 
paradoxically calling for good relations with Syria, stressing the need to respect 
international law, omitting reference to UNSC Resolution 1559 and sanctifying 
Hizbullah as ‘the Lebanese Resistance movement’ that epitomises ‘the Lebanese 
people’s national right to liberate their territories and defend their dignity in the face 
of Israeli aggressions, threats and ambitions’ (MER, 30 July, 2005: 17).  
 
For Elias Hanna, ‘Hizbullah benefited more from the Syrian withdrawal than it 
suffered’437. Accordingly, after being confined by the imposed conditions of the saqf 
al-suri for over two decades, the physical removal of Syria, strategically aligned in 
solidarity and identity but incompatibly distinct in position and practice, instilled 
Hizbullah with a degree of rejuvenated freedom by opening the previously vetted and 
coveted corridors of political practice. Although only marginally improving its political 
footprint, Shaykh Qassem revealed that the opportunity of participating in 
government ‘made us directly responsible for providing domestic protection in a 
better way than before’ (Khatib, 2011: 66). Furthermore, with Syria reduced to 
exerting its symbolic power indirectly, President Assad would increasingly rely on 
Hizbullah to sustain his influence over orthodox practice in Lebanon.  
 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of two ministers into government posed more 
questions for Hizbullah’s OF than it answered. In theory, Hizbullah intended to 
safeguard ‘itself and its arms behind the same debilitating rules of governance to 
ensure that no decisions could be made to disarm the movement despite continuous 
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 14 March received 15 positions, 8 March were allocated two portfolios, President Lahoud possessed three appointments while the 
remaining four representatives were considered independent (MER, 23 July, 2005: 7; Alagha, 2006: 65).  
437
 Interview with Elias Hanna in Zouk Mosbeh, 7 August 2012.  
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UNSC Resolutions’ (Leenders, 2012: 246). Therefore, the Islamic Resistance would 
deliberately exploit the discrepancy between Lebanon asking the international 
community ‘to help discover the killers of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and at 
the same time ignore the UN-drawn Blue-Line’ (Randa Haidar in MER, 6 July, 2005). 
Yet, since the concept of consensual democracy, which was enshrined in Lebanon’s 
PF, reified the ruling of a two-thirds majority, Hizbullah’s 14 MPs and two ministers 
would remain insufficient in emphatically shielding the Islamic Resistance from 
political pressures emanating via domestic schemes or UNSC Resolutions.              
 
7.2 The (Mis)Management of the ‘Silent Majority’ 
 
Before the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon’s MSF and PF, while related by 
virtue of Syrian-imposed orthodoxy, were distinctly compartmentalised in purpose. 
Following Syria’s withdrawal, the struggle for the reconstitution of orthodoxy 
conflated the mutually inclusive homology between political stability and national 
security. As Syria set to reassert itself from Damascus, Hizbullah was solely 
responsible for maintaining the Islamic Resistance in the MSF by transporting its 
symbolic capital to the PF. Consequently, Hizbullah had to emerge from its position 
of heterodoxy in the PF to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy, a process that would 
require the strategic acquisition of legitimate capital through the adjustment of its 
practices. This ‘Lebanonisation’, a transformation comparatively more tangible than 
the 1990s, was not a revolutionary project to precipitate substantive change but a 
reactionary method to reform the reproductive orthodoxy of a pre-existing system. 
Accordingly, ‘while Hizbullah’s participation in government is a mark of its 
reconciliation with the State, it does not necessarily signify a reconciliation with the 
current political authority’ (Fayyad, 2006: 8). This durable programme, in which 
semantic interpretations of orthodoxy in the MSF encroached upon the orthodoxy of 
the PF, resulted in over two years of contentious politics.    
 
In the midst of Hizbullah’s induction into government, Lebanon was mired in a series 
of assassinations targeting high-profile anti-Syrian figures, including journalist Samir 
Kassir (2 June) and LCP leader George Hawi (28 June). Moreover, a week before 
the release of Detlev Mehlis’s first report on 20 October, which implicated both Syrian 
and Lebanese intelligence officers in the killing of Rafiq Hariri, an attempt had been 
made on the life of President Lahoud’s son-in-law Elias Murr while Ghazi Kan’an, 
Syria’s former intelligence chief in Lebanon and a close confidant of Hariri, allegedly 
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committed suicide438. As the implementation of UNSC 1636 applied diplomatic 
pressure on Syria to cooperate with the investigation or risk further sanctions, the 
publication of Detlev Mehlis’s second report on 12 December coincided with the 
assassination of Al-Nahar journalist Gebran Tueni439. With the majority of Siniora’s 
government displaying support for the adoption of UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1636 
and 1644, the last of which broadened the scope of investigations beyond Hariri, the 
five Shi’i ministers walked out in protest only to return once the government assured 
them that Hizbullah would be classified as the ‘resistance’, not a ‘militia’, thereby 
exempting the Islamic Resistance from the specifications of UNSC Resolutions 
(MER, 17 December, 2005: 7; Alagha, 2011: 121) 440.        
 
However, despite commanding influence over Shi’i ministers in government, 
Hizbullah’s OF acknowledged that this was an inadequate and unsustainable source 
for protecting the Islamic Resistance as long as the PF was institutionally governed 
by majority rulings. While the absence of Shi’i representatives in cabinet decisions 
was a powerful image, the credibility of Hizbullah’s position and practice in the PF 
would be improved by the presence of a non-Shi’i ally. From the beginning of 2005, 
former Phalange leader and Syrian fixer Karim Pakradouni had been mediating 
between the FPM, President Lahoud and President Assad over the return of Michel 
Aoun to Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 252). By March 2005, after Syria advised that 
Sayyid Nasrallah be notified of these discussions, Hizbullah initiated a year-long 
process of negotiation with the FPM before announcing a ten-point Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), which was signed at the Saint Michael Church in the southern 
suburb of Shiyyah on 6 February 2006 (MER, 11 February, 2006)441.  
 
Overall, rather than reduced to the expedient convergence of two discordant parties, 
the MOU enabled these relative novices in the PF, both of whom were locked in 
heterodox positions, to seize upon the opportunity of combining their symbolic capital 
within two disproportionately disenfranchised segments of the SMF to enhance their 
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 The assassination attempt on Elias Murr, a pro-Syrian member of 8 March, and the alleged suicide of Ghazi Kan’an, Syria’s former 
intelligence chief in Lebanon, may be linked to the imminent release of the UN investigation’s first report, which was rumoured to be 
implicating Syrian and Lebanese intelligence figures in the assassination of Hariri. Both Murr and Kan’an were not only privy to 
sensitive information pertaining to the intelligence movements in Lebanon, but they were also considered untrustworthy by Rustom 
Ghazaleh, who replaced Kan’an as Syria’s spy chief in Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 266; Harris, 2009: 68; Blanford, 2006: 177-179).           
439
 The second UN report tied the assassination to three brothers in Al-Ahbash who had direct links to President Lahoud (MER, 16 
January, 2006: 16).    
440
 UNSC Resolution 1644 not only extended the inquiry for another six months, but it also introduced the prospect of a tribunal with 
an international character. Under Belgian prosecutor Serge Frammertz, all political killings (attempted and executed) from Marwan 
Hamadeh to Gebran Tueni would be investigated as part of the same case (Harris, 2009b: 69). 
441
 While Sayyid Nasrallah originally met with Tony Harb and Kamal Yazigi, Pakradouni conducted talks between Emile Lahoud and 
General Aoun (Pakradouni, 2012: 252-253). The final details were negotiated between two delegates from each of Hizbullah’s (Abu 
Zaynab and Mahmoud Qomati) and the FPM’s (Gebran Bassil and Ziyad Abs) political councils (Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 
September 2012). The signing of the MOU at Saint Michael’s was of symbolic importance with Sayyid Nasrallah acknowledging the 
historical presence of Christians in the predominantly Shi’i southern suburbs while Michel Aoun was born and raised in the southern 
district of Haret Hurayk, the location of Hizbullah’s headquarters.    
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respective positions through the establishment of a collective collusio in the PF. 
While the FPM calculated that they should have been allocated 40 seats in the 2005 
elections, the Shi’i also repeatedly argued that they were entitled to at least 40 seats 
in parliament (Harris, 2009a: 17)442. By this logic, both parties, with the addition of 
Amal, possessed a ‘silent majority’ representing almost two-thirds of Lebanon. 
Although Michel Aoun’s vehement opposition to Syria’s meddling in Lebanese affairs 
posed a potential issue for this prospective partnership, the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces cosmetically removed this obstacle, facilitated his return and enabled both 
parties to promote a compatible domestic programme that focused on eliminating the 
kleptocratic corruption of Lebanon’s capitalist system443. Subsequently, the MOU, 
which omitted any reference to the Ta’if Accords or UNSC Resolution 1559, not only 
permitted Michel Aoun to use Hizbullah’s status as an anti-establishment actor for 
the purpose of confronting his traditional Christian rivals in 14 March, but by 
reinstituting the dynamics of the PF away from ‘traditionally vertical (inter-sectarian) 
lines towards horizontal (intra-sectarian) direction’, the FPM also provided Hizbullah 
with a popular non-Shi’i associate that would politically support the Resistance, 
uphold relations with Syria and advocate government decision-making based on 
consensus over majority (Fayyad, 2006: 5)444     
 
Despite expending significant attention to invest in augmenting its social capital in the 
PF, Hizbullah’s OF became rapidly redirected to the eruption of hostilities in the MSF 
as the abduction of Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev on 12 July 2006, two soldiers 
within the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), sparked the 34-day ‘July War’ (al-harb al-
tormuz)445. Following the kidnapping of three IDF soldiers on 7 October 2000 as well 
as botched attempts in June and November 2005, this operation, allegedly 
orchestrated by Imad Mugniyeh and resulting in the deaths of ten IDF soldiers, was 
not an innovatively conceived strategy but a consistently applied tactic446. Rather, the 
timing of the operation, which occurred soon after the capture of Gilad Shalit in the 
Gaza Strip, and Israel’s bellicose response, which tested the capabilities of the 
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 Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012.   
443
 Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012.  
444
 The MOU’s ten-point plan and initial analysis into the comparative advantages of the alliance are detailed in MER issues dated 11 
February, 2006; 25 February, 2006; and 1 April, 2006.     
445
 Following the infiltration of an Islamic Resistance cell into Israel, the IDF deployed two hummers of seven people to the penetrated 
area. The second was disabled by machine gun fire and artillery, killing all three soldiers, while the first was hit with RPGs. 
Goldwasser and Regev were subsequently seized during the attack. Two hours later, after the IDF sent a Merkava tank unit into 
Lebanese territory, the Islamic Resistance bombed the patrol killing all four soldiers. Another IDF soldiers died when the Nahal force 
was ordered to retrieve the wounded. With Goldwasser and Regev also dying from their injuries, this operation became one of the 
deadliest days for the IDF in Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 1-5, 12-13).    
446
 While the IDF foiled a kidnapping attempt in the Sheba Farms in June 2005, a foray into Israel by the Islamic Resistance on 21 
November 2005 was also repelled by the IDF (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 5-6). In May 2006, Hizbullah and Israel exchanged fire 
across the border (Norton, 2007a: 134-135). After the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006, the IDF raised the abduction alert 
in South Lebanon from 2 to 4 before lowering it again two days before the kidnapping (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 10-11).    
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Islamic Resistance, called to question the ability of Hizbullah’s OF to manage the 
synergy between practices in the MSF and PF.     
 
Operation ‘Truthful Promise’ (wa’d al-sadiq), along with Israel’s sustained retaliation, 
caused the deaths of 161 Israelis (119 soldiers; 42 civilians) and an estimated 1,191 
Lebanese of which approximately 200 were Islamic Resistance fighters (ICG, 2006a: 
1)447. By the time of the ceasefire on 14 August, the Islamic Resistance had fired 
around 4,000 rockets to Israel’s 20,000 (Crooke & Perry, 2006; Cordesman, 2006: 
22). The conflict left 1.5 million people displaced with Lebanon suffering $4 billion 
worth of damage compared to $500 million in Israel (Norton, 2007a: 142)448. An hour 
after Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were captured, Al-Manar broadcast a 
recording of Sayyid Nasrallah revealing that ‘we’ve kept our promise to free our 
prisoners’ (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 75)449. However, on 27 August, Sayyid 
Nasrallah admitted that ‘if any of us had a one percent concern that Israel was going 
to respond so fiercely, we would not have ordered the kidnapping of those 
soldiers’450. While these statements confirm the decision-making process of 
Hizbullah’s kidnapping strategy, the friction between the MSF and PF is more 
indicative for ascertaining the rationale behind the tactical timing and implications of 
the operation. In Bourdieusian terms, this episode can be characterised as an 
instance of allodoxia, a (mis)adventure or (mal)practice predicated on the 
misjudgement or misperception of the value of one’s capital in relation to the 
structural parameters of legitimate action.   
 
Prior to Operation ‘Truthful Promise’, Hizbullah’s OF was developing the social 
capital it had accrued with the FPM in the PF by engaging in the National Dialogue 
Roundtable from 2 March451. Affirming his loyalty to Lebanon, Sayyid Nasrallah not 
only informed the committee that he would even ‘fight the Syrians if they occupied 
the Sheba Farms’, but he also signed an ‘honour pact’ with Sa’ad Hariri days before 
the kidnapping ‘not to do anything that would provoke Israel along the Lebanese 
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 Perhaps due to the difficulty in identifying an Islamic Resistance fighter, numbers vary from 64 (Hizbullah figures), 150 (MER, 7 
October, 2006: 10), 184 (Crooke & Perry, 2006) to 500 (Israeli calculations).  
448
 One million IDPs were from South Lebanon while the remaining 500,000 were from northern Israel. The War left 15,000 homes 
destroyed as well as 1500 factories, markets, shops, commercial buildings and vital infrastructure (airports, ports, water and sewage 
facilities and electrical plants). Additionally, Israeli attacks decimated 91 bridges, 600km of road and 545 cultivated fields. Regarding 
economic losses, and perhaps as a result of combining short-term damages with projected long-term effects, figures vary between $2-
20 billion for Lebanon and $500 million to $4 billion for Israel (Alagha, 2011: 124-125; Blanford, 2011: 412; Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 
249-250; Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 97; ICG, 2006a: 1; Norton, 2007: 142; Salem, 2006: 4; Zisser, 2009: 164-165).     
449
 By 12 July 2006, Israel was only holding three Lebanese prisoners: Samir Kuntar, Nissim Nasser and perhaps Yihiye Sakaf (Harel 
& Issacharoff, 2008: 83).  
450
 Slightly different translations of Sayyid Nasrallah’s interview have been presented (Alagha, 2011: 127; Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 
250; Leenders, 2006: 49-50; Norton, 2007b: 486).    
451
 The three-month National Dialogue consisted of 14 Lebanese politicians including Sayyid Nasrallah, Michel Aoun, Nabih Berri, 
Samir Geagea, Fuad Siniora, Sa’ad Hariri and Amin Gemayel (Pakradouni, 2012: 282-283).  
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border’ (Ibrahim Baydoun in MER, 9 July, 2006)452. Additionally, Hizbullah agreed in 
principle to the establishment of an international tribunal (Salem, 2006: 2). Although 
these discussions displayed a cooperative façade in the PF, the activation of 
operations in the MSF was determined by the erosion of Hizbullah’s resolve following 
the application of political pressure exerted by 14 March on Lebanon’s national 
defence strategy as well as on the Palestinian question.   
 
Firstly, the premise of Hizbullah’s programme entitled ‘Is Israel our Enemy or not?’ 
(2006) fundamentally contrasted the 14 March mantra of ‘Lebanon’s strength is its 
weakness’, a phrase coined by Pierre Gemayel to explain that Lebanon’s relative 
fragility and neutrality would balance against the domination of intervening parties. 
Subsequently, 14 March launched a multi-pronged campaign to undermine the 
legitimacy of Hizbullah’s proposition. Buoyed by the release of Serge Brammertz’s 
first report and in a move that President Lahoud warned would ‘create a violent 
controversy in Lebanon’, Premier Siniora omitted the term ‘Resistance’ in the 
preamble for the Arab Summit in Khartoum on 28 March (Pakradouni, 2012: 289-
290). Moreover, emboldened by UNSC Resolution 1680 on 17 May, which reinforced 
UNSC Resolution 1559, the 14 March alliance increased the volume of its 
protestations against Hizbullah453. Not only did 14 March assert that Resistance 
should be contingent on the confirmation of the Sheba Farms as Lebanese by the 
UN and on the unanimous support of the Lebanese people, but Walid Jumblatt and 
Sa’ad Hariri also exploited perceived flaws in Hizbullah’s logic, namely its incessant 
detachment from state institutions, specifically the LAF, and its immaturity in failing to 
comprehend that protracted military issues can only be resolved via political 
processes (MER, 5 August, 2006: 7-8,16).  
 
Secondly, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in the Iraqi city of Samarra on 22 
February 2006 exacerbated internecine tensions between the Sunni and Shi’i. A 
couple of months earlier, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-Palestinian founder 
of the Al-Qaida-inspired Tawhid wal Jihad in Iraq, the group accused of the bombing, 
claimed responsibility for firing Katyusha rockets into Israel from South Lebanon 
(Blanford, 2006: 196)454. Moreover, following the arrest of nine Lebanese and 
Palestinian salafi-jihadi militants in April for plotting the assassination of Sayyid 
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 Interview with Hagop Pakradounian in Beirut, 6 September 2012.  
453
 UNSC Resolution 1680 called on Syria to prevent the infiltration of weapons into Lebanon; to engage with its neighbour on the 
delineation of borders; and to participate in diplomatic relations in order to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence. In June, 
a UN report into the assassination of Hariri reminded Syria of Chapter VII ramifications in the event of culpability or obstruction 
(Harris, 2009b: 72-73).     
454
 In July 2005, Jund al-Sham, a salafi-jihadi group in South Lebanon, announced that it would target leading Hizbullah figures. In 
January 2006, the Lebanese authorities arrested 13 Al-Qaida members and charged them with planning terrorist attacks in Lebanon 
(Blanford, 2006: 195-196).  
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Nasrallah, al-Zarqawi accused Hizbullah in June of ‘raising false banners regarding 
the liberation of Palestine’ (Gambill, 2009: 145). Therefore, after the kidnapping of 
Gilad Shalit by Hamas on 25 June, not only did the emergence of radical Palestinian 
factions and the resumption of operations by Hizbullah’s Sunni counterpart risk 
eclipsing the Palestinian credentials of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF, but these 
episodes also vindicated the complaints of 14 March in the PF, which argued that 
Hizbullah’s defence strategy was constrained by the inability of the Islamic 
Resistance to contain Palestinian groups within the self-professed parameters of its 
security jurisdiction in the South. 
 
In this context, Operation ‘Truthful Promise’ could be interpreted as either an Iranian 
or Syrian order ‘aimed at igniting a war with Israel’ or ‘a reckless miscalculation that 
unwittingly wreaked havoc on the country’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006a: 1). Refuting the 
role of external forces, U.S. military experts admitted that kidnapping operations were 
orchestrated from Hizbullah’s headquarters in al-dahiyeh with no Israeli official 
believing that the Islamic Resistance was purely adhering to orders from Iran or Syria 
(Cordesman, 2006: 15; Exum, 2006: 7)455. Therefore, while the Islamic Resistance 
had been preparing for war with Israel since 2000, it would appear that the July 
kidnapping represented a bidirectional ‘reminder operation’ that conformed to 
conventional practice in applying a defensive tactic aimed at reiterating Israel’s 
offensive occupation and its incarceration of Lebanese prisoners while 
simultaneously acting as a strategically calculated decision in proactively diverting 
attention away from sectarian sedition and restoring its credibility in Lebanon.  
 
Technically, the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers was classified as a ‘quality operation’, 
one in which the commanders of the Islamic Resistance are required to seek the 
permission of Hizbullah’s al-majlis al-shura456. Nevertheless, the discrepancy 
between Sayyid Nasrallah’s pledges in the PF and the practice of the Islamic 
Resistance in the MSF can perhaps be explained by dispositional disparities within 
Hizbullah’s OF. As kidnapping was recognised and sanctioned as a pre-existing 
strategy in the MSF, it is feasible to assume that Sayyid Nasrallah may have deferred 
tactical decision-making to Imad Mugniyeh, the head of the Amn al-Muddad. Due to 
its previous success, and since Mugniyeh was head of the Jihad Council within the 
majlis al-shura, the clandestine figure probably exercised significant autonomy in 
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 While Iran despatched around 100 military advisors to Lebanon and although Syria continued to supply weapons to Hizbullah, the 
Islamic Resistance remained relatively independent during the War. Henry Crumpton, the U.S. State Department’s Coordinator for 
Counter-Terrorism, admitted in reference to Syria and Iran, ‘in terms of them controlling Hizbullah, no. They cannot put Hizbullah out 
of business…Iran does not completely own Hizbullah’ (MER, 29 July, 2006: 14).       
456
 Interview with Timur Goksel in Beirut, 9 May 2012).  
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identifying and timing prospective operations. Furthermore, informed by inscribed 
experience, and with abductions ordinarily subscribing to predictable procedural 
outcomes, there was little precedent of a state going to war over the capture of two 
soldiers, particularly considering that Israel was embroiled with Hamas in Gaza and 
traditionally avoided fighting on concurrent fronts (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 83).        
 
However, by abducting IDF soldiers in Ayta ash-Sha’ab and shelling Za’rit, neither of 
which were in the vicinity of the Sheba Farms, the Islamic Resistance partially 
violated the ‘rules of the game’ thereby evoking a stern reaction from Israel for 
committing allodoxia, a process by which the Islamic Resistance misattributed and 
miscalculated the balanced equilibrium between its possessed capital and perceived 
opportunities in the MSF (Exum, 2006: 8; Leenders, 2006: 39-40)457. Invoking 
Hizbullah’s contraventions and haunted by the embarrassment of its withdrawal in 
2000, Israeli Defence Minister Amir Peretz stated that ‘we expected Hizbullah to 
break the rules, so now we will break it’ (Hirst, 2010: 308).  
 
Despite neutralising 59 of Hizbullah’s long-range rocket launchers in the first 34 
minutes of Operation Specific Weight on 13 July, Israel’s performance during the 
war, as accentuated by the subsequent Winograd Commission, was a dismal display 
of political indecision, military blunders and internal miscommunication demonstrating 
the divergent dissonance between Israel’s PF and MSF (Exum, 2006: 12)458. As 
judged by Elias Hanna, ‘Israel lost because it did not win and Hizbullah won because 
it did not lose’459. The expectations encompassing the latter part of the equation were 
substantially aided by the lack of coherent aims articulated by Israel’s inexperienced 
and fragmented governing triumvirate460. Five days after authorising Operation 
Specific Weight, and three days into air strikes on al-dahiyeh, Premier Olmert finally 
listed Israel’s ambitious conditions for a ceasefire, namely the return of hostages, the 
deployment of the LAF to the South and the disarming of Hizbullah (Blanford, 2011: 
389). Although Hizbullah’s OF was compelled into contemplating negotiations due to 
its rising vulnerability, its preservation was assisted by Premier Olmert’s intransigent 
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 After the Islamic Resistance struck Israel in May 2006, the IDF warned that if such a provocation was repeated, Israel would use it 
as a pretext ‘for a new arrangement along the border’ (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 71).  
458
 Before the war, Hizbullah possessed 13,000 rockets ranging from the Katyusha (20km), Fajr-3 (43km) and Fajr-5 (75km) to the 
Uragan (70km), Khaibar (100km) and Zelzal 2 (210km) (Blanford, 2006: 338-339; Exum, 2006: 6; Cordesman, 2006). Prior to 
Operation Specific Weight, Israeli leaders agreed that this arsenal be pre-emptively liquidated. The attack limited the Islamic 
Resistance’s ability in launching long-range rockets and incapacitated its missile command centre (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 77-91).      
459
 Interview with Elias Hanna in Zouk Mosbeh, 7 August 2012.  
460
 In May 2006, the triumvirate consisted of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff for 
the Israeli Armed Forces Dan Halutz. These three constantly disagreed over mission objectives. Initially, while Olmert and Halutz 
wanted to hold the Lebanese government accountable by striking civil infrastructure, Peretz strongly opposed this direction (Harel & 
Issacharoff, 2008: 77-78). 
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adherence to a holistic programme that led to a series of mismanaged ventures that 
disrupted the cohesive balance between Israel’s PF and MSF.    
 
Rather than complement military action with a corresponding political solution, the 
dysfunctional relationship involving Premier Olmert and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz 
created a chasm between the two resulting in a confused strategy of 
incommensurate goals that risked plunging Israel into protracted conflict461. This 
deficiency in homology was patently evident in Israel’s concept of proportionality and 
its disorderly ground offensive into Lebanon. Firstly, in the case of air strikes 
targeting the densely-populated al-dahiyeh, Lebanon’s infrastructure and the 
massacre at Qana on 30 August, Israel failed to justifiably associate these civilian 
centres with its proportionate attacks on Hizbullah. Secondly, as evinced in Maroun 
Al-Ras, Bint Jubayl, Taybeh and Ayta ash-Sha’ab, Israeli military commanders were 
confounded as to whether ground incursions represented the first stage of a surge 
into Lebanon or a precautionary measure to consolidate positions across the 
border462. In this tautological state of flux, Israel neglected the diplomatic track, 
especially Fuad Siniora’s seven-point, Hizbullah-approved ceasefire plan on 24 July, 
which addressed all of Israel’s prerequisite conditions463. Epitomising Israel’s 2006 
experience, despite the impending UNSC Resolution 1701 on 14 August, Premier 
Olmert presented the IDF with 60 hours to advance to the south of the Litani River464. 
Not only were 33 Israeli soldiers killed in the last few days of the conflict, but UNSC 
Resolution 1701 was also not dissimilar from Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni’s 
original proposal a month earlier (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 94-95; 229).  
 
While Israel’s indeterminate aims rendered Hizbullah’s victory dependent purely on 
survival, the effective performance of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF ensured that 
Israel was prevented from achieving its objectives by creating ‘new definitions of 
power and victory that cannot be measured in quantitative or material terms’ (Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2006a: 3). Before 12 July 2006, the Islamic Resistance was 
compartmentally organised into four geographical areas in al-dahiyeh, South 
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 On 23 July, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni that the hostages would not be released through military means (Harel & 
Issacharoff, 2008: 145).   
462
 For Israel’s Northern Command, forays into Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jubayl were the first phase of ‘Elevated Waters’, a campaign 
to advance into Lebanese territory. Meanwhile, Israel’s General Headquarters wanted to avoid a ground offensive in Lebanon 
altogether (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 132-150).   
463
 Siniora’s plan called for the release of Israeli and Lebanese soldiers; the retreat of Israel behind the Blue-Line; the transfer of 
contested territory to the UN; the handover of minefield maps to the UN; the deployment and authority of the LAF to South Lebanon; 
the enhanced support of UNIFIL; the reinstating of the 1949 armistice line; and the commitment of the international community to the 
rehabilitation of Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 307-309). This proposal was accepted by the five Shi’i ministers in government (Harel & 
Issacharoff, 2008: 157).   
464
 Following the failure of Operation Change of Direction 8 on 1 August, the IDF devised Operation Change of Direction 11, a multi-
directional push towards the Litani River. Despite reservations, Premier Olmert authorised the plan 60 hours before the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 173-196, 209-215).   
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Lebanon, the southern coastline and the Biqa’ Valley with around 500-600 concealed 
weapons caches and bunkers (Blanford, 2011: 346; Exum, 2006: 4; Crooke & Perry, 
2006)465. Despite the initial damage inflicted by Operation Specific Weight, the C-802 
anti-ship missile attack on the INS Sa’ar 5 Hanit on 14 July as well as the Katyusha 
assaults on Kfar Giladi and Haifa on 6 August proved that the Islamic Resistance 
retained its destructive potential466. In addition to rockets, the ‘netcentric’ warfare 
employed by the Islamic Resistance kept its ground forces mobile and versatile 
(Cordesman, 2006: 21). South of the Litani, Hizbullah mobilised the Nasr Brigade, an 
elite unit centring on 1,000 men operating around 12-15 villages in small groups of 
seven to ten (Exum, 2006: 5; Blanford, 2011: 346). Since Israel failed to pass the 
Litani River, the northern-based Badr Brigade focused on launching long-range 
rockets467. The adoption of hybrid guerrilla tactics, in which ‘flat, networking of 
autonomous units, using deliberately low-tech systems, combined with its episodic 
and unexpected deployment of small specialised units using high-tech weapons’, 
disabled and circumvented the competitive advantage of Israel’s conventional 
military capabilities in South Lebanon (Crooke, 2009: 185-186)468. 
 
Unlike conclusions to previous encounters with Israel, in which Syria directly 
transmitted the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance from the MSF to PF, 
Hizbullah’s OF was now accountable for managing this transference. Seizing upon 
the opportunity of framing its exploits as an unprecedented ‘divine victory’ by a 
Muslim-Arab force over Israel, the Islamic Resistance renewed its self-professed 
status as the only actor capable of defending Lebanon. In theory, UNSC Resolution 
1701 sought to curtail Hizbullah by permitting only UNIFIL and the LAF to bear arms 
between the Litani River and the Blue-Line, a precursory motion before implementing 
Resolutions 1559 and 1608 that demanded the complete disarmament of armed 
groups unless authorised by the government (ICG, 2006a: 2). Hizbullah accepted 
Resolution 1701, specifically the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese soldiers and 
10,000 UNIFIL representatives, interpreting it as ‘an arms management as opposed 
to an arms decommissioning scenario’ that applied to visible weapons and not the 
concealed munitions of the Resistance (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006b: 3). Regardless of 
                                                 
465
 Not one Islamic Resistance commander knew the entire structure or location of the bunker network. Each unit comprised of three 
bunkers – one for munitions and two for reserves. Each bunker was 30-50 metres underground, constructed with reinforced steel and 
contained electricity systems, air supplies and drainage pipes. The Islamic Resistance also built decoy bunkers (Crooke & Perry, 
2006; Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 45-46).   
466
 Unbeknownst to Israel, Hizbullah had been developing an amphibious warfare unit consisting of the C-701 (15km) and C-802 
(120km) anti-ship missiles since the 1990s (Exum, 2006: 6; Blanford, 2011: 350; Cordesman, 2006: 18). In a live speech, Sayyid 
Nasrallah’s asked the people to look to the sea, at which point a camera broadcast instant images of the attack on INS Hanit with the 
Hizbullah leader stating that ‘you wanted a change in the game rules – you will get it’ (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 102).    
467
 Realising that the average response time of Israel’s Air Force was 90 seconds, the Islamic Resistance had trained to set-up, fire 
and cover its positions in 60 seconds (Crooke, 2009: 185-186).  
468
 The Islamic Resistance had amassed a vast selection of anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment by 2006 (Exum, 2006: 6; 
Cordesman, 2006: 5, 18).    
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the semantics, neither UNIFIL nor the LAF were capable or willing to enforce the 
Resolution’s stipulations469. Counterintuitively, the presence of these forces assisted 
the Islamic Resistance in creating a buffer with Israel in securing the Shi’i population 
while supplying an internationally legitimate cover for the movement to resume its 
social services and replenish its military stockpiles470. However, confronting 
dissenting reservations from 14 March, senior Hizbullah official Nabil Qaouk 
remarked that ‘there is now a political assault to achieve the same aims as the 
military war (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007a: 6).   
 
Consequently, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan posited that ‘it has generally been 
accepted that Hizbullah cannot be disarmed by force’ (MER, 2 September, 2006: 7). 
Therefore, rather than target Hizbullah’s weapons by imposing ambiguous 
expectations, UNSC Resolution 1701 attempted to ‘reclaim the rules of the game 
politically’ by emphasising that ‘as long as Hizbullah’s demands are raised within the 
framework of Lebanon’s lawful rights as a state, they will be dealt with on that basis 
and not on the basis of Hizbullah’s particular conditions’ (Rosana Boumoncef in 
MER, 26 August, 2006: 12). By shifting direction to the PF, the international 
community and its Lebanese partners intended to nullify the symbolic capital 
acquired by Hizbullah in the MSF. In the absence of Syria, Hizbullah would be 
compelled to justify the advantageous orthodoxy of the Islamic Resistance in the 
MSF from a disadvantageous position of heterodoxy in the PF, a competitive arena 
where structured practice privileged majority rulings over inter-confessional 
consensus. Due to the allocation of seats in the 2005 elections and the subsequent 
polarisation of the PF, the Islamic Resistance would be exposed to institutionally 
majoritarian decisions unless Hizbullah pursed other extra-institutional opportunities 
to obstruct this process. If Hizbullah forfeited, ‘it loses not only its political power and 
the type of Lebanon that it envisages, but also its arms’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007: 7).        
 
Responding to this threat, Hizbullah issued an ultimatum on 6 November demanding 
that Premier Siniora either form a national unity government and grant 8 March a 
blocking third plus one over decision-making or the alliance would resort to protesting 
its under-representation on the streets (Alagha, 2011: 130-131)471. Ultimately, 
                                                 
469
 The Islamic Resistance maintained good relations with both UNIFIL and the LAF in the South. For the latter, not only did it refuse 
to deploy to the South without Hizbullah’s consent, but it also concurred with Hizbullah’s logic of differentiating between private and 
public weapons (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006b: 3). Similarly Hizbullah’s Ali Fayyad stated that ‘we agreed with the Army that if they see us 
with weapons, they can take them. But they cannot search for caches; caches are not visible’ (ICG, 2006a: 14).    
470
 During his ‘Divine Victory’ speech, Sayyid Nasrallah claimed that the Islamic Resistance had already boosted its rocket arsenal to 
20,000 (MER, 22 September, 2006: 7).  
471
 Hizbullah claimed that the number of parliamentary seats (57/128) and cabinet posts (7/24) distributed to 8 March did not represent 
their popular support. This logic was reinforced by surveys conducted in 2006 by Al-Nahar and the Beirut Centre for Research and 
Information, both of which concluded that the Shi’i alone were entitled to between 37 and 40 seats in parliament based on their 
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achieving veto power would permit 8 March to ‘prevent passage of sensitive laws, 
but also to bring down the government at a time of its choosing’ (ICG, 2006a: 12). 
Catalysing the impending implosion, Premier Siniora retorted by approving a draft 
text submitted by the UN for the tribunal in Lebanon despite the resignation of six 
opposing ministers472. The opposition, which was backed by President Lahoud and 
Speaker Berri, not only asserted that Article 52 of the Constitution insists that the text 
be ratified by the presidency and parliament, but also decried a motion without Shi’i 
representation as contravening the Ta’if Accords stipulation that ‘no authority is 
constitutional which violates the pact of national coexistence’ (Salem, 2006: 2; ICG, 
2006a: 8-10). This struggle for orthodoxy in the PF, in which both parties claimed 
symbolic capital after the 2006 War, resulted in a political impasse. Compounding 
this crisis, 14 March politician Pierre Gemayel was assassinated on 21 November. 
By default, the defection or death of two more cabinet members would collapse the 
government (MER, 25 November, 2006: 7)473.    
 
Amidst this descent into paralysis, each actor pursued specifically targeted spheres 
that they perceived would maximise mobilising opportunities for transferring capital 
into the PF. Consequently, while Hizbullah’s OF set to reassert the status of its 
weapons via the accumulation of capital in the SMF, 14 March sought to challenge 
the orthodoxy of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF by enlisting the services of 
external actors in legitimising the tribunal and enhancing the capabilities of the LAF. 
On 1 December, Hizbullah’s supporters erected 1,000 tents adjacent to parliament in 
Riad al-Sulh and Martyrs Square, both symbolic spaces for 14 March, and called on 
the government to resign (Norton, 2007b: 488; Harris, 2009b: 77). However, in an 
episode in which Sayyid Nasrallah miscalculated the adjustment of partisan rhetoric 
of Resistance with the pragmatic practice of political resolution, the campaign slogan 
of ‘no to civil war, no to lifting the sit-in, no to use of weapons in the country and no to 
foreign trusteeship’ soon spiralled out of control as violence erupted between the 
Sunni and Shi’i leaving eight dead and hundreds injured (MER, 3 February, 2007: 7). 
This temporary detachment between Hizbullah’s OF and the SMF in articulating the 
distinction of legitimate repertoires for mobilisation in the PF and MSF signified that 
                                                                                                                                           
population figures (MER, 18 November, 2006: 9). Contrary to the Ta’if Accords, Hizbullah believed that ‘the Lebanese cake should be 
divided three ways, not two ways’ (MER, 27 January, 2007: 9).      
472
 Since the UN submitted the draft text in English on 10 November, the opposition managed to get the vote postponed until 13 
November. Despite the resignation of a quarter of the cabinet, the five Shi’i ministers plus President Lahoud’s Greek Orthodox ally 
Yacoub Sarraf, Siniora adopted the bill (MER, 18 November, 2006: 7; ICG, 2006a: 8; Harris, 2009b: 76; Norton, 2007b: 487).  
473
 By the end of 2006, 14 March suggested a 19-9 government split with each party picking the remaining two candidates who would 
be unable to vote when a clear division occurred thereby preventing both blocs from achieving a two-thirds majority. In another 
proposal, a 19/10+1 arrangement was forwarded in which the 30th minister would be approved by a majority and unable to vote on 
divisive matters (ICG, 2006a: 14-15).   
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the Party was no longer ‘master of a confrontation it had planned but which was 
taking a confessional life of its own’ (ICG, 2007: 3)474.  
 
Moreover, aside from mobilising its constituents in the SMF, Hizbullah’s OF also 
propagated unity with Syria over the legitimate orthodoxy of the PF while balancing 
between its pursuit of symbolic capital and Syria’s management of its declining 
symbolic power. For Hizbullah’s OF, permitting the tribunal to succeed through a 
majority vote would not only weaken its patron, but it would also set a dangerous 
precedent for the inevitable discussion of its weapons. For Syria, the tribunal 
represented an existential threat to its authority in Lebanon. While the interests of 
both parties converged, as stakeholders occupying differing perceptions and 
positions, each were subject to their own inscribed dispositions for actualising the 
manifestation of these agendas into practice. Although the assassinations of 14 
March politicians Walid Eido (13 June) and Antoine Ghanem (19 September) 
indirectly served Hizbullah’s interests, as an invested domestic actor competing for 
credible capital in Lebanon’s PF, the Party would endeavour to distance itself from 
these illegitimate methods.    
 
Conversely, 14 March dispositions for acquiring legitimacy in the SMF directed 
practice towards securing grants from foreign donors to rehabilitate Lebanon’s 
economy, pursuing the international tribunal and restoring the capabilities of the LAF. 
Since the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and the fragmentation of the Maronite 
leadership diminished the coalition’s ability to maintain symbolic capital not only 
within the Sunni and Christian communities but also amongst international patrons, 
14 March sought to revitalise its position. Firstly, in January 2007, following earlier 
fora in Rome and Stockholm, the Lebanese government received pledges of $7.6 
billion from foreign donors during the Paris III Conference (MER, 27 January, 2007: 
7)475. Intending to overshadow the reconstruction and assistance offered by 
Hizbullah, Premier Siniora claimed that the funds would revive confidence and 
investments in the Lebanese market as well as rebuilding Lebanon’s infrastructure 
and compensating families whose properties were destroyed by the war476.  
 
Secondly, 14 March exerted pressure on 8 March by invoking the legitimacy of the 
international tribunal. On 30 May 2007, the controversial UN draft text was adopted 
                                                 
474
 To defuse tensions, Sayyid Nasrallah stressed the need for political dialogue, issued a fatwa encouraging the Shi’i to vacate the 
streets and declared that ‘anyone using a firearm against a Lebanese brother is working for Israel’ (ICG, 2007: 3; Norton, 2007b: 488).  
475
 During the July War, Premier Siniora received pledges of around $1 billion in Rome before securing another $1 billion in financial 
assistance in Stockholm in September (MER, 29 July, 2007: 8-9; 9 September, 2007: 13-14).      
476
 The premier announced that $40,000 would be paid to every family who had lost its home (MER, 9 September, 2007: 13-14).    
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by UNSC Resolution 1757 under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which 
‘permits the use of force to confront threats to international peace and security’ 
(Harris, 2009a: 17; Norton, 2007b: 487). Lastly, the government appealed to the U.S. 
for military aid. Having provided Lebanon with only $126 million between 1948-2006, 
the U.S. committed to a package of over $1 billion by the end of 2007, a deal that 
was contingent on a 14 March administration (MER, 15 September, 2007: 10; Addis 
& Blanchard, 2011: 20)477. However, concerned that lethal weaponry may fall into the 
wrong hands, the U.S. ensured that the LAF was only supplied with non-lethal 
equipment (Schenker, 2009: 227-228; MER, 15 September, 2007: 10). As 
demonstrated with the 19 May until 2 September siege of Nahr Al-Bared in 2007, a 
Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, the LAF suffered from a deficiency of 
combat experience and military hardware. The assault against Fatah Al-Islam, 
purportedly an affiliate of Al-Qaida with links to Syrian intelligence, killed 163 LAF 
soldiers and resulted in 34,000 residents losing their homes (MER, 15 September, 
2007: 9; Norton, 2007b: 489)478. 
 
The expiration of President Lahoud’s term on 24 November 2007 also presented 
both coalitions with an invaluable opportunity to vie for capital in the PF. 
Nevertheless, neither alliance had the two-thirds quorum required to push through a 
preferred candidate479. For the first time since Lebanon’s independence, the doors of 
the president’s palace in Baabda remained closed. Although Hizbullah was intent on 
appointing a pro-Syrian president, ensuring a blocking third in a national unity 
government and renouncing UNSC Resolution 1559, the Party delegated internal 
Maronite discussions to its ally with Shaykh Qassem remarking ‘General Aoun has 
written specific points in his pocket…go and talk to him…if you agree, we could 
reach a settlement in 24 hours’ (MER, 15 December, 2007: 2). While resigned to 
withdrawing his candidacy, the FPM leader provisionally accepted the nomination of 
General Michel Sulayman but argued for his accession to be connected with a 
broader government reform package addressed in his five-point plan480. In the midst 
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 Between 2006 and 2010, the U.S. has provided Lebanon with $1.35 billion in overall assistance. Of this figure, $690 has been 
reserved for improving the capacities of the LAF and ISF (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 20). Additionally, the U.S. designated Jihad al-
Bina as a ‘terrorist organisation’ in February 2007 and issued an Executive Order in August 2007 ‘blocking the property of persons 
undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes’ (Schenker, 2009: 229-230).    
478
 Shaker al-Absi, a member of the anti-Arafat, Syria-endorsed Fatah Al-Intifada in Damascus in 1983 before becoming an associate 
of Al-Qaida operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, seized control of Fatah Al-Intifada compounds in Nahr al-Bared in November 2006 and 
changed the name of the group to Fatah Al-Islam. According to Qassem Qassir, Syria has ‘something to do with them [Fatah Al-Islam] 
but not everything to do with them’ (Gambill, 2009: 146-147; MER, 26 May, 2007: 11-12; 9 June, 2007: 13; 30 June, 2007: 8; 7 July, 
2007: 11-12; 16 December, 2007: 9-10).  
479
 From September until November 2007, a committee chaired by Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and consisting of the four main 
Christian leaders – Michel Aoun, Sulayman Franjiyeh, Samir Geagea and Amine Gemayel – discussed options before submitting a list 
of 12 names. Although Michel Aoun was adamant on becoming president, strict 14 March obstacles to this scenario led to Michel 
Sulayman, Commander in Chief of the LAF, and Riad Salameh, the Governor of Lebanon’s Central Bank, emerging as the two 
favourites (Pakradouni, 2012: 340; MER, 25 August, 2007: 8; 17 November, 2007: 2).  
480
 The five-point plan stated: 1) the FPM leader would suggest a presidential candidate from outside his party; 2) Sa’ad Hariri would 
appoint a premier from outside the Future Movement; 3) the National Government would be split 55/45 in favour of 14 march with 
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of amplified pressure on 14 March following the assassinations of General Francois 
al-Hajj on 12 December 2007, widely identified as a replacement for General 
Sulayman, and Captain Wissam Eid on 25 January 2008, an ISF communications 
officer responsible for investigating Hariri’s killing, Sa’ad Hariri rejected Michel Aoun’s 
proposal and refused to acquiesce to the opposition’s demand for veto power 
(Norton, 2007a: 167; Harris, 2009b: 78)481. Aggravating the vacuum, Speaker Nabih 
Berri postponed any potential vote until 8 March received a favourable deal482. 
 
Despite detaching itself from the intricacies of these negotiations, Hizbullah 
proceeded on its rhetorical berating of 14 March with MP Husayn Hajj Hassan 
prophetically announcing that ‘you want to monopolise authority and you think the 
Americans can protect you. You will soon know that you are mistaken’ (MER, 5 
January, 2008: 3). After the culmination of a series of security developments, 
including the intermittent assassinations of political officials, the killing of the 
reclusive head of Hizbullah’s Jihad Council Imad Mugniyeh in Damascus on 12 
February 2008 and the deployment later that month of the USS Cole to the 
Mediterranean to deter Syria against intervening in Lebanon, the internalised logic of 
practice in the PF, which had resulted in an eight month hiatus, was in danger of 
being directly infiltrated by the practical logic of the MSF483. 
 
By the beginning of May 2008, Hizbullah was embroiled in an acerbic exchange with 
Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh over the existence of its 
independent communications network that connected Beirut, South Lebanon and the 
Biqa’ Valley (Harris, 2009b: 78). In particular, Hizbullah was accused of installing this 
sophisticated system for monitoring the activity of government officials and 
businessmen using Runway 17 at Beirut Airport (MER, 3 May, 2008: 2). After an 
inquiry confirmed that Hizbullah was running a privatised network separate from state 
control in breach of Lebanon’s sovereignty, the government removed Director of 
Airport Security Brigadier General Wafiq Shuqayr for permitting the installation of 
illegal surveillance equipment and sharing confidential information with Hizbullah 
(ICG, 2008: 3). In response, Sayyid Nasrallah, declaring that its clandestine 
                                                                                                                                           
each camp appointed two major cabinet posts each; 4) the caza system would be adopted as part of a new election law; 5) General 
Sulayman would remain as Commander in Chief of the LAF (Pakradouni, 2012: 341).     
481
 Concerning the composition of a national unity government, 14 March was willing to offer a 15-5-10 split. Other proposed 
combinations included a 10-10-10 equal split and a 13-7-10 division (MER, 3 January, 2008: 26).     
482
 From September 2007 until May 2008, Berri postponed the parliamentary vote on the president 19 times (Norton, 2007a: 169).  
483
 It is widely believed that Mugniyeh was assassinated during a coordinated CIA-Mossad operation. At his funeral, Sayyid Nasrallah 
revealed for the first time that Jawad Nur al-Din and Hajj Radwan were aliases for Mugniyeh (MER, 23 February, 2008: 2). Although 
Mugniyeh’s replacement was kept anonymous during Hizbullah’s 8th Conclave in 2009, Israeli sources note that Hossein Mahadavi, 
an Iranian Quds Force commander had assumed responsibility for Mugniyeh’s duties (Gleis & Berti, 2012: 64-66). Other names 
include Fuad Shakar, who Mugniyeh replaced in 2001; Mustapha Badr al-Din, Mugniyeh’s brother-in-law; and Talal Hamiyeh, who 
served with Mugniyeh in the PLO and IJO.       
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communication centre was invaluable in its fight against Israel, vowed to ‘cut any 
hand that extends to touch the arms of the Resistance’ (MER, 10 May, 2008: 8). 
Consequently, with the LAF supposedly striking a deal to desist from intervening, the 
Islamic Resistance launched Operation Smashing the Balance on 8 and 9 May, an 
offensive that blocked entry points into Beirut, seized media buildings owned by the 
Future Movement and secured the residences of 14 March leaders Sa’ad Hariri and 
Walid Jumblatt (Alagha, 2011: 143)484. On 14 May, as the Islamic Resistance 
returned positions back to the LAF, an estimated 70 people had been killed. While 
Marwan Hamadeh commented that Lebanon was witnessing ‘the encroachment of 
Hizbullah’s mini-state’, Abdel Rahman Rashid wrote that ‘the opposition has now 
become naked and Hizbullah’s identity disclosed – it is a confessional, aggressive 
and foreign-backed militia’ (MER, 10 May, 2008: 7; 17 May, 2008: 8).   
 
Hizbullah’s blitzkrieg of Beirut had three immediate consequences. Primarily, ‘the 
message was delivered. Don’t fuck around with us’485. Although thwarted in the 
Chouf, the Islamic Resistance, which deliberately targeted 14 March assets as 
opposed to symbolic government buildings, was clinical in its operational precision, 
mobilising only 50 experienced men to supervise strategically important locations 
while delegating the groundwork to Amal and the SSNP, two allies with a 
considerable presence in central Beirut (Zisser, 2009: 171-172)486. Secondly, and 
controversially, Defence Minister Elias Murr admitted that while Hizbullah’s Operation 
Smashing the Balance was objectionable, there was consensus both in Lebanon’s 
PF and outside that something needed to break the political deadlock487. Thirdly, and 
arguably most critically, Hizbullah’s OF had demonstrated that bereft of the 
recognised capital required to effectively enhance its position in the PF, the Islamic 
Resistance would not hesitate to overcompensate by unilaterally transposing or 
imposing the legitimate status of its symbolic capital in the MSF to coercively 
facilitate endogenous change within the structured logic of practice in the PF.   
 
This audacious move, which could be viewed as the second instance of Hizbullah’s 
allodoxia in as many years, led to the signing of the Doha Accord under the auspices 
of Emir Shaykh Hamad al-Thani on 21 May, in which 14 March maintained its 
majority in a national unity government but the 8 March received its one third plus 
                                                 
484
 In a decision that caused the resignation of prominent Sunni officers, General Sulayman said that the 70,000-strong LAF (60% 
Shi’i) wanted to ‘avoid deeper divisions on the domestic front and to preserve social peace’ (MER, 24 May, 2008: 9). The Islamic 
Resistance also attempted to connect Shi’i villages in the South to Beirut by targeting the Chouf Mountains (Badran, 2009b: 54).     
485
 Interview with Timur Goksel in Beirut, 9 May 2012.  
486
 Jumblatt struck a deal with his Druze rival, Talal Arslan, in order to repel the Islamic Resistance from the Chouf (Badran, 2009: 55).  
487
 Interview with Elias Hanna (Beirut, 7 August, 2012).  
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one veto power, enabling it to prevent the government from pursuing policies that 
threatened to enforce the international tribunal or regulate Hizbullah’s weapons488. 
On 25 May, Michel Sulayman officially became the President of Lebanon. Ultimately, 
the Doha Accord institutionalised the repositioning that had transpired amongst 
actors in the PF since Ta’if. However, for Husayn al-Husayni, unlike the principle of 
cross-sectarian coalitions enshrined in the Syria-imposed orthodoxy of the Ta’if 
Accord, the Doha Accord ‘did not give candidates not belonging to the prominent 
political force in their sect a chance to win’, leading to ‘the collapse of the known 
political system’ (MER, 25 October, 2008: 7). While this process exacerbated political 
polarisation in Lebanon, and although the entrenched doxa of the PF prevented any 
party from possessing an outright majority, Hizbullah, with the assistance of its 8 
March allies, was elevated to an enhanced position from which it could propagate its 
interpretation of orthodox practice to instrumentally contribute to the redesigning of 
the predominant governing parameters of orthodoxy in the PF. Typifying this 
influence, Hizbullah’s weapons became normalised into Lebanon’s national defence 
strategy with the cabinet statement proclaiming ‘the right of Lebanon, its people, 
arms and Resistance to liberate or restore the Sheba Farms and Kfar Shouba hills as 
well as the occupied part of Ghajar, and the right to defend Lebanon against any 
aggression and protect its waters’ (MER, 2 August, 2008: 2)489.  
 
7.3 Serving at the Pleasure of the Resistance 
 
As explained above, between 2000 and 2010, Hizbullah’s OF was primarily focused 
on instituting two complementary processes: firstly, adapting to Israel’s withdrawal by 
adjusting its symbolic capital in the MSF to preserve the predominant status of its 
prevailing orthodoxy; and secondly, the active transference of symbolic capital in the 
MSF to compensate for Hizbullah’s heterodox values of capital in the PF following 
the forced retreat of its guarantor in 2005. However, neither of these developments 
would have been possible without the commensurate cultivation of its Resistance 
habitus in the third sphere of activity, namely the SMF. By not only providing a pool 
of prospective recruits for the Islamic Resistance, but also ensuring Hizbullah’s 
performance in the polls, the mobilisation of the SMF was the most significant sine 
qua non driver for both inter-field homology and the instigation of change. While 
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 In Doha, both alliances agreed to vote in Michel Sulayman as president. The composition of the national unity government would 
be a 16:11:3 split with parties also agreeing to implement the 1960 caza system into the Election Law. Furthermore, the Accord 
stipulated that ‘the state will have the exclusive authority to ensure the security of the country and its citizens in a manner that 
maintains common living and social peace for all Lebanese and residents on Lebanese soil’ (MER, 24 May, 2008: 8). 
489
 President Sulayman announced that the army and the state must capitalise ‘on the capacities of the Resistance’ whereas Michel 
Aoun acknowledged that the Islamic Resistance was legitimate until Israel withdrew from the Sheba Farms (MER, 31 May, 2008: 17-
18; 22 November, 2008: 8).   
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regulated by inscribed perceptions and dispositions, the practice of agents within the 
SMF is not structured to the point of remaining stagnant. Rather than act as passive 
receptacles, these actors are embedded in a mutually constitutive negotiation with 
their contextual environment.    
 
By 2000, the landscape and composition of the Shi’i within the SMF was altering. 
Testament to two decades of social welfare and capacity building, Hizbullah’s 
constituents were more educated, empowered and expressive. Subsequently, this 
Resistance habitus in the SMF, which had been nurtured and nourished by Israeli 
occupation, would ultimately bestow Hizbullah with the legitimacy to sustain the 
Islamic Resistance after 2000 as well as endorse the encroachment of the MSF onto 
the PF in 2006 and 2008. While an increasingly self-conscious community may have 
posed a challenge to Hizbullah’s symbolic capital, diversified and dependent 
constituencies presented Hizbullah’s OF with the opportunity to revise its 
mobilisational framing and practices in ways that resonated, realigned and redirected 
its SMF counterparts into generating collectively compliant action. Invoking 
Bourdieu’s axiom that all fields are competitive struggles over culture, Hizbullah’s OF 
objective was to reconcile and reinforce its post-2000 Resistance narrative into the 
pre-existing structured practice of its corresponding habitus in the SMF.       
 
Conventionally, the characteristics and motivations of Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus 
in the SMF have been viewed through a unitary lens. As evidenced by the initial 
phases of its evolution in Lebanon, Hizbullah’s holistic framework of ‘Islamic 
Resistance’ appealed to a Shi’i community that was economically deprived, socially 
dislocated and politically marginalised. Consequently, the prevalent perception was 
that Hizbullah exclusively represented the highly pious Shi’i underclass. 
Problematising this assumption, scholars examining Shi’i constituencies after the civil 
war posited that Hizbullah derived a significant proportion of its support from the Shi’i 
middle class as well as Shi’i who identified with low levels of religiosity, a conclusion 
questioning the view that socio-economic issues and religious predispositions 
featured highly as the predominant trends illustrating Hizbullah’s attraction to the Shi’i 
community (Harik, 1996, 2005; Hamzeh, 1997, 2004; Norton, 2000). 
 
Since Israel’s withdrawal, the debate over the relative categorisation of Hizbullah’s 
constituencies resurfaced. In their review detailing the backgrounds of 129 
Hizbullahis killed in action, Krueger and Maleckova (2002: 27-34) discovered that 
participants were more educated and less impoverished than the average Lebanese 
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citizen. Contrarily, in his 2003 study of 256 respondents exploring the origins of 
Hizbullah’s support, Haddad (2006: 21-34) argued that ‘destitution, illiteracy, intense 
dissatisfaction, and high religiosity correlate positively with favorable attitudes vis-à-
vis political attachment to Hezbollah’. Contradicting these results, a cross-
confessional poll of 983 respondents conducted by Hanf (2003: 197-228) found that 
only 22% of people considered religion important while 80% cited non-religious 
indicators as more relevant with two-thirds of the survey revealing that economic 
cleavages were more divisive than differences of identity490. Based on this empirical 
and quantified evidence, Hizbullah’s post-2000 constituencies were either estranged 
from their Lebanese counterparts or the source of Hizbullah’s support belies 
reductionist attempts that disregard its eclectic components.  
 
Rather than a case of incompatible dichotomies, namely high versus low religiosity or 
economic destitution versus relative affluence, the phenomenon of Hizbullah’s 
support is one of compatible distinctions. While it is an anathema to inspect 
Hizbullah’s evolution through a linear lens, it is also a methodological fallacy to 
expect Hizbullah’s adherents to have remained static. Although the Shi’i activism 
espoused by Hizbullah initially targeted a homogenous subsection of downtrodden 
Shi’i seeking a conduit to articulate their grievances, the opportunities provided by 
Hizbullah’s considerable investments in the community enabled each agent to 
accumulate new forms of legitimate capital in the SMF thereby altering their 
perceptions and dispositions of the contextual environment within the structuring 
parameters of a Resistance habitus. Therefore, while solidaristic in practice and 
identity, Hizbullah agents possess different attitudes and abilities that render their 
developments within the SMF uneven. As Hizbullah enhances its stature and 
expands its influence in legitimating capital, the space for distinction between 
Resistance habiti in the SMF widens. Increasingly, Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus 
becomes heterogeneous in position and disposition with the degree of 
institutionalisation broadly distinguishable between ideologues, instrumentalists and 
pragmatists.  
 
Firstly, ideologues have been fully inducted and inculcated into Hizbullah’s Islamic 
Resistance. Independent of relational dynamics and context, ideologues are 
stringently loyal to Hizbullah’s principles and practice. Secondly, instrumentalists, 
while not fully subscribing to Hizbullah’s interpretation of Shi’i religious framing or 
                                                 
490
 According to a similar survey in October 2005, 34% of respondents claimed not to identify with their confession (Farha, 2009: 91).  
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military activity, recognise the importance of conforming to the predominant strictures 
of confessional mobilisation in the SMF. These Shi’i agents, who benefit socially and 
economically from Hizbullah’s elevated political prestige, its patronage systems and 
its sophisticated network of social services, strategically perceive their individual 
prosperity to be inextricably linked to a collective propensity that privileges 
Hizbullah’s Shi’i narrative. Thirdly, Shi’i pragmatists purely classify themselves in 
association with Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the SMF as the most convenient 
way of managing the processes of daily practice. For this grouping, although 
Hizbullah represents a leading voice for the Shi’i in Lebanon, it remains secondary to 
familial or tribal ties. Unlike the stratifications alluded to in the surveys, these 
dynamic combinations are not delineated or compartmentalised by socio-economic 
or religious indices. Conversely, by 2000, a wealthy ideologue of low religiosity and a 
destitute instrumentalist or pragmatist of high religiosity may coalesce under 
Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the SMF.  
 
Since Hizbullah had portrayed the Resistance as antithetical to Israel, the first 
challenge for Hizbullah’s OF in a post-2000 epoch was the emergence of a young 
Shi’i demographic within its Resistance habitus in the SMF. Rather than display the 
insecure dispositions of previous generations, this educated segment of Shi’i society, 
raised on the revolutionary revised narrative of piety, pride and practice, imagined a 
reconstitution of Resistance towards a modern, post-occupation period. In particular, 
this entailed ‘the expansion of a Shi’i market base that demands access to leisure 
activities that do not violate certain moral norms’ (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 14; 2007: 4). 
For Hizbullah’s OF, while conventional methods of community mobilisation through 
religious centres, social services, media outlets and organised public 
commemorations were effective, they were inadequate forms of cultural production in 
maintaining its Resistance habitus within a rapidly modernising context. As 
emphasised by Hizbullah MP Mohammad Fneish, ‘the ability of Islamic groups to 
retain their party faithful is largely dependent on their willingness to adapt to the 
socio-political context within which they operate and their effectiveness in dealing 
with the challenges arising from it’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 307). Therefore, to 
prevent gaps forming ‘between the daily practice of its sympathizers and its 
discourse’ (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 163), Hizbullah’s OF developed new 
techniques that not only aimed to satisfy the expectations of a proliferating 
demographic, but also simultaneously reinforce its monopolisation of space where 
Hizbullah’s cultural capital would be repeatedly consumed, legitimated and 
reproduced by its structuring Resistance habitus in the SMF.   
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Firstly, while unable to dictate the appetite for leisure and entertainment markets in 
al-dahiyeh, Hizbullah’s OF involved itself in commercial ventures to ensure that these 
projects observed and were integrated into the area’s intrinsically Hizbullah-regulated 
aesthetic (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 15)491. Moreover, adjusting to a technologically aware 
and articulate audience, Hizbullah’s OF not only revamped programmes on Al-
Manar, but also digitalised the semiotic projection of its messaging through the 
Lebanese Association for the Arts (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 17)492. Secondly, Hizbullah’s 
OF capitalised on the entrenched inter-subjective understandings of Resistance in 
the SMF to elevate and enshrine its legacy in the annals of Lebanese history. 
Discarding post-2000 pretentions of its obsolete obscurity, the Islamic Resistance 
would be immortalised as a perpetual struggle over oppression that required 
perennial mobilisation. This cultural (re)production of Hizbullah’s symbolic historical 
narrative of Resistance and its appropriation of collective memory was particularly 
evident with the opening of museums, especially the private shuhada 
commemorations, the Rijalat Al-Majd exhibition for Hizbullah’s 1,281 martyrs in al-
dahiyeh and the public restoration of the Israeli prison at Khiyam, as well as the 
establishment of the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Beirut (Danawi, 
2002: 25-39; Deeb, 2008: 372-386; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 158-198)493.  
 
Despite encountering a period of transition, Hizbullah’s OF was able to address and 
adapt to trends that impacted its Resistance habitus in the SMF. Due to the multi-
faceted structure and composition of the SMF, Hizbullah could not exercise symbolic 
power, a state in which the perceptions and dispositions of its agents resulted in the 
replication of a legitimately holistic apparatus of programmatically compliant practice. 
Nevertheless, after two decades of capital identification, accumulation and 
transference, Hizbullah’s OF had achieved symbolic capital within the Shi’i 
community, a status in which the acquisition and currency of capital, whether social, 
cultural or economic, produced a recognised expression of orthodox practice. 
Whether institutionalised via conviction, compulsion or coercion, its exemplary 
performance in the 2004 municipality elections demonstrated that Hizbullah’s 
                                                 
491
 Whether demonstrated by the Al-Imna’ Group’s proposal to build an amusement park or plans to open U.S.-based commercial 
chains, ‘even when not directly party-driven or controlled, sites incorporated into the Islamic milieu often work to consolidate 
Hizbullah’s constituencies’ (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 15).    
492
 This group hired professional designers, graphic artists and advertising experts to produce exhibits and media commemorating 
political and religious events (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 17).   
493
 The shuhada museums, which were placed in the converted apartments of Hizbullah fighters, intended to promote sympathy and 
solidarity with the martyr and his family. Visitors were exposed to military and social pictures of the deceased, quotes from the Qur’an, 
personal messages to his family and videos showing the martyr profess the voluntary motives behind his sacrifice as well as 
broadcasting the mission in which he perished (Danawi, 2002: 25-39). In Khiyam, where Israel had incarcerated around 5,000 
Lebanese, Hizbullah’s museum aimed to appropriate the cultural rights to the site while creating an association of legitimacy between 
the Islamic Resistance and the Israeli occupation. The Islamic Cultural Centre was formed to propagate the historical consistency and 
convergence between Iran and Lebanon, focusing on shared religious identity and solidarity.  
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extensive social services and the cultural (re)production of its narrative amounted to 
hegemonic authority over its constituencies494.  
 
The second challenge confronting Hizbullah’s OF post-2000 was the devastating 
humanitarian and economic toll incurred during the July 2006 War, which evoked a 
critical response from a Lebanese public that accused Hizbullah of deliberately 
rousing a bellicose response from Israel. According to an Al-Arabiyah survey in 
January 2007, Hizbullah’s national popularity plummeted from 74% to 54% with 53% 
of respondents blaming Hizbullah for provoking the conflict (Alagha, 2011: 132). 
However, since the July War disproportionately affected the lives and livelihoods of 
Hizbullah’s constituencies, the magnitude of Israel’s aggression and its resulting 
repercussions threatened to rupture the cohesion between the framing disseminated 
by Hizbullah’s OF and the digestion of this narrative within its corresponding 
Resistance habitus in the SMF.  
 
For Lob (2014: 2), the events of 2006 showed that ‘a crack in Hizbullah’s edifice had 
appeared as the organisations encountered the first serious blow to its popular 
support’. Conversely, a survey conducted by Abdo Saad in 2006 reported that 95% 
of the Shi’i population remained supportive of Hizbullah’s Resistance (Malthaner, 
2011: 219)495. While this ‘crack’ may have been detectable on the surface in the 
aftermath of 2006, a combination of Hizbullah’s pre-existing modalities for mobilising 
and regulating agents in the SMF, as well as its adeptness to adapt, customise and 
modernise, effectively prevented this crack from morphing into a substantial crevice. 
In particular, Hizbullah’s OF focused on deploying and augmenting its capital within 
the SMF to further incubate and inculcate its Resistance habitus by mobilising its 
network of social welfare institutions to reconstruct damaged constituencies, 
monopolising public space to form an indelible link between physical nature and 
symbolic Resistance as well as developing the cult of Sayyid Nasrallah, a Shi’i leader 
personifying the epicentre of the Resistance against Israel. 
 
Firstly, through its social services, Hizbullah’s OF had invested significant resources 
in instilling and institutionalising its Resistance habitus. Overall, these public 
programmes performed multiple and concurrent functions. Not only was Hizbullah 
abiding by an Islamic obligation to empower its community, but this daily practice 
                                                 
494
 Hizbullah, which won 120 of 900 municipalities in Lebanon, managed to further eclipse Amal. In Beirut, Hizbullah won 98 to Amal’s 
10; in South Lebanon, Hizbullah won 87 to Amal’s 55; and in the Biqa’, Hizbullah won 36 to Amal’s 21 (Harb, 2011: 134; Hamzeh, 
2004: 132-135; Alagha, 2006: 55-56).   
495
 Considering that Abdo Saad is a pro-Hizbullah pollster, it is likely that the survey was methodologically and politically partial.  
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also repeatedly inscribed agents with a holistic Resistance framework that ensured 
political support at the ballot box, consolidated the reproduction of Resistance 
dispositions through the routinisation of sacred or mundane rituals and acted as a 
public monitoring mechanism to deter dissension or defection. Consequently, after 
2006, Hizbullah could rely on the influence of extant, established and entrenched 
practices within the SMF. Testament to the scale and scope of its influence, 
Hizbullah was reportedly the second highest employer in Lebanon after the 
government, providing salaries for approximately 35,000 families (Nir, 2009: 184).             
 
The Council for Development and Reconstruction calculated that the July War had 
cost Lebanon $7 billion in economic losses and $3.6 billion in direct damages to 
civilian infrastructure (Al-Harithy, 2010a: 3)496. Moreover, Al-Hayat reported that 
around 85% of the destruction caused by Israel had centred on the predominantly 
Shi’i southern suburbs and South Lebanon (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 98)497. Cognisant 
of the inevitable politicisation of reconstruction, Israeli General Yossi Kuperwasser 
implored the international community to act before Hizbullah and Iran could capitalise 
on the situation (MER, 26 August, 2006: 14). Heeding this warning on 31 August, 
around $1.8 billion was raised for humanitarian aid at the Stockholm Conference with 
Prime Minister Siniora pledging $33,000 to each family whose home was destroyed 
(Fattah & Kolb, 2006: 106). However, following a speech from Sayyid Nasrallah the 
day after the ceasefire outlining Hizbullah’s policies for addressing reconstruction, 
Hizbullah’s OF had already employed its extensive economic and social capital to 
swiftly deposit funds and access affected communities through Jihad Al-Bina (Harb & 
Fawwaz, 2010: 24). Within the first weeks, and with financial assistance from Iran, 
Hizbullah spent between $300-$400 million on compensation and rehabilitation 
projects, issuing $12,000 to those who had lost their homes and $10,000 to those 
whose homes were damaged (Flanagan & Abdel-Samad, 2011; Blanford, 2011: 413; 
ICG, 2007: 20)498. As summarised by one beneficiary, ‘the Lebanese state takes three 
months to bring help. The UN takes three years. Hizbullah is there the next day’499. 
Accordingly, not only had Hizbullah reassured the cross-section of its SMF agents by 
honouring, activating and delivering upon its pledge, but it had also recorded a 
significant political victory in undermining the Lebanese state’s ability to provide. 
 
                                                 
496
 The $7 billion amounted to approximately 30% of GDP, a staggering total considering that Lebanon already had a debt burden that 
stood at 180% of GDP. The $3.6 billion included the destruction of 125,000 housing units, 612 schools, 97 bridges and 850 
commercial enterprises (Al-Harithy, 2010a: 3).   
497
 Al-dahiyeh ($876m); Bint Jubayl ($552m); and Marjeyoun ($362m) (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 98).   
498
 Aside from Hizbullah’s disposable income, Iran apparently transferred $150 million to Hizbullah immediately after the ceasefire and 
was willing to supply Hizbullah with an ‘unlimited budget’ for reconstruction programmes (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 105).  
499
 This quote originally appeared in a Boston Globe article by Thanassis Cambanis on 19 August (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 107).  
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Secondly, continuing with its engagement in cultural (re)production, Hizbullah’s OF 
embarked upon a reconstruction effort that imbued the Resistance footprint not only 
in its adornment and manipulation of space, but also in the design of the physical 
landscape500. During the 2006 War, 4,000 Israeli airstrikes targeted al-dahiyeh, mostly 
around Hizbullah’s ‘security quadrant’ in Haret Hurayk, an act of ‘urbicide’ that 
destroyed 1,232 residential buildings that housed approximately 30,000 people 
(Alamuddin, 2010: 46; Harb & Fawaz, 2010: 21). In response, Sayyid Nasrallah 
issued a promise (wa’d) to make al-dahiyeh ‘more beautiful than it was’ (Harb & 
Fawaz, 2010: 24). The Wa’d Project, planned by Hizbullah-affiliated institutions, such 
as Jihad Al-Bina and the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), 
was broadcast broadly via the Lebanese Association for Arts (Harb, 2011: 141-145). 
Although residents, aside from those in Haret Hurayk, had the option of delegating 
reconstruction responsibility to Hizbullah, ‘the government was funding Wa’d through 
its compensation for dwellers and Wa’d’s operations were mostly financed by the 
government’s compensation payments to the dwellers’ (Harb &Fawaz, 2010: 29)501.  
 
While both the government and Hizbullah’s OF acknowledged the struggle for 
symbolic capital within the SMF, the latter’s pre-existing presence and control in al-
dahiyeh enabled it to benefit disproportionately from the process. Although funded 
through state channels, Hizbullah not only exercised exclusive rights over the 
selection of private enterprises to invest in and implement proposals, but also dictated 
the appearance of the reconstruction effort. Considering that the population of al-
dahiyeh had bloated from 100,000 in 1975 to 750,000 after 2006, Hizbullah’s urban 
landscaping, which was framed as the social solution for confronting Israel’s attempts 
to eliminate the Resistance, exchanged its economic and social capital into cultural 
capital, a transformation that significantly augmented the legitimacy of its symbolic 
capital amongst the Resistance habitus in the SMF502. This reconstruction method 
was also duplicated in other strategic sites of Resistance, such as Bint Jubayl in 
South Lebanon (Al-Harithy, 2010b: 70-99)503.  
 
                                                 
500
 The acknowledgement and importance of this exercise in legitimation was demonstrated in 2007. In what Deeb (2008: 395) 
referred to as ‘cultural erasure’, Israel destroyed Hizbullah’s museum in Khiyam along with 20 publishing houses and research 
institutes.    
501
 Due to the importance of the area to Hizbullah, residents in al-dahiyeh received more generous compensation packages with 
$55,000 provided for those whose houses had been destroyed while $30,000 was offered for partially damaged homes. Nevertheless, 
since the area was disproportionately impacted by Israeli attacks, other state bodies, such as the Council of the South, the Ministry of 
the Displaced, the Central Fund of the Displaced and the Council of Development and Reconstruction, also vied for influence by 
contributing to compensation efforts in al-dahiyeh (Harb & Fawwaz, 2010: 27-28). As traditionally mixed area of Haret Hurayk was 
home to Hizbullah’s ‘security quadrant’, Hizbullah circumnavigated local government to ensure that the main organs of the Islamic 
Resistance remained clandestine.          
502
 The population figures for al-dahiyeh were cited in MER, 26 November, 2009. For Harb (2011: 148), the Hizbullah-al-dahiyeh link 
operates ‘as a cognitive framework nourishing a collective Shi’i consciousness and generating a feeling of pride and self-worth’.     
503
 Due to its geographical position, and since it was the location of a major battle with Israel in 2006, Bint Jubayl was of vital symbolic 
relevance for Hizbullah. Reconstruction efforts focused on Hizbullah’s attempts to rebrand its identity and instil a collective memory 
that perceived the city as the frontline of the Resistance (Al-Harithy, 2010b: 70-99).  
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Furthermore, as demonstrated in Mleeta, a large outdoor museum managed by the 
Association for Reviving Resistance Heritage (ARRH), Hizbullah’s OF also conceived 
cultural (re)production initiatives that intended to connect and engrain the Islamic 
Resistance into the fabric of Lebanon’s natural landscape504. Opened in 2010 with the 
slogan, ‘where the land speaks to the heavens’, the site seeks to solidify a dialectic in 
which Mleeta, previously one of Hizbullah’s main hubs of Resistance against Israeli 
occupation, is naturalised and legitimised by divine providence. Located at the 
summit of a hill with views over the fertile planes of South Lebanon, visitors are 
directed through a labyrinth of spaces that reveal the daily practice of a Hizbullah 
fighter in the field, from trails, tunnels, bunkers, and arms caches to displays of 
captured Israeli military equipment505. For the purpose of framing the site’s relevance, 
visitors are welcomed by an introductory video narrated by Sayyid Nasrallah that 
supplants historical facts with Hizbullah’s Resistance narrative506. By doing so, 
Mleeta, which received nearly half a million visitors in the first three months, ‘can 
control people by narrating a specific heritage and memory…As these values merge 
[Islamic Resistance and culture], they become one with a singular conceptualisation 
of “culture” within which there appears to be very little room for negotiation’ (Mleeta 
architect cited in Harb & Deeb, 2011: 29). For a Hizbullah supporter, by visualising 
the transcendental metamorphosis of Resistance practice through imagery and 
iconography, Mleeta reaffirms identity, reinforces purpose and reinvigorates pride in 
connecting them to the glorified sacrifice of the Islamic Resistance, which in turn, 
confirms and cements the illusio of their Resistance habitus in the SMF.  
 
Thirdly, in Sayyid Nasrallah, Hizbullah possesses a charismatic leader of Weberian 
proportions. Equipped with military acumen, religious credentials, political nous and 
oratory skills, Sayyid Nasrallah is the embodiment of the modern Shi’i activist. 
Consequently, the Hizbullah leader is not only revered by his supporters, but he is 
also respected by his adversaries. Although appointed Secretary General in 1992, 
Sayyid Nasrallah was propelled into the limelight in 1997 following the death of his 
son, Hadi, during a Hizbullah operation against Israel. Since then, ‘Abu Hadi’ has 
been admired throughout the region both within and outside the Shi’i community. 
While the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll of 2008 listed Sayyid Nasrallah as the 
most popular leader in the region with an exponential rise from 14% in 2006 to 26% in 
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 The ARRH is also responsible for the Khiyam museum, the memorial garden in Maroun Al-Ra’s in South Lebanon, the memorial 
museum in the Biqa’ commemorating Shaykh Abbas Moussawi and the Resistance museum in al-dahiyeh (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 17).   
505
 A detailed blueprint and discussion of Mleeta, including the ‘Exhibition’, ‘Abyss’, ‘Path’, ‘Cave’, ‘Liberation Field’ and ‘Martyrs Hill’, 
is provided by Mona Harb and Lara Deeb (2011: 22-24).  
506
 One notable example is the lack of reference to other Lebanese groups that pioneered the Resistance against Israel while 
Hizbullah was in its infancy. As demonstrated with the commemorative plaque of ‘Tribute to the Sons of the Resistance Martyrs’, the 
site unsurprisingly promotes a Hizbullah-centric interpretation of historical Resistance against Israel.    
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2008, the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre ranked the Hizbullah leader as the 
17th most influential Muslim leader in the world (Telhami, 2008; Esposito & Kalin, 
2009). His renowned yet sporadic speeches, prepared with meticulous detail, are 
delivered both in public and from undisclosed locations to vast audiences. Conveyed 
in a linguistic style that fuses classical and colloquial Arabic to not only demonstrate 
his credibility as a statesman, but also his connection to the Shi’i street, Hizbullahis 
emphasise his honesty, integrity and commitment to the Resistance.         
 
While the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 enhanced his profile, Sayyid Nasrallah, whose 
name literally means ‘victory of God, became vindicated by his promise of ‘divine 
victory’ in 2006. In December that year, when Hizbullah supporters mobilised for 
sustained public protests against the government, their slogan was ‘Allah, Narallah w-
al-dahiyeh kullaha’ (‘God, Nasrallah and the entire suburbs’) (Malthaner, 2011: 91). 
By extension, his prophetic statements have earned him a reputation whereby his 
words exude a linguistic form of symbolic power. Whereas his virtues as a leader 
remind the Shi’i of the Twelve Infallible Imams, his retreat from public view, which is a 
precautionary measure to mitigate against the risk of assassination, has acted to 
reinforce an association with a lineage of martyred Shi’i icons. This elusiveness has 
augmented his appeal to the point where, similar to his Shi’i forbearers and 
conforming to the ritual practice of the tradition, Sayyid Nasrallah is on a path to 
apotheosis. On the rare occasions when he publicly emerges, he is mobbed by 
crowds frequently interrupting his speeches by chanting in frenzied unison: ‘labayka 
ya Nasrallah’ (‘At your wish, Nasrallah’). Consequently, Sayyid Nasrallah is the 
conduit through which the Shi’i visualise, express and channel their support for 
Hizbullah. As proclaimed by one supporter in 2006, ‘Sayyid Hassan is our state. This 
war may not be over, but we are not afraid. The Sayyid will protect us’507. His words 
are compliantly obeyed, his image decorates Hizbullah households as well as 
communities and his name resounds in songs, ‘you are our sensitivity, you help us 
touch and help us feel, you are our only medicine, you cure us and help us heal’508. 
As the personification of Hizbullah, Sayyid Nasrallah is an invaluable source of 
symbolic capital in the SMF. 
 
Following the developments of 2006 in the MSF, and through its strategic deployment 
of capital and multi-faceted activities in the SMF, Hizbullah’s OF successfully 
reconnected the two fields in synchronised synergy. By 2008, in mobilising tens of 
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 This quote is extracted from a New York Times article by John Kifner on 16 August 2006 (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 109). 
508
 These lines are taken from a ‘Wa’d’ (‘promise’) song about Sayyid Nasrallah (Cambanis, 2010: 197).  
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thousands of people for two years of sustained protest against the government before 
launching an armed assault on Beirut, Hizbullah’s OF, with limited instances of 
internal discord, enlisted its symbolic capital in both fields to pressure for change in 
the PF. After the resulting Doha Agreement, Israeli General Gadi Eisenkot, warning 
that ‘harming the population is the only means of restraining Nasrallah’, disclosed the 
‘Dahiyeh Doctrine’, a military strategy authorising the indiscriminate bombing of 
Lebanon in the event of an attack on Israel (MER, 4 October, 2008: 4-5; Hirst, 2010: 
380).  
 
Despite these threats, Hizbullah contributed 12 out of the 57 seats amalgamated by 8 
March alliance in the 2009 elections. Although its proportion of seats in parliament 
was reminiscent of previous performances, the transformation of symbolic capital in 
the MSF into social capital in the PF resulted in a Hizbullah-led 8 March alliance that 
not only comprised around 45% of the Chamber of Deputies, but also allegedly 
carried 55% of the popular vote, 130,000 more than its 14 March rivals who received 
71 seats (Cambanis, 2010: 286) 509. While reiterating the disparity between the 
‘parliamentary majority’ and the ‘popular majority’ in Lebanon, Sayyid Nasrallah 
accepted the results but insisted on a national unity government that enshrined the 
concept of ‘consensus democracy’. After five months of political manoeuvring, 8 
March gained one-third of cabinet posts in Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri’s government 
on 7 November 2009, an administration Emile Khoury referred to as the ‘Third 
Republic’ (MER, 14 November, 2009: 7-9)510.  
 
Conclusion  
 
After a decade of recurring episodes of hysteresis in Lebanon, the end of 2009 
signified a brief moment of catharsis as Hizbullah’s OF had strategically managed its 
capital to reposition its Resistance habitus both within and between the MSF, SMF 
and PF. In this context, and 24 years after its original ‘Open Letter’, Hizbullah 
delivered its 32-page ‘Political Manifesto’ on 30 November, 2009511. Projected to an 
audience at Jinen Hall in al-dahiyeh, Sayyid Nasrallah appeared on screen 
proclaiming Hizbullah’s rebranded framing from ‘Islamism’ and political revisionism to 
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 Out of the 128 seats in five major electoral districts nationwide, 8 March had won 2/19 in Beirut, 10/23 in the Biqa’, 21/35 in Mount 
Lebanon, 3/28 in North Lebanon and 21/23 in South Lebanon (MER, 13 June, 2009: 14-18).   
510
 After onerous negotiations, the agreed composition of the national unity government was a 15 (majority), 10 (opposition) and 5 
(president appointees) split with the opposition requiring a 10+1 combination to veto legislation. Hizbullah were allocated the 
Agriculture and Administrative Development ministries (MER, 14 November, 2009).   
511
 In 1994, following Hizbullah’s induction into politics, and in 2002, after Israel’s withdrawal, Hizbullah officials intimated that the 
Party would be updating the 1985 Open Letter but the process was delayed due to contextual complications and the need for internal 
discretion (Alagha, 2011: 163).   
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‘Lebanonisation’ and political pragmatism’512. Reflecting its maturity, the Hizbullah 
leader stated that ‘people evolve. The whole world has changed over the past 24 
years. Lebanon changed’513. However, by identifying with the Resistance, Syria, Iran 
and Palestinian rights while chastising U.S. hegemony and Israeli belligerence, 
Hizbullah’s OF confirmed its unwavering loyalty to revisionist heterodoxy in the FIP. 
Moreover, by promoting a national defence strategy that staunchly justified the 
sanctity of its weapons, Hizbullah continued to refuse any flexibility in the PF 
regarding the ‘red-line’ status of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF. Therefore, Sayyid 
Nasrallah’s interpretation of change was not informed by Hizbullah’s acceptance of 
orthodoxy in Lebanon’s PF but by Hizbullah’s ability to utilise the transference of 
symbolic capital in the MSF in altering the orthodoxy of the PF. Consequently, the 
2009 cabinet statement, which was released days after Sayyid Nasrallah’s speech, 
accentuated ‘the right of Lebanon, its people, its army, and its Resistance to liberate 
the occupied Lebanese territory in Sheba and Kfar Shouba hills’. 
 
From a mainstream SMT perspective, whether through necessity or conviction, 
Hizbullah’s gradual politicisation and the subsequent decision to reframe its focus 
from Islamic governance to ‘consensus democracy’ represented an objective 
opportunity enabling the Party to safeguard its interests while ensuring its 
preservation by inducting and sustaining the mobilisation of the Resistance within the 
pre-existing structures of Lebanon’s political institutions. Nevertheless, by prioritising 
the relational dialectic of perceived opportunities between Hizbullah’s OF and 
Lebanon’s PF, this framework neglects to acknowledge the dynamic and diversified 
mobilising modalities employed by Hizbullah’s OF beyond the political process in 
harmonising its Resistance habitus within the SMF and MSF as well as in maintaining 
a balance of synergy between its operational spheres of practice. By applying a 
Bourdieu-SMT approach, the continuous and complex constitution juxtaposing the 
strategic decisions of Hizbullah’s OF between 2000 and 2010 in relation to its 
endogenous and exogenous contexts can be more effectively explained.  
 
Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbullah’s OF was preoccupied with 
retaining and realigning its symbolic capital within and between the MSF and SMF 
while relying exclusively on Syria to protect the Islamic Resistance in the PF, a sphere 
Hizbullah’s OF actively sought to avoid as it was predisposed to perceive delicately 
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 The ‘Political Manifesto’ was published just after Hizbullah’s 8th Conclave. The Party’s 7-member majlis al-shura remained largely 
unchanged aside from Muhammad Ra’ad’s position as head of the Parliamentary Council, an addition that potentially reflected 
Hizbullah’s increasingly political activities on account of the 8 March alliance. Additionally, following the assassination of Imad 
Mugniyeh, the eighth member and head of the Jihad Council remained anonymous.        
513
 Extract from Ladki (2009).   
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woven political processes in Lebanon as characterised by the toxic and corrupt 
practices of elite sectarianism, state bureaucracy, chronic kleptocracy, familial 
patronage and foreign meddling. However, after fissures within Pax Syriana 
culminating in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 and the withdrawal 
of Syrian forces from Lebanon, Hizbullah’s OF was devoid of Syrian protection and 
surrounded by impending domestic threats.  
 
Cognisant of the freedom of movement opportunities entailed with the shattering of al-
saqf al-suri yet aware of the precedent set by Amal’s politicisation, Hizbullah’s OF 
conformed to a notion of ‘Lebanonisation’ in the PF that was more tangible than the 
1990s but contained an irrefutable caveat of plausible deniability, a situation whereby 
it possessed enough of a national presence to defend the Islamic Resistance without 
accepting national accountability for unintended consequences. Nevertheless, 
following mounting pressure between 2006 and 2008 as Hizbullah’s OF persisted in 
forcefully applying the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF onto the 
logic of the PF, the Party realised that preserving its symbolic capital in the MSF and 
SMF while concurrently advancing its position in the PF demanded more sustainable 
solutions than either withdrawing Shi’i ministers from government in protest or directly 
transferring and illegitimately transposing its orthodoxy in the MSF onto the PF.   
 
Consequently, Hizbullah’s OF revised its traditional heterodoxy in the PF by adjusting 
its dispositions and perceptions, acquiring the sufficient forms of capital required to 
enhance its position and succumbing to the generative/regulative practice of elite 
sectarianism. However, by tacitly acknowledging and participating within the rules of 
orthodoxy in the PF, even for the purpose of guaranteeing short-term protection in the 
MSF while in the long-term pursuing a reconstitution of the prevalent orthodoxy of the 
PF as an active stakeholder, the endemically polarised nature of the PF limited the 
modalities through which Hizbullah’s OF conventionally navigated around the 
politicisation of the MSF and the privatisation of the SMF. In other words, vying for 
political coverage to alleviate the Islamic Resistance inevitably entailed the burden of 
accountability, an expectation that risked compromising the harmonious balance of its 
holistic narrative. Therefore, the prospect of this enhanced engagement in the PF led 
Hizbullah’s OF to prepare for a corresponding shift in the diversification and 
modernisation of mobilising tactics in the SMF by expanding its social services, 
investing in leisure activities and imprinting its cultural (re)production on public space.  
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Since the inception of the Islamic Resistance occurred within the structures of 
Lebanon’s relational context, managing the opportunities for seeking protection in the 
PF was inextricably counterbalanced by the threat this level of participatory 
interaction posed in undermining the autonomous position of the Islamic Resistance 
in the MSF. Consequently, Hizbullah’s OF was confronted with an institutionalised 
process of contestation in Lebanon that inherently balanced the conflictual equation 
between the perception of opportunities as determined by the differentiating logics of 
the PF and MSF with the SMF wedged in the middle. For example, Hizbullah insisted 
on occupying only two ministries in government since 2005 but ‘they don’t need to 
address this; they have the whole country’514. By 2009, the precise terms of the 2006 
Hizbullah-FPM MOU became clear with the former delegating the day-today 
administrative authority to the latter, a position it could use to eclipse its Christian 
rivals in exchange for the FPM offering its non-Shi’i support to the former in vetoing 
any legislation in the PF that compromised the Islamic Resistance. In this way, 
Hizbullah’s OF could implicitly defend the Islamic Resistance in the PF while explicitly 
concealing and exonerating itself from accusations that the Party was monopolising 
the functions of the PF to achieve this objective. However, despite the FPM 
possessing more parliamentary seats and cabinet posts than its ally, this 
arrangement was neither as equitable nor as subtle as it appeared with the broader 
Lebanese public aware that Hizbullah was the figurehead of the 8 March alliance.  
 
A Bourdieu-SMT lens provides an insightful perspective for identifying and examining 
the efforts of Hizbullah’s OF between 2000 and 2010 in traversing the delicate 
equilibrium of passively non-committal engagement in the PF while sustaining its 
symbolic capital in the SMF and MSF. In conclusion, Hizbullah’s consistent strategic 
practice elicited a series of corresponding trends, conceived before 2010 but 
activated in 2011, that indicated the challenges of maintaining and sustaining a 
harmonious inter-field Resistance habitus of concurrent orthodoxy within the pre-
existing structures of Lebanon.  
 
Firstly, although Sayyid Nasrallah opined that the Resistance ‘should be shielded 
from being tarnished in local political and bickering’, the two are inexorably 
inseparable via field homology (MER, 14 July, 2009: 10). Confirming the assumptions 
of the broader Lebanese public, the advancement of Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus 
in the PF was predicated on safeguarding the orthodoxy of its symbolic capital in the 
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 Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012.   
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MSF. This was particularly evident on 12 January 2011 when Gebran Bassil, the 
FPM’s Minister of Energy, announced the resignation of all ten opposition cabinet 
members, which was followed by the withdrawal of the independent Shi’i Minister of 
State Adnan Husayn, thereby activating the veto clause and enabling 8 March to 
collapse Sa’ad Hariri’s government.     
 
While the die was cast by its ally, the game was orchestrated by Hizbullah to 
reprimand Hariri for threatening to legitimise the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), 
an investigation the politicisation of which Hizbullah interpreted as a precursor for 
targeting the weapons of the Islamic Resistance. Although Hizbullah circulated this 
argument after the inception of the STL in March 2009, the collapse of the 
government occurred days before the first issuance of indictments that on 28 June 
2011 implicated four Hizbullah members - Salim Ayyash, Mustapha Badr al-Din, 
Husayn Oneissi and Asad Sabra - as the alleged perpetrators behind the 
assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005515. Therefore, despite its rhetoric of 
‘Lebanonisation’ and ‘consensus democracy’, by portraying itself as an actor willing to 
pursue inimical as opposed to inclusive policies that subordinated the stability of the 
PF to its interests in the MSF, Hizbullah’s OF was viewed as a disingenuous pariah. 
This stringent modus operandi not only risked intensifying both non-Shi’i and Shi’i 
resentment within the SMF, but also the cost/benefit calculations of the FPM in its 
arrangement with Hizbullah in the PF.  
 
Secondly, the Party’s gradual involvement in the orthodoxy of the PF placed 
considerable strains on the social contract between Hizbullah’s OF and its Resistance 
habitus in the SMF. In 2008, Shaykh Qassem stated that ‘we have never considered 
the Resistance to be in competition with the state’ (MER, 27 September, 2008: 4). 
Nevertheless, despite the alternative administration in June 2011 being headed by 
former Sunni Premier Najib Miqati and with the Party only possessing two ministries, 
Hizbullah’s OF was behind the formation and function of a government that was 
devoid of 14 March figures516. Rather than perceived as having nominal (2005) or 
veto (2009) influence, by 2011, Hizbullah indirectly supervised all ministries of state. 
Therefore, Hizbullah became elevated onto a pedestal of accountability for everyday 
administrative responsibilities it had so eagerly attempted to avoid, such as electricity 
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 A fifth Hizbullah member, Hassan Mehri, was indicted on 31 July 2013. The STL and the role of Hizbullah in the assassination of 
Rafiq Hariri have been covered extensively (MacDonald, 2010; Taher, 2011; Bergman, 2015) 
516
 The majority of the 30-member cabinet was dominated by 8 March parties with the Free Patriotic Movement (7), Tashnag (3), 
Hizbullah (2), Marada (2), Amal (2) and SSNP (1) as well as ministers from outside March 8, including Premier Miqati’s party (3), the 
Arab Liberation Movement (1), independents (6) and the PSP (3) (Interviews with Walid Jumblatt in Beirut, 3 July 2012 and Hagop 
Pakradounian in Beirut, 6 September 2012). Muhammad Fneish and Husayn Hajj al-Hassan retained their positions as Hizbullah’s 
Minister of State and Minister of Agriculture respectively.   
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shortages, unemployment, crime, income inequality and public services. Restrained 
by the innately debilitating structures of Lebanon’s state bureaucracy, Hizbullah, 
previously tasked with providing for the Shi’i community, was embroiled in a national 
system of limitations that conflated its roles between a state and non-state actor.   
 
This situation highlighted vulnerabilities within the Resistance habitus in the SMF. 
Despite its extensive social services and cultural (re)production initiatives, Hizbullah’s 
OF does not command exclusive control over the perceptions and practices of its 
agents in the SMF. In particular, increasingly educated, integrated and modernised 
Shi’i youth, 70% of which are under 20, have demonstrated a tendency to question 
the boundaries of prevailing norms and values (Raphaeli, 2009: 110; Harb & Deeb, 
2007: 5). Subsequently, they are optimally placed to juxtapose disparities between 
their expectations and the quality of services available, an equation that was 
problematised by instances where elements within the Hizbullah community 
contradicted the Party’s narrative of piety in reportedly succumbing to the 
symptomatic temptations of greed extended to those participating in an institutionally 
corrupt political system517. Furthermore, in 2009, Hizbullah admitted to difficulty in 
curbing petty crime in Beirut’s increasingly congested southern suburbs518. 
Consequently, Shi’i opportunists previously attached to a Resistance habitus in the 
SMF sensed an opportunity to exploit the distraction of Hizbullah’s deeper 
politicisation and capitalise on the Party’s overstretched reach domestically. More 
specifically, this refers to the expanding autonomy and activity of powerful clans in the 
northern Biqa’ or informal urbanised familial gangs in al-dahiyeh519.  
 
Thirdly, while previously engaged in mainstream struggles with Amal and Sayyid 
Fadlallah for symbolic capital within the Shi’i community in the SMF, both direct and 
indirect opposition to the monopoly of Hizbullah’s OF over the Shi’i narrative became 
increasingly more vocal after 2000. Despite its enhanced reputation after Israel’s 
withdrawal, there were a series of sporadic tremours of discord from a variety of 
formal and informal grassroots Shi’i initiatives, including Dr Mahmoud Ramadan’s 
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 In 2007, Walid Jumblatt accused Hizbullah-affiliated Shi’i investors of illegally purchasing Christian and Druze land in the South 
Lebanon, the Western Biqa’ and Mount Lebanon in order to link the Party’s three core constituencies (MER, 16 June, 2007: 16-17; 
Interview with Walid Jumblatt in Beirut, 3 July 2012). In 2009, Salah Ezzedine, a Shi’i businessman with connections to Hizbullah, 
embezzled $300 million in a pyramid scheme (Blanford, 2011: 473; Lob, 2014: 5). In 2011, not only was Jihad Mugniyeh, Imad’s son, 
accused of living a decadent lifestyle, but his mother Wafa, Imad’s wife, was prevented from attending a conference by Hizbullah to 
ensure her private wealth was not made public (Blanford, 2011, 475; The Arab Digest, 11 December, 2011). In 2013, the brother of 
Hizbullah MP Muhammad Fneish was arrested on charges of illegally importing medicine (Lob, 2014: 5).         
518
 In late 2009, since al-dahiyeh was experiencing higher levels of criminal activities, including car thefts, drug dealing, counterfeiting 
and unlawful abuse of state utilities and services, Hizbullah called on the state to deploy 350-600 members of the ISF to administer 
order (MER, 26 November, 2009: 7).    
519
 As noted in previous chapters, Hizbullah has relied on the social structures of prominent clans to comprise the nucleus of the 
organisation. Whether associated to the Chamas (Nasr al-Din, Allaw) or Zaaiter (Muqdad, Jaafar) branches of the Hamadiyya clan, 
these families are affiliated to Hizbullah through convenience over conviction while continuing to engage in their own practices. One 
tribal member stated that Hizbullah ‘are powerful, but they can’t afford to mess with the tribes here, so they leave us alone’ (Samaha, 
2012; Blanford, 2011: 477-478).      
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Shi’i Grouping (2004), Issam Abu Darwish’s Al-Kiyan Gathering (2004), Sayyid 
Muhammad Al-Amin’s public rallies (2004) and Shaykh Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin’s 
Shi’i Gathering (2005)520. In particular, as epitomised by the provocative and 
polemical article published on 7 August 2006 by Lebanese University Professor Mona 
Fayyad entitled ‘To Be a Shi’i Now…’, the destruction caused by the July War and the 
perception of Hizbullah’s self-professed absolution in accepting responsibility 
accentuated discontentment amongst sectors of the Shi’i community521. 
Substantiating claims by these pockets of protest that insisted Hizbullah primarily 
depended on incentivising practical co-option as opposed to motivating principled 
conviction in maintaining its hegemony over the Shi’i community, Al-Nahar reported 
during the July War that approximately 70% of the Shi’i supported Hizbullah while 
only 25-30% of those were ideologues (Zisser, 2009: 173).  
 
However, Hizbullah’s OF consistently prevented this dissatisfaction from translating 
into sustained counter-mobilisation within the Shi’i community in the SMF. Firstly, 
through its expansive network of social service institutions, Hizbullah’s OF deployed 
extensive values of economic and social capital to address the diverse needs of its 
constituencies, ensure compliance and preserve its symbolic capital. Secondly, 
although Ibrahim Shamseddine, Ahmad al-As’ad and Shaykh Ahmad Talib are 
prominent Shi’i figures, their grassroots initiatives remained largely disparate and 
dysfunctional with neither possessing the individual or the collective capacities of 
recognised capital in the SMF to propose a networked, organised or viable ‘third way’ 
alternative, a trend that was effectively managed by Hizbullah’s control of public 
space and accessible resources within the Shi’i community522. Thirdly, as 
demonstrated by the cases of journalist Ali al-Amin and activist Lokman Slim, 
Hizbullah’s OF regularly employed its sophisticated media organs and organised 
community networks to discredit the legitimacy of aspiring challengers within the 
SMF523. Lastly, Hizbullah’s OF also adopted tactics of direct intimidation, assault and 
detainment to nullify perceived threats to its authority from individuals who openly 
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 More information on these expressions of dissent can be found in (MER, 31 July, 2004: 15; 7 August, 2004: 7-8; 28 August, 2004: 
9-10; 19 September, 2005: 13).  
521
 Interview with Dr Mona Fayyad in Beirut, 17 August 2012). One extract from the article reads: ‘To be a Shi’i is to accept that your 
country be destroyed before your very eyes…and that it comes tumbling down on your head, and that your family be displaced and 
dispersed and becomes a ‘refugee’ in the four corners of the nation and the world, and that you accept standing up to the enemy with 
no complaints as long as there is a fighter out there with a rocket that he can launch at northern Israel – and maybe even at its south 
– without asking about the ‘why’ or about the timing or about the usefulness of the end result…’ 
522Ibrahim Shamseddine is the son of Sayyid Muhammad Shamseddine, Ahmad al-As’ad is from one the most eminent zu’ama 
families in Lebanon and Shaykh Ahmad Talib is the son-in-law of Sayyid Fadlallah. 
523
 While Ali al-Amin, Lokman Slim and Ibrahim Shamseddine were accused by Hizbullah’s media organs of providing information and 
receiving money from U.S. agencies, Shaykh Ahmad Talib’s Lebanese Ulama Gathering was portrayed as being a pro-14 March 
organisation (Interview with Ali al-Amin in Beirut, 26 August 2012). Hayya Bin’a, Lokman Slim’s NGO, has frequently faced 
bureaucratic obstacles imposed by Hizbullah-affiliated municipalities to prevent him from working in Shi’i areas (Interview with Lokman 
Slim in Beirut, 9 August 2012).  
 301
criticised the Party (Smyth, 2011: 3-4)524. The 2010 arrest and trial of Shaykh 
Mechaymesh, formerly a member of Hizbullah before opposing the concept of wilayat 
al-faqih, as well as the efforts of the Independent Clerical Gathering and other Shi’i 
figures in lobbying for his release, represented an example of Hizbullah’s attitude to 
dissension within the Shi’i community of the SMF525. 
 
The purpose of mentioning these three themes is not to conclude that Hizbullah’s OF 
is on the brink of demise. On the contrary, not only does Hizbullah’s OF possess 
hegemonic material and symbolic control over its constituencies, but the expulsion of 
Shaykh Tufayli (1997), the defection of Shaykh Mechaymesh (1998), the dismissal of 
Nayef Krayem (2003) and the resignation of Husayn Nabulsi (2006) remain the only 
notable cases of friction within Hizbullah’s OF526. Rather, the objective is to 
emphasise that the strategic priority of Hizbullah’s OF between 2000 and 2010, which 
ultimately aimed to increasingly engage with the orthodox structures of the PF in 
order to protect the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF, was neither 
a unilaterally monolithic nor a universally accepted phenomenon. As it pursued this 
logic, Hizbullah’s OF risked episodes of allodoxia in either disrupting the management 
of its Resistance habitus within the Shi’i community or rupturing simmering tensions 
within the pre-existing structures of an entrenched system in Lebanon.  
 
In particular, amidst Lebanon’s complicated dynamics, maintaining equilibrium within 
and between four positions of orthodoxy simultaneously, without the prospect of 
achieving symbolic power, enhances the possibility of corresponding counter-
mobilisations from either extant (orthodox) or emerging (heterodox) actors. In the PF, 
as Hizbullah’s OF independently strives for symbolic capital via the logic of the Islamic 
Resistance over the doxa of institutionalised inclusivity, it confronts challenges from 
the convergence of its field counterparts. In the SMF, Hizbullah’s OF risks creating 
fractures within the practice of its Resistance habitus as the management of its 
symbolic capital becomes perceived as exercising symbolic power where coercion 
overpowers consent. In the MSF, similar to the case of Hamas and the Qassam 
Brigades in Gaza, the continuous balance between political compromise and military 
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 These included: Ahmad Chehab, and independent Shi’i; Durayd Yaghi, the Shi’i Vice President of the PSP; Sayyid Ali al-Amin, 
who was removed from his post as Grand Mufti of Tyre; and Ahmad al-As’ad, the head of the Lebanon Option Party (Smyth, 2011: 3-
4; MER, 11 April, 2009: 4).       
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 Shaykh Mechaymesh was detained by the Syrian authorities in 2010 before being transferred to Lebanon in October 2011 and 
charged with spying for Israel. Senior Hizbullah officials, especially Shaykh Qaouk and Shaykh Ali Daamoush, have allegedly played 
a role in his detainment. Lokman Slim, along with the Independent Clerical Gathering, which includes Shaykh Ahmad Talib, Sayyid Ali 
al-Amin, Shaykh Hassan al-Amin and Shaykh Hani Fahs, are running the campaign for his release (Interviews with Lokman Slim on 9 
August, Ali al-Amin on 26 August and Reda Mechaymesh on 3 September 2012).  
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 Hizbullah dismissed Nayef Krayem, the Director of Al-Manar, in 2003 for harbouring pro-Fadlallah tendencies in his controversial 
statements about Ashoura and the concept of wilayat al-faqih (ICG, 2003: 14; Norton, 2007a: 118). Husayn Nabulsi, Hizbullah’s 
Director of Media Relations, resigned after the 2006 War for unknown reasons.  
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reinforcement poses a threat in either widening or conflating the distinction of 
symbolic capital in the PF and MSF527. Lastly, since all fields are sites of struggle that 
contain orthodoxy and heterodoxy, Hizbullah’s Resistance habitus in the OF, as 
demonstrated after the civil war, is also not immune from internal fissures over 
legitimate forms of capital and practice. As articulated by Hizbullah MP Muhammad 
Fneish, ‘in striking a delicate balance between ideological integrity and political reality, 
it [Hizbullah] too must be careful not to allow this balance to tilt too heavily either way, 
lest it spell its eventual demise’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 307).     
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 Members of the Islamic Resistance have independent and privileged access to counterparts in Iran and Syria that are not extended 
to the political branch leading to decentralised decision-making processes within Hizbullah (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 18).  
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Conclusion 
Whither the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon?   
 
‘When you play the game of thrones; you win or you die. There is no middle ground’.  
- Cersei Lannister, ‘Game of Thrones’, 2011 -    
 
‘I’ll tell them how I survive it…It’s like a game. Repetitive. Even a little tedious after more than twenty 
years. But there are much worse games to play’. 
- Katniss Evergreen, ‘The Hunger Games: Mockingjay’ (Collins, 2010: 390). 
 
‘The game is the game. Always.’  
- Avon Barksdale, ‘The Wire’, 2002 - 2008 
 
Over the last decade, a proliferation of TV shows and films have entered the public 
sphere of mainstream popular culture in the West. Whether intending to transmit their 
respective narratives through the lens of reflected reality, fantasy or dystopia, a 
predominant theme is to convey political and social struggles by invoking the 
rationale of a ‘game’. Due to the perceived linkages between the ‘gaming world’ and 
the ‘material world’, illuminating the latter via the language of the former becomes an 
appealing exercise. In this way, disparities and dichotomies within prevalent 
organising structures and power dynamics are produced through intersubjective 
understandings and zero-sum calculations of inherent rules and allocated resources, 
resulting in a range of strategies and tactics devised to maintain or enhance one’s 
relative position with unpredictable and elusive outcomes.  
 
Academics, in order to capitalise on trendy analogies as a means of translating 
complex concepts, have responded with a series of literature, in particular on ‘Game 
of Thrones’ (Carpenter, 2012; Saideman, 2013), ‘The Wire’ (Penfold-Mounce, Beer & 
Burrows, 2011; Bramall & Pitcher, 2013) and ‘The Hunger Games’ (Henshaw, 2013; 
Weber, 2013)528. While the creation and reproduction of Hizbullah’s Islamic 
Resistance may not attract the same number of viewers, the intricate and incessant 
balancing of actors in Lebanon resembles the motif of a game. Norton (1987: 126) 
stated that ‘a sect must dominate or be dominated, or withdraw from the game’, and 
while Hizbullah MP Ali Fayyad admitted that the Party of God is enmeshed in the 
country’s ‘internal political game’, Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah has frequently 
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 Not only has Francis Fukuyama, the prominent author of the ‘End of History’, written an article entitled ‘Down to the Wire’ (2012), 
but his work has also been cited online to explain ‘Game of Thrones’ and ‘The Hunger Games’. 
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referred to military confrontation with Israel as tantamount to observing the ‘rules of 
the game’529. 
 
In the Introduction, three inter-related aims were listed in exploring Hizbullah’s 
struggle for symbolic power in Lebanon. Firstly, the intention was to investigate 
Hizbullah’s mobilisation through the lens of Social Movement Theory (SMT), a 
prevalent conceptual model for collective action that is under-utilised by scholars 
specialising on the Middle East. Secondly, since mainstream SMT contains a number 
of theoretical deficiencies, the purpose was to employ analytical tools developed by 
Pierre Bourdieu, such as habitus, capital and field, to complement and supplement 
the effectiveness of SMT. Thirdly, the goal was to empirically apply this 
reconceptualisation to illustrate how Hizbullah inculcates and institutionalises its 
Resistance within and between multiple fields of practice, each constituted by 
differing logics and differentiated structures.  
 
The applied objectives to achieve these aims have concurrently sought to 
dialectically examine Hizbullah’s induction and emergence within the pre-existing 
parameters of Lebanon’s multi-faceted ‘game’. Consequently, reconfiguring the 
George Polya (1945) approach of problem-solving analysis, this thesis has attempted 
to comprehend the subject (Hizbullah’s mobilisation in Lebanon), devise a plan for 
addressing the phenomenon (the development of a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation) 
and implement the framework (reconciling theory and praxis through empirical 
assessment). Adhering to the fourth component of the model, namely reviewing the 
results of the process, this Bourdieu-SMT schematic invites and reveals eight salient 
conclusions pertaining to Hizbullah’s struggle for symbolic power in Lebanon.  
 
The Shi’i past is fundamental in illuminating the Shi’i present. By omitting an 
account that assesses the location of the Shi’i during the phases of Lebanon’s 
evolution and the incremental institutionalisation of its composite structures, any 
evaluation into Hizbullah is rendered limited in its ability to sufficiently comprehend 
the root causes behind why and how the movement moves. As detailed in Chapter 
Four, a Bourdieu-SMT lens assists in this process by offering a conceptual 
framework not only equipped to construct the constitution and composition of 
Lebanon’s state structures, but also to place and trace the habitus of the Shi’i within 
the parameters of these emerging fields.  
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 Interview with Ali Fayyad in Beirut, 29 March 2012.  
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Firstly, the Shi’i are characterised by their heterodox position, not their heterodox 
practice. In other words, claims of Shi’i exceptionalism should be replaced by a 
perspective that identifies and interprets the Shi’i as marginally included rather than 
perennially excluded. Therefore, while reduced to the peripheries and eclipsed by the 
more cohesive narratives of their counterparts, they remained inducted into a system 
that provided opportunities for accumulating and deploying legitimate capital in the 
Political Field (PF). Secondly, entrenched rivalries between traditional Shi’i elites 
have consistently controlled the space between the Social Mobilisational Field (SMF) 
and the PF. Consequently, with the elites predisposed to preserve their privileged 
position, the reproduction of the patron-client relationship has greatly restricted 
opportunities for pursuing organised Collective Action Frames or mobilisational 
practice. Thirdly, there exist only scant examples documenting the cultivation of a 
collective Shi’i habitus (collusio), a state in which agents in the SMF are conjoined in 
perception, position and practice. A combination of divergent Shi’i elite interests, a 
conventionally quietist and divided ulama as well as a lack of available and 
accessible legitimate capital hindered the development of sustained mobilisation 
through an Organisational Field (OF).         
 
Prior to the Lebanese civil war, the Shi’i were geographically separated, socially 
dislocated, economically deprived, ideologically confounded and politically 
marginalised. Through Amal, Musa al-Sadr managed to initiate the harmonising of 
Shi’i habiti into collective mobilisation. Nevertheless, its immediate and broad remit 
compromised the coherence of its collusio. Therefore, any Shi’i actor aspiring to 
inculcate a collective Shi’i habitus would confront the challenge of navigating and 
negotiating an SMF structured by dispositionally dispersed and disjointed agents, 
pre-existing cleavages of capital, diversified mobilisational modalities and contrasting 
Collective Action Frames.        
 
Hizbullah in Lebanon is a progeny, not a proxy of the Islamic Republic. Iran has 
been pivotal in the evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Following 1979, the Islamic 
Republic utilised its symbolic power in Iran to export the revolution by transferring 
significant values of cultural, social and economic capital that facilitated the creation 
of Hizbullah. This alignment has resulted in the predominant assumption that 
Hizbullah is a passive and compliant extension of Iranian foreign policy as opposed 
to an active and invested stakeholder in Lebanese affairs. As outlined in Chapter 
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Five, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective highlights the complexity of this mutually 
constituted relationship.  
 
Firstly, the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO), an Iranian-endorsed group responsible 
for perpetrating attacks and kidnappings against Western targets in the 1980s, 
exhibited solidarity with Hizbullah in terms of identity and ideology but was detached 
from the Party of God in purpose, position and practice. While the IJO was an 
amorphous cadre of Shi’i operatives with pre-existing capital in the MSF that acted 
as a tool for Iran to execute immediate objectives, Hizbullah, as demonstrated by its 
Iranian-funded activities in the SMF, represented the gradual consolidation of an 
enduring OF that would embody a sustained presence traversing all fields in 
Lebanon. Secondly, the prevailing doxa (law) constituting the logic of Hizbullah’s OF 
may have centred on the seemingly Iranian imported concepts of wilayat al-faqih and 
Resistance against Israel, but this neglects the composition of the habiti within the 
field itself. Whereas the Islamic Republic provided the broader impetus behind 
Collective Action Frames and mobilisational techniques, the habiti comprising 
Hizbullah’s OF were also influenced by internal developments intrinsic to Lebanon. 
Therefore, the orthodoxy charged with interpreting and negotiating the governing 
doxa in Hizbullah’s OF was one of Lebanese design within its relational context, not 
one of Iranian imposition. 
 
Consequently, Hizbullah’s OF, which functions as the movement’s central nucleus 
and nervous system, may have been structured by the transference of Iranian capital 
but the continual structuring is performed by agents embedded within the mutually 
constitutive structures of Lebanese dynamics. Therefore, while there is a 
considerable degree of field homology between Iran’s PF and Hizbullah’s OF, a 
connection that results in a synergy of perceptions and dispositions, this does not 
translate into harmonised or homogenised practice. As Hizbullah’s OF evolved into 
an established movement within the operational fields of Lebanon, relying less on the 
transference of capital from Iran, the Party of God became more self-sufficient in 
devising and developing independently constructed Collective Action Frames and 
mobilisational methods, that while resonating with Iran, pursued an autonomous 
trajectory of perceived opportunities within Lebanon.    
 
Hizbullah’s OF guides rather than dictates the dynamism of the SMF. Since 
emanating from the amalgamation of Shi’i groups in the Ba’albeck in 1982, the aim of 
Hizbullah has been to instil a Resistance habitus in the SMF, one in which agents are 
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infused with the discourse and practice of a brand of radical Shi’i activism that 
intends to entrench dispositions of empowerment, resilience and self-sufficiency. 
Cognisant of its deficiency in legitimate forms of capital, Hizbullah sought to initially 
utilise the transference of economic and cultural capital from Iran by conforming to 
orthodox confessional mobilising structures in the Shi’i community, such as familial 
ties, mosque networks, the establishment of media organs and the provision of social 
services. In gradually accruing symbolic capital within the Shi’i community by 
incorporating and building-upon pre-existing methods, Hizbullah employed its own 
organisations to implant and institutionalise its Resistance habitus in the SMF.  
 
Originally, Hizbullah’s institutions endeavoured to perform an Islamic duty in reviving 
a traditionally downtrodden community. Following Hizbullah’s decision of infitah, or 
‘opening-up’, to participate in the 1992 elections, the increasing Shi’i dependency on 
these services acted as an incentive for political mobilisation. Subsequently, not only 
has the Party of God developed these organisations in terms of structure, 
professionalism and sophistication, but it has also adapted and expanded its 
activities in the SMF to reflect the growing diversification of the Shi’i community. As 
Hizbullah’s OF produces the parameters of a Resistance habitus, SMF agents 
reproduce its legitimacy through routinised practice. In the context of a seemingly 
dysfunctional state apparatus, some refer to the scale and scope of Hizbullah’s work 
as a ‘state within a non-state’ (John Kifner cited in Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 109). As 
Bilal Naim, the former director of the Hizbullah-sponsored Mahdi Scouts, claimed, 
‘Hizbullah is stronger than the state…this is not Hizbullah’s problem, this is the 
government’s problem’ (quoted in Blanford, 2011: 413-414).  
 
Although Hizbullah’s OF has deftly consolidated a Resistance habitus, its agents 
retain agency by remaining constituted in relation to the broader logic of the SMF. 
Therefore, while the Party of God is responsible for exposing opportunities for capital 
accumulation within the Shi’i community, its increasingly empowered and educated 
constituencies are becoming more adept at independently adjusting their dispositions 
and perceptions towards modern forms of mobilisation. While Hizbullah’s OF 
attempts to innovatively prepare for this eventuality through investments in leisure 
and entertainment activities, the cultural (re)production of private and public space 
and technologically-advanced modalities for engagement, it confronts significant 
challenges in sustaining the integrity of its Resistance habitus. In particular, as 
Hizbullah becomes perceived as a politically influential force in Lebanon, it is 
compelled to manage the enhanced expectations of a young constituency, growing 
 308
opposition voices within the Shi’i community, the prospect of petty crime and the 
socio-economic implications of its military activities.       
 
The Islamic Resistance is enabled and disabled in the MSF. The invasion of 
Lebanon by Israel in 1982 was arguably the prime catalyst for Hizbullah’s 
conception. Therefore, as a core component of orthodoxy in Hizbullah’s OF, the 
nurturing of a Resistance habitus in the MSF and the subsequent accruement of 
symbolic capital is dialectically constituted by Israeli occupation. Initially, the Islamic 
Resistance benefited from Iran’s social capital with Syria, the custodian of symbolic 
power in Lebanon, to access the MSF. In the mid-1980s, despite the withdrawal of 
the PLO, the Islamic Resistance was reduced to a heterodox position and inhibited 
by the established presence of the Lebanese National Resistance and operational 
inexperience in the MSF. Most importantly, as demonstrated by its internecine feud 
with Amal, the legitimation of Hizbullah’s position and practice was defined by Syria’s 
imposed rules of orthodoxy in the MSF. 
 
The calculated strategy of Syria at the end of the civil war to balance Shi’i actors in 
Lebanon by enhancing Amal’s capital in the PF while augmenting Hizbullah’s capital 
in the MSF, acted to preserve the Islamic Resistance under the mitigated 
management of al-saqf al-suri (‘the Syrian ceiling’). Subsequently, recognised as the 
exclusive representative of Lebanese Resistance against Israel, Hizbullah adapted 
its military practice to elevate its status in the MSF. Following Operation 
Accountability (1993), Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), the formation of the 
Lebanese Resistance Brigades (1997), Israel’s withdrawal (2000) and the invocation 
of the Sheba Farms as justification for continuing the Resistance (2000-), the Islamic 
Resistance not only achieved symbolic capital within the Shi’i community and 
amongst the broader Lebanese public, but by establishing ‘rules of engagement’ that 
observed the mutual logic of confrontation and deterrence, Hizbullah also legitimated 
its capital in the MSF with Israel. Although the Islamic Resistance was designated a 
‘terrorist organisation’ by the U.S., Israel accepted the group as a ‘military 
organisation’ (MER, 28 October, 2006: 9).  
 
Whereas Syria’s symbolic power in Lebanon enabled the Islamic Resistance, its 
demise after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 threatened to 
disable the legitimacy of Hizbullah’s symbolic capital in the MSF. The disparity lies in 
the irreconcilably divergent dispositions and perceptions concerning whether the 
Islamic Resistance is the cause or effect of the state’s inability to defend Lebanon. 
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Whereas the 14 March coalition claims that Hizbullah’s arsenal is the cause of the 
state’s weakness, Hizbullah’s Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah argues 
the opposite, namely that ‘until the causes of the virtual absence of the state are 
addressed, Hizbullah’s arms will remain’ (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007: 14). As a result, 
while 14 March exploited Hizbullah’s relative deficiency of recognised capital in the 
PF by employing internationally-mandated resolutions, especially the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, that question the legitimacy and loyalty of the Islamic 
Resistance in the MSF, Hizbullah, as witnessed in 2006 and 2008, capitalised on the 
deficiency of 14 March capital by transferring and applying its symbolic capital, 
derived from the logic of the MSF, to the logic of the PF for the purpose of exerting 
leverage over 14 March.      
 
The Party of God is a reticent and recalcitrant actor in the PF. On 26 May 1975, 
following the collapse of his military government after just three days, Brigadier 
General Nur Al-Din Rifai opined, ‘blessed is the one who does not govern in 
Lebanon…I can tell you that military life is better than politics’ (MER, 16 September, 
2000: 7). Exemplified by its 1985 ‘Open Letter’ and its slogan advocating for ‘the 
Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’, Hizbullah realised the regulative historical structures 
of the PF. George Orwell wrote that ‘to accept political responsibility now means 
yielding oneself over to orthodoxies and party lines, with all the timidity and 
dishonesty that that implies’ (Davidson, 2001: 483). In a similar vein, Hizbullah, 
conceived from radical habiti exhibiting dispositions towards Islamic Resistance, was 
hesitant to risk compromising the integrity of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF by 
fully accommodating or engaging in what it interpreted as the debilitating and bias 
framework of the PF.  
 
Although the decision to participate in the 1992 elections was labelled as infitah 
(‘opening-up’) or ‘Lebanonisation’, a process that tacitly acknowledged the political 
system, Hizbullah seized on the opportunity of democratically entering the PF in 
order to deliberately propagate a heterodox position and practice. This induction into 
the PF represented a ratio of win-win proportions. Militarily protected but politically 
restrained by Syria, Hizbullah’s OF could access Lebanon’s governing structures, 
publicly promote the exploits of the Islamic Resistance and garner symbolic capital in 
the SMF by chastising the predominant orthodoxy without the corresponding 
accountability attached to the complicity of that orthodoxy. The assassination of Rafiq 
Hariri in 2005 and Syria’s sudden disintegration of symbolic power in Lebanon 
presented both an opportunity and threat for Hizbullah in the PF. While Syria’s retreat 
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removed significant restraints on the independent acquisition of Hizbullah’s capital in 
the PF, it exposed the symbolic capital of the Islamic Resistance in the MSF to the 
scrutiny of established actors in the PF. Consequently, to compensate for its lack of 
recognised capital in the PF, Hizbullah resorted to and relied on preserving its 
symbolic capital in the MSF by translating and deploying it to the PF. Whereas its 
social capital with Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, both forged due to the 
extent of Hizbullah’s symbolic capital in the MSF, acted to block the pursuit of 
practice that targeted Hizbullah by conforming to the orthodox procedures of the PF, 
the concurrent transference of the logic of the MSF to the PF, as demonstrated by 
the practice of the Islamic Resistance in 2006 and 2008, acted to elicit and exact 
concessions that altered the prevailing orthodoxy in the PF.   
 
Huda al-Husayni argued that Hizbullah ‘has not joined the political process in order to 
integrate, but rather to use it to protect its irregular existence outside’ (MER, 5 May, 
2007: 8). Hizbullah remains a reticent and recalcitrant actor in the PF that avoids 
institutionalised state structures by engaging instrumentally and superficially to 
promote heterodoxy. Nevertheless, in order to defend the orthodoxy of its symbolic 
capital in the MSF, Hizbullah was required to gradually embed itself more 
substantively within the orthodoxy of the PF. Despite recurrently possessing only two 
cabinet ministries, a practice that prefers to conceal its influence by distributing 
responsibility to its allies rather than attract public attention for being associated with 
the structural idiosyncrasies of Lebanon’s PF, the role of Hizbullah in creating and 
managing the governments of Najib Miqati (June, 2011) and Tammam Salam 
(February, 2014) revealed its interest in prioritising the orthodoxy of the Islamic 
Resistance in the MSF over the orthodoxy of active participation in the PF.     
 
Hizbullah’s relevance is contingent on maintaining field homology. A Bourdieu-
SMT perspective places conceptual focus on the dynamic and concurrent 
relationships within as well as between fields of practice. Rather than 
disproportionately credit or reduce the importance of one particular field, an analysis 
of Hizbullah requires a holistic approach that not only identifies the designated fields 
in which Hizbullah has created, cultivated and consolidated a Resistance habitus, but 
also explains how Hizbullah’s OF balances its position within each sphere to produce 
and reproduce the harmony of its Resistance habitus as well as the homology of its 
presence across fields in Lebanon. In order to maintain the durability of this process, 
it is incumbent on Hizbullah’s OF to consistency ensure the effective implementation 
of three inter-related processes. 
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Firstly, whether referring to the SMF, MSF or PF, Hizbullah’s OF, through the 
deployment of mobilising repertoires and Collective Action Frames, must strategically 
inform, induce and induct agents into the opportunities of participating in accordance 
to the pre-existing structured illusio (‘stakes’) of each field. Secondly, by providing, 
exposing or enhancing agents’ access to legitimate forms of recognised capital within 
a designated field, Hizbullah’s OF must tactically inculcate dispositions and 
perceptions that seek to institutionalise a cohesive Resistance habitus and facilitate 
vertical ascension of reproductive practice towards symbolic capital and the 
occupation of predominant orthodoxy within each field. Thirdly, while developing its 
positions depending on the specific generative and regulative structures within each 
field, Hizbullah’s OF, by adapting, customising and modernising its mobilisational 
repertoires and Collective Action Frames, must simultaneously strive to horizontally 
align the cohesion and coherence of its Resistance habitus across fields that are 
constituted by differentiated logics. 
 
Since the prospect of an archetypal Resistance habitus exists in the conflated space 
between the theoretical logic of its strategic ambitions and the practical logic of its 
tactical objectives, Hizbullah’s OF produces a diversification of homologous 
Collective Action Frames to encompass the multiplicity of intra-field, inter-field, and 
extra-field contextual challenges in attaining a uniform orthodoxy of mobilising 
practice in Lebanon. While the constant negotiation and balancing of its positions 
may be accused of evoking organisational ambiguity, this informality enables 
Hizbullah’s OF to be rhetorically agile and versatile (Badran, 2009a: 64; Piscatori, 
1989: 314). Rather than admit incompatibility, Hizbullah’s OF ‘uses sophisticated 
arguments – or sophistry – to reconcile them all’ (Saad-Ghorayeb & Ottaway, 2007: 
4-5). Moreover, in Sayyid Nasrallah, a revered leader whose values and virtues recall 
the ‘synthesis of the saint and the revolutionary’ described by Arthur Koestler, 
Hizbullah’s OF possesses a mouthpiece that is capable of discursively welding the 
overall orthodoxy of a Resistance habitus together in harmonious constellation 
(Davidson, 2001: 421).  
 
Progression is a relative, not absolute objective. Hizbullah emerged on the 
peripheries of the civil war advocating an Iranian-inspired and Israeli-justified ‘Islamic 
Revolution in Lebanon’. In Bourdieusian terms, Hizbullah was struggling to replicate 
the Islamic Republic’s ascension to symbolic power, a state in which it legitimately 
dominated the prevailing orthodoxy of discourse and practice in Lebanon. However, 
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due to the intrinsic limitations embedded within the structured constitution and 
diverse composition of Lebanon, the aim of vertically or horizontally converting 
symbolic capital into symbolic power is elusive. According to Ezzat Safi, ‘Hizbullah 
must understand that speaking of victory when it comes to internal Lebanese issues 
is baseless and illogical as the Shiite Group will never get the chance to impose its 
ideas and views on its rivals in Lebanon’ (MER, 21 April, 2007: 7). 
 
In the SMF, by conforming to the pre-existing orthodoxy of confessional mobilisation, 
Hizbullah’s OF achieved symbolic capital within the Shi’i community, a situation in 
which its values of economic, social and cultural capital were deemed legitimate. 
While this institutionalised a Resistance habitus, there remain an eclectic variety of 
sectarian and non-sectarian agents in the SMF, endowed with their own forms of 
recognised capital, whose presence inherently precludes Hizbullah from dominating 
the prevailing orthodoxy. In the MSF, although the Islamic Resistance equally 
consolidated its Resistance habitus and accumulated symbolic capital, the 
conventional state model, in which legitimacy over violence is bestowed upon the 
symbolic power of the LAF, prevents Hizbullah from exercising exclusive rights over 
the predominant orthodoxy of the MSF. In the PF, despite attempting to avoid the 
entrenched structures of elite sectarian politics that govern practice by propagating a 
heterodox position, not only was Hizbullah drawn into the logic of orthodox 
participation, but avenues for acquiring symbolic capital are also inhibited by 
processes and positions that are designed to reproduce the prevailing system. Under 
these circumstances, Hizbullah’s OF is wedged between the conceptual pretension 
of symbolic power and the practical preservation of symbolic capital. 
 
Therefore, as relayed by a Hizbullah member, the Islamic Resistance is ‘a revolution 
that comprehends that failure to recognise the existence of boundaries can lead to 
disaster’ (Crooke, 2009: 177). Rather than struggle for symbolic power, Hizbullah’s 
OF, through a dialectical process of mutual constitution, self-correction and 
realignment within the boundaries of its situational environment, has adjusted its 
dispositions and perceptions to reconceptualise its Resistance habitus towards a 
redefinition of revolution that considers the opportunities prevalent in the 
predominant structures of Lebanon. According to Huda al-Husayni (MER, 5 May, 
2007: 8), Hizbullah wants to duplicate the role of the Pasdaran in the Islamic 
Republic whereby it operates ‘along with the state, but independently’ while 
benefiting from the support of the state’s institutions. Consequently, the recourse of 
maintaining symbolic capital over struggling for symbolic power has forced the 
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trajectory of the Islamic Resistance to be framed and contested through ‘negotiated 
revolution’ (Lawson, 2004), a relational process of capital acquisition, possession, 
positioning, deployment and exchange that results in incremental gains and 
compromises within an extant Lebanese framework.  
  
The permeation of Syria’s protracted hysteresis into Lebanon. During the period 
of this research, the conflict in Syria erupted to embody one of the most politically 
intractable and militarily intransigent humanitarian crises since the Second World 
War. Following Hizbullah’s involvement on the side of President Bashar al-Assad, a 
number of policy-affiliated commentators have assessed the cause, context and 
consequence of the deployment of the Islamic Resistance in Syria (Byman & Saab, 
2014; ICG, 2014; Levitt, 2014; Lob, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Recurring themes include 
the passive subordination of Hizbullah to Iranian interests, the aggravation of 
Shi’i/Sunni sectarian tensions in Lebanon as a result of the Islamic Resistance in 
Syria, the revelation of Hizbullah’s moral hypocrisy in reconciling its strategic 
discourse with its tactical practice and its eroding popular legitimacy within the Shi’i 
community in Lebanon. While the Hizbullah dimension of the Syria conflict requires 
further academic attention and inquiry, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective can provide a 
few preliminary and brief observations.  
 
Firstly, along with Iran, the Assad regime has been instrumental in activating the core 
doxa of Hizbullah’s OF, namely facilitating the Islamic Resistance against Israel. 
While there have been differences in practice concerning the orthodoxy of 
Resistance, as evidenced by Syria’s historical curtailing of Hizbullah’s influence in 
Lebanon, Sayyid Nasrallah announced that ‘Syria is the backbone of the 
Resistance…the Resistance will never stand by while its backbone is exposed’ (Al-
Manar, 25 May, 2013). Initially, with Hizbullah reluctant to enmesh itself in Syria’s 
intrinsic dynamics and Syria reticent to request support from a Lebanese asset, 
Hizbullah justified its intervention under the pretext of defending Shi’i communities, 
protecting Shi’i shrines as well as offering logistical and material assistance to its ally 
in the same way it accused Sunni actors in Lebanon with regards to the opposition. 
Furthermore, the timing of the decision to publicly declare its commitment to the 
conflict in April 2013 was determined more by the calculated perceptions of 
Hizbullah’s OF in relation to its Lebanese context rather than its ‘absolute obedience 
to Iran’ (Levitt, 2014: 110). Primarily, the encroachment of takfiri groups, a term 
employed by Hizbullah to describe Al-Qaida-inspired, salafi-jihadi movements, 
particularly Jabhat al-Nusra, in the vicinity of Lebanon’s borders posed a 
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destabilising threat to the Party of God by potentially accessing and galvanising 
corresponding trends in Lebanon. Furthermore, the regionalisation and polarisation 
of the crisis in the Field of International Politics (FIP), which increasingly juxtaposed a 
Russian-endorsed, Iranian-led Resistance ‘Axis’ against a U.S.-sponsored, Saudi-led 
Sunni alliance, risked deposing President Assad, weakening Iran and placing the 
Islamic Resistance in a precarious position in Lebanon. As emphasised by a 
Hizbullah official, ‘if we didn’t fight in Syria, we would now be fighting in Lebanon’ 
(ICG, 2014: 5). 
 
Secondly, the Islamic Resistance immersed itself into the hysteresis of Syria’s MSF. 
Devoid of the symbolic capital it possesses in Lebanon’s MSF, the Islamic 
Resistance, along with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iraqi Shi’i militias, Afghani 
Shi’i militias and Syrian paramilitary units, is contributing values of transferable 
capital in the struggle to preserve the symbolic capital and predominant orthodoxy of 
the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Originally responsible for assisting President Assad in 
securing the Lebanon-Syria border around Qusayr and Qalamoun, as well as 
defending the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine in southeast Damascus, the presence of the 
Islamic Resistance expanded to support the SAA in consolidating and recapturing 
territory in Aleppo, Homs and Dara’a. From a Bourdieu-SMT perspective, and in the 
context of Lebanon’s MSF, this sustained practice may result in three inter-related 
consequences. Primarily, as the Islamic Resistance independently ingrains its 
habitus and acquires capital in direct relation to the structures of Syria’s MSF, it may 
solidify its position to become an established agent vying for symbolic capital, 
thereby causing fused MSF logics between Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, as 
demonstrated by sporadic attacks on Hizbullah targets by salafi-jihadi groups, the 
growing field homology between Syria’s MSF and Lebanon’s SMF, which produces 
habiti of overlapping positions, may lead to an intensification of heterodoxy by 
emerging salafi-jihadi actors, bolstered by the potential radicalisation of both Sunni 
Lebanese and predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees, that challenge the legitimate 
orthodoxy of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. Moreover, the deployment of the 
Islamic Resistance in the proximity of the Syria-Israel border risks disrupting and 
dismantling the structured logic of Hizbullah-Israel relations in Lebanon’s MSF by 
attempting to transfer this dynamic to a new sphere of differentiated constitution.  
 
Thirdly, the Collective Action Frames and mobilisation methods employed by 
Hizbullah in institutionalising a Resistance habitus in the SMF have been 
predominantly shaped in contradistinction to Israel. Accordingly, Hizbullah’s OF has 
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been able to avoid explicitly engaging in sectarian discourses or practices in 
Lebanon. By allegedly shifting attention from Israel to prioritise a conflict that was 
increasingly perceived as a Shi’i-Sunni war that aggravated tensions in Lebanon, 
Hizbullah risked a ‘crisis of popular legitimacy’ (Lob, 2014) in which the Resistance 
habitus of Hizbullah agents in the SMF became dislodged from their routinised 
practice. However, by utilising the legitimacy of its pre-existing mobilisational 
structures, Hizbullah’s OF devised and disseminated revised and realigned 
Collective Action Frames that justified its continual support for President Assad by 
weaving traditional themes of Resistance against the U.S. and Israel alongside the 
emerging threat posed by takfiri groups, a designation of salafi-jihadi extremists in 
Syria that intentionally attempted to dissociate established Sunni actors in Lebanon 
from this trend as opposed to conflate their practices. Conversely, the Collection 
Action Frames employed by Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater 
Syria (ISIS) and their counterparts in Lebanon, which not only refer to the Shi’i as 
apostates, but also discard the structured logic of Lebanon as illegitimate, coupled 
with their practice, which targets Shi’i communities, acts to validate and vindicate 
Hizbullah’s position amongst its Resistance habitus in the SMF. The ability of 
Hizbullah’s OF to sustain this association will determine its success in maintaining 
the legitimacy of its symbolic capital in the SMF.                 
 
Fourthly, the Syrian conflict exacerbated fractures between the primarily pro-
opposition 14 March coalition and the principally pro-regime 8 March alliance in the 
PF. Considering the current orthodoxy of the 8 March alliance, Hizbullah’s OF 
activated its Resistance habitus and employed its social capital with Amal and the 
FPM to prohibit its traditional adversaries from enacting political motions that 
undermined its position in Lebanon. Consequently, as Hizbullah presides over a 
paralysed political process, oversees a plummeting economy, fosters sectarian 
tensions and prolongs a deteriorating humanitarian crisis, the perceptions and 
dispositions of 14 March become reinforced. Citing its obstinate stance on the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which has implicated five Hizbullah members in the 
2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and its military involvement in Syria, which 
contravenes the Baabda Declaration, a document that reiterates the neutrality of 
Lebanon in regional affairs, 14 March accuses the Party of God of privileging its 
strategic partnership with Iran and Syria over its responsibility to stabilise Lebanon. 
In response, and testament to the observance of orthodoxy, Hizbullah’s OF has 
sought to resort to conventional practice in addressing these disputes by transferring 
and transposing its predominant narrative, infused by the symbolic capital of the 
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Islamic Resistance, to the logic of the PF. By appealing to the nationalisation and 
normalisation of the security threat posed by salafi-jihadi groups in Lebanon, 
especially to the pre-existing Sunni elite, Hizbullah intends to adhere to the balancing 
structures of sectarian politics by engaging in negotiation with its confessional 
counterparts in order to reconstitute the prevailing orthodoxy of the PF.  
 
According to Hizbullah MP Ali Fayyad, the Party of God, having decided to induct 
and immerse itself into the ‘internal political game’ of Lebanon, is now invested in 
‘working to change the sectarian system’530. Nevertheless, testament to the complex 
intricacies of positional balancing within the constituted structures of Lebanon, by 
entering the ‘the sectarian system’, Hizbullah is not immune or indifferent to its 
influence in reproducing prevailing orthodox practice. Since opposition to Hizbullah is 
disposed to perceive the Party of God’s discourse and practice as one that intends to 
alter or impose the orthodoxy of sectarianism in its favour as opposed to reconstitute 
the doxa of sectarianism in Lebanon, ‘the Shi’i party is as much constrained by its 
success as its adversaries have been enlivened by its rise’ (Norton, 2007a: 172). 
Subsequently, as stated by Roland Pryzbylewski (‘Prez’) in ‘The Wire’, ‘no one wins. 
One side just loses more slowly’. Regardless, the conditioned and conditioning 
characteristic of the habitus is predicated on unforeseen outcomes as much as by 
relational processes. In this respect, the struggle, and by extension, ‘the game is not 
over’531.          
 
A Bourdieu-SMT approach can offer a valuable theoretical insight into the 
contributing and determining factors driving Hizbullah’s perpetual mobilisation and 
movement within the Lebanese ‘game’. However, rather than claim to provide an all-
encompassing conceptual model for explaining the emergence and evolution of 
Hizbullah, this Bourdieu-SMT perspective, subscribing to the Popperian model of 
falsification, ought to be applied and tested to other instances of movement 
mobilisation in order to initiate an inter-disciplinary conversation in which a variety of 
epistemological and methodological lenses are employed and cross-fertilised to 
explain the conceptually underexplored phenomenon of collective action in the 
Middle East. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
530
 Interview with Ali Fayyad in Beirut, 29 March 2012.  
531
 Interview with Ali Fayyad in Beirut, 29 March 2012.  
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Saleh, Dr Mohsen Saleh (2012), member of the advisory council at the Consultative 
Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), Beirut, 27 March.  
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Salem, Dr Paul (2012), Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Beirut, 10 August.    
 
Slim, Lokman (2012), Independent Shi’i activist, Beirut, 9 August.   
 
Arabic Sources  
 
This thesis relied on primary material in Arabic supplied by two main sources. Firstly, 
for data and information pertaining specifically to Hizbullah’s internal activities, 
statements and social services, the researcher received approximately 400 articles 
from the archives of the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), 
a semi-autonomous think-tank associated with Hizbullah that monitors and stores 
releases from a selection of the Party’s various media outlets (listed below). This 
sample of reports, ranging from 1982 until 2010, was translated with the assistance 
of Noam Raydan. They are quoted in the text from their original Arabic source.       
 
- Al-‘Ahd 
- Al-Intiqad  
- Al-Manar 
- Al-Moqawama   
 
Secondly, this thesis benefitted from access to Philippa Mishlawi’s archives of Middle 
East Reporter (MER), a daily and weekly publication run by Toufiq Mishlawi that 
translated and analysed press material from a variety of Arabic outlets across the 
region (listed below). The researcher only utilised MER reports covering the period 
between 1982 and 2010. In instances where information from this source is used, the 
relevant Arabic publication is cited specifically with reference to MER for translation 
purposes. Alternatively, when the text quotes direct analysis attributed to MER, only 
the publication is referenced.         
 
- Ad-Diyar (Lebanon) 
- Al-Akhbar (Lebanon) 
- Al-Anwar (Lebanon) 
- Al-Ba’ath (Syria) 
- Al-Balad (Lebanon) 
- Al-Hayat (London) 
- Al-Massira (Lebanon) 
- Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon)    
- Al-Nahar (Lebanon) 
- Al-Nida Al-Watan (Egypt) 
- Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London) 
- Al-Safir (Lebanon) 
- Al-Wasat (Bahrain) 
- Al-Watan (Saudi Arabia) 
- Al-Watan Al-Arabi (Lebanon) 
- Asharq Al-Awsat (Saudi Arabia and London) 
- Ash-Shiraa (Lebanon) 
- As-Siyassa (Kuwait) 
- Tishreen (Syria) 
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